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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  















Police - From: 1930 To: 1959

This page lists 21 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Fisher v Oldham Corporation [1930] 2 QB 384
1930

McCardie J
Police
The court examined the authorities as to the relationship between police and local authorities. Held: The police were not the servants of the Watch Committee of a borough corporation so as to make the corporation civilly liable for wrongs committed by the police. The police perform their duties as constables wholly independently of the Watch Committee. McCardle J illustrated the situation: "Suppose that a police officer arrested a man for a serious felony? Suppose, too, that the watch committee of the borough at once passed a resolution directing that the felon should be released? Of what value would such a resolution be? Not only would it be the plain duty of the police officer to disregard the resolution, but it would also be the duty of the Chief Constable to consider whether an information should not at once be laid against the members of the Watch Committee for a conspiracy to obstruct the course of justice."
1 Citers



 
 Betts v Receiver of Metropolitan Police District and Carter Paterson and Co Ltd; 1932 - [1932] 2 KB 595

 
 Thomas v Sawkins; KBD 1935 - [1935] 2 KB 249; 30 Cox CC 265 KB

 
 Davis v Lisle; CA 1936 - [1936] 2 KB 434; [1936] 2 All ER 213

 
 Duncan v Jones; KBD 1936 - [1936] 1 KB 218
 
Cooper v Wilson [1937] KB 309
1937


Natural Justice, Police
Police officers can be removed from office only by a valid exercise of the statutory power of dismissal.
1 Citers



 
 Herniman v Smith; HL 1938 - [1938] AC 305

 
 Gavin v London (City) Police Authority; 1944 - [1944] KB 358
 
Dumbell v Roberts [1944] 1 All ER 326
1944
CA
Scott LJ
Police, Torts - Other
The court discussed the nature of reasonable grounds for suspicion for an arrest. The threshold for the existence of reasonable grounds for suspicion is low, and the requirement is limited. Scott LJ said: "The protection of the public is safeguarded by the requirement, alike of the common law and, so far as I know, of all statutes, that the constable shall before arresting satisfy himself that there do in fact exist reasonable grounds for suspicion of guilt. That requirement is very limited. The police are not called upon before acting to have anything like a prima facie case for conviction."
1 Citers



 
 Christie v Leachinsky; HL 25-Mar-1947 - [1947] AC 573; [1947] UKHL 2; [1947]1 All ER 567; [1947] 63 TLR 231; (1947) 111 JP 224
 
Clarence Henry Willcock v Muckle [1951] 2 The Times LR 373
26 Jun 1951
KBD
Lord Goddard CJ, Sir Raymond Evershed MR, Somervell and Jenkins LJJ, Kilberry, Lynskey and Devlin JJ
Administrative, Police
Mr Willcock was stopped for speeding. PC Muckle asked him to show his national registration identity card. Mr Willcock refused. PC Muckle served a notice requiring its production which Mr Willcock ignored. He was prosecuted. He argued that the emergency which had led to the Act had passed. He was convicted by the magistrates, but the magistrates imposed only an absolute discharge. He appealed. Held: There had been a declaration that the war had come to an end but no Order in Council revoking the Act. Only one emergency was meant - the imminent outbreak of war. The policeman had really wanted the defendant's vehicle registration number, but was still acting under standing orders requiring them to ask every person stopped to produce the identity card. Lord Goddard "That sort of thing tends to make motorists not law-abiding; it tends to cause resentment." The Act was being used for a purpose for which it was not passed. A court of seven judges had been convened to decide whether the Act remained in force. It did. It required a specific Order in Council to revoke it. '. . . The court wishes to express its emphatic approval of the way in which they [the magistrates] dealt with this case by granting the defendant an absolute discharge. Because the police may have powers, it does not follow that they ought to exercise them on all occasions or as a matter of routine . . . To demand production of the national registration identity card from all and sundry . . . is wholly unreasonable. This Act was passed for security purposes; it was never passed for the purposes for which it is now apparently being used. To use Acts of Parliament passed for particular purposes in war-time when the war 'is a thing of the past . . . tends to turn law-abiding citizens into law-breakers, which is a most undesirable state of affairs.
Further, in this country we have always prided ourselves on the good feeling that exists between the police and the public, and such action tends to make people resentful of the acts of the police, and inclines them to obstruct the police instead of assisting them.'
Devlin J: 'I think that it would be very unfortunate if the public were to receive the impression that the continuance of the state of emergency had become a sort of statutory fiction which was used as a means of prolonging legislation initiated in different circumstances and for different purposes.'
National Registration Act 1939 12(4)

 
Tempest v Snowden [1952] 1 KBD 130
1952


Police, Torts - Other
A custody officer is not required to be sure that the accused person is guilty before charging him, but rather whether he believes that a charge is warranted
1 Citers


 
Everett v Ribbands [1952] 2 QB 198
1952


Torts - Other, Police
The court considered the tort of the malicious obtaining of a search warrant.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Ex parte Parker [1953] 1 WLR 1150
1953


