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Personal Injury - From: 1960 To: 1969

This page lists 37 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Gage v King [1961] 1 QB 188; [1960] 3 All ER 62
1960

Diplock J
Personal Injury, Damages
The issue was as to the recoverability, in personal injury proceedings, of the wife's medical expenses which had been paid for by the husband out of the joint account. After referring to the findings which a court may be driven to make in relation to a joint account as between husband and wife where the marriage has ended by death or divorce: "But what is to happen to the balance in the joint account when the marriage breaks up is a very different question from that of the mutual rights of the parties in relation to the account while the marriage is still subsisting. As I have said, I do not think that such an arrangement between husband and wife is meant to be attended with legal consequences as between the two spouses while the marriage is still subsisting. Mrs Gage's right to draw upon the joint account was subject to no legal limitation . .
1 Citers


 
Hamilton v National Coal Board [1960] AC 633
1960
HL
Lord Jenkins
Personal Injury
Lord Jenkins said: "Were it not for the presence in the Act of 1937 of the definition of the word "maintained" quoted above, which has no counterpart in the Act of 1954, I would have no hesitation in regarding the case of Galashiels Gas. Co. Ltd. v Millar as sufficient to conclude the present question in the appellant's favour. The process of construing one statute by reference to another, and treating decisions on the meaning of the latter as determining the construction of the former is a process which should be applied with caution. But in the present case the language, the subject-matter and the intent of (for example) section 24 (1) of the Act of 1937 and section 81 (1) of the Act of 1954 are so closely allied that (apart from the ground of distinction afforded by the omission from the Act of 1954 of the definition contained in the Act of 1937, whatever it may be worth) it would, to my mind, be clearly wrong to give the words "properly maintained" in section 81 (1) a different meaning from that which has been authoritatively assigned to precisely the same words in comparable provisions of the Act of 1937. I confess I would not willingly attribute this to my mind untoward effect to the absence from the Act of 1954 of the definition of the Act of 1937. It would, as I think, be manifestly absurd if the same statutory language applied to two precisely similar machines with precisely similar defects contracted in precisely similar circumstances should give rise to a breach of statutory duty with respect to one of them, but not with respect to the other, merely because the locus in quo was in the one case a mine and the other a factory."
1 Citers


 
Oliver v Ashman [1961] 3 WLR 669; [1961] 3 All ER 323; [1962] 2 QB 210
1961
CA

Damages, Personal Injury
The rule that loss of earnings, in the years lost to an injured plaintiff whose life expectancy had been shortened, were not recoverable, was still good law.
1 Citers


 
Boardman v Sanderson [1961] EWCA Civ 6; [1964] 1 WLR 1317
7 Feb 1961
CA

Personal Injury

[ Bailii ]
 
