swarb.co.uk - law index
These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.
Planning - From: 1900 To: 1929
This page lists 2 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.
Blackpool Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment (1980) 40 P & CR 104
1900
CA
Ackner LJ
Planning
A house had been used by the owner as a second home for holidays by himself and his family, by members of his office staff, and by "family groups" who paid rent. There were lettings at a rent for 10 out of 18 weeks in the four month holiday season; for the remainder of the year the premises were left empty. The local planning authority served an enforcement notice alleging a material change of use from use as a private dwelling house to use for holiday lettings on a commercial basis. On appeal, the Inspector had concluded that there had. been no material change of use. The Secretary of State adopted the Inspector's conclusions and allowed the owner's appeal against the enforcement notice. The local planning authority's appeal was dismissed by the Divisional Court. The planning authority submitted that the Inspector had erroneously approached the matter on the basis that "if the house is occupied by one family, the house is residential and therefore in accordance with the permitted use as a dwelling-house." Held:
Ackner LJ said: "I would agree that, if that is what the Inspector is saying, it would be wrong, because not every residential use is necessarily a use as a private dwelling-house. To my mind, however, what is said reads quite clearly as being merely a double description. If the house is occupied by one family, etc., the use is residential and in accordance with permitted use as a private dwelling-house. In my judgment, what was being found as fact here was that the character of the user from the planning point of view had not been changed by the fact that the premises were being occupied not only by the owner and his family but also by his friends or by members of his office staff or by paying tenants during the periods that I have indicated.
If that is right, it is a finding of fact, and all that this court has to ask itself is: was it a finding of fact that could reasonably have been made on the evidence before the inspector. It is common ground, as I understand it, that the question for determination in the context of this appeal is whether the character of the use of this dwelling-house as a private residence has been changed so substantially as to amount to a material change of use. It is a question of fact and degree. It is a decision that is based on the particular facts of this case that I have recited. This is not a case that lays down, as I see it, any principle. The Inspector was not dealing with a house that was constantly being let in short holiday lettings. She was dealing with a house that was being occupied by the owner, by the owner's friends and by the owner's staff on a non-paying basis, with, superadded to that, a period in the aggregate of 10 weeks in the year during which it was let as a rent to single households. I think that she was wholly entitled to reach the conclusion that the character of this dwelling-house and its use was not materially changed by the succession of occupiers over the period that I have mentioned in the categories that I have described. As I have said, I do not consider that she was seeking to propound any proposition of law in her paragraph 42. She was making the legitimate findings of fact on which to base her conclusion that there had been no material change of use."
Jupp J agreed with Ackner LJ "that not every residential use is necessarily a use as a private dwelling house", and added: "I also agree that the method of taking the evidence in this case has left some matters of fact unclear that might have come out and turned out very differently from the way they did had they been open to further probing and questioning. It is not to be thought that, in a case like this where the lettings had a different character from that concluded by the Inspector here, there would not be a material change of sue. It depends entirely on the facts, as Diplock LJ said in Wilson v West Sussex County Council: 'Considerations which are relevant are planning considerations . . .' and these vary from case to case."
1 Citers
Davis v Bromley Corporation [1908] 1 KB 170
1907
CA
Vaughan Williams LJ, Sir Gorell Barnes, President, and Bigham J
Torts - Other, Planning
The plaintiff had submitted building plans for the defendant's approval, which were refused for alleged non-compliance with by-laws. The Plaintiff contended that the plans complied with the by-laws and that the rejection was not bona fide. Held: The court denied the existence of a tort of misfeasance in public office.
Vaughan Williams LJ said: "It is not contested that the legislature has given power to this body to decide whether they will sanction such works or not; it is not suggested that in so deciding the Council are exercising judicial functions, and in fact they are not doing so; they are exercising a discretion vested in them by Statute . . and the whole object of this action is really to see if, by this means, the plaintiff can overrule the Council's decision."
1 Citers
