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Personal Injury - From: 1980 To: 1984

This page lists 21 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Roberts v Ramsbottom [1980] 1 WLR 823
1980

Neill LJ
Personal Injury, Road Traffic
A motorist was involved in an accident when unknowingly he was suffering from a stroke and was unaware of his unfitness to drive. The court considered several criminal cases about automatism before holding: "I am satisfied that in a civil case a similar approach should be adopted. The driver will be able to escape liability if his actions at the relevant time were wholly beyond his control. The most obvious case is sudden unconsciousness. But if he retained some control, albeit imperfect control, and if his driving, judged objectively, was below the required standard, he remains liable."
1 Citers


 
Wheeler v Copes [1981] 3 All ER 405
1981
QBD
Chapman J
Personal Injury, Health and Safety, Land
A labour-only subcontractor was provided with an inadequate ladder by the defendant. He was injured using it. Held: The defendant was found liable.
However, Chapman J said: "The plaintiff puts his case to a considerable extent on the Occupiers' Liability Act 1957, but it seems to me that there may be considerable difficulty in relation to that because the Act is dealing with an occupier. It is true that it covers moveable structures, such as vessels, vehicles and aircraft. I do not doubt that in appropriate circumstances it could apply to a ladder, but I see considerable difficulty in saying that once the defendant had handed the ladder over to the plaintiff and his partner for the purpose of the bricklaying the defendant was still the occupier of this ladder."
Occupiers' Liability Act 1957
1 Citers



 
 Thompson v Brown Construction (Ebbw Vale) Ltd; HL 1981 - [1981] 1 WLR 744; [1981] 2 All ER 296

 
 Crossley v Rawlinson; 1981 - [1981] 3 All ER 674 DC

 
 McKay v Essex Area Health Authority; 1982 - [1982] QB 1166
 
Birkitt v Hayes [1982] 1 WLR 816
1982


Personal Injury, Damages
Where a case takes a long time to come on for trial because there has been unjustifiable delay by the plaintiff, he has been kept out of his money by his own default for part of the period. It is a "special reason" for not giving some of the interest.
1 Citers


 
McLoughlin v O'Brian [1983] 1 AC 410; [1982] 2 All ER 298; [1982] UKHL 3; [1982] 2 WLR 982
6 May 1982
HL
Lord Wilberforce, Lord Bridge, Lord Scarman
Personal Injury, Damages
The plaintiff was the mother of a child who died in an horrific accident, in which her husband and two other children were also injured. She was at home at the time of the accident, but went to the hospital immediately when she had heard what had happened. She saw and comforted her injured husband and children, and was told of the death of her youngest child. She brought proceedings for the psychiatric effect of the shock that she sustained as a result. Held: Her appeal was allowed. The House identified the circumstances in which such a claim could succeed:
1. While damages cannot, at common law, be awarded for grief and sorrow, a claim for damages for 'nervous shock' caused by negligence can be made without the necessity of showing direct impact or fear of immediate personal injuries for oneself.
2. A plaintiff may recover damages for 'nervous shock' brought on by injury caused not to him -- or herself but to a near relative, or by the fear of such injury.
3. Subject to the next paragraph, there is no English case in which a plaintiff has been able to recover nervous shock damages where the injury to the near relative occurred out of sight and earshot of the plaintiff.
4. An exception has been made where the plaintiff does not see or hear the incident but comes upon its immediate aftermath.
5. A remedy on account of nervous shock has been given to a man who came upon a serious accident involving numerous people immediately thereafter and acted as a rescuer of those involved.
Three issues were to be addressed: the class of persons whose claims should be recognised, the proximity of such persons to the accident and the means by which the shock was caused. Foreseeability in any given set of circumstances is ultimately a question of fact.
On the issue of the court's role in developing the law, Lord Scarman: "By concentrating on principle the judges can keep the legal system clear of policy problems which neither they, nor the forensic process which it is their duty to operate, are equipped to resolve. If principle leads to results which are thought to be socially unacceptable, Parliament can legislate to draw a line or map out a new path."
Lord Wilberforce said: "there remains, in my opinion, just because "shock" in its nature is capable of affecting so wide a range of people, a real need for the law to place some limitation upon the extent of admissible claims." and
"As regards proximity to the accident, it is obvious that this must be close in both time and space . . The shock must come through sight or hearing of the event or of its immediate aftermath."
and "Whatever is unknown about the mind body relationship (and the area of ignorance seems to expand with that of knowledge), it is now accepted by medical science that recognisable and severe physical damage to the human body and system may be caused by the impact, through the senses, of external events on the mind. Thus there may be produced what is as identifiable an illness as any that may be caused by direct physical impact."
1 Cites

