swarb.co.uk - law index
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Planning - From: 1980 To: 1984
This page lists 39 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.
Ewen Developments Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1980] JPL 404
1980
CA
Planning
The court upheld an enforcement notice requiring that the whole of an embankment be removed.
1 Citers
Mills and Allen Ltd v City of Glasgow [1980] JPL 409
1980
SCS
Scotland, Planning, Media
The sherriff court had not accepted a submission by the Council that an alteration from a painted gable wall advertising Raleigh Bicycles, to a smaller advertisement for Carlsberg Special Brew, painted onto plywood sheets which were nailed to the wall and surrounded by a timber frame, was a "substantial alteration" in the use of the site for the display of advertisements. Held: "On the second point the Sheriff could not accept, however, that the interposition of sheets of plywood between the paint and the stonework of the building must necessarily be regarded as a substantial alteration in the manner of the use of the site for the purpose of displaying advertisements, nor could he see that it necessarily made any difference that, according to the pursuers' averments, the new advertisement was surrounded by 'a nominal timber frame'. The general appearance and effect of an advertisement might be the same whether it was painted directly on a wall or on sheets of plywood or metal nailed to the wall, or printed on paper which in turn was pasted on the underlying surface. Changes from one such method to another may be no more than comparatively minor changes in the method used to achieve what may in appearance be almost exactly the same display. They were not necessarily substantial alterations in the manner of the use of the site for the purpose of that display."
1 Citers
Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd [1980] QB 156
1980
CA
Cumming-Bruce LJ
Nuisance, Planning
The exercise of the permission to develop granted by the local planning authority may have the result that the character of the neighbourhood changes and that which would previously have been a nuisance must be held no longer to be so
Cumming-Bruce LJ said: "The planning authority has no jurisdiction to authorise a nuisance save (if at all) in so far as it has statutory power to change the character of a neighbourhood."
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Northavon District Council v Secretary of State [1980] 40 P&CR 332
1980
Planning
The introduction onto land of waste material can be either a change of use or an operation, depending on whether the purpose is to get rid of the material or to alter the character of the land.
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Glover v Secretary of State for the Environment (1980) JPL 110
1980
Planning
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Newbury District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 578; [1980] 1 All ER 731; [1980] 2 WLR 379
1980
HL
Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Scarman, Lord Fraser, Lord Lane
Planning, Estoppel
Issues arose as to a new planning permission for two existing hangars. Held: The appeal succeeded. The question of the validity of conditions attached to planning permissions will sometimes be a difficult one. To be valid, a condition must be imposed for a planning purpose and not for an ulterior one; it must fairly and reasonably relate to the development permitted and must not be so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have imposed it. Viscount Dilhorne summarised four conditions attached to planning permissions: "It follows that the conditions imposed must be for a planning purpose and not for any ulterior one, and that they must fairly and reasonably relate to the development permitted. Also they must not be so unreasonable that no reasonable planning authority could have imposed them." As to existing use rights: "If, however, the grant of planning permission, whether it be permission to build or for a change of use, is of such a character that the implementation of the permission leads to the creation of a new planning unit, then I think that it is right to say that existing use rights attaching to the former planning unit are extinguished."
Lord Scarman said that estoppels bind individuals on the ground that it would unconscionable for them to deny what they have represented or agreed, "but these concepts of private law should not be extended into "the public law of planning control, which binds everyone."
Lord Fraser: "The only circumstances in which existing use rights are lost by accepting and implementng a later planning permission are . . . When a new planning unit comes into existence. . ."
Lord Lane: "The holder of planning permission will not be allowed to rely on any existing use rights if the effect of the permission when acted on has been to bring one phase of the planning history of the site to an end and to start a new one." and "The change of use from repository to wholseale warehouse could not by any stretch of the imagination be said to have started a new plannning history or created a new planning unit. Indeed no one has so contended."
