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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Police - From: 1960 To: 1969

This page lists 18 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Piddington v Bates [1960] 3 All ER 660; [1961] 1 WLR 162
1960

Parker LCJ
Police
Two entrances to a printing works were picketed by striking printers. A police officer decided that there should be no more than two pickets at each entrance. The defendant wished to join the two pickets at the rear entrance. The officer said two pickets were enough. The defendant pushed gently past and the officer gently arrested him, and charged him with obstructing a constable in the execution of his duty. There was no disorder, and no violence was threatened or offered by any of the pickets or other persons present. Held: The defendant's appeal failed since the officer had reasonable grounds for anticipating that a breach of the peace was a real not a remote possibility. The police must anticipate "a real, not a remote, possibility" of a breach of the peace before they are justified in taking preventive action".
1 Citers


 
Bearmans Ltd v Metropolitan Police District Receiver [1961] 1 WLR 634; [1961] 1 All ER 384
1961
CA
Sellers LJ, Devlin LJ
Police, Damages, Evidence
Sellers LJ said: "The second plaintiffs had paid some £5,000 for that theft; and for their respective losses these plaintiffs sought to recover damages under the Riot (Damages) Act, 1886"
The court considered that a liberal approach was appropriate for the admissibility of hearsay evidence in civil proceedings.
Riot (Damages) Act 1886
1 Citers



 
 Glinski v McIver; HL 1962 - [1962] AC 726; [1962] 1 All ER 696

 
 Irving v National Provincial Bank; CA 1962 - [1962] 2 QB 73
 
Marrinan v Vibart [1963] 1 QB 528; [1962] 3 All ER 380
2 Jan 1962
CA
Sellers LJ, Diplock LJ
Defamation, Police
Two police officers gave evidence in a criminal prosecution of others, that the plaintiff, a barrister, had behaved improperly by obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty and subsequently gave similar evidence at an inquiry before the Benchers of Lincoln's Inn into the conduct of the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought an action against the police officers alleging that they, together with another person, had conspired to injure him by making false and defamatory statements about him. Held: The decision of Salmon J was upheld. The immunity given to police extends to allegations of conspiracy to give false evidence.
Sellers LJ said: "Whatever form of action is sought to be derived from what was said or done in the course of judicial proceedings must suffer the same fate of being barred by the rule which protects witnesses in their evidence before the court and in the preparation of the evidence which is to be so given", and "This immunity exists for the benefit of the public, since the administration of justice would be greatly impeded if witnesses were to be in fear that any disgruntled and possibly impecunious persons against whom they gave evidence might subsequently involve them in costly litigation."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Waterfield and Lynn (1963) 48 CR R42; [1964] LR 1 KB 164
1963

Ashworth J
Police
A police officer does not have an unfettered right to restrict movements on private land.
Ashworth J said: "In the judgment of this court it would be difficult . . to reduce within specific limits the general terms in which the duties of police constables have been expressed. In most cases it is probably more convenient to consider what the police constable was actually doing and in particular whether such conduct was prima facie an unlawful interference with a person's liberty or property."
1 Citers



 
 Ridge v Baldwin (No 1); HL 1964 - [1964] AC 40; [1963] UKHL 2
 
Dallison v Caffery [1965] 1 QB 348; [1964] 2 All ER 610
1965
CACD
Lord Denning MR, Goddard LJ, Diplock LJ
Criminal Practice, Police
It is for the detaining authority to justify all periods of detention.
The court described the common law duty on a prosecutor to disclose material. Lord Denning MR said: "The duty of a prosecuting counsel or solicitor, as I have always understood it, is this: if he knows of a credible witness who can speak to material facts which tend to show the prisoner to be innocent, he must either call that witness himself or make his statement available to the defence. It would be highly reprehensible to conceal from the court the evidence which such a witness can give. If the prosecuting counsel or solicitor knows, not of a credible witness, but a witness whom he does not accept as credible, he should tell the defence about him so that they can call him if they wish. Here the solicitor, immediately after the court proceedings [for committal before the magistrates], gave the solicitor for the defence the statement of Mr. and Mrs. Stamp; and thereby he did his duty."
Diplock LJ said that it is for the trial judge objectively to determine whether the suspicion held by a police officer and used to justify an arrest was reasonable and that whether there are such grounds or not is a question of law: "The test whether there was reasonable and probable cause for the arrest or prosecution is an objective one, namely, whether a reasonable man, assumed to know the law and possessed of the information which in fact was possessed by the defendant, would believe that there was reasonable and probable cause."
He described the continuing nature of an arrest: "The trespass by the arrestor continues so long as he retains custody of the arrested person, and he must justify the continuance of his custody by showing that it was reasonable. What is reasonable conduct on the part of a police officer in this respect may not be the same as what would be reasonable conduct on the part of a private arrestor."
1 Citers