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[ Bailii ]
 
Deerness v John R Keeble and Son (Brantham) Ltd [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep 260
1983
HL
Lord Diplock, Lord Edmund-Davies, Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Brandon of Oakbrook and Lord Brightman
Personal Injury, Limitation
The plaintiff suffered very serious injuries as a passenger in a car, and a writ was issued within the three-year period against the driver and the owner of the car whose insurers made a substantial interim payment. The writ was not served, nor renewed at the end of 12 months, and the limitation period expired without its renewal. A second writ was issued, the insurers relied on the section 11 time bar and the plaintiff sought an extension of time under section 33. Held: Lord Diplock "Faced with the unanimous decision of this House in Walkley that a plaintiff who has actually started an action before the expiry of the primary limitation period has not been prejudiced by what are now the provisions of s11 of the Limitation Act 1980, and therefore cannot bring himself within the provisions s33(1), the learned judge seized on a passage in my own speech in that case in which, with customary caution, I had left open the possibility that there might be some 'most exceptional circumstances' in which the plaintiff might be allowed to proceed after the expiry of the primary limitation period despite the fact that he had brought an action for the same cause of action before the three-years primary limitation period had expired. I added that the only exception I had been able to think of - '… would be in a case in which the plaintiff had been induced to discontinue by a misrepresentation or other improper conduct by the defendant.' Walkley's case was one of discontinuance of proceedings, and the example that I gave is perhaps more accurately characterised as an estoppel from relying on s11 of the Act rather than a disapplication of that section upon a direction of the Court made in the exercise of the discretion conferred upon it by s33, in the making of which direction the Court must have regard to the matters specified in s33(3). Whether a defendant is estopped or not is a question of law. It is not a matter of discretion for the Judge. Sir John Donaldson, MR pointed this out in his judgment in the instant case. The rationale of the rule laid down by this House in Walkley's case did not logically admit of any exceptions."
Limitation Act 1980 11 32(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Munro v Anderson-Grice Engineering Co Ltd 1983 SLT 295
1983

Lord Grieve
Scotland, Personal Injury, Limitation
An action was raised in 1980 for damages for vibration white finger in which exposure had ceased in 1973. In early 1974 the pursuer had been advised by his solicitors that a claim against the defenders was unlikely to succeed. The pursuer argued that he had acted reasonably by accepting the advice of his solicitor in 1974 and that it was equitable to allow the action to proceed. The defenders argued that there was no explanation why, having decided not to proceed in 1974, the pursuer had raised the action in 1980. Held: The court refused to exercise his discretion in favour of allowing the pursuer to bring the action out of time: "In my opinion however it does not follow that because at some stage within the triennium a pursuer has taken a reasonable course of action which results in a failure to raise an action timeously, that it must be considered equitable to allow him to proceed with an action after the expiry of the three year limitation period. ... No doubt the reasonableness of the pursuer's actings will have a bearing on the equities, but for the latter to be properly considered by the court circumstances beyond those averred by the pursuer in this case are required".
1 Citers


