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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Police - From: 1995 To: 1995

This page lists 19 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Regina v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, Ex parte P (1995) 160 JP 367
1995
QBD
Simon Brown LJ, Curtis J
Police
A court may set aside a police caution where the defendant had not made a clear admission of guilt. Simon Brown LJ: "It follows, in my judgment, that there was here no clear and reliable admission of guilt at any stage. I am invited to look at the evidence in the round and cumulatively to find such an admission. I decline to do so. In my judgment, the applicant made no admission of guilt, whether as an aider and abettor, or on the basis of joint enterprise. In short, I conclude that there was here the clearest failure to comply with the condition that the offender must admit the offence, and that a caution will not be appropriate without such a clear and reliable admission".
1 Citers


 
Trobridge v Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147
1995


Commonwealth, Police, Personal Injury

1 Citers


 
Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire Gazette, 15 February 1995; Times, 13 January 1995; [1995] 1WLR 804; [1995] 4 All ER 473
13 Jan 1995
QBD
Laws J
Intellectual Property, Police, Media, Human Rights
The police were asked by shopkeepers concerned about shoplifting, for photographs of thieves so that the staff would recognise them. The police provided photographs including one of the claimant taken in custody. The traders were told only to show them to staff. Held: A duty of confidence could arise when the police photographed a suspect without his consent, but the photograph could be published if reasonably required for the prevention and detection of crime, the investigation of alleged offences, or the apprehension of suspects unlawfully at large. The police could rely on the public interest defence to any action for breach of confidence. The police in disclosing the photograph acted entirely in good faith for the prevention or detection of crime and had distributed it only to persons who had reasonable need to make use of it. However "the term “reasonable” is fluid in its application and it is as impossible as it is undesirable to lay down anything like a lexicon of the circumstances that will amount to reasonable use." (Obiter:) "If someone with a telephoto lens were to take from a distance and with no authority a picture of another engaged in some private act, his subsequent disclosure of the photograph would, in my judgment, as surely amount to a breach of confidence as if he had found or stolen a letter or diary in which the act was recounted and proceeded to publish it. In such a case, the law would protect what might reasonably be called a right of privacy, although the name accorded to the cause of action would be breach of confidence. It is, of course, elementary that, in all such cases, a defence based on the public interest would be available."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Taylor v Anderton (Police Complaints Authority Intervening) Independent, 28 February 1995; Gazette, 15 March 1995; Times, 19 January 1995; [1995] 1 WLR 447
19 Jan 1995
CA
Sir Thomas Bingham MR, Rose, Morritt LJJ
Police, Defamation, Litigation Practice
Reports, which had been prepared for the purposes of a police complaint procedure, could be entitled to protection from disclosure under a public interest immunity certificate. The court also considered the relationship between the documentation and the decision as to whether a trial wasto be by judge alone, or with a jury. Cost is also a consideration: 'The case as it stands will be very lengthy, very expensive, very burdensome and very difficult to control if tried by a judge alone. If tried by a judge and jury it will be even lengthier, even more expensive, even more burdensome and even more difficult to control.' The fact that sight of a document for inspection may give the inspecting party a litigious advantage in the litigation does not of itself make production of the document unfair: "The crucial consideration is, in my judgment, the meaning of the expression 'disposing fairly of the cause or matter'. Those words direct attention to the question whether inspection is necessary for the fair determination of the matter, whether by trial or otherwise. The purpose of the rule is to ensure that one party does not enjoy an unfair advantage or suffer an unfair disadvantage in the litigation as a result of a document not being produced for inspection. It is, I think, of no importance that a party is curious about the contents of a document or would like to know the contents of it, if he suffers no litigious disadvantage by not seeing it and would gain no litigious advantage by seeing it. That, in my judgment, is the test."
1 Citers


 
Friedl v Austria (1995) 21 EHRR 83; 15225/89; [1995] ECHR 12; [1995] ECHR 15225/89; [1995] ECHR 15974/90; (1996) 21 EHRR 1; (1995) 21 EHRR 83
31 Jan 1995
ECHR