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[ Planning BlawG ]
Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment; HL 7-Feb-1980 - [1981] AC 75; [1980] 2 All ER 608; [1980] UKHL 1; [1980] 3 WLR 22; (1980) 144 JP 387; (1980) 78 LGR 269
Newbury District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 578; [1980] 1 All ER 731; [1980] 2 WLR 379; (1980) 40 P & CR 148
1981
HL
Lord Scarman, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Fraser, Lord Lane
Planning
The grant of a temporary planning permission did not operate to cancel an existing established use. A planning condition requiring removal of hangars was invalid because it did not fairly or reasonably relate to the permitted development. The grant of an unnecessary planning permission does not exclude a landowner from relying on an existing use right. Where an impossible condition is attached the permission might be read without it.
Viscount Dilhorne said: "If, however, the grant of planning permission, whether it be permission to build or for a change of use, is of such a character that the implementation of the permission leads to the creation of a new planning unit, then I think that it is right to say that existing use rights attaching to the former planning unit are extinguished." and
"It follows that the conditions imposed must be for a planning purpose and not for any ulterior one, and that they must fairly and reasonably relate to the development permitted. Also they must not be so unreasonable that no reasonable planning authority could have imposed them . ."
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Inverclyde District Council v Lord Advocate (1981) 43 P & CR 375
1981
Lord Keith
Scotland, Planning
An application for submission of details supporting an application for outline planning permission had been made within the time limit. However, following an inquiry the Secretary of State had indicated that approval would be appropriate in respect of a more limited area, and had invited submission of detailed plans and information relating to the reduced area. The authority argued that such an amendment would be outside the scope of the original permission. They accepted that an amendment was possible within the three-year period, but submitted that once that period had come to an end no amendment whatever could validly be made. Held: The argument was rejected. Lord Keith said: "It is to be observed that neither in the Act of 1972 nor in the Order of 1975 is any procedure laid down for the manner in which applications of this nature are to be dealt with, apart from the provisions about entry in the register. This is not a field in which technical rules would be appropriate, there being no contested lis between opposing parties. The planning authority must simply deal with the application procedurally in a way which is just to the applicant in all the circumstances. That being so, there is no good reason why amendment of the application should not be permitted at any stage, if that should prove necessary in order that the whole merits of the application should be properly ascertained and decided upon . . "
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Cord v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] JPL 40
1981
Planning
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Kerrier District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment (1981) 41 P&CR 284
1981
QBD
Planning
A building had been constructed on a site, but failed to comply with the permission granted because the basement did not have planning approval.
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Regina v North Hertfordshire District Council, Ex parte Sullivan [1981] JPL 752
19 May 1981
Comyn J
Planning
The court was asked whether an extension of a listed building which involved the demolition of parts of the listed building constituted demolition within the meaning of the Act which required the proposal to be notified to various interested bodies by the local planning authority. Held: The dominant word in the provisions about demolition, alteration and extension was the word "demolition," especially where, under the interpretation section, demolition was deemed to refer not only to a building but also to part of a building.
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Jennings Motors Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment and another [1982] 1 All ER 471; [1982] QB 541; [1982] 2 WLR 131; (1981) 43 P & CR 316
27 Nov 1981
CA
Lord Denning MR, Oliver, Watkins LJJ
Planning
The land owners had demolished a building and erected a new building on a small part of the entire site, but without obtaining planning permission. The local authority argued that this was a change of use and a breach of planning control. Held: The erection of a new building to replace an earlier one did not constitute a new planning unit, but the new building could inherit the use established by the former.
1 Cites
Bernard Wheatcroft Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1982) 43 P&CR 233
1982
CA
Forbes J
Land, Planning
The developer originally sought permission for 450 homes. That was refused. Before the appeal, it proposed an alternative with 250 homes to be adopted only if the size of the development were considered to be the critical factor. The inspector decided for the smaller scale application. The developer appealed, but the Secretary of State dismissed the appeal saying in addition that it was improper to allow the smaller scale development where the development was not severable. Held: It had been permissible for the Inspector to grant a lesser permission than had been applied for, by the use of conditions and provided the effect was not to alter the substance of the application, which was a matter on which the Secretary of State had to exercise his judgment. The court went on to explain how the judgment should be reached: "The main but not the only criterion on which that judgment should be exercised is whether the development is so changed that to grant it would be to deprive those who should have been consulted on the changed development of the opportunity of such consultation." Where a proposed deveeopment had already been through full consultation, and opposition had been total, it was not necessary to consult again on the smaller proposal.
