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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Police - From: 1992 To: 1992

This page lists 10 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Marcel v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1992] Ch 225; [1992] 1 All ER 72
1992
CA
Nolan LJ, Dillon LJ, Sir Christopher Slade
Police, Intellectual Property, Human Rights
A writ of subpoena ad duces tecum had been issued requiring the production by the police for use in civil proceedings of documents seized during a criminal fraud investigation. The victim of the fraud needed them to pursue his own civil case. Held: The court discharged the injunction granted at first instance and held that the police were obliged to comply with a subpoena which could only be resisted on grounds which would have been available to the true owner of the documents.
The statutory powers given to the police are coupled with a public law duty. The precise extent of the duty is difficult to define in general terms beyond saying that the powers must be exercised only in the public interest and with due regard to the rights of individuals. In the context of the seizure and retention of documents, the public law duty is combined with a private law duty of confidentiality towards the owner of the documents.
Dillon LJ said: "Even where a subpoena has been served, the police should not disclose the seized documents to the advisers of a party to civil proceedings in advance of the attendance at court required by the subpoena, unless at the least the police have first given to the true owner of the documents notice of the service of the subpoena and of the wish of the police to produce the documents in advance of the attendance at court required by the subpoena, and have given the true owner a reasonable opportunity to state his objections, if any, to that course." and "The responsibilities which are by law and custom entrusted to the police are wide and varied. The powers conferred upon them must be considered against the background of those responsibilities. If the hands of the police were too strictly tied with regard to the use of documents and information acquired under compulsory powers then the public interest would suffer . . The statutory powers given to the police are plainly coupled with a public law duty. The precise extent of that duty is, I think, difficult to define in general terms beyond saying that the powers must be exercised only in the public interest and with due regard to the rights of individuals."
Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC at first instance had said that section 22 referred to the duration of retention, not to its purpose: "However, there manifestly must be some limitation on the purposes for which seized documents can be used. Search and seizure under statutory powers constitute fundamental infringements of the individual's immunity from interference by the state with his property and privacy – fundamental human rights. Where there is a public interest which requires some impairment of those rights, Parliament legislates to permit such impairment. But, in the absence of clear words, in my judgment Parliament cannot be assumed to have legislated so as to interfere with the basic rights of the individual to a greater extent than is necessary to secure the protection of that public interest. In the case of this Act, it is plainly necessary to trench upon the individual's right to his property and privacy for the purpose of permitting the police to investigate and prosecute crime; hence the powers conferred by Part II of the Act. But in my judgment Parliament should not be taken to have authorised use of seized documents for any purpose the police think fit. For example, could the police provide copies of seized documents to the Press save in cases where publicity is necessary for the pursuit of their criminal investigations? . . In my judgment, subject to any express statutory provision in other Acts, the police are authorised to seize, retain and use documents only for public purposes related to the investigation and prosecution of crime and the return of stolen property to the true owner. Those investigations and prosecutions will normally be by the police themselves and involve no communication of documents or information to others. However, if communication to others is necessary for the purpose of the police investigation and prosecution, it is authorised. It may also be, though I do not decide, that there are other public authorities to which documents can properly be disclosed, for example to City and other regulatory authorities or to the security services. But in my judgment the powers to seize and retain are conferred for the better performance of public functions by public bodies and cannot be used to make information available to private individuals for their private purposes."
Sir Christopher Slade said: "In my judgment, documents seized by a public authority from a private citizen in exercise of a statutory power can properly be used only for those purposes for which the relevant legislation contemplated that they might be used . . As a starting point, therefore, it is necessary to consider the purposes for which Parliament contemplated that documents seized under the powers conferred by Part II of the Act of 1984 might properly be used by the police. In my judgment, those purposes must be co-terminous with the purposes for which it envisaged that such documents might properly be retained by the police. The Vice Chancellor, ante, p.234B, stated that "Section 22 is dealing with the duration not the purpose of retention." I do not, for my part, read the scope of section 22 as being so limited as this. Not only does section 22(2) specify certain stated purposes for which anything seized for the purposes of a criminal investigation may be retained, but the subsection is prefaced by the words "Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) above." These prefacing words presuppose that subsection (1) has itself specified, albeit in general terms, the purposes for which documents seized by virtue of section 19 or 20 may be retained. Accordingly, it seems to me, they presuppose that the phrase in subsection (1), "so long as is necessary in all the circumstances," has specified in general terms not only the duration but also the purposes for which retention of seized documents may continue."
What then is the meaning of the phrase in section 22(1), "so long as is necessary in all the circumstances?" In my judgment, in its context, this phrase can only mean: so long as is necessary for carrying out the purposes for which the powers given by sections 19 and 20 have been conferred. I shall not attempt a comprehensive statement of those purposes. They clearly include inter alia the primary purposes of investigating and prosecuting crime and the return to the true owner of property believed to have been obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence. Further, the relevant sections would, I think, authorise acts which were reasonably incidental to the pursuit of those primary purposes, thus including in appropriate circumstances the disclosure to third parties of seized documents."
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 22
1 Citers


 
Regina v Central Criminal Court ex parte A J D Holdings Ltd Unreported 14 February 92
14 Feb 1992
CACD
Nolan LJ
Police
Nolan LJ said that the phrase used in section 15(6)(b), "so far as is practicable," is imprecise and that it may well be impossible to draw a clear line between what is and what is not practicable.
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 15(6)(b)
1 Citers