Withers v Perry Chain Co Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 1314; [1961] EWCA Civ 4; [1961] 3 All ER 676
21 Jul 1961
CA
Sellers LJ, Devlin LJ
Personal Injury
An employee with dermatitis returned to work when it was known both to him and his employers that continuing to work would carry a small risk of it recurring or being exacerbated. Held: The Court allowed the employer’s appeal against the trial judge’s award of damages.
Sellers LJ said: “the defendants gave her what they thought to be the best available work they had. In fact, if she had not taken that work it would seem that she would not have worked at all and would not have earned any wages, which apparently she sought to do. I cannot believe that the common law requires employers to refuse to employ a person who is willing to work for them simply because they think that it is not in the person’s best interests to do the work. That would be imposing a restriction on the freedom of the individual which I think is foreign to the whole spirit of the common law of our country.” and
“there is no duty at common law requiring an employer to dismiss an employee rather than retain him or her in employment and allowing him or her to earn wages, because there may be some risk. The duty of the defendants in this case was to take all reasonable care for the plaintiff in the employment in which she was engaged, including a duty to have regard to the fact that she had had dermatitis previously. Beyond that I do not think the common law can be invoked.”
Devlin LJ: “In my opinion there is no legal duty upon an employer to prevent an adult employee from doing work which he or she is willing to do. If there is a slight risk, as the judge has found, it is for the employee to weigh it against the desirability, or perhaps the necessity, of employment. The relationship between employer and employee is not that of a schoolmaster and pupil. There is no obligation on an employer to offer alternative safe employment, though no doubt a considerate employer would always try to do so - as the defendants thought they had done here. Nor is there any obligation on an employer to dismiss an employee in such circumstances. It cannot be said that an employer is bound to dismiss an employee rather than allow her to run a small risk. The employee is free to decide for herself what risks she will run. I agree with what [Sellers LJ] has said, that if the common law were to be otherwise it would be oppressive to the employee, by limiting his ability to find work, rather than beneficial to him…. It may be also, on the principle of Paris v Stepney Borough Council, that when the susceptibility of an employee to dermatitis is known there is a duty on the employer to take extra or special precautions to protect such an employee."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Wise v Kaye [1961] EWCA Civ 2; [1962] 1 QB 638; [1962] 1 All ER 257; [1962] 2 WLR 96
1 Dec 1961
CA
Sellers LJ, Upjohn LJ, Diplock LJ
Personal Injury, Damages

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 McWilliams v Sir William Arrol and Co Ltd; HL 1962 - [1962] 1 WLR 295; 1962 SC (HL) 70

 
 Browning v War Office; CA 1962 - [1963] 1 QB 750; [1962] 3 All ER 1089
 
Cartledge v E Jopling and Sons Ltd [1962] 1 QB 189
1962
CA
Pearson LJ
Personal Injury, Limitation
The court gave guidance on when an injury passes from being de minimis to being sufficiently significant to found a cause of action: "there is from the beginning some injury occurring from day to day, as each of the minute particles which enter the lung tissue causes some microscopic injury and permanent scarring, but a reasonable application of the de minimis rule postpones the first damage for legal purposes to the point at which the accumulated scarring is sufficient to diminish appreciably the elasticity of the lungs and deprive them of much of their reserve capacity; that point is not likely to be reached for several years, and may not be reached for many years, but when it is reached there is the damage completing the cause of action . . "
1 Citers


 
McWilliams v Sir William Arrol and Company Ltd [1962] UKHL 3; [1962] 1 WLR 295; [1962] 1 All ER 623; [1961] UKHL 8; 1962 SLT 121; 1962 SC (HL) 70
21 Feb 1962
HL
Lord Chancellor, Viscount Simonds, Lord Reid, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Devlin
Negligence, Health and Safety, Personal Injury
Damages were sought after the death of the pursuer's husband working for the respondent. The trial judge had been satisfied that even if the defendants had performed their duty at common law and pursuant to statute, and had provided the deceased steel erector with a safety harness, he would not have worn it, even working 70ft above ground, and he therefore suffered no loss as a consequence of the breach of duty complained of. Held: The claim failed. The House, applying the "but for" test held that the breach of duty did not cause his death. Once the employer is shown to be in breach of duty to provide equipment, the assumption is that it would have been used, because a reasonable employee would use it, unless the employer proves otherwise.
Lord Reid said: "In the end when all the evidence has been brought out it rarely matters where the onus originally lay: The question is which way the balance of probability has come to rest".
Factories Act 1937
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
McWilliams v Sir William Arrol and Co Ltd [1961] UKHL 8; 1962 SLT 121; 1962 SC (HL) 70; [1962] 1 WLR 295
21 Feb 1962
HL

Health and Safety, Personal Injury

[ Bailii ]
 
