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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Police - From: 1849 To: 1899

This page lists 19 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
John Wray v William Chapman And Henry Smith [1850] EngR 278; (1850) 14 QB 742; (1850) 117 ER 286
11 Feb 1850


Police

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Regina v William Baldry; 1852 - (1852) 2 Den CC Res 430; (1852) 2 Den CC 430; [1852] EngR 63; (1852) 2 Den 430; (1852) 169 ER 568
 
Harrison v Bush (1855) 5 E & B 344; [1855] EngR 41; (1855) 5 El & Bl 344; (1855) 119 ER 509
1855

Lord Campbell CJ
Administrative, Police, Constitutional
The office of Secretary of State is in theory one and indivisible.
Lord Campbell CJ stated: "In practice, to the Secretary of State for the Home Department . . belongs peculiarly the maintenance of the peace within the kingdom, with the superintendence of the administration of justice as far as the Royal prerogative is involved in it."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Hermann v Seneschal (1862) 13 C B (N S ) 392 [143 E R 156]
1862

Erle C.J
Police
In considering immunity given to officers acting in execution of their duty, 'I think the governing question for the jury was, whether the defendant really believed that the facts existed which would bring the case within the statute …, and honestly intended to put the law in force; and that, if the jury found that the defendant did so really believe, and did so honestly intend, then the defendant was entitled to a verdict’
1 Citers


 
Dawson v Vasandau [1863] 11 WR 516
1863


Police
It is not necessary for a charging officer to believe that the prosecution will result in a conviction before charging a prisoner.
1 Citers


 
Buckley v Gross (1863) 3B & S 556
1863

Blackburn J, Cockburn CJ, Crompton J
Police, Torts - Other
The court had to decide the ownership of of tallow which had been kept at warehouses. In a fire; it melted and flowed down the sewers into the river where part of it was collected by a man with no right to it; and he sold it to the claimant. The police stopped the claimant and took him before a magistrate. The magistrate discharged the claimant. Under the section the magistrate had power, where the real owner was known, to make an order for the detention and subsequent delivery of goods "charged to be stolen or fraudulently obtained" to the rightful owner, and where the owner was unknown to order delivery to the receiver of the Metropolitan Police Force who was authorised, in the absence of a claim made by the real owner within 12 months, to sell them. Pursuant to these statutory provisions the magistrate made an order for the detention of the goods. The tallow became a nuisance and the police sold the tallow to the defendant before the 12 month period expired. The claimant then sued the defendant to recover it. The court directed a verdict for the defendant with leave to the claimant to move to enter judgment if the Court of Queen's Bench should be of the opinion that he could maintain his action. The court held that he could not. Cockburn CJ said: "Under these circumstances it appears to me plain that, by virtue of the authority vested in him by the statute, an order was made by the justice, within the scope of his authority and jurisdiction, with respect to dealing with this tallow, and whether the police were or were not warranted in selling it within twelve months is immaterial. The plaintiff, who had nothing but bare naked possession (which would have been sufficient against a wrong doer) had it taken out of him by virtue of this enactment. As against the plaintiff, therefore, the defendant derives title, not from a wrong doer, but from a person selling under authority of the justice, whether rightly or not is of no consequence. I wholly disagree with the doctrine of the plaintiff's counsel, that if the policeman did anything ultra vires, that would revest the possession of this tallow in the plaintiff. He had no title beyond what mere possession gave, and, so soon as the goods were taken from him by force of law, there was a break in the chain of that possession." Crompton J said: "This action must be founded on possession; here the possession was divested out of the plaintiff, and he cannot revert to a right of property to re-establish it. I agree with my Lord Chief Justice that, where possession is lawfully divested out of a man, and the property is ultimately converted by a person who does not claim through an original wrong doer, the party whose possession was so divested had no property at the time of the conversion. Here, in my mind, the plaintiff's possession was gone. The goods were properly taken from him ...." Blackburn J: "I do not wish to question the doctrine laid down in several cases, that possession of personal property is sufficient title against a wrong doer; nor that it is no answer to the plaintiff in such a case to say that there is a third person who could lawfully take the chattel from him; and I do not know that it makes any difference whether the goods had been feloniously taken or not. But, assuming that to be the law, the plaintiff has not brought himself within it. ... I draw the inference of fact that the justice was satisfied that this tallow had come from the warehouses, and I hold that, as matter of law, the police were bound to keep it for the true owner, because they had ascertained that there was a true owner, and who he was. Their possession was the possession of the true owner and not of the wrong doer, whose possession was terminated by their taking possession. It is therefore not necessary to consider whether the sale of the tallow to the defendants by the police was right or wrong. If wrong, the true owner may complain against them; if not, no one else can, but at all events, not the plaintiff, who was himself a wrong doer."
Metropolitan Police Act 1839 29
1 Citers


