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Personal Injury - From: 1970 To: 1979

This page lists 44 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Taylor v O'Connor [1970] 1 All ER 365; [1971] AC 115; 114 Sol Jo 132; [1970] TR37; [1970] 2 WLR 472
1970
HL
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Guest, Viscount Dilhorne, and Lord Pearson,
Personal Injury, Damages
The appellant driver had caused a car accident in 1965, in which the respondent's husband died. The respondent sought damages under the Fatal Accidents Acts for herself then aged 52 and for her 18 year old daughter. The husband died aged 53 and a partner in a successful firm of architects. His life expectancy on death was 18 years, and of the respondent 21 years. After tax, his income was pounds 7,500 per year up to retirement. Under the partnership deed he would have to leave some part of his income in the partnership as working capital and at the time of the death this amounted to pounds 10,000 and during the rest of his working life as a partner he would have left pounds 1,500 per year in the firm. When assessing damages the trial judge, holding that he might have continued as a full partner beyond the normal retirement age, or may have continued as a consultant, ruled that the husband would have continued to enjoy a net spendable income of pounds 6,000 per annum for the remainder of his life. The dependency of the respondent and the daughter were estimated at pounds 4,000 profit. Pounds 250 was to be deducted in respect of the accelerated benefit from the savings of pounds 10,000; tthe dependency for the purposes of the award of Damages was reckoned at pounds 3,750 per annum. The judge increased the proposed multiplier to allow for inflation. To the resulting song of pounds 45,000, the judge added pounds 9,000 as the present value of pounds 18,000, being the product of pounds 1,500 left in the firm for each of the 12 years. The Court of Appeal had refused to disturb the trial award. The driver now appealed against quantum. Held: There were no grounds for interfering with the amount of Damages awarded by the trial judge.
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Guest, Viscount Dilhorne, and Lord Pearson said that prospective inflation is not a valid reason for increasing a multiplier.
Lord Reid and lord Dilhorne said that in assessing the effect of the incidence of tax on and awarded damages, any private income of the recipient should be ignored. HL
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Malcolm v Broadhurst [1970] 3 All ER 508
1970
QBD
Geoffrey Lane J
Personal Injury
The principle of foreseeability of psychiatric injury is subject to the qualification that, where the psychiatric injury suffered by the plaintiff is consequential upon physical injury for which the defendant is responsible in law, the defendant will be bound to compensate the plaintiff in respect of the former even if unforeseeable. This is an application of the rule that a wrongdoer must take his victim as he finds him--sometimes called the "talem qualem" rule or, more colloquially, the "eggshell skull" rule. There is no difference in principle between an eggshell skull and an eggshell personality.
1 Citers


 
Hinz v Berry [1970] 2 QB 40
1970
CA
Lord Denning, Sir Gordon Wilmer, Lord Pearson
Personal Injury, Damages
Then plaintiff saw her husband killed and her children injured by a runaway motor car. At trial she was awarded damages for nervous shock. The question was whether, having regard to the fact that she had suffered sorrow and grief it would not be to overcompensate her by failing to make a deduction for the sorrow and grief which was otherwise not compensable. Held: A plaintiff who suffered from extreme grief, including a case where the condition of the sufferer was debilitating, but which fell short of a recognised psychiatric illness was not able to recover damages. Personal injury at law connotes serious trauma or illness.
Lord Denning said: "The law at one time said that there could not be damages for nervous shock; but for these last twenty-five years, it has been settled that damages can be given for nervous shock caused by the sight of an accident, at any rate to a close relative." and "In English law no damages are awarded for grief and sorrow caused by a person's death. No damages are to be given for the worry about the children, or for the financial strain or stress, or the difficulties of adjusting to a new life. Damages are however recoverable for nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognisable psychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant." Also he said: "It happened on April 19, 1964. It was bluebell time in Kent"
Sir Gordon Wilmer discussed setting damages for this kind of injury: "It is practically impossible to find any signposts on the road; there is no tariff or pattern of awards in this class of case; and this makes it difficult for any one judge to criticize another’s estimate of what the damages ought to be."
Lord Pearson said: "The first factor was her own inevitable grief and sorrow at losing her husband, a good husband who was also a good father to her family. That would have caused much sorrow and mourning in any event. Secondly, there was her anxiety about the welfare of her children who were injured in the accident. Thirdly, there was the financial stress resulting from the removal of this very hard-working breadwinner who took extra work in addition to his normal work. She may well have been in considerable financial difficulties. The fourth factor was the need for adjusting herself to a new life, which may well have been quite unusually severe in this case. Now, all those four factors are not compensatible, that is to say that they are not proper subjects to be taken into account in assessing damages according to English law." and "It should not be for the whole of the mental anguish and suffering which she has been enduring during the last five or six years. It should be only for that additional element which has been contributed by the shock of witnessing the accident, and which would not have occurred if she had not suffered that shock. It is a difficult distinction to draw, but I think the judge has laid a proper foundation and has found a right ground of decision, namely, that where there is an extra element which has been added by the shock of witnessing the accident, that is a proper subject of compensation. On his findings in this case that that element in itself was the sole cause of the added morbidity, the recognisable psychiatric element in her present condition, that is a proper ground for a substantial sum of money to be awarded."
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 Jenkins v Allied Ironfounders Ltd; HL 1970 - [1970] 1 WLR 304; 1970 SC (HL) 37; 1970 SLT 46
 
