swarb.co.uk - law index
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Personal Injury - From: 1991 To: 1991
This page lists 10 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.
ÂCorbett v Barking Havering and Brentwood Health Authority [1991] 2 QB 408; [1990] EWCA Civ 15
1991
CA
Farquharson LJ, Lord Justice Ralph Gibson
Personal Injury, Damages
The Claimant was a child who would have been dependant on his deceased young mother only until adulthood. When the trial took place the infant Plaintiff was 11.5 with a dependency until the age of 18. As the multiplier calculated as at the date of death was 12 there was only one half of a year left for the future dependency. Held: The Court was bound by the date of death calculation rule even though the multiplier was effected primarily by the Claimant’s needs. "The power to deprive a tardy litigant of interest when he is guilty of unjustifiable delay is an essential discipline."
The court was asked as to the quantification of damages for a child after the death of his mother in giving birth to him.
Fatal Accidents Act 1976 3(1)
1 Citers
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 H v Ministry of Defence; CA 1991 - [1991] 2 All ER 834; [1991] 2 WLR 1192
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Wilson v Ministry of Defence [1991] ICR 595; [1991] 1 All ER 638
1991
Scott Baker J
Employment, Personal Injury, Damages
The court was asked to look at three events envisaged, and to consider whether, if they did occur, they should be described as constituting serious deterioration. Held: "First of all the development of arthritis to the extent that surgery is required. Osteoarthritis is a progressive condition. It is very common in cases where damage is suffered to an articular surface. I am not satisfied that it is established that deterioration to the point of surgery being required falls within the definition of serious deterioration in the circumstances of this case. It seems to me to be simply an aspect of a progression of this particular disease.
Secondly, development of arthritis to the extent that he changes employment. Again, it seems to me very much the same approach can be applied as with regard to the requirement of surgery and I do not think that deterioration triggering a change of employment can properly be described as serious within the meaning of the section.
Thirdly, that the plaintiff suffers a further injury in the nature of further damage to the ankle or elsewhere."
The court rejected the Claimant's approach: "The question then arises as to which cases are appropriate for a provisional damages award and which are not. I deal with this because, although I formed the view that there was no serious deterioration envisaged in this case, that was not a matter that I found entirely easy and indeed there are some matters that may more properly be dealt with under the heading of "discretion" rather than taking into account the circumstances of the case in looking at whether or not the section was complied with.
The general rule in English law is that damages are assessed on a once-and-for-all basis. Section 32A of the Supreme Court Act 1981 creates a valuable statutory exception. In my judgment, the section envisages a clear and severable risk rather than a continuing deterioration, as is the typical osteoarthritic picture.
In my judgment, many disabilities follow a developing pattern in which the precise results cannot be foreseen. Within a general band this or that may or may not occur. Such are not the cases for provisional damages. The courts have to do their best to make an award in the light of a broad medical prognosis.
In my judgment, there should be some clear-cut event which, if it occurs, triggers an entitlement to further compensation.
Argument was addressed to the question of whether or not the discretion should be exercised. No doubt the courts will work out over a period of time the various factors that it may be relevant to take into account in the exercise of such a discretion. In my judgment, the important factors in this case are, first, to look and see whether, in respect of any of the three events outlined by Mr. Langstaff, there can truly be said to be a clear-cut identifiable threshold. In my judgment, there cannot.
I also take into account the degree of risk and the consequences of the risk. They do not seem to me to be such as to place this case into the category where there is a great demand that there ought to be only a provisional damages award at this stage.
In a sense, this point leads into the third aspect that I regard as particularly relevant to the exercise of this discretion, and that is weighing up the possibilities of doing justice by a once-and-for-all assessment against the possibility of doing better justice by reserving the plaintiff's right to return.
It seems to me that the case falls within the general run of cases where there are uncertainties as far as the future is concerned. Nobody can look into a crystal ball and see precisely how the condition of the plaintiff's ankle will develop, but I think that the uncertainties are such that they can all properly be taken into account in making a once-and-for-all assessment of damages today. My conclusion therefore is that this is not an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion in favour of a provisional damages order."
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Ravenscroft v Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic [1991] 3 All ER 73
1991
Personal Injury
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Hevican v Ruane [1991] 3 All ER 65; [1991] 141 New LJ 235
1991
QBD
Mantell J
Damages, Personal Injury
The plaintiff's son died in a car crash, and she claimed damages for nervous shock. Held: Given the relationship, the psychological illness was reasonably foreseeable, and recoverable.
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Cunningham v Reading Football Club Ltd Independent, 20 March 1991
20 Mar 1991
Drake J
Negligence, Personal Injury
The plaintiff sought damages after being injured by a piece of concrete thrown by a hooligan at a football match. Held: Where a land owner could reasonably expect that visiting fans might use broken off pieces of concrete and hurl them at others, and did not ensure that such pieces were removed, it could be liable in damages as occupier.
Occupier' Liability Act 1957
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Alcock and Others v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1991] 3 All ER 88
31 May 1991
CA
Lords Justices Parker, Stocker and Nolan
Damages, Personal Injury
The defendant policed a football match at which many people died. The plaintiffs, being relatives and friends of the deceased, inter alia suffered nervous shock having seen the events either from within the ground, or from outside or at home on television. Held: To establish a claim the plaintiffs had to show that it was foreseeable that they would suffer the injury, and also a sufficiently close relationship with the deceased. If this was not a family relationship, it had to be one of particular closeness. To make a claim for damages for nervous shock, the plaintiffs must show physical proximity. Those who had seen the events on television could not so claim.
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McAuley v Bristol City Council [1991] EWCA Civ 2; [1992] QB 134; [1992] 1 All ER 749; (1991) 23 HLR 586; [1991] 45 EG 155; [1991] 3 WLR 968; [1991] 2 EGLR 64; 89 LGR 931
25 Jun 1991
CA
Neill, Ralph Gibson LJJ
Personal Injury, Land
The Council appealed against a finding of liability to the plaintiff tenant who slipped and fell in the back garden of the tenanted house.
Defective Premises Act 1972 4
[ Bailii ]
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 Alcock and Others v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police; HL 28-Nov-1991 - Gazette, 22 January 1992; [1991] 3 WLR 1057; Times, 29 November 1991; [1992] 1 AC 310; [1991] UKHL 5
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Thompson v Johnson and Johnson Pty Ltd [1991] 2 VR 449; [1991] VicRp 84; [1991] Aust Torts Reports 68-587
30 Nov 1991
International, Negligence, Personal Injury
(Supreme Court of Victoria)
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