Police

1 Citers


 
Regina v Bass [1953] 1 QB 680; (1953) 17 Cr App R 51
1953
CCA
Lord Goddard CJ, Byrne and Parker JJ
Criminal Practice, Police
The court considered how to deal with the admission of a statement where the defendant contested its admissibility. Here the defendant said he had not been cautioned before the interview. Held: It was within the discretion of the judge to admit the interview "It is to be observed, as this court pointed out in Rex v Murray [1951] 1 KB 391, that while it is for the presiding judge to rule whether a statement is admissible, it is for the jury to determine the weight to be given to it if he admits it, and thus, when a statement has been admitted by the judge, he should direct the jury to apply to their consideration of it the principle as stated by Lord Sumner, and he should further tell them that if they are not satisfied that it was made voluntarily, they should give it no weight at all and disregard it."
Byrne J said: "This court has observed that police officers nearly always deny that they have collaborated in the making of notes, and we cannot help wondering why they are the only class of society who do not collaborate in such a matter. It seems to us that nothing could be more natural or proper when two persons have been present at an interview with a third person than that they should afterwards make sure that they have a correct version of what was said. Collaboration would appear to be a better explanation of almost identical notes than the possession of a superhuman memory."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Ex parte Fry [1954] 1 WLR 730
1954

Goddard LCJ
Police

1 Citers


 
Hinchcliffe v Sheldon [1955] NZ Police Law Rp 18; [1955] 1 WLR 1207; [1955] 3 All ER 406; (1955) 120 JP 13
20 Jan 1955
QBD
Lord Goddard CJ, Cassels, Streatfield JJ
Police, Crime
The appellant was the son of the licensee of an inn. On returning to the inn one night at about 11.17, he found that police officers wished to enter the premises as they suspected that the licensee was committing an offence under the Licensing Act 1953. He shouted warnings to the licensee, who did not open the door to the police officers until 11.25 p.m. The licensee was not found to be committing any offence. The police had the right to enter licensed premises, whether an offence was being committed or not. The appellant was convicted under section 2 of the 1885 Act which prescribes the punishment for an assault on a constable in the execution of his duty, "shall apply to all cases of resisting or wilfully obstructing any constable or peace officer in the execution of his duty." On appeal, he submitted that he could not be convicted of obstructing a constable when in the execution of his duty unless it was shown that the licensee had committed an offence. Held: "obstructing", within the meaning of s. 2 of the Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act 1885 meant making it more difficult for the police to carry out their duties; under s. 151 (1) of the Licensing Act 1953 it was the duty of the police to enter licensed premises if they thought it likely tbat an offence might be committed, and, therefore, the appellant, in making it difficult for the police to enter the inn, was guilty of wilfully obstructing a constable when in the execution of his duty, and was rightly convicted under s. 2 of the Act of 1885.
Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act 1885 2 - Licensing Act 1953 151
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ NZLII ]

 
 Attorney-General for New South Wales v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd; PC 14-Mar-1955 - [1955] AC 457; [1955] UKPC 6; [1955] 1 All ER 846; [1955] 2 WLR 707
 
Schuster v City of New York 154 NE2d 534; 5 NY2d 75; 180 NYS2d 265; 5 NY 2d 75
1958


Police, Negligence, International
Court of Appeals of New York - The victim was a public spirited young man whose murder had no obvious explanation other than retribution for his cooperation with the police. Held: It may be possible to create a case of circumstantial evidence so strong as to lead the mind inevitably to the conclusion that injury to a person who supplied information to the police resulted from his having supplied such information.
1 Citers


 
Gaynor v Allen [1959] 2 QB 403
1959

McNair J
Road Traffic, Police, Negligence
McNair J considered that when looking at the driving of a police officer, the standard remained that of the experienced skilled and careful driver. McNair considered a submission: "that if the motor-cyclist had been a civilian he would undoubtedly have been guilty of some negligence in driving at 60mph, though not necessarily entirely to blame for the accident. To show that a police officer was driving at that speed on a restricted road does not prima facie show negligence" Held: McNair J said: "The driver of this police motor-cycle on this occasion must be judged, as regards civil liability, in exactly the same way as any other driver of a motor-cycle in similar circumstances. He, like any other driver, owed a duty to the public to drive with due care and attention and without exposing the members of the public to unnecessary danger."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Smith (1959) 43 Cr App R 121; [1959] 2 WLR 623; [1959] 2 QB 35; [1959] 2 All ER 193
1959

Lord Parker CJ
Criminal Evidence, Police, Crime
The court considered a situation where one admission was made at 10.00 pm one night under a threat or inducement, and a second statement was made the next morning before a different investigator and after the usual caution was given. The issue was whether the second statement was still under the influence of the threat or inducement of the first. Held: Even the most gentle threats or slight inducements will taint a confession, thoughh "The court thinks that the principle to be deduced from the cases is really this: that if the threat or promise under which the first statement was made still persists when the second statement is made, then it is inadmissible. Only if the time-limit between the two statements, the circumstances existing at the time and the caution are such that it can be said that the original threat or inducement has been dissipated can the second statement be admitted as a voluntary statement.
This court, however, is of the clear opinion that the second statement was admissible. No doubt, the opening reference to what it was said he had said to the regimental sergeant-major put the appellant in a difficulty. No doubt it was introduced by Sergeant Ellis in the hope that thereby he might get a continued confession; but it is quite clear that the effect of any original inducement or threat under which the first statement was made had been dissipated. Quite apart from the fact that the caution was given and given twice, some nine hours had elapsed and the whole circumstances had changed. The parade had ended. The rest of the company had gone to bed. The effect of the threat or the inducement was spent. On those grounds this court has come to the conclusion that the oral and written statements made to Sergeant Ellis were clearly admissible."
The test for causation of a death at common law is that it is a "substantial or significant cause"

 
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