 
Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414; [1966] 3 WLR 17
1966

Lord Parker CJ
Police, Crime
At common law there is no legal duty to provide the police with information or otherwise to assist them with their inquiries. Lord Parker set out three questions to be answered when asking whether there had been an obstruction of an officer in the execution of his duties: (1) Was there any obstruction of a constable? (2) Was the Constable acting lawfully in the execution of his duty? And (3) Was the obstruction intended to obstruct the constable in the execution of his duty?
Lord Parker CJ said: "It is also in my judgment clear that it is part of the obligations and duties of a police constable to take all steps which appear to him necessary for keeping the peace, for preventing crime or for protecting property from criminal injury. There is no exhaustive definition of the powers and obligations of the police, but they are at least those, and they would further include the duty to detect crime and to bring an offender to justice . . it seems to me quite clear that the defendant was making it more difficult for the police to carry out their duties, and that the police at the time and throughout were acting in accordance with their duties. The only remaining ingredient, and the one upon which in my judgment this case revolves, is whether the obstructing of which the defendant was guilty was a wilful obstruction. 'Wilful' in this context not only in my judgment means "intentional" but something which is done without lawful excuse, and that is indeed conceded . . Accordingly, the sole question here is whether the defendant had a lawful excuse for refusing to answer the questions put to him. In my judgment he had. It seems to me quite clear that although every citizen has a moral duty or, if you like, a social duty to assist the police, there is no legal duty to that effect, and indeed the whole basis of the common law is the right of the individual to refuse to answer questions put to him by persons in authority, and to refuse to accompany those in authority to any particular place; short, of course, of arrest."
. . and "In my judgment there is all the difference in the world between deliberately telling a false story someth ing which on no view a citizen has a right to do - and preserving silence or refusing to answer, something which he has every right to do. Accordingly, in my judgment, looked at in that perfectly general way, it was not shown that the refusal of the defendant to answer the questions or to accompany the police officer in the first instance to the police box was an obstruction without lawful excuse. "
Police Act 1964 51(3)
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 J W Dwyer Ltd v Metropolitan Police District Receiver; 1967 - [1967] 2 QB 970

 
 Kenlin v Gardner; CA 1967 - [1967] 2 QB 510

 
 McGowan v Chief Constable of Kingston Upon Hull; 21-Oct-1967 - Times, 21 October 1967
 
Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd v Jones [1968] QB 299; [1967] EWCA Civ 4; (1968) 132 JP 175; [1968] 1 All ER 229; [1968] 2 WLR 201
12 Dec 1967
CA
Lord Denning MR, Salmon LJ
Police, Torts - Other
Lord Denning MR said that a constable equipped with a search warrant: "may seize not only the goods which he reasonably to be covered by the warrant, but also any other goods which he believes on reasonable grounds to have been stolen and to be material evidence on a charge of stealing or receiving against the person in possession of them or anyone associated with him."
Salmon LJ: "If the preservation of law and order requires that a policeman shall have the power to arrest a man whom he believes on reasonable grounds to be a thief or a receiver, it is difficult to understand why the policeman should not have the power to seize goods on that man's premises which the policeman believes on reasonable grounds that he has stolen or received"
Police officers had entered the plaintiff's shop premises armed with a search warrant authorising them to search for goods stolen from A. They found none of A's goods there, but did find and seize goods which they believed on reasonable grounds to have been stolen from B, C and D. They had no warrant to seize these goods, and there was no previous decided case which indicated that they were entitled to do so. The plaintiff said they had acted unlawfully. Held. Diplock LJ said: "unless forced to do so by recent binding authority, I decline to accept that a police officer who is unquestionably justified at common law in arresting a person whom he has reasonable grounds to believe is guilty of receiving stolen goods, is not likewise justified in the less draconian act of seizing what he, on reasonable grounds, believes to be the stolen goods in that person's possession."
1 Cites