Human Rights, Police
The Commission distinguished between the taking and keeping of photographs without identifying the subjects, and police questioning in order to establish identity and the recording of these personal data; the former was not an interference with article 8(1) but the latter was, although it was 'relatively slight' (Later friendly settlement).
1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Kumar v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Unreported, 31 January 1995
31 Jan 1995
CA
Sir Ralph Gibson
Police, Negligence
The claimant complained that in instituting and continuing a patently hopeless prosecution for rape, based only on the evidence of a woman who had made repeated false allegations of rape, the police had acted in breach of a duty of care to him. Held: The claimant's appeal against the striking out of his claim failed. Sir Ralph Gibson: "In my judgment, for similar reasons [to those given in Elguzouli-Daf], the interests of the whole community are better served by not imposing a duty of care upon the police officers in their decisions whether or not to place sufficient reliance upon the account of a complainant to justify the making of a charge against an accused."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Office Ind Summary, 27 February 1995
27 Feb 1995
QBD

Police
Original complainant not entitled to see Home Secretary's order on appeal.

 
Guenat v Switzerland 24722/94; (1995) 810A DR 130
10 Apr 1995
ECHR

Human Rights, Police
Article 5 did not apply to a claim of false imprisonment by the police where they had acted through necessity.
European Convention on Human Rights 5
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
In Re L (Minors)(Police Investigation) (Privilege) Times, 25 April 1995
25 Apr 1995
CA

Children, Police
A report voluntarily given to a court hearing care proceedings, may be released to the police.
1 Citers


 
Wilding v Chief Constable of Lancashire Unreported, 22 May 1995
22 May 1995
CA
Nourse, Beldam and Kennedy LJJ
Police, Torts - Other
The court considered a claim by a woman for wrongful arrest and unlawful detention by police officers who had reasonably suspected her of burglary of the house of her former partner. In interview by the police, she denied the offence and made assertions that prompted the officers to contact the complainant to ask him to attend the police station to deal with them before continuing with the interview. Within about two hours after the complainant had been contacted and had made a statement, the police decided that there would be no further enquiries. They released the woman without charge, initially on bail, and subsequently did not charge her with any offence. On the issue whether it had been necessary, by reference to section 37(2) and (3) of PACE, to detain her in custody while they made those further enquiries. Held: Attempts to define, or to provide synonyms for, 'necessary' should be avoided. In such circumstances a court: "should ask itself the question, in circumstances like this, whether the decision of the custody sergeant was unreasonable in the sense that no custody officer, acquainted with the ordinary use of language and applying his common sense to the competing considerations before him, could reasonably have reached that decision.
Applying that test in this case, I bear in mind that what was being suggested was a comparatively short period of detention, so that the officers, having checked with . . the complainant . . whether or not there had been, for example, one telephone call about money or whether the appellant did in fact owe him any money, might then continue the interview, or restart the interview, for the purpose they had contended they had, which was obtaining evidence relating to the offence by questioning her. Looking at the matter from that standpoint, it seems to me that the custody officer could reasonably, in the circumstances of this case, have come to the conclusion that he had reasonable grounds for believing that the detention of the appellant without being charged was necessary within the meaning of the section."
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 37(2) 37(3)
1 Citers


 
Woods v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis Unreported, 26 May 1995
26 May 1995
CA
Nourse, Beldam and Kennedy LJJ
Police, Torts - Other
The court in considering the period of detention of the claimant, asked itself whether the circumstances were such that the decision of the custody sergeant was unreasonable in the sense that no custody sergeant, applying common sense to the competing considerations before him, could have continued to detain the suspect.
1 Citers



 
 Baldwin v West Yorkshire Police, orse Baldwin v Director of Public Prosecutions; QBD 3-Jul-1995 - Ind Summary, 03 July 1995; [1996] RTR 238

 
 Connolly v Dale; QBD 11-Jul-1995 - Times, 13 July 1995; [1996] QB 120; [1995] 3 WLR 786; [1996] 1 Cr App R 200; Independent, 27 July 1995; [1996] 1 All ER 224
 