Videan -v British Transport Commission [1963] 2 All ER 860; [1963] 3 WLR 374; [1963] 2 QB 650
1963
CA
Lord Denning MR, Pearson LJ
Personal Injury
The court was asked as to the duty of a land owner to a trespasser. Held: At least in respect of his own activities an occupier owed the trespasser duty to take care not to injure a trespasser whose presence was foreseeable or reasonably to be anticipated having regard to all the circumstances. Therefore it favoured a duty of exercising reasonable care to guard against infliction of reasonably foreseeable injury. Lord Denning said: "Whichever it is, so long as it is not wanton interference, if the rescuer is killed or injured in the attempt, he can recover damages from the one whose fault has been the cause of it."
Pearson LJ said: "Such persons [occupiers] are entitled to farm lands, operate quarries and factories, run express trains at full speed through stations, fell trees and fire shots without regard to the mere general possibility that there might happen to be in the vicinity a trespasser who might be injured. Such persons do not have to cease or restrict their activities in view of that possibility, which is too remote to be taken into account and could not fairly be allowed to curtail their freedom of action."
1 Citers



 
 Gill v Donald Humberstone and Co Ltd; HL 1963 - [1963] 1 WLR 929; [1963] 3 All ER 180
 
Cartledge v E Jopling and Sons Ltd [1963] AC 758; [1963] 1 All ER 341
1963
HL
Lord Reid, Lord Evershed MR, Lord Pearce
Limitation, Personal Injury
The plaintiffs were steel dressers who, in the course of their employment, had inhaled quantities of noxious dust which had caused them to suffer from pneumoconiosis. They issued proceedings on 1 October 1956 but were unable to show any breach of duty by their employers which contributed to their condition after 1 October 1950. The defendants pleaded that the claims were barred by the six year limitation period under section 2 of the 1939 Act. Held: Lord Reid made it clear that he would have wished to hold "that a cause of action ought not to be held to accrue until either the injured person has discovered the injury or it would be possible for him to discover it if he took such steps as were reasonable in the circumstances". But the House unanimously held that the 1939 Act and established authority precluded it from so holding. Where a defendant sought to rely upon some damage as setting the limitation clock running, the damage referred to must be ‘real’ as distinct from minimal. The common law ought never to produce a wholly unreasonable result.
Lord Pearce said: "It is for a judge or jury to decide whether a man has suffered any actionable harm and in borderline cases it is a question of degree.
It is a question of fact in each case whether a man has suffered material damage by any physical changes in his body. Evidence that those changes are not felt by him and may never be felt tells in favour of the damage coming within the principle of de minimis non curat lex. On the other hand evidence that in unusual exertion or at the onslaught of disease he may suffer from his hidden impairment tells in favour of the damage being substantial." and "The cause of action accrued when it reached a stage, whether known or unknown, at which a judge could properly give damages for the harm that had been done."
Lord Reid: "If this were a matter governed by the common law I would hold that a cause of action ought not to be held to accrue until either the injured person has discovered the injury or it would be possible for him to discover it if he took such steps as were reasonable in the circumstances. The common law ought never to produce a wholly unreasonable result … But the present question depends on statute, the Limitation Act, 1939, and section 26 of that Act appears to me to make it impossible to reach the result which I have indicated."
Limitation Act 1939 2
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Curwen v James [1963] 1 WLR 748
1963
CA

Personal Injury, Damages
An appeal court had a discretion to hear relevant evidence of events after the date of judgment, in this case a change in circumstances of the victim's widow, when considering a claim for damages for personal injury, where that evidence would clearly have impacted on the award.
1 Citers


