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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Police - From: 1970 To: 1979

This page lists 20 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Donnelly v Jackman [1970] CLY 2218; [1970] NZLR 980; [1970] 1 WLR 562
1970

Turner J
Police, Crime, Commonwealth
Turner J considered the law of attempt: "He who sets out to commit a crime may in the event fall short of the complete commission of that crime for any one of a number of reasons. First, he may, of course, simply change his mind before committing any act sufficiently overt to amount to an attempt. Second, he may change his mind, but too late to deny that he had got so far as an attempt. Third, he may be prevented by some outside agency from doing some act necessary to complete commission of the crime—as when a police officer interrupts him while he is endeavouring to force the window open, but before he has broken into the premises. Fourth, he may suffer no such outside interference, but may fail to complete the commission of the crime through ineptitude, inefficiency or insufficient means. The jemmy which he has brought with him may not be strong enough to force the window open. Fifth, he may find that what he is proposing to do is after all impossible—not because of insufficiency of means, but because it is for some reason physically not possible, whatever means be adopted. He who walks into a room intending to steal, say, a specific diamond ring, and finds that the ring is no longer there, but has been removed by the owner to the bank, is thus prevented from committing the crime which he intended, and which, but for the supervening physical impossibility imposed by events he would have committed. Sixth, he may without interruption efficiently do every act which he set out to do, but may be saved from criminal liability by the fact that what he has done, contrary to his own belief at the time, does not after all amount in law to a crime."
1 Citers



 
 Ghani v Jones; CA 1970 - [1970] 1 QB 693
 
Hussein v Choung Fook Kam [1970] AC 942
1970
HL
Lord Devlin
Police, Torts - Other
When making an arrest, the standard of proof required of the officer is suspicion and no more. It falls well short of prima facie proof. Suspicion should not be elided with guilt, or even prima facie proof of guilt. It "is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking: I suspect but I cannot prove."
1 Citers


 
Hussein v Chang Fook Kam [1970] AC 942
1970
PC
Lord Devlin
Police
In determining whether the information available to an officer is sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion and charge, the test to be applied by a police officer is "Suspicion in its ordinary meaning is a state of conjuncture or surmise where proof is lacking: 'I suspect but I cannot prove'. Suspicion arises at or near the starting point of an investigation of which the obtaining of prima facie proof is at the end." A reasonable suspicion is "a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking".
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Roy v Prior; HL 1970 - [1971] AC 470; [1970] 2 All ER 729
 
Regina v Governor of Pentonville Prison, Ex parte Fernandez: Fernandez v Government of Singapore [1971] 1 WLR 987; [1971] 2 All ER 691
1971
HL
Lord Diplock
Human Rights, Police
The court considered the degree of risk to an individual which should give rise to a duty on the police to protect him under article 2. Held: Lord Diplock said: "My Lords, bearing in mind the relative gravity of the consequences of the court's expectation being falsified either in one way or in the other, I do not think that the test of the applicability of paragraph (c) is that the court must be satisfied that it is more likely than not that the fugitive will be detained or restricted if he is returned. A lesser degree of likelihood is, in my view, sufficient; and I would not quarrel with the way in which the test was stated by the magistrate or with the alternative way in which it was expressed by the Divisional Court. 'A reasonable chance,' 'substantial grounds for thinking,' 'a serious possibility' - I see no significant difference between these various ways of describing the degree of likelihood of the detention or restriction of the fugitive on his return which justifies the court in giving effect to the provisions of section 4(1)(c). Instead of too close a calculation, the court should consider the words 'applying, untrammelled by semantics, principles of common sense and common humanity."
European Convention on Human Rights - Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 4(1)(c)
1 Citers