Jefford v Gee [1970] 2 QB 130; [1970] EWCA Civ 8; [1970] 1 All ER 1202; [1970] 1 Lloyd's Rep 107; [1970] 2 WLR 702
4 Mar 1970
CA
Lord Denning MR
Damages, Scotland, Personal Injury
The courts of Scotland followed the civil law in the award of interest on damages. The court gave examples of the way in which they apply the ex mora rule when calculating the interest payable in a judgment. If money was wrongfully withheld, then the courts had power to award interest during the period of delay between the time the money was legally and ascertainably due and the time when the court ordered that it should be paid.
The court established the principles for awarding interest on damages awards in personal injuries cases: "Therefore if I could see my way to do so, I should certainly be disposed to give the appellants, or anybody in a similar position, interest upon the amount withheld from the time of action brought at all events." and "It should only be awarded to a plaintiff for being kept out of money which ought to have been paid to him" and "We applied this principle very recently in Harbutt's 'Plasticine' Ltd . . . where we all agreed in saying: 'the basis of an award of interest is that the defendant has kept the plaintiff out of his money; and the defendant has had the use of it himself. So he ought to compensate the plaintiff accordingly'." The court used published short term interest rates. The half rate approach was used because interest was not large enough to warrant minute attention to detail. The half rate was a reasonable approximation. In relation to benefits, the plaintiff (whilst he received no interest on the moiety for which he gave credit against damages) did not have to give credit in the interest calculation in respect of his windfall receipt of the other moiety of benefits paid.
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[ Bailii ]

 
 Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd; CA 18-Dec-1970 - [1971] 1 All ER 686; [1971] 2 WLR 585; [1971] 2 QB 163; [1970] EWCA Civ 2; [1971] 1 Lloyd's Rep 289; [1971] RTR 79

 
 Smith v Central Asbestos Co Ltd; CA 1971 - [1972] 1 QB 244; [1971] 3 All ER 204

 
 Ashcroft v Curtin; CA 1971 - [1971] 1 WLR 1731; [1971] 3 All ER 1208
 
Rogers v George Blair [1971] 11 KIR 391
1971

Salmon LJ
Personal Injury, Health and Safety
The court considered the suitability of some goggles as a means of protecting a workman's eyes. Held: To be suitable, the protection need not make it impossible for an accident to occur but it must make it highly unlikely.
1 Citers


 
Albert v Motor Insurers Bureau [1971] 3 WLR 291
1971
HL

Road Traffic, Insurance, Personal Injury, Contract
The plaintiff suffered injury as a passenger when getting a lift to work from a co-worker. The driver was uninsured and had given lift to several co-workers over a period of time, mking a charge. Held: The lift arrangement was in the nature of a contract, and therefore under the MIB scheme, the MIB were obliged to pay compensation.