 
Roles v Nathan [1963] EWCA Civ 6; [1963] 1 WLR 1117; [1963] 2 All ER 908
15 May 1963
CA
Lord Denning MR, Harman, Pearson LJJ
Personal Injury
Two chimney sweeps were overcome by fumes, and died in the basement of the Manchester Assembly Rooms. Whilst occupied working in flues (against advice), a boiler had been lit. Held: (Majority - Pearson LJ dissenting) The land-owner's appeal succeeded.
Lord Denning MR said: "the warnings which were given to the sweeps were enough to enable them to be reasonably safe. The sweeps would have been quite safe if they had heeded these warnings. They should not have come back that evening and attempted to seal up the sweep-hole while the fire was still alight. They ought to have waited till next morning, and then they should have seen that the fire was out before they attempted to seal up the sweep-hole. In any case they should not have stayed too long in the sweep-hole. In short, it was entirely their own fault. The Judge held that it was contributory negligence. I would go further and say that under the Act the occupier has, by the warnings, discharged his duty."
Harman LJ said: "the sweeps had been warned by the occupier through his agent, Collingwood, of the danger which killed them. That, however, as the section says does not without more absolve the occupier from liability. The crucial question is whether, in all the circumstances, the warning was "enough to enable the visitors" ( that is, the sweeps )"to be reasonably safe". In my judgment,it was. The occupier did not request or even authorise the sweeps to close the sweep hole while the fire was alight. Mr Corney did not expect the return of the sweeps on Friday night; they told him they were coming back in the morning. He had arranged that they should do the work on Saturday morning. He said also that he anticipated that the fire burning on Friday night would be out by Saturday morning, thus making the work safe. It is true that the caretaker apparently did not let the fire out, and it is said that Corney failed in his duty because he did not expressly order the caretaker to do so, nor did he expressly forbid the sweeps to attempt the work with the fire on. Nevertheless, these sweeps knew as much about the danger as he did. There was no obligation on than to proceed without drawing the fire, they were free to do so, and they deliberately chose to assume the risk notwithstanding the advice given."
Occupiers' Liability Act 1957
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]

 
 Shepherd v H West and Son Ltd; HL 27-May-1963 - [1963] UKHL 3; [1963] 2 All ER 625; [1963] 2 WLR 1359; [1964] AC 326
 
Hardy v Motor Insurers' Bureau [1964] 2 QB 745; [1964] 2 All ER 742
1964
CA
Diplock LJ, Lord Denning MR
Insurance, Personal Injury, Contract
The court was asked whether insurance pursuant to the Road Traffic Act 1960 would provide valid cover for the benefit of a third party injured by deliberately criminal conduct on the part of the driver. Held: Diplock LJ said: "The rule of law on which the major premise is based - ex turpi causa non oritur actio - is concerned not specifically with the lawfulness of contracts but generally with the enforcement of rights by the courts, whether or not such rights arise under contract. All that the rule means is that the courts will not enforce a right which would otherwise be enforceable if the right arises out of an act committed by the person asserting the right (or by someone who is regarded in law as his successor) which is regarded by the court as sufficiently anti-social to justify the court's refusing to enforce that right."
Diplock LJ said: "It is well settled that if a man commits murder or committed felo de se in the days when suicide was still a crime, neither he nor his personal representatives could be entitled to reap any financial benefit from such an act: In the Estate of Crippen [1911] P. 108; Beresford v. Royal Insurance Co. Ltd . [1938] A.C. 586. This was because the law recognised that, in the public interest, such acts should be deterred and moreover that it would shock the public conscience if a man could use the courts to enforce a money claim either under a contract or a will by reason of his having committed such acts...The court has to weigh the gravity of the anti-social act and the extent to which it will be encouraged by enforcing the right sought to be asserted against the social harm which will be caused if the right is not enforced." As to proposition that all contracts to indemnify a person against a liability which he may incur by committing an intentional crime are unlawful:- "The rule of law . . - ex turpi causa non oritur actio - is concerned not specifically with the lawfulness of contracts but generally with the enforcement of rights by the courts, whether or not such rights arise under the contract. All that the rule means is that the courts will not enforce a right which would otherwise be enforceable if the right arises out of an act committed by the person asserting the right ... which is regarded by the court as sufficiently anti-social to justify the court's refusing to enforce that right."
Lord Denning MR said: "no person can claim indemnity or reparation for his own wilful and culpable crime. He is under a disability precluding him from imposing a claim."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Doughty v Turner Ltd [1964] 1 All ER 98; [1964] 1 QB 518; [1963] EWCA Civ 3; [1964] 2 WLR 240; [1964] 1 All ER 98; [1964] QB 518
1964
CA
ord Pearce, Harman, Diplock LJJ
Negligence, Personal Injury
The cover on a cauldron of exceedingly hot molten sodium cyanide was accidentally knocked into the cauldron and the plaintiff was damaged by the resultant explosion. Held: The plaintiff’s claim failed. The defendant employer owed a duty of care in respect only of a foreseeable risk, that of splashing of the liquid if the cover fell into it.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Haley v London Electricity Board; HL 28-Jul-1964 - [1964] 3 All ER 185; [1964] 3 WLR 479; [1965] AC 778; [1964] UKHL 3
 