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[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 QB 118; [1968] 1 All ER 763; [1968] 2 WLR 893
1968
CA
Lord Denning MR
Police, Criminal Practice
The constitutional status of the Commissioner had never been defined, either by statute or by the courts. By common law police officers owe to the general public a duty to enforce the criminal law. The court considered the extent to which a court could interfere with decisions made by a Chief Constable.
Lord Denning MR said: "Although the chief officers of police are answerable to the law, there are many fields in which they have a discretion with which the law will not interfere. For instance, it is for the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, or the chief constable, as the case may be, to decide in any particular case whether inquiries should be pursued, or whether an arrest should be made, or a prosecution brought. It must be for him to decide on the disposition of his force and the concentration of his resources on any particular crime or area. No court can or should give him direction on such a matter. He can also make policy decisions and give effect to them, as, for instance, was often done when prosecutions were not brought for attempted suicide."
. . And "No Minister of the Crown can tell him that he must, or must not, keep observation on this place or that; or that he must, or must not, prosecute this man or that one. Nor can any police authority tell him so. The responsibility for law enforcement is on him. He is answerable to the law and to the law alone."
The decision as to the offence for which a person is to be prosecuted is a matter for the prosecuting authority, which has a wide discretion in the matter.
1 Citers


 
King v The Queen [1969] 1 AC 304; [1968] 2 All ER 610
1968
PC
Lord Hodson
Crime, Constitutional, Police
(Jamaica) The defendant said that in searching him the police had acted in breach of his rights guaranteed under the Constitution, which read: "Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry of others on his property." The Crown said that drugs were found. The defendant said they were planted. The magistrate accepted the evidence of the Crown, admitted the challenged evidence, and convicted the defendant. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. Held. The defendant's appeal failed. Lord Hodson reviewed the authorities and said: "The appellant relied in support of his submission that the evidence illegally obtained against him should be excluded on the argument that it was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, and reference was made to an Irish case of The People (AG) v. O’Brien, where the point was discussed by the Supreme Court of Eire. The provision of the Jamaican Constitution scheduled to the Jamaica Order in Council, No. 1550 of 1962 (paragraph 19) gives protection to persons against search of persons or property without consent. This constitutional right may or may not be enshrined in a written constitution, but it seems to their Lordships that it matters not whether it depends on such enshrinement or simply upon the common law as it would do in this country. In either event the discretion of the court must be exercised and has not been taken away by the declaration of the right in written form. Having considered the evidence and the submissions advanced, their Lordships hold that there is no ground for interfering with the way in which the discretion has been exercised in this case. This is not in their opinion a case in which evidence has been obtained by conduct of which the Crown ought not to take advantage. If they had thought otherwise they would have excluded the evidence even though tendered for the suppression of crime.”
In considering a right, it matters not whether the right infringed is enshrined in a constitution or is simply a common law right (or presumably an ordinary statutory right).
The requirement for a police officer to be named in a warrant is important because if no such person is named when the legislation so requires, the warrant is invalid.


 
 Blackburn v Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis; CA 1968 - [1968] 2 QB 118; [1968] 2 WLR 893

 
 Alderson v Booth; QBD 1969 - [1969] 2 QB 216
 
Hussien v Chong Fook Kam [1970] AC 942; [1969] UKPC 26; [1970] 2 WLR 441; [1969] 3 All ER 1626
7 Oct 1969
PC
Lord Devlin
Police, Torts - Other, Commonwealth
(Malaysia) The Board considered the propriety of an arrest by the police. Lord Devlin said: "An arrest occurs when a police officer states in terms that he is arresting or when he uses force to restrain the individual concerned. It occurs also when by words or conduct he makes it clear that he will, if necessary, use force to prevent the individual from going where he may want to go."
In order to have a reasonable suspicion the officer need not have evidence amounting to a prima facie case: "Suspicion in its ordinary meaning is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking: "I suspect but I cannot prove". Suspicion arises at or near the starting point of an investigation, of which the obtaining of prima facie proof is the end. When such proof has been obtained, the police case is complete; it is ready for trial and passes on to its next stage. It is indeed desirable as a general rule that an arrest should not be made until the case is complete. But if arrest before that is forbidden, it could seriously hamper the police" and "There is another distinction between reasonable suspicion and prima facie proof. Prima facie proof consists of admissible evidence. Suspicion can take account matters that could not be put in evidence at all."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
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