swarb.co.uk - law index
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Planning - From: 1970 To: 1979
This page lists 34 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.
Lavender v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1970] 1 WLR 1231; [1970] 3 All ER 871
1970
Willis J
Local Government, Planning
While it is not for the courts to interfere with the formulation or administration of the Minister's planning policies, the Minister is not able to dictate the exercise of discretion on the basis of a policy mandate.
1 Citers
Manchester Corporation v Connolly; CA 1970 - [1970] Ch 420
Stringer v Ministry of Housing and Local Government [1970] 1 WLR 1281
1970
Cooke J
Planning
The material considerations to be allowed for by the local authority in exercising its planning functions are considerations of a planning nature, "all considerations relating to the use and development of land are considerations which may, in a proper case, be regarded as planning considerations". Though a private individual may not have any right of action against the local authority they can take his interests into account. Whether a particular consideration is material in a particular case will depend on the circumstances.
1 Citers
Trustees of the Walton-on-Thames Charities v Walton and Weybridge Urban District Council (1970) 21 P and CR 411
1970
CA
Salmon LJ, Widgery LJ
Planning
There is no room for an implied condition in a planning permission. Widgery LJ said: "I have never heard of an implied condition in a planning permission and I believe no such creature exists. Planning permission enures for the benefit of the land. It is not simply a matter of contract between the parties. There is no place, in my judgment, within the law relating to planning permission for an implied condition. Conditions should be express, they should be clear, they should be in the document containing the permission."
1 Citers
Hartley v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1970] 1 QB 413
1970
CA
Lord Denning MR, Widgery LJ
Planning
A petrol station operated with an area to display and sell cars. Sales stopped in 1961 when the owner died. His son was thought too young and inexperienced son to be involved in car sales. Sales were resumed in 1965 when a new owner acquired the site. The court was asked whether that 1965 resumption amounted to an unauthorised change of use. The Minister and the Divisional Court held that it did. The appellant site owner submitted: "The intention is an essential element; and here the evidence supports the view that though the widow, because of her son's youth and inexperience, told him not to sell cars, she would have liked the car sales to continue since the demand was there; so the evidence is that the car sales use was only temporarily suspended until such time as the then owners felt able to resume it." Held: The submission failed.
Lord Denning MR: "The question in all such cases is simply this: Has the cessation of use (followed by a non-use) been merely temporary, or did it amount to an abandonment? If it was merely temporary, the previous use can be resumed without planning permission being obtained. If it amounted to abandonment, it cannot be resumed unless planning permission is obtained. ... Abandonment depends on the circumstances. If the land has remained unused for a considerable time, in such circumstances that a reasonable man might conclude that the previous use had been abandoned, then the tribunal may hold it to have been abandoned."
Widgery LJ: "The substance of the defence of the appellant in this case must be that although it seems there had been no car sales use from 1961 to 1965, yet on a fair and commonsense view of the facts, the proper interpretation of those facts was that the original phase 1 use for car sales had never come to an end. It is in connection with that argument that the question of abandonment arises.
It has been suggested in the courts before, and it seems to me that it is now time to reach a view upon it, that it is perfectly feasible in this context to describe a use as having been abandoned when one means that it has not merely been suspended for a short and determined period, but has ceased with no intention to resume it at any particular time. It is perfectly true, as Mr. Glidewell says, that the word 'abandonment' does not appear in the legislation. We are not concerned with the legislation at this stage but merely with the facts of the matter. I cannot think of a better word to describe a situation in which the land owner has stopped the activities constituting the use not merely for a temporary period, but with no view to their being resumed. If that has happened, then, as a matter of fact, the use has ceased."
1 Citers
Lever (Finance) Ltd v City of Westminster [1970] EWCA Civ 3; [1971] 1 QB 222; (1970) 21 P & CR 778; 68 LGR 757; [1970] 3 WLR 732; [1970] 3 All ER 496
22 Jul 1970
CA
Lord Denning MR, Sachs, Megaw LJJ
Planning, Local Government
The appellant developers had obtained detailed planning approval for fourteen houses, but after adjustments for a building line, moving several properties distances of several feet toward other properties, further plans were submitted without identifying the changes. The changes were discussed, and an approval noted by the developer's architect. The development proceeded. A neighbour objected, and the officer recommended an application for approval of the amendment. The planning committee refused approval. Held: The developer succeeded.
Lord Denning MR said that the case "should be decided on the practice proved in evidence. It was within the ostensible authority of Mr. Carpenter to tell Mr. Rottenberg that the variation was not material. Seeing that the developers acted on it by building the house, I do not think the Council can throw over what has been done by their officer, Mr Carpenter."