 
 Wheatley v Lodge; 1971 - [1971] 1 WLR 29; [1971] 1 All ER 173
 
Regina v Fennell [1971] 1 QB 428
1971
CACD
Lord Widgery CJ
Crime, Police
A father was accused of assaulting a police constable in order to release his son from custody. He pleaded self defence, saying that he had believed the arrest unlawful. Held: The defence failed. A defendant seeking to justify an assault, pleading self-defence by reference to his belief must show that the belief was not only honest but also reasonable.
Lord Widgery CJ considered the nature of self defence: "It was accepted in the court below that if the arrest had been, in fact, unlawful the appellant would have been justified in using reasonable force to secure the release of his son. This proposition has not been argued before us and we will assume, without deciding it, that it is correct. Mr. Bain referred us to a number of authorities concerned with the use of force in self-defence and pointed out that a sufficient justification was there established if the accused genuinely believed on reasonable grounds that a relative or friend was in imminent danger of injury, even though that belief was based on an honest mistake of fact: R v Chisam (1963) 47 Cr A R 130. Mr. Bain then contended that by a parity of reasoning a father who used force to effect the release of his son from custody was justified in so doing if he honestly believed on reasonable grounds that (contrary to the fact) the arrest was unlawful.
We do not accept that submission. The law jealously scrutinises all claims to justify the use of force and will not readily recognise new ones. Where a person honestly and reasonably believes that he or his child is in imminent danger of injury it would be unjust if he were deprived of the right to use reasonable force by way of defence merely because he had made some genuine mistake of fact. On the other hand, if the child is in police custody and not in immediate danger of injury, there is no urgency of the kind which requires an immediate decision, and a father who forcibly releases a child does so at his peril. If in fact the arrest proves to be lawful, the father's use of force cannot be justified."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Ludlow and Others v Burgess (1972) 75 Cr App R 227
1972

Parker LCJ
Crime, Police, Torts - Other
A police officer has no more right to lay hands on someone than any other member of the community. The person so restrained is entitled to use reasonable force to free himself.
1 Citers


 
Dibble v Ingleton [1972] 1 QB 480
1972

Bridge J
Police, Crime
A motorist was suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol and was required to provide a specimen of breath. He claimed that he had consumed alcohol only a few minutes earlier and the constable had to wait until 20 minutes had elapsed before administering a breath test. Meanwhile the appellant consumed more alcohol supplied to him by a passengers so making it impossible for the constable to perform his duty under the Road Safety Act. The question for the court was whether the drinking of alcohol, with the intention of making it impossible to ascertain from a specimen taken subsequently if the level of alcohol in his body when he was stopped exceeded this prescribed limit, could amount to wilful obstruction of the officer in the execution of his duty. Held: Obstruction may consist in persisting in conduct of a positive nature which is, taken by itself, entirely lawful.
Bridge J said: "For my part I would draw a clear distinction between a refusal to act, on the one hand, and the doing of some positive act on the other. In a case, as in Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 Q.B. 414, where the obstruction alleged consists of a refusal by the defendant to do the act which the police constable has asked him to do - to give information, it might be, or to give assistance to the police constable - one can see readily the soundness of the principle, if I may say so with respect, applied in Rice v Connolly, that such a refusal to act cannot amount to a wilful obstruction under section 51 unless the law imposes upon the person concerned some obligation in the circumstances to act in the manner requested by the police officer.
On the other hand, I can see no basis in principle or in any authority which has been cited for saying that where the obstruction consists of a positive act, it must be unlawful independently of its operation as an obstruction of a police constable under section 51. If the act relied upon as an obstruction had to be shown to be an offence independently of its effect as an obstruction, it is difficult to see what use there would be in the provisions of section 51 of the Police Act 1964."
Police Act 1964 51(3)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
King v Hodges [1974] Crim LR 424
1974


Police
The court considered that a police officer's powers were exercisable when he reasonably believed that a breach of the peace was about to take place.
1 Citers