 
Brown v Nelson and others [1971] LGR 20
1971

Nield J
Personal Injury, Negligence
A pupil at an approved school went on an Outward Bound course including riding on a cable and pulley slung between two trees. From the cable hung a knotted rope. When the pupil got onto the rope the cable snapped, and he fell with it. He suffered serious injuries from which some years later he died. The Outward Bound confidence course was run by parties independent of the school. Held: The claim was dismissed against the school. Nield J said: "What duty did the school authorities owe to the deceased? They were not the occupiers of the site or of the apparatus. They had, in my view, a general duty to take reasonable steps for the safety of those under their charge and use such care as would be exercised by a reasonably careful parent. Counsel tell me that there is no authority covering the situation where a school makes use of someone else's equipment at premises other than the school premises. In my judgment, where a school must take their pupils to other premises, they discharge their duty of care if they know the premises and if the premises are apparently safe, and if they know that the premises are staffed by competent and careful persons. They further discharge their duty if they permit their pupils there to use equipment which is apparently safe and is under the control of competent and careful persons who supervise the use of such equipment. They do not in such circumstances have an obligation themselves to make an inspection."
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 O'Connell v Jackson; CA 7-Jul-1971 - [1971] CLY 3115; [1972] 1 QB 270; [1971] EWCA Civ 5; [1971] 3 All ER 129; [1971] 2 Lloyd's Rep 354; [1971] 3 WLR 463; [1972] RTR 51; [1971] 2 LLR 354
 
Haggar v de Placido [1972] 1 WLR 716
1972


Personal Injury, Damages
£13,500.00 was awarded for pain and suffering and loss of amenities for a case involving severe disablement.
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 Knipe v British Railways Board; CA 1972 - [1972] 1 QB 361
 
Mitchell v Mulholland (No. 2) [1972] 1 QB 65
1972
CA
Widgery LJ
Damages, Personal Injury
The plaintiff was severely injured, and recovered substantial damages. £20,000 for pain and suffering and loss of amenity, and £21,350 for nursing care. The court declined to adjust the award for anticipated inflation: "an award of damages for personal injury should not reflect the possibility of continuing inflation."
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Murray v Shuter [1972] I Lloyds Rep 6
1972
CA
Lord Denning MR
Personal Injury
The plaintiff had been badly injured and was not expected to live long. When his claim for damages was almost ready for trial, his lawyers requested an adjournment. It was not possible for a live plaintiff to claim damages for his 'lost years'. They realised that, if judgment were to be given before he died, it would not be possible for dependants to claim in respect of their dependency. He would recover much less than would be recovered by his estate and dependants after his death. At the hearing of the application to adjourn the trial, there was no dispute as to the effect of judgment before the death and no dispute as to entitlement of the widow to bring another action for loss of dependency if the plaintiff died before his action was brought to judgment. Held: The court granted the adjournment requested as an exercise of discretion. Lord Denning MR said that if the action were disposed of in the plaintiff's lifetime, the dependants would have no separate action for their own benefit, but if the trial were deferred until after the death, his own action would continue for the benefit of his estate and in addition, his dependants could bring an action under the FAA. He said: 'The two actions can be combined'.
1 Citers


 
Berry v Stone Manganese and Marine Ltd [1972] 1 Lloyd's Rep 182
1972


Personal Injury, Negligence
The plaintiff sought damages in common law negligence respect of noise at work which "amounted to about 115 to 120 decibels, whereas the. . tolerable noise is about 90" and no ear muffs had been provided. Held: The claim succeeded.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board ex parte Staten [1972] 1 WLR 569
1972


Personal Injury
The words of the scheme should be given "their ordinary sensible meaning"
Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 1990
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 Daish v Wauton; CA 1972 - [1972] 2 QB 262

 
 British Railways Board v Herrington; HL 16-Feb-1972 - [1972] AC 877; [1972] 2 WLR 537; [1971] 1 All ER 749; [1972] UKHL 1
 