1 Cites
[ Bailii ]
Hussain v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (1971) 221 EG 627
1971
Planning
1 Citers
Regina v Yeovil Borough Council, ex parte Trustees of Elim Pentecostal Church, Yeovil; QBD 1971 - (1971) 23 P&CR 39; [1971] 70 LGR 142
Kent County Council v Kingsway Investments (Kent) Limited [1971] AC 72
1971
HL
Lord Morris
Planning
The objectives of the policy discouraging conditional planning consents included the avoidance of the accumulation of unimplemented permissions, an objective which itself underlay the time limit provisions, originally introduced under the 1968 Act.
1 Citers
Petticoat Lane Rentals Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment; CA 1971 - [1971] 2 All ER 793; [1971] 1 WLR 1112
Westminster Bank Limited v The Minister for Housing and Local Government, Beverley Borough Council; HL 1971 - [1971] AC 508
Stevens v Bromley London Borough Council; 1972 - [1972] 1 Ch 400
Burdle v Secretary of State for the Environment [1972] 1 WLR 1207; [1972] 23 All ER 240
22 Jun 1972
QBD
Lord Widgery CJ, Willis, Bridge JJ
Planning
The appellants had purchased land which had been used as a dwelling with a lean-to annex which had been used as a scrap yard, selling off car parts. The appellant had reconstructed the annex with a shop front, and began to use it more substantially for the sale of car parts. The planning authority served an enforcement notice asserting a change of use and breach of planning control. On appeal both the appellant and respondent presented the site as a whole. The appeal failed, but the respondent had argued that the notice could apply only to the annex, falling within the definition on its own of a shop, and that therefore the enforcement referred to the annex alone. The appellant said that by considering only the annex, he had lost the ability to argue that as regards the site as a whole, there had been no material cange of use. Held: The Secretary of State's decision did not identify the reasoning used to reach his decision, and the matter must be remitted. Whilst the word shop would not naturally apply to the whole site, the accident of the language used by the planning authority could not determine what made up the planning unit. A good guide to what made up a planning unit was to consider the site as a whole until and unless some smaller unit could be identified from its physical and functional identity.
Bridge J: It 'may equally be apt to consider the entire unit of occupation even though the occupier carries on a variety of activities and it is not possible to say hat one isincidental or ancillary to another' and 'however, it may frequently occur that within a single unit of occupation two or more physically separate and distinct areas are occupied for substantially different and unrelated purposes. In such a case each area used for a different main purpose (together with its incidental and ancillary activities) ought to be considered as a separate planning unit.'
Town and Country Planning Act 1962 180
1 Cites
1 Citers
Thomas David (Porthcawl) Ltd and others v Penybont Rural District Council and others [1972] 3 All ER 1092
5 Oct 1972
Lord Denning MR, Edmund Davies, Stephenson LJJ
Planning
The appellant complained that an enforcement notice had been served as to an entire plot of land when the activities complained of, sand and gravel extraction, had occurred on only two smaller parts. Held: The site should be looked at as a whole. The appellant had a licence from the land owner to extract materials from the remaining site, had claimed the right to make such extractions, and had already extended their operations during the appeal process. The abolition of the four year rule for change of use enforcement did not apply to mining.
1 Cites
1 Citers
Pilkington v Secretary of State for the Environment; QBD 1973 - [1973] 1 WLR 1527; (1973) 25 P & CR 508
Kingston London Borough Council v Environment Secretary; 1973 - [1973] 1 WLR 1549
Aston v Secretary of State for the Environment; 9-Apr-1973 - Unreported, 09 April 1973
Regina v Hillingdon London Borough Council, Ex parte Royco Homes Ltd; 1974 - [1974] QB 720; [1974] 2 All ER 643; [1974] 2 WLR 805
Turner v Secretary of State of the Environment; 1974 - (1974) 28 P & CR 123
AI and P (Stratford) Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council; 1975 - [1975] 237 Estates Gazette 416
Howard v Secretary of State; CA 1975 - [1975] QB 235
Hope v Secretary of State for the Environment (1975) 31 P & CR 120
1975
Phillips J
Planning
1 Cites
1 Citers
Regina v The Secretary of State for the Environment, ex Parte Ostler; CA 16-Mar-1976 - [1976] EWCA Civ 6; [1977] 1 QB 122
Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Ostler [1977] 1 QB 122
1977
CA
Administrative, Planning
The six week period during which a challenge must be made to a compulsory purchase is not capable of extension under the rules of court. The legislative intention is that questions as to the invalidity may be raised on the specified grounds in the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, but that otherwise the jurisdiction of the court is excluded in the interests of certainty.
Hoveringham Gravels v Chiltern District Council; CA 1977 - [1977] 76 LGR 533
Newbury District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment and others (1977) 35 P&CR 170
1977
QBD
Lord Widgery CJ, Michael Davies and Robert Goff JJ
Planning
The Council appealed against the quashing of its decision to impose certan conditions on a planning permission requiring the demolition of two hangars at the airfield subject of the application. Held: The Council's appeal failed.
