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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Prisons - From: 1980 To: 1984

This page lists 14 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Silver v United Kingdom (1980) 3 EHRR 475
1980
ECHR

Human Rights, Prisons
(Commission) Complaint was made as to the censorship of prisoners' correspondence. The censorship of prisoners' correspondence was ancillary to prison rules restricting the contents of correspondence. The Commission, therefore, and the Court had to consider what restraints upon the content of correspondence were permissible. Held: Communications making representations about the prisoner's trial, conviction or sentence whether to the Home Secretary or others should in principle not be prevented. Although there was a statutory right to have recourse to the Home Secretary and it was he who had the statutory power and responsibility to refer cases back to the Court of Appeal, it was not justifiable to confine such communications to him. As regards letters attempting to stimulate public agitation or petition, the Commission again recognised the needs of good order and discipline and the fact that public agitation rather than recourse to legal remedies might undermine the rule of law, but it also accepted as conceivable that: "to avoid or expose injustice, matters relating, for example, to a prisoner's trial, conviction or sentence, or to prison conditions, in general or in a particular case should be brought to the public's attention if necessary by way of petition-raising." A blanket prohibition upon such communications was an over broad restriction. The Commission considered that the applicant's "attempts to clear his name were a legitimate and reasonable exercise of his rights, which had not been shown to have posed any threat to prison good order."
European Convention on Human Rights
1 Citers


 
A v United Kingdom (1980) 3 EHRR 131
1980
ECHR

Human Rights, Health, Prisons
The Commission declared admissible a complaint from a Broadmoor patient who had been secluded for five weeks after a fire. A friendly settlement was reached, without admission of liability but on the basis that new guidelines for the use of seclusion would be issued, as indeed they were.
1 Citers


 
McFeeley and others v The United Kingdom 8317/78; [1981] 3 EHRR 161; [1984] ECHR 23
15 May 1980
ECHR

Human Rights, Prisons
(Commission) The claimants had been convicted of terrorist-type offences in Northern Ireland and were serving prisoners in HMP The Maze. They protested at a change of regime imposed in 1976, resulting in them not being permitted association with the rest of the prison community. Prisoners complained at "close body" searches, including anal inspections, which were carried out routinely on occasions where dangerous objects had in the past been found concealed in the recta of protesting prisoners. Held: In assessing whether security measures in a prison may fall within the ambit of Article 3 in a given case, regard must be had to the particular conditions, the stringency of the measure, its duration, the objective pursued and its effects on the person concerned. "The Commission has taken into consideration the exceptional circumstances in the Maze Prison, in particular the dangerous objects that have been found concealed in the recta of protesting prisoners (such as razor blades, flints, matches, cigarette lighters); the fact that, in the past, protesting prisoners have used such objects for disruptive purposes (e.g., to burn the perspex shields used for window coverings); the serious risk that concealed letters might identify prison officers as potential assassination targets." and "While there can be no doubt that many prisoners find such procedures humiliating, the Commission is of the opinion that in the circumstances the level of mental or physical suffering is not such as to amount to inhuman treatment. Similarly, it does not consider that the degree of debasement or humiliation involved, particularly in respect of prisoners who must be aware by reason of their campaign of the substantial security threat posed, reaches the level of severity required for it to amount to degrading treatment."
European Convention on Human Rights 3
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Payne v Lord Harris of Greewich [1981] 1 WLR 754
1981
CA
Lord Denning MR, Shaw LJ
Prisons, Natural Justice
A prisoner sought a declaration that he was entitled to be given the reasons for refusing him parole so that he could make representations in rebuttal. Held: The declaration was refused.
Lord Denning MR said: "No doubt it is the duty of all those concerned - from the member of the local review committee, to the Parole Board, to the Secretary of State - to act fairly. That is the simple precept which now governs the administrative procedure of all public bodies. But the duty to act fairly cannot be set down in a series of set propositions. Each case depends on its own circumstances."
Shaw LJ said: "In the well-known case of Reg. v. Gaming Board for Great Britain, Ex partes Benaim and Khaida [1970] 2 QB 417, 430, Lord Denning M.R. said: 'It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply: nor as to their scope and extent. Everything depends on the subject matter . . ' In a context in which the public interest may be put at risk by the inopportune release of a prisoner on licence, no constraints or pressures should weigh upon the Parole Board in coming to what must in the end be a decision in which expedience must be an important influence."
Brightman LJ referred to the same passage from Ex parte Benaim and Khaida and said: "The scope and extent of the principles of natural justice depend on the subject matter to which they are sought to be applied."
1 Citers