 
Eccles v Bourque (1974) 50 DLR (3d) 753
11 Oct 1974

Laskin CJ and Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Spence, Pigeon, Dickson, Beetz and de Grandpre JJ
Torts - Other, Police
Canlii (Supreme Court of Canada) An action was brought by the appellant against the respondents, three constables on the Vancouver Police Force, for damages for trespass alleged to have been committed when the police officers entered the appellant’s apartment to apprehend one C, for whom there were three outstanding warrants. The officers were in plain clothes but were armed. They gave notice of presence by knocking on the door of the apartment and after it was opened notice of identity was given. An officer then told the appellant the reason for the entry. C was not found in the apartment. The appellant was successful at trial, but, on appeal, the Court of Appeal by a majority reversed. Leave to appeal to this Court was granted by the Court of Appeal. Held. The appeal should be dismissed.
Canlii Per Laskin C.J. and Judson, Spence and Dickson JJ.: The submission that a person who is by s. 450 of the Criminal Code authorized to make an arrest is, by s. 25, authorized by law to commit a trespass with or without force in the accomplishment of that arrest, provided he acts on reasonable and probable grounds, was not accepted. Section 25 merely affords justification to a person for doing what he is required or authorized by law to do in the administration or enforcement of the law, if he acts on reasonable and probable grounds, and for using necessary force for that purpose. The question was whether the respondents were required or authorized by law to commit a trespass, not whether they were required or authorized to make an arrest. If they were authorized by law to commit a trespass, the authority for it must be found in the common law for there is nothing in the Criminal Code.
Unlike civil process, in the execution of criminal process the test is whether there are reasonable and probable grounds for acting. If the police officer has reasonable and probable cause to believe that the person named in the warrant for arrest is in the home of a stranger he has the right, after proper demand, to enter the home forcibly, to search and to arrest. In the present case the police officers had reasonable and probable grounds for believing that C was in the appellant’s apartment.
Except in exigent circumstances, the police officers must make an announcement prior to entry. In the ordinary case, before forcing entry, they should give (i) notice of presence by knocking or ringing the doorbell, (ii) notice of authority, by identifying themselves as law enforcement officers and (iii) notice of purpose, by stating a lawful reason for entry. On the facts of this case, proper notice was given.
1 Citers

[ Canlii ]
 
Raymond Lyons and Co Ltd v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1975] 1 All ER 335; [1975] QB 321
1975
QBD
Lord Widgery CJ
Police, Magistrates
A suspected thief had left a valuable ring with the claimant jewellers for valuation. They reported the matter to the police and handed the ring to them. The suspected thief never reappeared, and no-one claiming to be the true owner emerged. The police did not return the ring to the jewellers, who applied to the Magistrates Court under the 1897 Act. The magistrates declined to order the police to return the ring, on the ground that the jewellers were not the owners of it. Held: The appeal failed. The procedure under the 1897 Act is suitable only for ‘straightforward, simple cases where there is no difficulty of law and the matter is clear’. He added: ‘I would discourage them from attempting to use the procedure of the Act of 1897 in cases which involve a real issue of law or any real difficulty in determining whether a particular person is or is not the owner’. Where there was a real issue of law or any real difficulty in determining whether a particular person was or was not the owner, a claim should be brought in the civil courts.
Police (Property) Act 1897 1
1 Citers



 
 Spicer v Holt; HL 1977 - [1977] AC 987
 
United States v Ramsey [1977] USSC 97; 431 US 606; 97 SCt 1972; 52 LEd2d 617
6 Jun 1977


Utilities, Police, Immigration
United States Supreme Court - Title 19 U.S.C. ss 482 and implementing postal regulations authorize customs officials to inspect incoming international mail when they have a "reasonable cause to suspect" that the mail contains illegally imported merchandise, although the regulations prohibit the reading of correspondence absent a search warrant. Acting pursuant to the statute and regulations, a customs inspector, based on the facts that certain incoming letter-sized airmail envelopes were from Thailand, a known source of narcotics, and were bulky and much heavier than a normal airmail letter, opened the envelopes for inspection at the General Post Office in New York City, considered a "border" for border-search purposes, and ultimately the envelopes were found to contain heroin. Respondents were subsequently indicted for and convicted of narcotics offenses, the District Court having denied their motion to suppress the heroin. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the border-search exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applicable to persons, baggage, and mailed packages did not apply to the opening of international mail, and that the Constitution requires that before such mail is opened a showing of probable cause must be made and a warrant obtained. Held:
1. Under the circumstances, the customs inspector had "reasonable cause to suspect" that there was merchandise or contraband in the envelopes, and therefore the search was plainly authorized by the statute. Pp. 611-616.
2. The Fourth Amendment does not interdict the actions taken by the inspector in opening and searching the envelopes. Pp. 616-625.
(a) Border searches without probable cause and without a warrant are nonetheless "reasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 616-619.
(b) The inclusion of international mail within the border-search exception does not represent any "extension" of that exception. The exception is grounded in the recognized right of the sovereign to control, subject to substantive limitations imposed by the Constitution, who and what may enter the country, and no different constitutional standards should apply simply because the envelopes were mailed, not carried the critical fact being that the envelopes cross the border and enter the country, not that they are brought in by one mode of transportation rather than another. It is their entry into the country from without it that makes a resulting search "reasonable." Pp. 619-621.
(c) The border-search exception is not based on the doctrine of "exigent circumstances," but is a longstanding, historically recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment's general principle that a warrant be obtained. Pp. 621-622.
(d) The opening of international mail under the guidelines of the statute only when the customs official has reason to believe the mail contains other than correspondence, while the reading of any correspondence inside the envelopes is forbidden by the regulations, does not impermissibly chill the exercise of free speech under the First Amendment, and any "chill" that might exist under such circumstances is not only "minimal" but is also wholly subjective. Pp. 623-624.
1 Citers