 
Humphries v Connor (1864) 17 ICLR 1
1864

Fitzgerald J, O'Brien and Hayes JJ
Police
The plaintiff walked the streets of Swanlinbar, Co Cavan, wearing an orange lily, an action which was "calculated and tended to provoke animosity between different classes of Her Majesty's subjects", according to the defendant's pleadings. Several followed the plaintiff "and in consequence thereof caused very great noise and disturbance . . and threatened the plaintiff with personal violence for wearing said emblem." The defendant, a sub-inspector of Constabulary, requested the plaintiff to remove the emblem. When she refused he "gently and quietly, and necessarily and unavoidably" removed the emblem. The plaintiff sued him for trespass. The plaintiff demurred. Held: The court considered the duty of a police officer when faced with what he thought was an imminent breach of the peace: "With respect to a constable, I agree that his primary duty is to preserve the peace; and he may for that purpose interfere, and, in the case of an affray, arrest the wrongdoer; or, if a breach of the peace is imminent, may, if necessary, arrest those who are about to commit it, if it cannot otherwise be prevented."
Hayes J: "It would seem absurd to hold that a constable may arrest a person whom he finds committing a breach of the peace, but that he must not interfere with the individual who has wantonly provoked him to do so."
1 Citers


 
Dawkins v Lord Rokeby [1866] EngR 5; (1866) 4 F & F 806; (1866) 176 ER 800
1866


Police, Torts - Other

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Dawkins v Lord Rokeby; 1873 - (1873) LR 8 QB 255

 
 Dawkins v Lord Rokeby; HL 1875 - (1875) LR 7 HL 744
 
Hicks v Faulkner [1878] 8 QBD 167
1878

Judge Hawkins
Police, Torts - Other
Before charging a prisoner, a police officer must have "an honest belief in the guilt of the accused based upon a full conviction, founded upon reasonable grounds, of the existence of a state of circumstances, which, assuming them to be true, would reasonably lead any ordinary prudent and cautious man, placed in the position of the accuser to the conclusion that the person was probably guilty of the crime imputed."
1 Citers