Rider v Rider [1973] QB 505
1973
CA

Road Traffic, Personal Injury
Sachs LJ stated that "it is in my judgment clear that the corporation's statutory duty under section 44 of the Act of 1959 is reasonably to maintain and repair the highway so that it is free of danger to all users who use that highway in the way normally to be expected of them -- taking account, of course, of the traffic reasonably to be expected on the particular highway. Motorists who thus use the highway, and to whom a duty is owed, are not to be expected by the authority all to be model drivers. Drivers in general are liable to make mistakes, including some rated as negligent by the courts, without being merely for that reason stigmatised as unreasonable or abnormal drivers; some drivers may be inexperienced, and some drivers may find themselves in difficulties from which the more adept could escape. The highway authority must provide not merely for model drivers, but for the normal run of drivers to be found on their highways, and that includes those who make the mistakes which experience and common sense teaches are likely to occur." and "mere unevenness, undulations and minor potholes do not normally constitute a danger" within the section.
Highways Act 1959 44
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McCann v Sheppard [1973] 1 WLR 540
1973
CA
Lord Denning MR
Personal Injury, Damages
The injured plaintiff succeeded in his action for damages for personal injury. The defendants appealed the quantum of damage but before the appeal was heard the plaintiff died. The court was now asked to reduce the award because of the death. Held: Damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenities should be limited to an amount appropriate for the length of time that the injured party survived.
The court also considered what cause of action the widow might have. Lord Denning MR said: "It is open to doubt whether the widow here would have any claim under the Fatal Accidents Act. Her husband had sued Mr Sheppard to judgment. Under that Act, the matter must be looked at as at the time of his death. Applying the words of the statute "If death had not ensued", would he himself have been entitled to maintain an action and recover damages for negligence? I do not think so: for the simple reason that he had already recovered judgment and having done that he could not maintain another action for the same cause."
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 Smith v Central Asbestos Co Ltd; Central Asbestos Co Ltd v Dodd; HL 1973 - [1973] AC 518; [1972] 2 All ER 1135; [1972] 3 WLR 333; 13 KIR 75; [1972] 2 Lloyds Rep 413
 
George v Pinnock [1973] 1 WLR 118
1973
CA

Damages, Personal Injury
The court awarded £19,000 for general damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenity for severe disablement.
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 O'Brien v Robinson; HL 19-Feb-1973 - [1973] UKHL 1; [1973] AC 912

 
 Cunningham v Harrison; CA 17-May-1973 - [1973] QB 942
 
Causton v Mann Egerton (Johnsons) Ltd [1974] 1 All ER 453
1974

Roskill LJ
Personal Injury
The common law has always recognised a privilege in communications, such as medical reports in personal injury cases, which come into existence when litigation is contemplated, if they have been made with a view to such litigation. The court has no power to order production of privileged documents. Medical reports are in no different category from other experts' reports and it would be quite wrong to engraft a qualification on the doctrine of privilege according to the nature of the report or the class of professional qualification attaching to its maker ... [So] long as we have an adversary system, a party is entitled not to produce documents which are properly protected by privilege if it is not to his advantage to produce them, and even though their production might assist his adversary if his adversary or his solicitor were aware of their contents or might lead the court to a different conclusion from that to which the court might come in ignorance of their existence.
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Davies v Taylor [1974] AC 207
1974
HL
Lord Reid, Lord Cross of Chelsea
Personal Injury, Damages
The plaintiff's husband was killed in a road accident caused by the defendant's negligence. They were childless. She had deserted him five weeks before his death and thereafter, he learned about her adultery with a fellow employee. He tried to effect reconciliation with her but she refused. Shortly before his death, he had instructed his solicitor to institute divorce proceedings. The plaintiff claimed as widow and administratrix of the husband's estate. Held: Her claim for dependency failed because the court of first instance found that she had not proved that reconciliation with her husband was more probable than not. While the plaintiff could arguably make a claim for loss of chance, she had not shown any significant chance or probability of reconciliation with her husband before his death. To obtain anything under a head of substantial losses of future chance, the plaintiff must establish that that chance: "was substantial. If it was, it must be evaluated. If it was a mere possibility, it must be ignored. Many different words could be and have been used to indicate the dividing line. I can think of none better than 'substantial', on the one hand, or 'speculative' on the other. It must be left to the good sense of the tribunal to decide on broad lines, without regard to legal niceties, but on a consideration of all the facts in proper perspective."
Lord Reid said: "When the question is whether a certain thing is or is not true - whether a certain event did or did not happen - then the court must decide one way or the other. There is no question of chance or probability. Either it did or it did not happen. But the standard of civil proof is a balance of probabilities. If the evidence shows a balance in favour of it having happened then it is proved that it did in fact happen.
But here we are not and could not be seeking a decision either that the wife would or that she would not have returned to her husband. You can prove that a past event happened, but you cannot prove that a future event will happen and I do not think that the law is so foolish as to suppose that you can. All that you can do is to evaluate the chance. Sometimes it is virtually 100 per cent; sometimes virtually nil. But often it is somewhere in between. And if it is somewhere in between I do not see much difference between a probability of 51 per cent. and a probability of 49 per cent . . If the balance of probability were the proper test what is to happen in the two cases which I have supposed of a 60 per cent. and a 40 per cent. probability. The 40 per cent. case will get nothing but what about the 60 per cent. case. Is it to get a full award on the basis that it has been proved that the wife would have returned to her husband? That would be the logical result. I can see no ground at all for saying that the 40 per cent. case fails altogether but the 60 per cent. case gets 100 per cent. But it would be almost absurd to say that the 40 per cent. case gets nothing while the 60 per cent. case award is scaled down to that proportion of what the award would have been if the spouses had been living together. That would be applying two different rules to the two cases. So I reject the balance of probability test in this case."
Lord Cross of Chelsea said that "The word 'likely' which occurs in the last two of the three passages from the judgment which I have quoted above, may be used in different senses. Sometimes it may be used to mean 'more likely than not' at other times to mean 'quite likely' or 'not improbably' though less likely than not."
Fatal Accidents Act 1959
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Fowler v Tierney 1974 SLT (Notes) 23
1974

