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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Prisons - From: 1994 To: 1994

This page lists 14 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Grice v United Kingdom 22564/93
1994
ECHR

Human Rights, Prisons
(Year?) The applicant was a serving prisoner suffering from AIDS, who complained that aids sufferers were being discriminated against because unlike those suffering other medical conditions they were not released early on compassionate grounds. The Commission found no evidence of different treatment, but did say that where procedures relating to the release of prisoners appear to operate in a discriminatory manner: "The Commission has held that this may raise issues under Article 5 in conjunction with Article 14".
European Convention on Human Rights 5 14
1 Citers


 
McDonald v Secretary of State for Scotland 1994 SC 234
1994
ScSf

Scotland, Prisons
The pursuer was a serving prisoner. He said he had been repeatedly searched without lawful authority, warrant or justifiable cause. He raised an action of reparation in the sheriff court in which he sought damages from the Secretary of State for each illegal search. He also sought interdict against him from carrying out any searches without lawful authority, warrant or justifiable cause and interim interdict. The sheriff refused to grant interim interdict. He held that the crave for interdict was incompetent by virtue of section 21 of the 1947 Act. The pursuer was also challenging standing orders and that this was a matter which would require to be made the subject of judicial review in the Court of Session.
Crown Proceedings Act 1947 21
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Parole Board ex parte Gittens Times, 03 February 1994
3 Feb 1994
QBD

Prisons
The Parole Board may supplement their reasons by means of an affidavit, on appeal against their refusal of parole to a prisoner.

 
Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte T; Same v Same ex parte H and Others Gazette, 16 February 1994
16 Feb 1994
QBD

Criminal Sentencing, Prisons
Time in a mental hospital counts toward sentence served for parole purposes.