Jones v Gleeson (1965) 39 ALJR 258; [1966] ALR 235
1965


Commonwealth, Damages, Personal Injury
(Australia) When a policeman who had retired retired through injury sought damages for that injury, the pension he received as a result of his retirement was to be ignored entirely: "In recent years, however, the relevance or otherwise to the issue of damages of the fact that an injured person is entitled to a pension has been considered by this Court on several occasions (see Paff v. Speed; The National Insurance Co. of New Zealand, Ltd. v. Espagne, and Graham v. Baker n) and a very different view has been taken from that which is expressed in the majority judgments in Browning's case."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Kelly v Edmund Nuttall Sons and Co. (London) Ltd [1965] ScotCS CSIH_3; 1965 SC 427; 1965 SLT 418
15 Jul 1965
SCS

Scotland, Personal Injury

1 Cites

[ Bailii ]

 
 M'Glone v British Railways Board; HL 27-Oct-1965 - [1966] SC (HL) 1 HL(Sc); [1965] UKHL 2; 1966 SC 1; 1966 SLT 2
 
Ward v James [1966] 1 QB 273
1966
CA
Lord Denning MR
Personal Injury, Damages
The court rejected the suggestion that greater uniformity in awards of general damages in personal injury actions could be achieved by telling juries of awards in other cases, but instead abolished juries in such cases. Sums awarded are "basically a conventional figure derived from experience and from awards in comparable cases".

 
Taylor v Coalite Oils and Chemicals Ltd (1967) 3 KIR 315
1967
CA
Diplock LJ
Personal Injury
The section is part of a scheme of criminal liability, from which any civil liability only follows "by judicial interpretation". Diplock LJ said: "The occupier's duty in respect of working places is not to prevent accidents occurring to persons working at them but to take all such measures as are reasonably practicable to make and keep the working place safe for such persons. 'Safe' is the converse of 'dangerous'. A working place is safe if there is nothing there which might be a reasonably foreseeable cause of injury to anyone working there, acting in a way in which a human being may reasonably be expected to act, in circumstances which may reasonably be expected to occur."
Factories Act 1937 29(2)
1 Citers