 
Chief Constable of West Midlands Police v White Unreported, 13 March 1992
13 Mar 1992
CA
Tudor Evans J, Beldam LJ
Police, Magistrates
After conviction for licensing offences, the police seized a sum of money from the respondent which they alleged was the proceeds of unlicensed sales. The magistrates made no order on conviction, so the police brought the issue under the Act. The magistrate found that the money was the proceeds of illegal trading, but nevertheless held that Mr White was the owner of it. The police appealed. Held: The appeal was dismissed. Although the contracts for sale of unlicensed liquor were void and unenforceable, Mr White did become the owner of the money; it was impossible to identify any other persons as being the true owners of it; and the magistrate was not constrained on public policy grounds from making an order under the Act in favour of Mr White.
Police (Property) Act 1897 1
1 Citers


 
Plange v Chief Constable for Humberside Police Times, 23 March 1992; [1992] 156 LG Rev 1024; (1992) TLR 137
23 Mar 1992
CA
Parker LJ
Police, Torts - Other
Where an arresting officer knows at the time of arrest that no charge is possible, the arresting officer acts unlawfully. However, it is for the claimant to establish on Wednesbury principles that the decision to arrest in any particular case was unlawful for want of proper exercise of discretion. Parker LJ said that "it will only be in very exceptional cases that the condition precedent [in section 24(6) reasonable grounds to suspect] being satisfied, a Wednesbury challenge can succeed".
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Chief Constable of Lancashire Ex Parte Parker and Another; QBD 27-May-1992 - Gazette, 27 May 1992; [1993] QB 577; [1993] 2 All ER 56; [1993] 2 WLR 428

 
 Regina v Cox; 18-Sep-1992 - (Unreported), 18 September 1992; Times, 02 December 1992; [1992] CLY 886
 
Osman and another v Ferguson and another [1993] 4 All ER 344; [1992] EWCA Civ 8
7 Oct 1992
CA
Lord Justice McCowan
Police, Negligence
A schoolmaster developed an infatuation for a teenage pupil. It led to the killing of Ahmet's father, Ali, the wounding of Ahmet, the wounding of a deputy headmaster and the killing of the deputy headmaster's son. Mr Osman's widow and Ahmet claimed against, with another, the Commissioner of Metropolitan Police. The defendant appealed against arefusal to strike out the claim. Held: The appeal was allowed. In light of previous authorities, no action could lie against the police in negligence in the investigation and suppression of crime on the grounds that public policy required an immunity from suit. The Commissioner and his officers owed Ali and Ahmet no duty of care.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 D'Souza v Director of Public Prosecutions; HL 15-Oct-1992 - [1992] UKHL 10; [1992] 4 All ER 545; [1992] 1 WLR 1073
 
Goodwin and Another v Chief Constable of Lancashire Gazette, 02 December 1992
2 Dec 1992
CA

Criminal Evidence, Police
A Police training manual was properly withheld from discovery in the public interest.

 
Regina v Southampton Crown Court ex parte J and P [1993] Crim LR 962
21 Dec 1992

Watkins LJ, Auld LJ
Police, Legal Professions
A special material warrant was quashed, partly because it was too widely drawn. It was suspected that there had been thefts from the solicitor's firms client account. Watkins LJ discussed the need for a judge to give reasons for a decision under section 9 of the 1984 Act allowing the police to have access to special procedure materials: "The Act does not require a circuit judge to give reasons when making an order inter partes or issuing a warrant ex parte for access to special procedure material. However, challenges to decisions of circuit judges which have come before this Court demonstrate, in my opinion, especially as to ex parte applications, the need for this to be done. Reasons need not be elaborate, but they should be recorded and be sufficient to identify the substance of any relevant information or representation put before the judge in addition to the written information. They should set out what inferences he has drawn from the material relevant to the statutory conditions governing the content and form of the order or warrant sought. Where he has considered the question of legal privilege he should explain why, if he does, he has included in the order or warrant material which is prima facie privileged, or why he has excluded material as subject to privilege. In the latter case, where the excluded material consists of particular documents or categories of documents which might otherwise be included in the material to which access is given, he should explain why, if he does, he has included in the order or warrant material which is prima facie privileged, or why he has excluded material as subject to privilege. In the latter case, where the excluded material consists of particular documents or categories of documents which might otherwise be included in the material to which access is given, he should carefully describe and identify them in the order or warrant.
These requirements may seem onerous for the exercise of a power to which the police often seek recourse as a matter of urgency. But a Circuit Judge has a responsibility not only to assist the effective investigation of crime, but also to protect as needs be the holder of and the person in respect of whom he holds material in confidence from unjustified intrusion into their private affairs."
Auld LJ said: "the fact that a solicitor is himself under investigation is not of itself necessarily a sufficient reason for ordering such an intrusion into his affairs and those of his clients. All the circumstances of the individual application must be taken into account, including, for example, the seriousness of the matter being investigated, the evidence already available to the police to found a prosecution based on it, and the extent to which the solicitor has already been put on notice of interest on his affairs such as might have caused him to hide or destroy or otherwise interfere with incriminating documents."
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 9
1 Citers


 
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