 
Regina v North Humberside and Scunthorpe Coroner ex parte Jamieson Times, 28 April 1994; Independent, 27 April 1994; [1995] QB 1; [1994] 3 All ER 972; [1994] 3 WLR 82; (1994) 158 JP 1011;; (1994) 19 BMLR 35
27 Apr 1994
CA
Sir Thomas Bingham MR
Coroners, Health Professions, Prisons
The deceased prisoner had hanged himself. He had been a known suicide risk, and his brother said that the authorities being so aware, the death resulted from their lack of care. The inquest heard in full the circumstannces leading up to the death, but the Coroner directed the jury not to return a verdict which included any reference to lack of care. Held: A finding of neglect is rarely consistent with a suicide, or one where the deceased contributed to his own death. It would be wrong to allow the jury to attribute blame.
Sir Thomas Bingham MR said: 'Despite the rulings given by the appellate courts, problems continue to arise both for coroners seeking to conduct inquests and direct juries in accordance with the law as they understand it and for those interested in the death of a deceased person seeking to explore the full circumstances of the death and draw lessons which may prevent repetition. Coroners do their utmost to confine the proceedings before them within the bounds of what they consider to be proper. Interested parties not infrequently strain to pursue their quarry well beyond the boundaries set by the coroner.' and 'General Conclusions. An inquest is a fact finding inquiry conducted by a coroner, with or without a jury, to establish reliable answers to four important but limited factual questions. The first of these relates to the identity of the deceased, the second to the place of his death, the third to the time of death. In most cases these questions are not hard to answer but in a minority of cases the answer may be problematical. The fourth question, and that to which evidence and inquiry are most often and most closely directed, relates to how the deceased came by his death. Rule 36 requires that the proceedings and evidence shall be directed solely to ascertaining these matters and forbid any expression of opinion on any other matter.
Both in section 11(5)(b)(ii) of the Act of 1988 and in rule 36(1)(b) of the Rules of 1984, "how" is to be understood as meaning "by what means." It is noteworthy that the task is not to ascertain how the deceased died, which might reach general and far-reaching issues, but "how the deceased came by his death," a more limited question directed to the means by which the deceased came by his death. It is the duty of the coroner as the public official responsible for the conduct of inquests, whether he is sitting with a jury or without, to ensure that the relevant facts are fully, fairly and fearlessly investigated. He is bound to recognise the acute public concern rightly aroused where deaths occur in custody. He must ensure that the relevant facts are exposed to public scrutiny, particularly if there is evidence of foul play, abuse or inhumanity. He fails in his duty if his investigation is superficial, slipshod or perfunctory. But the responsibility is his. He must set the bounds of the inquiry. He must rule on the procedure to be followed. His decisions, like those of any other judicial officer, must be respected unless and until they are varied or overruled."
"It is not the function of a coroner or his jury to determine or appear to determine, any question of criminal or civil liability, to apportion guilt or attribute blame . . the prohibition on returning a verdict so as to appear to determine any question of civil liability is unqualified, applying whether anyone is named or not. Much of the difficulty to which verdicts of lack of care have given rise appear to be due to an almost inevitable confusion between this expression and the lack of care which is the foundation for a successful claim in common law negligence. Since many of those seeking that verdict do so as a stepping-stone towards such a claim the boundary is bound to become blurred. But lack of care in the context of an inquest has been correctly described as the obverse of self-neglect. It is to be hoped that in future the expression ‘lack of care’ may for practical purposes be deleted from the lexicon of inquests and replaced by ‘neglect’. Neglect in this context means a gross failure to provide adequate nourishment or liquid, or provide basic medical attention or shelter or warmth for someone in a dependent position (because of youth, age, illness or incarceration) who cannot provide it for himself. Failure to provide medical attention for a dependent person whose physical condition is such as to show he obviously needs it may amount to neglect . . Neglect can rarely, if ever, be an appropriate verdict on its own . . Neglect may contribute to a death from natural causes. Neither neglect nor self-neglect should ever form any part of any verdict unless a clear and direct causal connection is established between the conduct so described and the cause of death."
Coroners Act 1988 11(5)(b)(ii) - Coroners Rules 1984 36(1) 40
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Bateman and Howse, Regina (on the Application Of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Times, 01 July 1994; (1995) 7 Admin LR 175; [1994] EWCA Civ 36; [1994] COD 504
17 May 1994
CA
Sir Thomas Bingham MR, Farquharson, Simon Brown LJJ
Damages, Prisons
The plaintiff had been convicted of several counts of receiving stolen goods and sentenced to six years' imprisonment. He had appealed to the Court of Appeal on the ground that he had been convicted on the basis of evidence in statement form given by witnesses from New Zealand. His appeal failed. Some time later his case was referred back to the Court of Appeal under section 17 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. This time his appeal succeeded on what was essentially the same ground as that which had failed before and his convictions were quashed. Held: The plaintiffs' appeals were dismissed. Compensation should be payable to prisoners wrongly convicted only after new facts were discovered, not where the release came after a ruling which changed the law. In this case "the ground of the reversal was not . . the discovery of a new or newly discovered fact, but a legal ruling on facts which had been known all along."
Sir Thomas Bingham discussed the suggestion that the success of an appeal meant that the court felt there had been a miscarriage of justice, and said: "Therefore, it follows, he says, that he is a victim of a miscarriage of justice and from that it follows that he is entitled to compensation. To deny him compensation is, he argues, to undermine his acquittal and the presumption of innocence which flows from the fact that his convictions have been quashed. I am, for my part, unable to accept that argument, although I hasten to assure Mr Bateman that in doing so I have no intention whatever to undermine the effect of the quashing of his convictions. He is entitled to be treated, for all purposes, as if he had never been convicted. Nor do I wish to suggest that Mr Bateman is not the victim of what the man in the street would regard as a miscarriage of justice. He has been imprisoned for three-and-a-half years when he should not have been convicted or imprisoned at all on the second decision of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). The man in the street would regard that as a miscarriage of justice and so would I. But that is not, in my judgment, the question. The question is whether the miscarriage of justice from which Mr Bateman has suffered is one that has the characteristics which the Act lays down as a pre-condition of the statutory right to demand compensation. That, therefore, is the question to which I now turn." there was no new or newly discovered fact, so that Mr Bateman could not satisfy the relevant criteria under section 133.
Criminal Justice Act 1988 133
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Wynne v United Kingdom Ind Summary, 26 September 1994; Times, 27 July 1994; 26/1993/421/500; (1994) 19 EHRR 333; 15484/89; [1994] ECHR 24
18 Jul 1994
ECHR