Martin v Watson Times, 14 July 1995; Gazette, 06 September 1995; Independent, 19 July 1995; [1996] AC 74; [1995] 3 WLR 318; [1995] 3 All ER 559; [1995] UKHL 25
13 Jul 1995
HL
Lord Keith of Kinkel
Torts - Other, Police
The plaintiff had been falsely reported to the police by the defendant, a neighbour, for indecent exposure whilst standing on a ladder in his garden. He had been arrested and charged, but at a hearing before the Magistrates' Court, the Crown Prosecution Service offered no evidence, and the charge was dismissed. He appealed against the decision that he could not claim in malicious prosecution. Held: The appeal succeeded, though there was no English authority on the topic. Since the facts relating to the alleged offence were solely within the complainant's knowledge, and that as a practical matter the police officer who laid the information could not have exercised any independent discretion, the complainant could be sued for malicious prosecution, and upheld an award of damages against her. The complainant had "in substance procured the prosecution". The police officer to whom the complaint was made had no way of testing the truthfulness of the accusation.
The tort of malicious prosecution can be committed by a informer knowingly and maliciously laying a false complaint to the police. The actions taken by the police are insufficient intervention to interfere with that liability. To ground a claim for malicious prosecution a plaintiff must prove (1) that the law was set in motion against him on a criminal charge; (2) that the prosecution was determined in his favour; (3) that it was without reasonable and proper cause, and (4) that it was malicious.
Lord Keith said: "It is common ground that the ingredients of the tort of malicious prosecution are correctly stated in Clerk & Lindsell on Torts ´In action of malicious prosecution the plaintiff must show first that he was prosecuted by the defendant, that is to say, that the law was set in motion against him on a criminal charge; secondly, that the prosecution was determined in his favour; and thirdly, that it was without reasonable and probable cause; fourthly, that it was malicious.'" and "The essential feature of malicious prosecution is an abuse of the process of the Court. If that has occurred it is immaterial that the abuse has involved giving evidence in a court of law."
and "Where an individual falsely and maliciously gives a police officer information indicating that some person is guilty of a criminal offence and states that he is willing to give evidence in court of the matters in question, it is properly to be inferred that he desires and intends that the person he names should be prosecuted. Where the circumstances are such that the facts relating to the alleged offence can be within the knowledge only of the complainant, as was the position here, then it becomes virtually impossible for the police officer to exercise any independent discretion or judgment, and if a prosecution is instituted by the police officer the proper view of the matter is that the prosecution has been procured by the complainant."
Lord Keith also said: "Analogies were sought to be drawn with the immunity afforded in respect of evidence given in a court of law, which extends also to statements made to solicitors engaged in preparation for pending proceedings: Watson v M'Ewan . . No such analogy is, however, helpful. The essential feature of malicious prosecution is an abuse of the process of the court. If that has occurred it is immaterial that the abuse has involved giving evidence in a court of law. That was held in Roy v Prior [1971] A.C. 470 in relation to an action for malicious arrest . .
Similar considerations apply to statements made to the police under circumstances where the maker falls to be regarded as having in substance procured the prosecution. There is no way of testing the truthfulness of such statements before the prosecution is brought. To deny any remedy to a person whose liberty has been interfered with as a result of unfounded and malicious accusations in such circumstances would constitute a serious denial of justice."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Police Complaints Authority ex parte Hanratty Unreported, 25 July 1995
25 Jul 1995

Brooke J
Police
The court was asked whether the Police Complaints Authority had a power to re-open its own decision. Brooke J said: "Each of these cases turns on the particular statutory background . . (I leave open for another day) the question whether in any conceivable circumstances the PCA might be able to reopen a decision. I am quite clear, however, on the facts of this case, bearing in mind the statutory framework and the effect of a decision to grant a dispensation from the requirement of the regulations, which was communicated to the police and to the applicants in accordance with the PCA's duties, that there is no room in that statutory framework for the PCA then to reconsider their decision in the light of new submissions made to them by the applicant."
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Chief Constable of Sussex, Ex Parte International Trader's Ferry Ltd; QBD 28-Jul-1995 - Times, 31 July 1995; Independent, 28 July 1995; [1996] QB 197

 
 McCann and Others v The United Kingdom; ECHR 6-Oct-1995 - Times, 09 October 1995; Independent, 06 October 1995; 18984/91; (1996) 21 EHRR 97; A324 (1995); [1995] ECHR 31; [1995] ECHR 31

 
 Regina v Nicol and Selvanayagam; QBD 10-Nov-1995 - [1996] Crim LR 318; [1995] Times LR 607; (1996) 160 JP 155

 
 In Re G (A Minor) (Social Worker: Disclosure); CA 14-Nov-1995 - Times, 14 November 1995; Gazette, 06 December 1995; Independent, 08 December 1995; [1996] 1 WLR 1407; [1996] 1 FLR 276
 
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