 
Graham v Dodds [1983] 1 WLR 808; [1983] NI 22; [1983] 2 All ER 953
1983
HL
Lord Bridge
Personal Injury, Damages
A court dealing with personal injury claims normally makes a discount in respect of damages for the future loss of earnings
Lord Bridge said "The only issue arising in this appeal which is strictly one of law is whether, in assessing damages for loss of dependency arising from a fatal accident, the multiplier or number of years purchase should be calculated from the date of death or from the date of trial. Counsel for the defendant has contended for the former. Counsel for the plaintiff has throughout contended for the latter and this view prevailed with the learned Lord Chief Justice and the majority of the Court of Appeal. The judge, in a short note appended to the transcript in his report of the trial, said:
'I took the view that there is no legal principle that the number of years of purchase (in this case I suggest 11 to 14) should be automatically reduced having regard to the number of years special damage since the death of the deceased and that the contrast sometimes made with personal injury cases is not a sound one".
On this issue the majority of the Court of Appeal examined the speeches in your Lordships' house in Cookson v Knowles [1979] AC 556 and reached the conclusion that Lord Diplock and Lord Fraser of Tullybelton had expressed opposite and irreconcilable opinions. Gibson L.J. illustrated his understanding of the supposedly conflicting doctrines by indicating how they would apply in assessing the dependency of the widow of a young man killed at the age of 21, in the following terms:
'Should the action not come to hearing until five years had elapsed Lord Fraser of Tullybelton would assess at death the multiplier, which I take at say 18, and he would then allow five years' special damage and 13 years as the multiplier of future loss. Lord Diplock, on the other hand, would also give five years' special damage and then fix the multiplier on the assumption of the death of the deceased at the age of 26 years, which Mr. Hill conceded would not be appreciably less than the original figure of 18'.
On the basis of such a conflict, Gibson and O'Donnell L.JJ. held themselves free to choose which of the two doctrines they preferred and both came down in favour of the view they attributed to Lord Diplock.
It is to be observed that in Cookson v. Knowles Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Salmon and Lord Scarman all expressed their agreement with the speeches of both Lord Diplock and Lord Fraser of Tullybelton. Gibson L.J. recognised this and described it as a 'confusing feature' of the case. It would indeed be astonishing that such a radical conflict should have escaped the attention of the three concurring members of your Lordships' House, but still more astonishing that neither Lord Diplock nor Lord Fraser of Tullybelton should have said a word to indicate any awareness that they were disagreeing with each other on a matter of fundamental principle.
My Lords, I have to say, with respect, that the majority of the Court of Appeal based their decision in this case on a misunderstanding of the decision in Cookson v. Knowles [1979] AC 556. In that case the widow's claim under the Fatal Accidents Acts arose from the death of her husband at the age of 49. The trial judge took 11 years' purchase from the date of death as the appropriate multiplier. But he applied it to the estimated annual dependency at the date of trial, 2 1/2 years after the date of death, to arrive at a single capital sum of damages on which he awarded interest at 9 per cent from the date of death to the date of trial. The Court of Appeal reduced the capital award by estimating the dependency in two parts: (a) from the date of death to the date of trial, (b) from the date of trial onwards and allowed interest on the first part of the award only at a reduced rate. For the purpose of the capital assessment, the trial judge's figure of 11 years purchase from the date of death had to be divided; 2 1/2 was applied in calculating the pre-trial loss, 8 1/2 in calculating the future loss. But the propriety of calculating the overall multiplier from the date of death was not questioned. In the unanimous decision of this House affirming the Court of Appeal, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton dealt with the last point expressly in the following passage, at pp. 575-576:
'In the present case the deceased was aged 49 at the date of his death and the trial judge and the Court of Appeal used a multiplier of 11. That figure was not seriously criticised by counsel as having been inappropriate as at the date of death, although I think it is probably generous to the appellant. From that figure of 11, the Court of Appeal deducted 2 1/2 in respect of the 2 1/2 years from the date of death to the date of trial, and they used the resulting figure of 8 1/2 as the multiplier for the damages after the date of trial. In so doing they departed from the method that would have been appropriate in a personal injury case and counsel for the appellant criticised the departure as being unfair to the appellant. The argument was that if the deceased man had had a twin brother who had been injured at the same time as the deceased man was killed, and whose claim for damages for personal injury had come to trial on the same day as the dependant's claim under the Fatal Accidents Acts* the appropriate multiplier for his loss after the date of trial would have been higher than 8 1/2. On the assumption, which is probably correct, that that would have been so, it does not in my opinion follow that the multiplier of 8 1/2 is too low in the present claim under the Fatal Accidents Acts where different considerations apply. In a personal injury case, if the injured person has survived until the date of trial, that is a known fact and the multiplier appropriate to the length of his future working life has to be ascertained as at the date of trial. But in a fatal accident case the multiplier must be selected once and for all as at the date of death, because everything that might have happened to the deceased after that date remains uncertain. Accordingly having taken a multiplier of 11 as at the date of death and having used 2 1/2 in respect of the period up to the trial, it is in my opinion correct to take 8 1/2 for the period after the date of trial. That is what the Court of Appeal did in this case/ If I may say so, respectfully, I find the reasoning in this passage as cogent as it is clear. But, what is perhaps more important, I can find nothing in the speech of Lord Diplock which conflicts in any way with Lord Fraser of Tullybelton's reasoning or with his conclusion. The two passages cited by Gibson L.J. from Lord Diplock's speech dealing with the assessment of the dependants' future loss from date of trial are not directed to the question of the appropriate multiplier and certainly lend no support to the doctrine that this can be calculated on the assumption that the deceased, if he had survived the accident, would certainly have remained alive and well and in the same employment up to the date of trial. Such a doctrine, ignoring the uncertainty which, as Lord Fraser of Tullybelton pointed out, affects everything that might have happened to the deceased after the date of his death, is clearly contrary to principle and would lead to the highly undesirable anomaly that in fatal accident cases the longer the trial of the dependants' claims could be delayed the more they would eventually recover.
Accordingly, in so far as the learned Lord Chief Justice based his directions to the jury with respect to the multiplier to be applied in assessing future loss on the considerations appropriate in awarding damages for future loss of earnings to a surviving plaintiff in a personal injury case aged 4 5 (the age the plaintiff's husband would have attained at the date of trial if he had survived) and treated the pre-trial loss as 'special damage,' and in so far as the majority of the Court of Appeal approved the directions given on that basis, they erred in law".
Fatal Accidents (Northern Ireland) Order 1977
1 Citers