 
 Williams v Home Office (No 2); 2-Jan-1981 - [1981] 1 All ER 1211
 
Raymond v Honey [1982] AC 1; [1981] UKHL 8
4 Mar 1981
HL
Lord Wilberforce, Steyn LJ
Prisons, Human Rights, Contempt of Court
The defendant prison governor had intercepted a prisoner's letter to the Crown Office for the purpose of raising proceedings to have the governor committed for an alleged contempt of court. Held: The governor was in contempt of court. Subject to any legislation altering the situation, a prisoner retains all his rights that are not taken away expressly or by necessary implication by the fact of his imprisonment: "under English law, a convicted prisoner, in spite of his imprisonment, retains all civil rights which are not taken away expressly or by necessary implication . . In my opinion, there is nothing in the Prison Act 1952 that confers power to make regulations which would deny, or interfere with, the right of the respondent, as a prisoner, to have unimpeded access to a court. Section 47, which has already been quoted, is a section concerned with the regulation and management of prisons and, in my opinion, is quite insufficient to authorise hindrance or interference with so basic a right. The regulations themselves must be interpreted accordingly, otherwise they would be ultra vires. So interpreted, I am unable to conclude that either rule 34(8) - which is expressed in very general terms - or rule 37A(4), whether taken by themselves or in conjunction with Standing Orders, is in any way sufficiently clear to justify the hindrance which took place. The standing orders, if they have any legislative force at all, cannot confer any greater powers than the regulations, which, as stated, must themselves be construed in accordance with the statutory power to make them."
Steyn L said: "By way of summary, we accept that section 47(1) of the Act of 1952 by necessary implication authorises some screening of correspondence passing between a prisoner and a solicitor. The authorised intrusion must, however, be the minimum necessary to ensure that the correspondence is in truth bona fide legal correspondence." but "rule 33(3) of the Rules of 1964 is extravagantly wide. The very technique of dealing in one provision with ordinary correspondence and legal correspondence is flawed. In our view the Secretary of State strayed beyond the proper limits of section 47(1) when he made rule 33(3)."
Prisons Act 1952 47(1) - Prison Rules 1964 33(3)
1 Citers

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 O'Reilly v Mackman; HL 1982 - [1983] 2 AC 237; [1982] 3 WLR 1096; [1982] 3 All ER 1124; [1983] UKHL 1

 
 Soenen v Director of Edmonton Remand Centre; 1983 - (1983) 35 CR (3d) 206
 
Silver And Others v The United Kingdom 6205/73; [1983] 6 EHHR 62; [1983] 5 EHRR 347; [1983] ECHR 5; [1983] ECHR 11; 7052/75; 5947/72
25 Mar 1983
ECHR

Human Rights, Damages, Prisons
There had been interference with prisoners' letters by prison authorities. The Commission considered Standing Orders and Circular Instructions in relation to restrictions on correspondence. The rules were not available to prisoners and were restrictive. Held: "it is true that those applicants who were in custody may have experienced some annoyance and sense of frustration as a result of the restrictions that were imposed on particular letters. It does not appear, however, that this was of such intensity that it would in itself justify an award of compensation for non-pecuniary damage." Restrictions were however justifiable so long as the law was sufficiently precise to enable the individual to regulate his conduct, and that orders and instructions could be properly taken into account. " and "a law which confers a discretion must indicate the scope of that discretion." though "the Court has already recognised the impossibility of attaining absolute certainty in the framing of laws and the risk that the search for certainty may entail excessive rigidity . . [T]he Court points out once more that 'many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice." As to the rule prohibiting "letters which discuss crime in general or the crime of others': "The Commission considers that this restriction is also an obvious requirement of imprisonment and although it is not specified in the Prison Rules 1964, as amended, the Commission is of the opinion that it is a reasonable and foreseeable consequence of the Home Secretary's power under rule 33(1) of the Prison Rules 1964 to impose restrictions on prisoners' correspondence in the interests of good order, the prevention of crime or the interests of any persons. Prison security is, in the Commission's opinion, an essential part of such interest. The prohibition on prisoners' letters which discuss crime in general or the crime of others can, accordingly, be said to be 'in accordance with the law' within the meaning of Article 8(2). . . . On the justification issue, the Commission considers that a prohibition on prisoners' letters which discuss crime in general or the crime of others is, in principle, an ordinary and reasonable requirement of imprisonment, 'necessary in a democratic society … for the prevention of disorder or crime' within the meaning of Article 8(2)."
ECHR Judgment (Just Satisfaction) - Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient; Costs and expenses award - Convention proceedings.
European Convention on Human Rights 6-1 8 13
1 Cites

1 Citers

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Regina v Governor of Durham Prison, ex parte Hardial Singh [1984] 1 WLR 704; [1984] All ER 983; [1983] Imm AR 198; [1983] EWHC 1 (QB)
13 Dec 1983
QBD
Woolf J
Immigration, Prisons, Administrative
An offender had been recommended for deportation following conviction. He had served his sentence and would otherwise have been released on parole. He had no passport and no valid travel documents. He complained that the length of time for which he had then been detained was too long and that the detention had become unlawful, and he sought habeas corpus to secure release. Held: The detention was on the borderline of being unlawful, and unless an order was made within a few days, Mr Singh's application should succeed. A short adjournment was granted on this basis.
The power of the Secretary of State was subject to limitation to a period which is reasonably necessary for that purpose, depending on the circumstances of the particular case. If it is apparent to the Secretary of State that he is not going to be able to remove someone intended to be deported within a reasonable period, it would be wrong for the Secretary of State to seek to exercise his power of detention.
In relation to the power of deportation, Woolf J said: "Although the power which is given to the Secretary of State in paragraph 2 to detain individuals is not subject to any express limitation of time, I am quite satisfied that it is subject to limitations. First of all, it can only authorise detention if the individual is being detained . . pending his removal. It cannot be used for any other purpose. Secondly, as the power is given in order to enable the machinery of deportation to be carried out, I regard the power of detention as being impliedly limited to a period which is reasonably necessary for that purpose. The period which is reasonable will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. What is more, if there is a situation where it is apparent to the Secretary of State that he is not going to be able to operate the machinery provided in the Act for removing persons who are intended to be deported within a reasonable period, it seems to me that it would be wrong for the Secretary of State to seek to exercise his power of detention.
In addition, I would regard it as implicit that the Secretary of State should exercise all reasonable expedition to ensure that the steps are taken which will be necessary to ensure the removal of the individual within a reasonable time."
Immigration Act 1971 Sch 3 Para 2
1 Cites