Lord Ordinary, Lord Maxwell
Scotland, Personal Injury
A young woman was injured in a collision with a motor car when she was travelling as a pillion passenger on a motor scooter. She brought an action claiming damages against the driver of the motor scooter. The defender pleaded, inter alia, volenti non fit injuria. Held: It was proved that the defender evinced an initial reluctance to give the pursuer a lift, but he did inform her that he had only a provisional licence, either by using those actual words or words to equivalent effect, and that something was said by the defender relating to the pursuer taking a risk or to it being her fault if anything happened. The defender's plea was repelled.
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The Esso Malaysia [1974] 3 WLR 341; [1975] 1 QB 198
1974

Brandon J
Personal Injury, Jurisdiction
A Russian seaman died as the result of a collision in international waters between two foreign registered vessels. His family sought to claim here. Held: The benefit of the Fatal Accidents Acts can, in principle, be claimed by a foreigner. The rule which imposed liability for negligently causing a fatal injury was a universal rule of the law maritime. Brandon J declined to express any view on the applicability of the 1846 Act to deaths occurring abroad or in territorial waters.
Fatal Accidents Act 1976
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Smith v Manchester City Council (1974) 17 KIR 1; [1974] EWCA Civ 6
10 Jun 1974
CA
Edmund Davies, Stamp, Scarman LJJ
Damages, Personal Injury
The plaintiff, a part time domestic cleaner slipped and injured herself (a frozen shoulder) when working for the defendant. It was accepted that the cause of the slip was the defendant's negligence. At the time of the claim she was still employed by the defendant, but she asked for an award of damages for a possible future loss of earning as a result of being disadvantaged in the employment market. . Held: The court awarded damages for the potential loss to the plaintiff from the plaintiff's reduced earning capacity, equivalent to the loss of her competitive position in the labour market. Such an award was intended to compensate a plaintiff who is in employment, for a handicap in getting a new job if he lost the current one and for the longer than normal periods out of work between jobs because of his disability.
The damages award of £300 for this element was increased to £1,000.
Scarman LJ said: "Loss of future earnings or future earning capacity is usually compounded of two elements. The first is when a victim of an accident finds that he or she can, as a result of the accident, no longer earn his or her pre-accident rate of earnings. In such a case there is an existing reduction in earning capacity which can be calculated as an annual sum. It is then perfectly possible to form a view as to the working life of the plaintiff and, taking the usual contingencies into account, to apply to that annual sum of loss of earnings a figure which is considered to be the appropriate number of years' purchase in order to reach a capital figure. Fortunately in this case there is no such loss sustained by the plaintiff because, notwithstanding her accident, she has continued with her employment at the same rate of pay and, as long as she is employed by the Manchester Corporation, is likely, if not certain, to continue at the rate of pay appropriate to her pre-accident grade of employment. That element of loss, therefore, does not arise in this case.
The second element in this type of loss is the weakening of the plaintiff's competitive position in the open labour market: that is to say, should the plaintiff lose her current employment, what are her chances of obtaining comparable employment in the open labour market? The evidence here is plain:- that, in the event (which one hopes will never materialise) of her losing her employment with the Manchester Corporation, she, with a stiff shoulder and a disabled right arm, is going to have to compete in the domestic labour market with women who are physically fully able. This represents a serious weakening of her competitive position in the one market into which she can go to obtain employment. It is for that reason that it is quite wrong to describe this weakness as a "possible" loss of earning capacity: it is an existing loss: she is already weakened to Rat extent, though fortunately she is protected for the time being against suffering any financial damage because she does not, at Present, have to go into the labour market.
It is clearly inappropriate, when assessing this element of loss to attempt to calculate any annual sum or to apply to any annual sum so many years' purchase. The court has to look at the weakness so to speak "in the round", take note of the various contingencies, and do its best to reach an assessment which will do -justice to the plaintiff. "
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[ Bailii ]