 
Collier v Anglian Water Authority Times, 26 March 1983
26 Mar 1983
CA

Torts - Other, Personal Injury
The plaintiff was injured when she tripped over a paving stone on the sea defence wall promenade at Mablethorpe, for which the defendants were responsible. Held: The defendants were responsible for the area under the Act as occupiers, and accordingly owed the plaintiff a common law duty of care as a visitor and were liable in damages.
Occupiers Liability Act 1957

 
Gardner v Moore [1984] AC 548
1984
HL
Lord Hailsham LC
Insurance, Personal Injury
The uninsured first defendant deliberately drove a car at the plaintiff who was walking on the pavement, and thus caused serious injuries. The MIB accepted that the trial judge was bound by Hardy to declare that the Bureau was bound to indemnify the plaintiff in respect of his judgment against the first defendant. The Bureau appealed to the House of Lords. Held: The House dismissed the appeal, accepting the principle that a person "may not stand to gain advantage arising from the consequences of his own iniquity", but pointing out that the doctrine has its limits. The terms of policies issued by insurance companies were not relevant to the issues falling for decision in this case.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Bartrum v Hepworth Minerals and Chemicals Limited Unreported (Date unknown)
1984
QBD
Turner J
Negligence, Personal Injury
The claimant dived from a ledge on a cliff. In order to avoid shallow water he knew that he had to dive out into the pool but he failed to do so and fractured his neck. Held: The court dismissed his claim for damages saying "So far as the Act is concerned, by section 1(3) the defendants were under a duty to those whom they had reasonable grounds to believe would be in the vicinity of the danger, that is on the cliff for the purpose of diving, and the risk was one which, in all the circumstances, [they] may be reasonably expected to offer some protection. In my judgment the danger here was so obvious to any adult that it was not reasonably to be expected of the defendants that they would offer any protection."
Occupiers' Liability Act 1984 1
1 Citers