1 Citers

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Regina v Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Walsh [1985] AC 154; [1984] 2 All ER 609; [1984] 3 WLR 205
1984
HL
Lord Fraser
Prisons, Criminal Practice
Walsh faced two sets of charges. In one of which he was bailed and in the other he was remanded in custody. The Governor of the prison refused to produce him to the court for the purpose of facing the bailed proceedings. Held: Habeas corpus may be applied for and granted on occasions such as when there is an excessive delay in bringing a prisoner up for trial.
Lord Fraser referred to Section 29 of the 1961 Act and added that: "so the effect of Section 29(1) of the Act of 1961, and of the circular, is that a Governor of a prison may direct a prisoner to be taken to a court if he is satisfied that his attendance at the court is desirable in the interests of justice."
Criminal Justice Act 1961 29
1 Citers



 
 Freeman v Home Office (No 2); 1984 - [1984] 1 QB 524
 
Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Anderson [1984] QB 778
1984
QBD
Robert Goff LJ
Prisons
A prisoner challenged a standing order which restricted visits by his legal adviser as he contemplated proceedings concerning his treatment in prison when he had not at the same time made any complaint to the prison authorities internally. Held: The standing order was ultra vires. The court reiterated the principle that a prisoner retains all civil rights which are not taken away expressly or by necessary implication: "At the forefront of those civil rights is the right of unimpeded access to the courts; and the right of access to a solicitor to obtain advice and assistance with regard to the initiation of civil proceedings is inseparable from the right of access to the courts themselves." and "As it seems to us, a requirement that an inmate should make . . . a complaint as a prerequisite of his having access to his solicitor, however desirable it may be in the interests of good administration, goes beyond the regulation of the circumstances in which such access may take place, and does indeed constitute an impediment to his right of access to the civil court."
1 Citers


 
Campbell and Fell v The United Kingdom 7878/77; [1984] ECHR 8; 1984 7 EHRR 165; 7819/77
28 Jun 1984
ECHR

Prisons, Human Rights
Campbell and others had been involved in conduct within the prison leading to charges against them of mutiny and of striking an officer with a broom handle. The nature of the conduct in question was plainly susceptible of giving rise to criminal charges. Referring to the Engel Case, the court said: "The court was careful in the Engel and others judgment to state that, as regards the dividing line between the "criminal" and the "disciplinary", it was confining its attention to the sphere with which the case was concerned, namely military service. It is well aware that in the prison context there are practical reasons and reasons of policy for establishing a special disciplinary regime, for example, security considerations and the interests of public order, the need to deal with misconduct by inmates as expeditiously as possible, the availability of tailor made sanctions which may not be at the disposal of the ordinary courts and the desire of prison authorities to retain ultimate responsibility for discipline within their establishments." and continued 'In any event, the indications so afforded by the national law have only a relative value; the very nature of the offence is a fact of greater import. In this respect, it has to be borne in mind that misconduct by a prisoner may take different forms; certain acts are clearly no more than a question of internal discipline, whereas others cannot be seen in the same light. Firstly, some matters may be more serious than others; in fact, the Rules grade offences, classifying those committed by Mr Campbell as especially grave. Secondly the illegality of some acts may not turn on the fact that they were committed in prison: certain conduct which constitutes an offence under the Rules may also amount to an offence under the criminal law. Thus, doing gross personal violence to a prison officer may correspond to the crime of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and, although mutiny and incitement to mutiny are not as such offences under the general criminal law, the underlying facts may found a criminal charge of conspiracy. It also has to be remembered that, theoretically at least, there is nothing to prevent conduct of this kind being the subject of both criminal and disciplinary proceedings.'
Whilst there had been no breach of Article 6 in holding the hearing in private, there had been a breach in not making the decision public: "The Court has said in other cases that it does not feel bound to adopt a literal interpretation of the words 'pronounced publicly': in each case the form of publication given to the 'judgment' under the domestic law of the respondent State must be assessed in the light of special features of the proceedings in question and by reference to the object pursued by Article 6 in this context, namely to ensure scrutiny of the judiciary by the public with a view to safeguarding the right to a fair trial."
1 Cites

1 Citers

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