The court considered the additional difficulties in commons application cases of allowing amendments on apppeal because of the need to allow for the public interest.
Commons Registration Act 1965 - Town amnd Country Planning ACt 1971
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Edwin H Bradley and Sons Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1982) 264 EG 926; 1982 47 P and CR 374
1982
Glidewell J
Planning, Administrative
Reasons given for a decision may be brief, whilst still following Poyser. The fact that a procedure is not in the nature of a judicial or quasi-judicial hearing between parties may mean that the requirement to give a party full opportunity to advance his case does not apply in the same way as in such procedures. The reasons given must comply with the test formulated by Megaw J in In re Poyser and Mills' Arbitration, adding that provided the reasons comply with that test, the Secretary of State could not be challenged in that respect.
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Gravesham Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment; QBD 1982 - [1982] 47 P&CR 142; Times, 10 November 1982
Attorney-General ex relater Sutcliffe and Others v Calderdale Borough Council (1982) 46 P&CR 399
1982
CA
Stephenson, Ackner LJJ and Sir Sebag Shaw
Planning, Land
The court discussed whether a terrace of cottages was within the curtilage of an old factory which was a listed building. At first instance, Skinner J had held that they were, and that permission could not be granted for their demolition. The Council appealed. Held: The appeal failed.
Stephenson LJ said: "The terrace has not been taken out of the curtilage by the changes which have taken place, and remain so closely related physically or geographically to the mill as to constitute with it a single unit and to be comprised within its curtilage in the sense that those words are used in this subsection."
and "Three factors have to be taken into account in deciding whether a structure (or object) is within the curtilage of a listed building . . whatever may be the strict conveyancing interpretation of the ancient and somewhat obscure word 'curtilage'. They are (1) the physical 'layout' of the listed building and the structure, (2) their ownership, past and present, (3) their use or function, past and present. Where they are in common ownership and one is used in connection with the other, there is little difficulty in putting a structure near a building or even some distance from it into its curtilage."
Changes in ownership and changes in use of the cottages in more recent times had not taken the cottages out of the curtilage of the mill.
Town & Country Planning Act 1971 54(9)
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Restormel Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment and Rabey; 1982 - [1982] JPL 785
Cottrell v Secretary of State for the Environment and Tonbridge and Malling District Councilz [1982] JPL 443
1982
QBD
Woolf J
Planning
The land-owner sought planning permission for an established change of use to allow for a caravan on his field. He appealed against the Secretary of States refusal which had confirmed that of the local authority, but had relied on a different ground. Held. The land-owner's appeal failed. The Secretary of State's powers were not limited to finding that the Authority was wrong in law and thus allowing an appeal. He also had the power to confirm the decision for new or different reasons. That is what he had done.
Salisbury District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment; 1982 - [1982] JPL 702
London Borough of Camden v Backer and Aird; CA 1982 - [1982] JPL 516
Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden; ECHR 23-Sep-1982 - 7152/75; [1983] 5 EHRR 35; [1982] ECHR 5; 7151/75
Hodgetts v Chiltern District Council; HL 1983 - [1983] 2 AC 120
Grampian Regional Council v Secretary of State for Scotland; CS 1983 - 1984 SC 1 13; (1983) 47 P & CR 540
Grampian Regional Council v Secretary of State for Scotland [1984] SC (HL) 58; (1983) 47 P&CR 43; [1983] 1 WLR 1340; [1983] 3 All ER 673
1983
HL
Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Bridge of Harwich
Planning
The House endorsed the practice of imposing negative conditions in planning consents.