 
Brice v Brown [1984] 1 All ER 997; [1984] 1 WLR 997
1984

Stuart-Smith J
Personal Injury
The plaintiff, a lady with a hysterical personality disorder since childhood, had a minor taxi accident and then developed a major psychiatric illness - bizarre behaviour, suicide attempts, pleading with people to cut her head off - in response to a minor traffic accident. Held: She was of normal fortitude. A claim for nervous shock is not actionable unless the plaintiff incurs psychiatric damage which is caused by the tortfeasor as part of a breach of a duty owed by him to the plaintiff. Only then must the defendant bound to take the victim as he finds him.
Stuart-Smith J said that the phrase "nervous shock" is a "convenient phrase to describe mental injury or psychiatric illness to distinguish it from, on the one hand, grief and sorrow and, on the other hand, physical or organic injury. The psychiatric illness does not have to have any particular label or term of art applied to it."
1 Citers


 
Dexter v Courtaulds Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 372; [1984] 1 All ER 70
1984
CA
Lawton LJ
Personal Injury, Damages
The plaintiff had been injured at work, and awarded damages, including for loss of wages. The parties disputed the method of calculation of interest on the damages. Held: To avoid the laborious detailed calaculations of interest from day to day, it was proper in the general run of cases to award interest on the full amount but at half the rate. Lawton LJ said that the court Jefford v Gee clearly intended to lay down general principles for application in personal injury cases. He said that they should be departed from only in unusual circumstances.
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Regina v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Thompstone [1984] 1 WLR 1234
1984
CA
Sir John Donaldson MR
Personal Injury
The court considered the circumstances of a claimant's criminal record as they affected his entitlement to compensation under the scheme: "In each case, although different categories of circumstances can be taken into account, the issue is the same. Is the applicant an appropriate recipient of an ex gratia compensatory payment made at the public expense? As with all discretionary decisions, there will be cases where the answer is clear one way or the other and cases which are on the borderline and in which different people might reach different decisions. The Crown has left the decision to the board and the court can and should only intervene if the board has misconstrued its mandate or its decision is plainly wrong. ..."
1 Citers


 
Church v Ministry of Defence Unreported, 23 February 1984; (1984) 134 NLJ 623
23 Feb 1984
QBD
Pain J
Personal Injury
The 62 year old claimant sought damages after working in in the defendant's dockyard and being exposed to asbestos. Pleural plaques were apparent on X-ray and the pleura would constrict the lung and induce breathlessness; and the asbestos must have passed through the lung to reach the pleura so that it was probable that there was some concurrent fibrosis. It was probable that there would be no future deterioration "but there is undeniably a substantial risk that, the condition having been stable for many years, there will suddenly be a marked progression of lung fibrosis with consequent effect on breathing and on health". There was an extremely small risk of mesothelioma. For his part the claimant had worried 'very considerably'. The defendant submitted that this dod not amount to injury. It was "undeniable that some physiological injury has been done" but it was symptomless and unlikely to lead to future incapacity. The damage to the pleura and any damage to the lung should be regarded as minimal. No damages should be awarded for anxiety: it was not substantial and was not 'attached' to some physical cause. He cited Cartledge v E. Jopling. Held: The cliam succeeded. The pleural plaques had to be considered in conjunction with damage that had probably been caused to the lungs; he could not, therefore, regard the damage as minimal. He regarded anxiety as the natural consequence of the radiological finding, so that it was justifiably 'considerable' for some months. Saying "I do not think I can rate the damages as being very substantial in this case", he made a final award of £1,500 general damages
1 Citers