 
 Chadwick v British Railways Board; 1967 - [1967] 1 WLR 912; [1967] 2 All ER 945
 
Randall v The Motor Insurers Bureau [1968] 1 WLR 1190
1968
QBD
Megaw J
Road Traffic, Personal Injury
A school sergeant attempted to stop a vehicle which had been fly-tipping on private school land from leaving the land by standing in front of it. When the lorry moved toward him, the driver being determined to leave, he was forced to jump to one side. The front wing of the lorry caught him as he did so, causing no substantial injury, but he was then trapped between the moving lorry as it left the private premises and the escarpment of a raised bank to the side of the entrance. He was pulled forward as the lorry passed him, eventually falling to the ground with his head and shoulders inside the boundary of the school property and his legs outstretched, although he did not remember in which direction. A rear wheel of the lorry passed over his leg, fracturing it. At the time the rear wheel passed over his leg the front wheels of the lorry were already well out onto the public road beyond and the driver had started to turn the lorry into his direction of travel. The only question was whether the bodily injury was caused by or arose out of the use of the lorry on a road. The statutory question was whether the injuries were caused by or arose out of the use of a vehicle on a road within sections 203(3)(a) and 257 of the Road Traffic Act 1960. Held: Megaw J said: "In my judgment the answer to that question on the facts of this case is 'yes'. I have no doubt that in common sense and in the ordinary use of language the lorry was being used on a road . . at the time when the plaintiff sustained the serious injury of which he complains. If anything turns on the precise time of the incident, which again as a matter of common sense cannot be divided into a series of separate incidents, the determining factor is the time when the wheel of the lorry ran over the plaintiff's leg. At that time the greater part of the lorry was on the road and the lorry as a whole was using the road. The fact that the rear part of the lorry, including the wheel which ran over the plaintiff's leg, was still just on private property does not, in my view, affect the conclusion that the lorry was then using the road. It was the use of the lorry on the road, the fact that it was being driven further onto the road in order to drive away along the road, which caused the injury. Certainly the injury arose out of the use of the lorry on the road. The fact that the plaintiff when he was injured was still, though only just, on private property and that the wheel which caused the injury was still just on private property, does not, to my mind, affect the conclusion. The plaintiff therefore succeeds in his claim."
Road Traffic Act 1960
1 Citers



 
 Stokes v Guest Keen and Nettlefold (Nuts and Bolts) Ltd; QBD 1968 - [1968] 1 WLR 1776
 
Burnside v Emerson [1968] 1 WLR 1490
1968
CA
Diplock LJ, Lord Denning MR
Transport, Personal Injury
A car crashed as a result of running into a pool of storm-water lying across the road. The pool had been caused by the authority's failure properly to maintain the drainage system, which had become blocked. Held. The claim succeeded. Diplock LJ described the statutory obligation of a highway authority to maintain the highway as being "a duty not merely to keep a highway in such a state of repair as it is at any particular time, but to put it in such good repair as renders it reasonably passable for the ordinary traffic of the neighbourhood at all seasons of the year without danger caused by its physical condition." The duty to repair includes the drainage system, but not every flood is evidence of a failure to maintain.
Lord Denning MR said that the action for breach of the statutory duty involved the plaintiff showing both that the road was in a dangerous condition, such that injury may reasonably be anticipated to persons using the highway; and also that the dangerous condition was due to a failure to maintain; and that in this connection a distinction should be drawn between a permanent danger due to want of repair and a merely transient danger due to the elements: only the former was actionable.
Highways Act 1959 44(1)
1 Citers


 
Keating v Elvan Reinforced Concrete Co Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 722
1968


Personal Injury

New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 81
1 Citers


 
Brown v North British Steel Foundry Ltd 1968 SC 51
1968
OHCS
Lord President Clyde
Scotland, Personal Injury, Limitation
The 1954 Act passed on 4 June 1954 but was not to affect any action or proceeding if the cause of action arose before that date. The Lord Ordinary found that the pursuer who sought damages for pneumoconiosis did not begin to suffer from until 1955. But the pursuer contended that the injury had been done to his lungs by 1949 because he had been inhaling dangerous dust for some years before that and, as subsequent events showed, he was susceptible to pneumoconiosis in 1949. So the cause of action had arisen at that date. The First Division of the Court of Session rejected that argument. Held: Lord President Clyde said that there was no cause of action in 1949 and added: "To create a cause of action, injuria and damnum are essential ingredients. In the present case there is no evidence of any injuries to the workman's lungs in 1949. He had then merely a deposit of dust in his lungs, which might or might not subsequently create an injury. But, in addition, he had then sustained no damnum. He could not then have been awarded damages for any loss, because at that stage he had sustained no loss of wages and had suffered none of the discomforts and disabilities which, he avers, followed upon the onset of pneumoconiosis and which in fact flowed from the outbreak of that disease in 1955."
Law Reform (Limitation of Actions etc) Act 1954
1 Citers