Lord Bridge of Harwich said: "it is difficult to envisage a situation in practice in which the Tribunal, when assessing compensation, could be persuaded to act on a contrary opinion to that certified by the planning authority or the Secretary of State on appeal." and "It will be convenient to refer to the certificates contemplated by subsection (4)(a) and (b) as positive and negative certificates respectively. A decision by a planning authority, or by the Secretary of State on appeal, whether a positive or a negative certificate is appropriate, must proceed on the hypothesis predicated by subsection (3) and determine what planning permission, if any, would have been granted if the land were not proposed to be acquired by any authority possessing compulsory purchase powers. The sole purpose of the certification procedure is to provide a basis for determining the development value, if any, to be taken into account in assessing the compensation payable on compulsory acquisition. If a positive certificate is issued, it is to be assumed that the certified permission would be granted, subject to such conditions and at such future time, if any, as may be specified in the certificate: . . If a negative certificate is issued, 'regard is to be had' to the negative opinion certified: Although this is not conclusive, it is difficult to envisage a situation in practice in which the Lands Tribunal, when assessing compensation, could be persuaded to act on a contrary opinion to that certified by the planning authority or the Secretary of State on appeal."
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Federated Estates Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment and Gillingham Borough Council [1983] JPL 812
1983
David Widdicombe QC
Planning
"There was no obligation on an inspector to undertake an investigatory role, though he had certain powers to call for information if he considered it necessary. He should arrive at his conclusions on the basis of what the parties (including third parties) put before him, together with his inspection of the site and the area, and of course utilising his own experience, expertise and common sense."
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Pennine Raceway Ltd v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council; CA 1983 - [1983] QB 382
Sosmo Trust Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment; 1983 - [1983] JPL 806
Backer v Secretary of State for the Environment; 1983 - [1983] 2 All ER 1021; [1983] 1 WLR 1485; (1984) 47 P & CR 149
Westminster Renslade Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment; 1983 - (1983) 48 P & CR 255
Impey v Secretary of State for the Environment; QBD 2-Jan-1983 - (1984) 47 P & CR 157
Davy v Spelthorne Borough Council [1984] 1 AC 262; [1983] UKHL 3
13 Oct 1983
HL
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, Lord Wilberforce
Planning, Judicial Review
Although section 243(1)(a) provides that the "validity" of an enforcement notice is not to be questioned except as therein provided, the word "validity" is evidently not intended to be understood in its strict sense. It is used to mean merely enforceability. Lord Wilberforce explained the use of the terms 'private law' and 'public law': "The expressions 'private law' and 'public law' have recently been imported into the law of England from countries which, unlike our own, have separate systems concerning public law and private law. No doubt they are convenient expressions for descriptive purposes. In this country they must be used with caution, for, typically, English law fastens, not upon principles but upon remedies. The principle remains intact that public authorities and public servants are, unless clearly exempted, answerable in the ordinary courts for wrongs done to individuals. But by an extension of remedies and a flexible procedure it can be said that something resembling a system of public law is being developed."
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[ Bailii ]
Etheridge v Secretary of State for the Environment Times, 13 October 1983; (1983) 48 P&CR 35
13 Oct 1983
QBD
Woolf J
Planning
The landowner had obtained outline permission but with details reserved. Later full permission was granted, but the authority refused to approve matters which had already been approved in the original outline permission, saying they were out of time. Held: The respondent did have jurisdiction to hear the land-owner's appeal. The grant of the full permission was effectively the same as approval of the detail reserved in the outline, and the appeal was not out of time.
Obiter the court said that a sufficent test was whether the operations carried out would be permitted under the permission read in combination with the conditions.
Town and Country Planning Act 1971 245
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Gravesham Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1984] P & CR 142
1984
McCullough J
Planning
A building had been erected under permission for a "weekend and holiday chalet". In response to an enforcement notice served in relation to an extension to it, the Appellant submitted that the extension was permitted development because the building was in truth a dwelling-house. Held: Whether it was or was not a dwelling-house was a question of fact. A building that should be described as a 'dwelling house' if it ordinarily affords the facilities required for day-to-day existence."