[ Worldlii ]
 
Regina v Chester Justices ex parte Kenneth Smith (1978) 67 Cr App R 133
1978
QBD

Police, Magistrates
The wife of an offender applied for an order of mandamus requiring Magistrates to determine an application under s.1 of the 1897 Act for delivery to her of a car which the Crown Court had held was used in an offence and then had made an order under section 43 of the 1973 Act. Held: The Magistrates had been wrong to conclude that the issue of ownership had been determined in the Crown Court; it granted an order of manadamus.
Police Act 1897 1 - Powers of the Criminal Courts Act 1973 43
1 Citers


 
Klass And Others v Germany 5029/71; (1979) 2 EHRR 214; [1978] ECHR 4
6 Sep 1978
ECHR

Human Rights, Police
The claimant objected to the disclosure by the police of matters revealed during their investigation, but in this case, it was held, disclosure even after the event "might well jeopardise the long-term purpose that originally prompted the surveillance" and, in any event, there were statutory bodies "independent of the authorities carrying out the surveillance and…vested with sufficient powers and competence to exercise an effective and continuous control" The court recognised that some operations must be conducted secretly if they are to be conducted effectively. "The Court must be satisfied that, whatever system of surveillance is adopted, there exist adequate and effective guarantees against abuse."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Dytham; CACD 1979 - [1979] 1 QBD 722; (1979) 69 Crim App R 722
 
Regina v Troth (1979) 1 Cr App R (S) 131
1979
CACD

Police, Magistrates
The offender, a partner in a business, used a lorry which was partnership property to steal coal. The other partner was unaware of that use. An order had been made in the Crown Court to deprive the offender of his rights in the lorry. Held: The order was quashed. After referring to the application made to the Magistrates under s.1 of the 1897 Act, where the Magistrates had declined jurisdiction, the court said: "We do not say it is impossible for the Court to make an Order in a case such as this nor do we say it is impossible for the police to take proper steps under [the 1897 Act]. But clearly in the case of a partnership, it leads to difficulties which may be so onerous as to make it not worth while making the order in the first instance." An increased financial penalty might have been taken instead of making the order.
Police Property Act 1897
1 Citers


 
Malone v Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis (No 2) [1979] CLY 2098; [1979] 1 Ch 344; [1980] QB 49; [1979] 2 All ER 620; [1979] EWHC 2 (Ch)
28 Feb 1979
ChD
Sir Robert Megarry VC
Human Rights, Police, Criminal Evidence
The court considered the lawfulness of telephone tapping. The issue arose following a trial in which the prosecution had admitted the interception of the plaintiff's telephone conversations under a warrant issued by the Secretary of State. The plaintiff claimed that the interception had been and was unlawful. Held: Although he dismissed the plaintiff's claim, the Vice Chancellor said "Any regulation of so complex a matter as telephone tapping is essentially a matter for Parliament, not the courts . . this case seems to me to make it plain that telephone tapping is a subject which cries out for legislation."
"I am not unduly troubled by the absence of English authority: there has to be a first time for everything, and if the principles of English law, and not least analogies from the existing rules, together with the requirements of justice and common sense, pointed firmly to such a right existing, then I think the court should not be deterred from recognising the right. On the other hand, it is no function of the courts to legislate in a new field. The extension of the existing laws and principles is one thing, the creation of an altogether new right is another."
"I readily accept that if the question before me were one of construing a statute enacted with the purpose of giving effect to obligations imposed by the Convention, the court would readily seek to construe the legislation in a way that would effectuate the Convention rather than frustrate it. However, no relevant legislation of that sort is in existence. It seems to me that where Parliament has abstained from legislating on a point that is plainly suitable for legislation, it is indeed difficult for the court to lay down new rules of common law or equity that will carry out the Crown's treaty obligations, or to discover for the first time that such rules have always existed."
European Convention on Human Rights
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
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