 
Sykes v Ministry of Defence Unreported, 19 March 1984; Times, 23 March 1984
19 Mar 1984
QBD
Otton J
Personal Injury
The claimant was exposed to asbestos whilst working for the defendant in the naval dockyard at Portsmouth, and sought damages having developed pleural plaques, but no further damage was expected, save "a slightly increased risk of developing a lung cancer and a definite increased risk of developing mesothelioma". The plaintiff also sought damages for his anxiety. Held: The change in the structure of the pleura constituted by the pleural plaques amounted to a "significant and definite degree of damage" which could not be treated as minimal or negligible and which entitled the plaintiff to compensation as he had established "actual damage." Rejecting the defence that this did not yet constitute damage: "there has been a definite change in the structure of the pleura due to the presence of the asbestos. In my judgment that amounts to a significant and definite degree of damage which entitled the Plaintiff to compensation as he has established actual damage . . he is entitled to be compensated not only for the physical damage . . but also for the aspect of anxiety which seems to me to have a connection with physical damage, to be entirely genuine and thoroughly understandable in a person who has worked in such conditions and has known his workmates to die in the circumstances that he has described. I have also come to the conclusion that he is entitled to be compensated for the risks of lung cancer and mesothelioma."
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Jacobs v Hampshire County Council Times, 28 May 1984
28 May 1984
QBD
Skinner J
Personal Injury
Skinner J discussed the application of section 58 of the 1980 Act saying: "that, in assessing whether a council has a defence under section 58 of the 1980 Act, it is necessary to take account of the sort of traffic which would foreseeable use the highway and the character of the road itself." and "In determining the regularity of highway inspections, the council had had regard only to the type of area in which the highway was situated and the likely degree and type of use. They should also have taken account of the actual design of the carriageway concerned, in this case tarmac and adjoined cobbles at the edge of the carriageway, rendering it particularly vulnerable to water penetration."
Highways Act 1980 58
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Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 55 CLR 549; [1984] 54 ALR 417; [1985] CLY 2326; [1984] HCA 52
20 Aug 1984

Gibbs CJ, Murphy, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ
Commonwealth, Negligence, Personal Injury
(High Court of Australia) The claimant's husband was injured. She saw his injuries at hospital and was affected. She claimed damages for her own shock. Held: The driver owed her a duty of care, and was liable for negligence which caused nervous shock. A finding at first instance that she had normal fortitude, her predisposition to anxiety and depression gave no defence.
Brennan J said: "Liability for negligence occasioning nervous shock has not been readily accepted, perhaps because the courts found evidence of psychiatric illness and of its aetiology to be too vague to warrant a finding of a causal relationship between psychiatric illness and careless conduct . . A plaintiff may recover only if the psychiatric illness is the result of physical injury negligently inflicted on him by the defendant or if it is induced by "shock". Psychiatric illness caused in other ways attracts no damages . . I understand "shock" in this context to mean the sudden sensory perception - that is, by seeing, hearing or touching - of a person, thing or event, which is so distressing that the perception of the phenomenon affronts or insults the plaintiff's mind and causes a recognizable psychiatric illness."
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[ Austlii ]
 
Jayes v IMI (Kynoch) Ltd [1984] EWCA Civ 4; [1985] ICR 155
17 Oct 1984
CA
Sir John Donaldson MR, Oliver, Robet Goff LJJ
Personal Injury, Health and Safety
The plaintiff appealed against dismissal of his claim for damages for personal injury suffered on a machine at his work.
[ Bailii ]
 
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