McCullough J observed: "In using a simple word in common usage and leaving it undefined, Parliament realistically expected that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, there would be no difficulty at all in deciding whether a particular building was or was not a dwelling-house. The use in a statute of almost any word in common usage may give rise to difficulties of interpretation in a very small number of cases, but the problems are both fewer and less troublesome than those that are apt to result when the statute defines the word. The good sense of this is such that I do not intend to resolve the issue that arises in this appeal by attempting to define what Parliament left undefined.
The more helpful approach, in my opinion, is to consider a number of buildings that quite clearly are dwelling-houses and others that equally clearly are not and to see whether this throws up any indication of what ought and what ought not to be taken into account.
Consider a building that anyone would acknowledge was a dwelling-house. If it is not being lived in because, for example, the occupants are on holiday or because they have two houses and spend half the year in each, it remains a dwelling-house. Take a common situation where a family has a second house in the country that is only visited at weekends, in the summer months and for a summer holiday. That is clearly a dwelling-house. So the intention to use one's house, or the practice of using it throughout the year, is not essential.
If a house is empty pending its sale or because its owner cannot, or does not want, to let it, it is still a dwelling-house. So emptiness is not fatal.
If it cannot be occupied because it is flooded, or is undergoing extensive repair, it is still a dwelling-house. So, too, a second home in a remote mountainous district, cut off by snow every winter. So an ability to use it whenever one wants is not an essential either.
Suppose that there is a national emergency and an order is made prohibiting the use of houses in a particular area for the duration of the emergency: they would nevertheless remain dwelling-houses. So even an inability to use a house lawfully does not necessarily prevent it from being a dwelling-house.
Leaving aside extraordinary events like floods and national emergencies and repairs so extensive that the occupant has to move out, is it a characteristic of every dwelling-house that the owner or occupier could live in it permanently if he wanted to? I think not . .
Mr Aitchison has emphasised the "dwelling" in "dwelling-house" and has stressed that to dwell is to remain or reside. Comparatively few of those living in the buildings last mentioned ordinarily stay for long enough to be regarded as residing there. He submits, therefore, that a capacity to provide permanent accommodation is the essential character of a dwelling-house.
In my judgment, however, its more distinctive characteristic is its ability to afford to those who use it the facilities required for day-to-day private domestic existence.
Whether a building is or is not a dwelling-house is a question of fact. In Scurlock v Secretary of State for Wales, the Secretary of State had to decide whether a building that was used partly for residential purposes and partly for business purposes was a "dwelling-house" within the meaning of the Town and Country Planning General Development Order 1973. He adopted a factual approach, and the Divisional Court held that that was right."
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Lydcare Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [1984] 2 EGLR 180
1984
Planning
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Howes v Secretary of State for the Environment [1984] JPL 439
1984
QBD
Hodgson J
Planning
The inspector had directed himself that the removal of a hedge and the creation of an access was "a continuous operation and each step in the work prolong[ed] the period for serving the enforcement notice as regards every earlier step of the development." Held: The notice stood.
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Strable v Dartford Borough Council [1984] JPL 329
1984
CA
Stephenson LJ
Planning, Negligence
A local authority is not liable in damages for a negligent failure properly to complete its planning law duties. No action lay and the remedy available to an individual in such a case is to object on appeal to the Secretary of State and, if still dissatisfied with the planning results of that appeal, to seek judicial review of the Secretary of State's decision. The question is always whether, looking at the whole statute and at all the circumstances, including the history of the legislation, the relevant Act was passed primarily for the benefit of the individual or for the public in general.
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Peacock Homes Ltd v Secretary of State [1984] JPEL 729
1984
CA
Planning
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Grampian Regional Council v City of Aberdeen District Council (1984) 47 P&CR 633; [1984] JPL 371
1984
Planning, Scotland
The extinguishment of a private right is not a proper matter for a condition attached to a planning permission, even though a negative condition preventing development until a highway has been stopped up is unobjectionable.
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