 
 O'Kelly v Harvey; 1882 - (1882) 10 LR Ir 287
 
O'Kelly v Harvey (1883) 14 LR Ir 105
1883
CA

Police
The plaintiff, a nationalist Member of Parliament, sued the defendant for assault and battery. There was to be a meeting of the Land League. On the day before, a placard summoned local Orangemen to oppose it. The defendant, a justice of the peace was at the meeting. He knew of the placard and believed on reasonable and probable grounds that the only way of preventing a breach of the peace when the Orangemen arrived was to order the meeting to separate and disperse. The defendant asked the plaintiff and the other persons who were assembled to disperse and, when they failed to do so, he laid his hand on the plaintiff in order to disperse the meeting. Held: If made out, these averments would constitute a sufficient defence to the action. Law C explained the position: "The question then seems to be reduced to this: assuming the plaintiff and others assembled with him to be doing nothing unlawful, but yet that there were reasonable grounds for the defendant believing, as he did, that there would be a breach of the peace if they continued so assembled, and that there was no other way in which the breach of the peace could be avoided but by stopping and dispersing the plaintiff's meeting - was the defendant justified in taking the necessary steps to stop and disperse it? In my opinion he was so justified, under the peculiar circumstances stated in the defence, and which for the present must be taken as admitted to be there truly stated. Under such circumstances the defendant was not to defer action until a breach of the peace had actually been committed. His paramount duty was to preserve the peace unbroken, and that, by whatever means were available for the purpose. Furthermore, the duty of a justice of the peace being to preserve the peace unbroken he is, of course, entitled and in part bound, to intervene the moment he has reasonable apprehensions of a breach of the peace being imminent; and therefore, he must in such cases necessarily act on his own reasonable and bona fide belief, as to what is likely to occur. Accordingly in the present case, even assuming that the danger to the public peace arose altogether from the threatened attack of another body on the plaintiff and his friends, still if the defendant believed and had just grounds for believing that the peace could only be preserved by withdrawing the plaintiff and his friends from the attack with which they were threatened, it was, I think, the duty of the defendant to take that course." and
"I assume here that the plaintiff's meeting was not unlawful. But the question still remains - was not the defendant justified in separating and dispersing it if he had reasonable ground for his belief that by no other possible means could he perform his duty of preserving the public peace. For the reasons already given, I think he was so justified, and therefore that the defence in question is good . . ." The common law guards against the danger of a police officer acting incorrectly in anticipating events to avoid a breach of the peace by insisting that the duty arises only when the police officer apprehends that a breach of the peace is "imminent".
1 Citers


 
Richard Coomber v The Justices of the County of Berks [1883] 9 AC 61
1883
HL
Lord Blackburn
Income Tax, Police, Constitutional
The central issue was whether a block of buildings comprising county assize courts and a police station were liable to income tax under Schedule A. If they had been erected as part of the function of government in the administration of justice, then notwithstanding the fact that they were built by the county and paid for out of the county rates, the Crown's exemption from payment of taxes would apply. Held: They were both exempt, the police being ultimately a crown responsibility
Lord Blackburn said: "I do not think it can be disputed that the administration of justice, both criminal and civil, and the preservation of order and prevention of crime by means of what is now called police, are among the most important functions of Government, nor that by the constitution of this country, these functions do, of common right, belong to the Crown.
In England a subject may have a franchise, giving him the right to administer justice in a particular locality in courts held by him; and he may also have a right to name the constables. In early times, such local franchises were of value for the revenue derived from the fees, and, no doubt, as increasing the local influence of the grantee. But it was always held that on a proceeding in quo warranto the Crown could call on the person in possession of such a franchise to shew his title, on the ground that they were among the matters quae mere spectant ad regem, and that unless he shewed a title by grant from the crown, or by prescription, the franchises were seized and he was ousted. (See Comyn's Digest, Quo Warranto A, and the authorities there collected). In the present case there is no question raised as to any franchise in the hands of a subject.
From very early times, judges acting under the King's Commission went down to administer justice in counties. The sheriff, the head officer of the county, but appointed by the Crown, was always called upon to attend them, and to provide lodging and accommodation for them. He did this at the cost of the county. I do not stop to inquire by what machinery the cost was in early times defrayed. It is now provided for by the statutes referred to, and comes out of the county rate.
The sheriff also was bound to raise the hue and cry, and call out the posse comitatus of the county whenever it was necessary for any police purposes; in so doing he was acting for the Crown, but the burthen fell on the inhabitants of the county. By modern legislation, the county police are arrayed at the expense of the county, defrayed by a police rate on the county, supplemented, in some cases, by grants from the imperial revenues.
1 Citers



 
 Munster v Lamb; CA 1883 - (1883) 11 QBD 588
 
Hope v Evered (1886) 17 QBD 338
1886


Torts - Other, Police
It is an actionable wrong to procure the issue of a search warrant without reasonable cause and with malice.
1 Citers



 
 Dillon v O'Brien and Davis; 1887 - (1887) 16 Cox CC 245

 
 The Queen v D'Eyncourt; 1888 - (1888) 21 QBD 109
 
Jackson v Stevenson (1897) 2 Adam 255
1897


Police, Constitutional
At common law, it is contrary to constitutional principle and illegal to search someone to establish whether there are grounds for an arrest
1 Citers


 
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