Mr Justice Robert Goff set out the meaning of the subsectio: "The subsection provides that no enforcement notice shall be served in respect of such a development. It does not provide, as it easily could have done if such had been the intention, that no enforcement notice should be served on the Crown in respect of such development. It follows that, if a private citizen should subsequently acquire any such land from the Crown, he would not have to apply for planning permission in respect of development within the subsection. He too would be protected from the service of an enforcement notice by the terms of the subsection which are quite explicit."
Town and Country Planning Act 1947 87(1)
1 Citers
Clyde and Co v Secretary of State for the Environment [1977] 1 WLR 926
1977
CA
Sir David Cairns
Landlord and Tenant, Planning
Planning permission had been granted for an office block, together with 8 flats as part of the same building. The building was largely erected, with the residential part incomplete. There was an application to change the existing permitted use of the residential part of the block to office use. That application was refused. The resulting appeal was dismissed by the Secretary of State. At first instance Willis J. quashed the decision, following Granada on the basis that the desirability of retaining the existing housing use was an immaterial consideration. Held: This approach was wrong, Sir David Cairns: "The fact that the refusal of planning permission for a change of use cannot ensure that a current use which is a permitted use will continue was as already indicated the ground of the refusal of planning permission in the case of the Dartford cinema. It is equally true that whereas in the present case the permitted use has not been started, the refusal of an application to change of use cannot ensure that permitted use will ever be started. This was a point strongly relied on. I do not find it a compelling argument. The need for housing is certainly a planning consideration. If permission is given for office use, the permission will almost certainly be implemented and the building will be unavailable for housing. If permission for office use is refused, there is at least a fair chance that the building will be used for housing rather than being allowed to stand empty".
1 Citers
Penwith District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1977] JPL 371; [1977] 34 P & CR 269
1977
QBD
Planning
The second respondents had a factory. They sought planning permission to extend it, and this was granted with conditions, against which the land-owners appealed, saying that the first defendant had misused the opportunity to seek to impose conditions on the existing development. Held: When an application was made, an authority might grant permission attaching conditins which would affect an existing authorised us and without offering compensation. The new conditions must however relate to the development now permitted. That applied in this case, and the conditions were not ultra vires.
Sovmots Investments Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1977] QB 411
1977
Forbes J
Planning
Conveyancing Act 1881 6
1 Citers
Seddon Properties Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment; 1978 - (1978) 42 P&CR 26
Winchester City Council v Secretary of State for the Environment (1978) 36 P & CR 455
1978
Forbes J
Planning
Forbes J said: "What does "new evidence" in this context mean? It cannot mean that, because the inspector has not seen it before, everything that he sees is new evidence. If it meant that, every time that an inspector went on a view he would have to re-open the inquiry because he would be taking into account new evidence, and, of course, at that inquiry, in accordance with the terms of Rule 13(ii) of the Rules of 1974, he would have to go and have another view, and he would then be having further fresh evidence which would require him to re-open the inquiry once more, and one would have a never-ending case like a cat chasing its tail. The task of inspectors would then be even worse than it is at the moment. "New evidence" means that, if what is seen on a view raises a point that was either not raised during evidence or argument at the inquiry or, if it was raised, was taken as being so peripheral as to be of virtually no account, then there is a duty to reconvene the inquiry or at least to give an opportunity of making representations. If, however, when [what] is seen on a view simply serves to underline or give greater emphasis to some point that was raised at the inquiry, then no such opportunity need to be given."
1 Citers
Brighton Borough Council v Secretary of State for Environment (1978) 39 P & CR 46
1978
Planning
1 Citers
Newbury District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1978] 1 WLR 1241; [1979] 1 All ER 243
14 Jul 1978
CA
Lord Denning MR, Lawton and Browne LJJ
Planning, Estoppel
The Council had, when granting planning permission for the use of certain hangars on an airfield, required that on the end of the use, the hangars should be removed. That decision had been quashed by the repondent's inspector, and again by the Divisional Court. Held: The appeal succeeded.
Lord Denning MR, in the minority on this point, postulated a broad general principle of estoppel or "blowing hot and cold" in planning matters, saying that in 1962 the land owner had two inconsistent courses open to them: " One was to apply for a grant of planning permission; the other was to rely on any existing use rights that might be attached to the site. Once they opted for planning permission - and accepted it without objection - they had made their bed and must lie on it. No doubt they did not know of the past history, but that was only Q because they did not choose to rely on it. They should not be allowed to bring it up again now."
1 Cites
1 Citers
Suffolk County Council v Mason; HL 1979 - [1979] AC 705; [1979] 2 All ER 369