 
Wieland v Cyril Lord Carpets Ltd [1969] 3 All ER 1006
1969

Eveleigh J
Damages, Personal Injury
The plaintiff suffered injury from the admitted negligence of the defendant. After attending the hospital she felt shaken and the movement of her head was constricted by a collar which had been fitted to her neck. In consequence she was unable to use her bi-focal spectacles with her usual skill and she fell while descending stairs, sustaining further injury. Held: Eveleigh J gave an account of the meaning in law of forseeability, saying: "In the present case I am concerned with the extent of harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of actionable injury. In my view the injury and damage suffered because of the second fall are attributable to the original negligence of the defendant so as to attract compensation. If necessary I think the plaintiff’s case can also be put against the defendant in another way. If it can be said that it is foreseeable that one injury may affect a person’s ability to cope with the vicissitudes of life and thereby be a cause of another injury and if foreseeability is required, that is to say, if foreseeability is the right word in this context, foreseeability of the general nature will, in my view, suffice."
1 Citers


 
Newton v Cammell Laird and Co (Shipbuilders and Engineers) Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 415
1969
CA
Lord Denning MR, Widgery LJ
Personal Injury, Limitation
The court considered when the limitation period in a personal injury claim would start to run, where the plaintiff might be unaware of the damage: "You have to ask yourself: At what date was it reasonable for him - for the sick man himself - to have taken advice and found out that his illness was due to his employer's negligence or breach of duty. You do not ask: At what date would a reasonable person have taken advice. You ask: At what date was it reasonable for this man to take it? In other words, at what date ought he to have taken advice and found out that he had a worthwhile action?" Widgery LJ: "When one has to consider constructive notice under section 7(5)(c) it is necessary to look at all the circumstances of the particular individual concerned to see whether, when all those circumstances are looked at in the round, it can be said that his failure to take advice was reasonable."
Limitation Act 1963 7(5)(c)
1 Citers



 
 Murphy v Stone-Wallwork (Charlton) Ltd; HL 1969 - [1969] 1 WLR 1023
 
Waghorn v Wimpey (George) and Co [1969] 1 WLR 1764
1969

Geoffrey Lane J
Personal Injury, Litigation Practice
The plaintiff pleaded that he slipped on a bank, but the evidence was that he slipped on a path. Held: The variation in the case presented from that pleaded was fatal to the case. The court considered such variations: "In the present case Mr Archer contends that the true version of the facts is just a variation, modification or development of what is averred, and is not something new, separate and distinct. The only similarities, however, between the plaintiff's allegations in his pleadings, the way his case was presented, and what in fact took place were these: first of all, the plaintiff slipped; secondly, he slipped at his place of work; and thirdly, he slipped somewhere near a caravan, when it is alleged that he did slip somewhere near a caravan. But the whole burden of the claim put forward by the plaintiff, and the whole burden of the defence to that claim prepared by the defendants and put forward on their behalf by Mr Machin, has been the safety or otherwise of the bank, and not the safety or otherwise of the path at the right-hand side of the caravan, where it runs alongside the dip. In my judgment, this is not a case which is just a variation, modification or development of what is averred. It is a case which is new, separate and distinct, and not merely a technicality. Let me hasten to add that if matters emerge, particularly matters of technicality which, perhaps, could not be foreseen by those responsible for pleading cases, and those things emerge during a case, then it would be quite wrong to dismiss a plaintiff's claim because his pleadings have not measured up to the technical facts which have emerged. One often listens sympathetically to applications to amend in those circumstances. Here, however, there is nothing technical at all. A man is said to have slipped. There is nothing technical about that. One must test the plaintiff's submissions in this way: if these allegations had been made upon the pleadings in the first place, namely allegations based upon the facts as they have now emerged, would the defendant's preparation of the case, and conduct of the trial, have been any different? The answer to that is undoubtedly ´Yes.' Evidence would have been sought as to the safety of the pathway alongside the caravan; as to the frequency with which it was used; as to the position of the valve under the caravan. I say that because there was a dispute as to its precise position. Mr Younger, the charge-hand, said it was on the left-hand side of the caravan. Mr Frost said it was on the right-hand side. If the plaintiff's case had been pleaded to the effect that it was whilst he was on his way to that valve that he had slipped, then the preparation of the case would have been entirely different and its presentation would have been different. There was no application here for leave to amend. Indeed, Mr Archer may have been very wise not to make any such application, but the upshot of this matter is that this was clearly so radical a departure from the case as pleaded as to disentitle the plaintiff to succeed."
1 Citers