Human Rights, Prisons
A Discretionary lifer is not entitled to a review by a court of his continued detention. His article five rights were not breached. Where a national court imposed a fixed sentence of imprisonment, the supervision required by article 5.4 was incorporated into that judgment. The court held that the mandatory life sentence belonged to a different category from other sentences because it is imposed automatically as punishment for the offence of murder irrespective of conditions pertaining to the dangerousness of the offender.
European Convention on Human Rights 5.4
1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Secretary of State for Home Department ex parte H and Others, Regina v Same ex parte Hickey Times, 29 July 1994; [1995] QB 43; [1995] 1 WLR 734
29 Jul 1994
CA
Simon Brown LJ
Health, Prisons
A discretionary life prisoner who had been transferred to a mental hospital is not automatically eligible for a certificate under the section. The right conferred on a discretionary life prisoner by section 34 of the 1991 Act did not extend to those who were also detained under the MHA by reason of transfer and restriction directions given by the Home Secretary under sections 47 and 49 respectively. "I [do not] see anything unjust or illogical in two separate codes existing which cannot be triggered simultaneously, but each of which at an appropriate time, depending on the circumstances, can be triggered so as to achieve a judicial hearing. " The Home Secretary's powers to refer a case back to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) was an integral part of the just functioning of the overall process of criminal justice.
Criminal Justice Act 1991 31 Sch 12 9(3) - Mental Health Act 1983 47 49
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Pegg Independent, 09 August 1994; Times, 11 August 1994
9 Aug 1994
QBD

Prisons
The procedures for assessing lifer release questions are unfair. A higher standard is required of decision makers. The parole board should give reasons for a refusal to release where exemplary reports had been submitted on behalf of the prisoner.

 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v Robb Times, 21 October 1994; Ind Summary, 10 October 1994
10 Oct 1994
FD

Human Rights, Prisons, Health
A prisoner of sound mind has the same right to carry on a hunger strike to death, as anyone else. The fact of his imprisonment could not displace that right.

 
Boner v United Kingdom (30/2993/425/504), Maxwell v Same Times, 01 November 1994; 18711/91; [1994] ECHR 36
1 Nov 1994
ECHR

Legal Aid, Human Rights, Prisons
The refusal of Legal Aid for appeal for long term prisoners was breach of Human Rights Convention.
Hudoc Judgment (Merits and just satisfaction) Violation of Art. 6-3-c; Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient; Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Home Office v Barnes and Others Independent, 23 November 1994
23 Nov 1994
QBD

Employment, Administrative, Prisons
Prison officers may not, in the course of an employment dispute, refuse to accept prisoners into the prison after they had been properly committed to the care of the prison in which they worked.
Prisons Act 1952 8


 
 Regina v Secretary of State for Home Department Ex Parte Hickey and Others, Same Ex Parte Bamber; Same Ex Parte Malone (No 2); QBD 29-Nov-1994 - Independent, 29 November 1994; Times, 02 December 1994; [1995] 1 WLR 734
 
Regina v Parole Board Ex Parte White Times, 30 December 1994
16 Dec 1994
QBD

Prisons
The concept of "risk" was not confined to risk to the United Kingdom public alone, as a result of which the Parole Board is entitled, indeed, in an appropriate case, required, to take into account the risk to the public in a country to which a released prisoner will go, once he is released.
Criminal Justice Act 1991 34(4)(b)
1 Citers


 
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