 
 Froom v Butcher; CA 21-Jul-1975 - [1976] QB 286; [1975] EWCA Civ 6; [1975] 3 All ER 520

 
 Dick v Falkirk Burgh; HL 26-Nov-1975 - [1975] UKHL 6; 1976 SLT 21; 1976 SC (HL) 1

 
 Ward v Tesco Stores Ltd; CA 1976 - [1976] 1 WLR 810; [1976] 1 All ER 219
 
Moeliker v Reyrolle and Co Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 132; [1976] ICR 253
1976
CA
Browne LJ, Stephenson LJ
Personal Injury, Damages
The court considered the principles for the award of damages for future loss of earning capacity. Held: The court distinguished between an award for loss of earnings and compensation for loss of earning capacity. The latter head of damage arose where a plaintiff was at the time of trial in employment but there was a risk that he might lose that employment at some time in the future and by then, as a result of his injury, be at a disadvantage in getting another job or an equally well paid job. That was a different head of damage from an actual loss of future earnings which could be proved at the time of the trial.
Browne LJ said: "I do not think one can say more by way of principle than this. The consideration of this head of damages should be made in two stages. 1. Is there a ´substantial' or ´real' risk that a plaintiff will lose his present job at some time before the estimated end of his working life? 2. If there is (but not otherwise), the court must assess and quantify the present value of the risk of the financial damage which the plaintiff will suffer if that risk materialises, having regard to the degree of the risk, the time when it may materialise, and the factors, both favourable and unfavourable, which in a particular case will, or may, affect the plaintiff's chances of getting a job at all, or an equally well paid job.
It is impossible to suggest any formula for solving the extremely difficult problems involved in stage 2 of the assessment. A judge must look at all the factors which are relevant in a particular case and do the best he can." and "If the Court comes to the conclusion that there is no substantial or real risk of the plaintiff losing his present job in the rest of his working life, no damages will be recoverable under this head."
As to Smith v Manchester: "[it] laid down no new principle of law... [but was] merely an example of an award of damages under a head which has long been recognised - a plaintiff's loss of earning capacity where as a result of his injury his chances in the future of getting in the labour market work (or work as well paid as before the accident) have been diminished by his industry. This court made an award under this head in Ashcroft v Curtin [l971] 1 WLR 1731 three years before Smith's case. This head of damage generally only arises where a plaintiff is at the time of the trial in employment, but there is a risk that he may lose this employment at some time in the future, and may then, as a result of his injury, be at a disadvantage in getting another job or equally well paid job. It is a different head of damages from an actual loss of future earnings which can already be proved at the time of the trial."
Stephenson LJ sought words to define the correct approach to be followed stated: "I avoid "speculation" because this head of damage can really be nothing else".
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 Murphy v Culhane; CA 10-Jun-1976 - [1976] EWCA Civ 3; [1977] QB 94
 