 
Devine v Colvilles Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 475; [1969] UKHL 11; [1969] 2 All ER 53; 1969 SC (HL) 67
11 Mar 1969
HL

Scotland, Personal Injury
The House considered the position of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitir. The plaintiff had been injured falling or jumping from a raised platform. Held: The claim succeeded. " I hold it proved that there was a general panic. Now the defenders must take men as they are, and all men are not brave and wise neither are all men cowardly and foolish. Within these two limits there must be infinite variety. All men would not act with the exemplary courage which was shown by Mr Haggart. Plainly he was the exception amongst those who were present. If the pursuer did jump from the platform, which is the worst for him, in my opinion that was a reaction which, in the circumstances of this explosion, must be held as being within reasonable contemplation. If he had been a man of stronger fibre, possibly his reaction would have been different, but his reaction to the situation was not so absurd as to be beyond foreseeability. On the contrary, in my opinion it was just the reaction which might be anticipated where conditions were such as to have caused a general panic among the men at the plant.
It follows in my view that the defence of foreseeability fails."
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
McKew v Holland and Hannan and Cubitts [1969] 3 All ER 1621; [1969] UKHL 9; [1969] UKHL 12
26 Nov 1969
HL
Lord Reid
Personal Injury, Negligence
The appellant had been injured in the course of his employment for which the respondents were liable. Sometimes his left leg would gave way beneath him. He was descending a steep staircase without a handrail when the leg collapsed and he tried to jump down the stairs so that he would land in a standing position rather than falling over down the stairs. He suffered a severe fracture of his ankle. Held: Lord Reid: "In my view the law is clear. If a man is injured in such a way that his leg may give way at any moment he must act reasonably and carefully. It is quite possible that in spite of all reasonable care his leg may give way in circumstances such that as a result he sustains further injury. Then that second injury was caused by his disability which in turn was caused by the defender's fault. But if the injured man acts unreasonably he cannot hold the defender liable for injury caused by his own unreasonable conduct. His unreasonable conduct is novus actus interveniens. The chain of causation has been broken and what follows must be regarded as caused by his own conduct and not by the defender's fault or the disability caused by it. Or one may say that unreasonable conduct of the pursuer and what follows from it is not the natural and probable result of the original fault of the defender or of the ensuing disability. I do not think that foreseeability comes into this. A defender is not liable for a consequence of a kind which is not foreseeable. But it does not follow that he is liable for every consequence which a reasonable man could foresee. What can be foreseen depends almost entirely on the facts of the case, and it is often easy to foresee unreasonable conduct or some other nouvs actus interveniens as being quite likely. But that does not mean that the defender must pay for damage caused by the nouvs actus. It only leads to trouble that if one tries to graft on to the concept of foreseeability some rule of law to the effect that a wrongdoer is not bound to foresee something which in fact he could readily foresee as quite likely to happen. For it is not at all unlikely or unforeseeable that an active man who has suffered such a disability will take some quite unreasonable risk. But if he does he cannot hold the defender liable for the consequences.
So in my view the question here is whether the second accident was caused by the appellant doing something unreasonable."
1 Citers

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