Cummings v Grainger [1977] QB 397
1977
CA
Lord Denning MR, Ormrod and Bridge LJJ
Animals, Personal Injury
An untrained Alsatian dog was turned loose in a scrap-yard to deter intruders. The dog seriously injured the plaintiff who had entered the yard. Held: The requirements of section 2(2) were satisfied but the defendant was entitled to rely upon the trespasser defence provided by section 5. The dog had characteristics not normally found in Alsatian dogs except in circumstances where they are used as guard dogs. These were 'particular circumstances' within section 2(2)(b). Such an animal is behaving dangerously but it is doing so in a manner characteristic of its species in the circumstances.
Lord Denning MR: "This is a case of a barmaid who was badly bitten by a big dog"
Animals Act 1971 2 5
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 Regina v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Ex parte Clowes; 1977 - [1977] 1 WLR 1353

 
 Haydon v Kent County Council; CA 1978 - [1978] QB 343; [1978] 2 All ER 97
 
Walkley v Precision Forgings Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 1228
1978
CA
Megaw LJ, Shaw LJJ, Waller LJ
Personal Injury, Limitation
The plaintiff appealed the strict application of the limitation laws against his claim. He had been injured whilst working as a grinder. He began one claim which lapsed, and began a second claim outside the limitation period, requesting the court to use its discretion to extend the period so as to allow the second action. Held: Even if the first action could and would have been struck out for want of prosecution, Mr Walkley was entitled to seek an extension under section 2D in the second action and it was not possible to conclude on the material before the court that his application was bound to fail. (Waller LJ dissenting in part)
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 Cookson v Knowles; HL 24-May-1978 - [1979] AC 556; [1978] UKHL 3; [1978] 2 WLR 978; [1978] 2 All ER 604
 
Pickett v British Rail Engineering [1980] AC 136; [1978] UKHL 4
2 Nov 1978
HL
Lord Wilberforce, Lord Salmon, and Lord Edmund-Davies
Damages, Personal Injury
The claimant, suffering from mesothelioma, had claimed against his employers and won, but his claim for loss of earnings consequent upon his anticipated premature death was not allowed. He began an appeal, but then died. His personal representatives appealed. Held: The House assumed that, because the claimant had brought a successful claim for his personal injury, a claim by his dependants under the Fatal Accidents Act was precluded, although Lord Salmon emphasised that he expressed no concluded opinion about the correctness of that assumption. Damages could be recovered for loss of earnings in the claimant's lost years. Only in this way could provision be made for the loss to be suffered by the dependants. Referring to Skelton: "The judgments, further, bring out an important ingredient, which I would accept, namely that the amount to be recovered in respect of the earnings in the "lost" years should be that amount after deduction of an estimated sum to represent the victim's probable living expenses during those years.
There is the additional merit of bringing awards under this head into line with what could be recovered under the Fatal Accidents Acts."
Fatal Accidents Act 1976 1(1)
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[ Bailii ]
 
Walkley v Precision Forgings Ltd [1979] 1WLR 606; [1979] 2 All ER 548
1979
HL
Wilberforce Lord, Lord Diplock, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Edmund-Davies and Lord Keith of Kinkel
Personal Injury, Limitation
The plaintiff tried to bring a second action in respect of an industrial injury claim outside the limitation period so as to overcome the likelihood that his first action, although timeous, would be dismissed for want of prosecution. Held: He could not do so. He was not prejudiced by the primary limitation period since he had properly issued his initial claim within it; there was accordingly no discretion to be exercised under section 33 which by subsection (1)(a) postulates that the primary limitation provisions "prejudice the plaintiff". The court may not exercise its power to disapply the ordinary time limit in a personal injury action under section 33 of the Limitation Act where the plaintiff had brought an action before the expiry of that limit and was bringing a second action in which the application under section 33 was being made.
Lord Diplock: "So, to entitle the court to give a direction under [section 33(1)], there must be some prejudice to the plaintiff and the cause of that prejudice must be the requirement under [section 11] that he should start his action before the expiry of the primary limitation period.
My Lords, in my opinion, once a plaintiff has started an action (the first action) within the primary limitation period it is only in the most exceptional circumstances that he would be able to bring himself within section 2D in respect of a second action brought to enforce the same cause of action. If the first action is still in existence, as it was in the instant case when the matter was before the Master or the judge, cadit quaestio; he has not be prevented from starting his action by section 2A or section 2B at all, so the provisions of those sections cannot have caused him any prejudice. Does it make any difference if the first action is no longer in existence at the time of the application under section 2D either because it has been struck out for want of prosecution or because it has been discontinued by the plaintiff of his own volition? In my view, it does not. These are self inflicted wounds. The provisions of section 2A caused him no prejudice at all; he was able to start his action. The only cause of the prejudice to him in the case of dismissal for want of prosecution is dilatoriness which took place after the action was started whether on his own part or on the part of his legal advisors. In the case of discontinuance the only cause of prejudice is his own act.
The only exception I have been able to think of where it might be proper to give a direction under section 2D, despite the fact that the plaintiff had previously started an action within the primary limitation period but had subsequently discontinued it, would be a case in which the plaintiff had been induced to discontinue by a misrepresentation or other improper conduct by the defendant; but there is no suggestion of this in the instant case.
I would allow the appeal upon the ground that Mr Walkley, having previously started an action for the same cause of action within the primary limitation period prescribed by [section 11], cannot bring himself within section 2A at all. Any application by him under that section would fail in limine." and "Despite the use of the phraseology "an action shall not be brought," it is trite law that technically the Limitation Act does not prevent the commencement of an action by the Plaintiff after the limitation period has expired. What it does is to provide the defendant with a cast-iron defence if he chooses to avail himself of it; which he may do either by pleading it or, in a case where the action is in indisputably statute-barred, by taking out a summons to have it dismissed as vexatious. For the sake of brevity, however, I shall speak of the effect of the expiry of a primary limitation period as preventing the starting of the action."
HL Wilberforce L: "My Lords, as a matter of principle I have very great difficulty in understanding how in this case or indeed in any case that I can imagine where an action has been started within the normal limitation period, section 2D can be invoked at all. The section opens with the words:
'(1) If it appears to the court that it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed having regard to the degree to which- (a) the provisions of section 2A or 2B of this Act prejudice the plaintiff …
The provisions of section 2A are those which require an action for personal injuries to be brought within three years. So subsection (1)(a) must be contemplating a case in which, because the three years have expired without an action being brought, section 2A applies to the prejudice of the plaintiff. But if the plaintiff has brought his action within the three years, how has he been prejudiced by section 2A? This I fail to understand. If this argument is sound, the respondent's case fails in limine. He brought his first action within the normal limitation period, and if he has suffered any prejudice, it is by his own inaction and not by the operation of the Act. However, since the Court of Appeal did not decide the case on this argument, or, it seems, consider it, and since the provision is a new one, understanding of which may have to come with time, I will consider the appeal on the assumption that these initial words may apply to the case."
Viscount Dilhorne: "In my opinion this appeal should be allowed for it cannot be said that it was the provisions of section 2A (that is to say, the imposition of the three year period after which an action such as this cannot be proceeded with without the directions of the court) which prejudiced the respondent when within that period he brought an action for damages for the same personal injuries and in respect of the same cause of action as in his second action. He was prejudiced by his delay in proceeding with the first action and by his discontinuance of that action, not by the provisions of section 2A."
Limitation Act 1963
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Lim Poh Choo v Camden and Islington Area Health Authority [1980] AC 174; [1979] UKHL 1
21 Jun 1979
HL
Scarman L
Damages, Personal Injury
The plaintiff was catastrophically injured. Her life expectation was not affected, but she would never be able to work at her expected profession as a doctor, and was entitled to recover for loss of earnings. The defendant said that there was in effect a double claim. Held: In order to avoid double recovery there had to be two deductions; first the expenses of earning the income which had been lost and "secondly, the plaintiff's living expenses. This is necessarily a hypothetical figure in the case of a "lost years" claim, since the plaintiff does not survive to earn the money; and since there is no cost of care claim (the plaintiff being assumed to be dead), it falls to be deducted from the loss of earnings award". An award is conventional in the sense that there is no pecuniary guideline which can point the way to a correct assessment.
Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948 2(4)
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