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Nuisance - From: 1930 To: 1959
This page lists 47 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.
Vanderpant v Mayfair Hotel Co [1930] 1 Ch 138
1930
Luxmore J
Nuisance
The plaintiff complained in nuisance that the access to his home had been obstructed by people seeking to use the defendant hotel. Held: The claim failed. If it was established that the defendant "has interfered substantially with the reasonable access to the plaintiff's house" the plaintiff would have satisfied the necessary conditions to enable him to maintain the action; in those circumstances he would have "sustained an injury affecting him particularly, in a manner beyond that which other members of the public are in fact affected".
Luxmore J said: "It is necessary to determine whether the act complained of is an inconvenience materially interfering with the ordinary physical comfort of human existence, not merely according to elegant or dainty modes and habits of living but according to plain and sober and simple notions among English people."
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Price v Hilditch [1930] 1 Ch 500
1930
Maugham J
Land, Nuisance
The erection of a high boundary wall was established to be a nuisance. Maugham J: "A ground plan put in by one of the expert witnesses for the plaintiff shows the amount of floor space to which the light of the sky has access, calculated from the point of view of a table 2 feet 8 inches high, and the fact now is that there is hardly any part of the floor in the scullery from which the sky can be seen, whereas, before the erection of the wall, the sky could be seen from practically the whole of that small room."
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Wilkins v Leighton; 1932 - (1932) 2 Ch 106
Cunard v Antifyre Ltd [1933] 1 KB 551
1933
Talbot J
Nuisance
Talbot J defined private nuisance as an interference by owners or occupiers of property with the use or enjoyment of neighbouring property.
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Attorney-General v Corke [1933] Ch 89
1933
ChD
Bennett J
Nuisance
The defendant whose land had been occupied by caravan dwellers was liable in public nuisance and under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher and was restrained by injunction. Offending acts had been committed by the caravan dwellers, who were permitted to occupy the defendant's land, on other land in the neighbourhood. Bennett J rejected the submission of the defendant's counsel that: "The defendant cannot be made responsible for acts done by the caravan dwellers off the defendant's property."
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Wilchick v Marks and Silverstone; KBD 1934 - [1934] 2 KB 56
Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v Emmett; 1936 - [1936] 1 All ER 825; [1936] 2 KB 468
Shiffman v Order of St John of Jerusalem (Grand Priory in the British Realm of the Venerable Order of the Hospital); 1936 - [1936] 1 All ER 557
Leeman v Montague; 1936 - [1936] 2 All ER 1677
Matania v National Provincial Bank Ltd; CA 1936 - [1936] 2 All ER 633
Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor [1937] 58 CLR 479
26 Aug 1937
Commonwealth, Nuisance
(High Court of Australia)
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[ Austlii ]
Andreae v Selfridge and Co Ltd; CA 1938 - [1938] Ch 1
Hale v Jennings Bros [1938] 1 All ER 579
1938
Nuisance, Personal Injury
The plaintiff recovered damages for personal injuries under the rule in Rylands -v- Fletcher.
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Metropolitan Properties v Jones; 1939 - [1939] 2 All ER 202
Bond v Nottingham Corporation [1940] 1 Ch 429
1940
CA
Sir Wilfred Greene MR
Nuisance, Land
Sir Wilfred Greene MR said: "The nature of the right of support is not open to dispute. The owner of the servient tenement is under no obligation to repair that part of his building which provides support for his neighbour. He can let it fall into decay. If it does so and support is removed, the owner of the dominant tenement has no cause for complaint. On the other hand, the owner of the dominant tenement is not bound to sit by and watch the gradual deterioration of the support constituted by his neighbour's building. He is entitled to enter and take the necessary steps to ensure that the support continues by effecting repairs, and so forth, to the part of the building which gives the support. But what the owner of the servient tenement is not entitled to do is, by an act of his own, to remove the support without providing an equivalent."
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Rouse v Gravelworks Ltd [1940] 1 KBD 489
1940
CA
Slesser and Goddard LJJ
Nuisance
The defendants had dug out gravel from their land, leaving a large hole adjacent to the boundary with the plaintiff's land. Water filled the hole and caused damage to the plaintff's land. Held. The plaintiff's claim failed because the damage to his land was caused by "natural agencies". The decision might have differed if the water which filled the hole left by the excavation of the gravel had been brought in by pumping or perhaps even by percolation emanating from outside the defendants' land and induced by the excavation to flow into that land.
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Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan; HL 24-Jun-1940 - [1940] AC 880; [1940] 3 All ER 349; [1940] 56 TLR 887; [1940] UKHL 2
Thomas and Evans Ltd v Mid-Rhondda Co-operative Society [1941] 1 KB 381
1941
CA
Sir Wilfred Greene MR
Negligence, Nuisance
The defendants set out to re-construct a wall along the side of the river to protect their land and an adjacent highway from flooding. In doing so they pulled down the wall, leaving gaps which they intended to fill by a new building. The river suddenly rose and the respondents' land was flooded. Held: The appellants were not liable either in nuisance or in negligence. Sir Wilfred Greene MR said: "If this wall had been erected by the freeholder and taken down by the freeholder the next day, or a week, or a year afterwards, with the result that the flood water took the course which it would have taken if the wall had never been there, I cannot see, on any principle known to me, that the respondents would have been entitled to complain. If it were not so, a person, in putting up a defensive work on his own land, would act at his peril, because by the mere fact of erecting it he would be conferring on his neighbours, or persons in the neighbourhood, rights to insist that he should never remove the wall or building that he had put up." He went on to say that "the respondents had no right to have the wall erected, they had no right to insist on its continuance, they had no ground of complaint whatsoever against anybody who rightfully took it down."
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Slater v Worthington's Cash Store Ltd [1941] 1 KB 48
1941
Negligence, Nuisance
The defendant property owner was held to be liable for failing to remove snow from his roof, so that a minor avalanche injured a passer-by on the pavement.
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Maitland v Raisbeck [1944] 1 KB 689
1944
CA
Lord Greene MR
Nuisance
Lord Greene MR said: "Every person . . has a right to use the highway and, if something happens to him which in fact causes an obstruction to the highway but is in no way referable to his fault, it is quite impossible, in my view, to say that ipso facto and immediately a nuisance is created. It would be obviously created if he allows it to be an obstruction for an unreasonable time or in unreasonable circumstances, but the mere fact that it had become an obstruction cannot turn it into a nuisance . . If that were not so, it seems to me that every driver of a vehicle on a road would be turned into an insurer in respect of latent defects in his own machine."
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Read v J Lyons and Co Ltd; HL 1946 - [1947] AC 156; [1946] 2 All ER 471; [1947] LJR 39; [1946] 175 LT 413; [1946] 62 TLR 646; [1946] 91 Sol J Jo 54; [1946] UKHL 2
Newcastle-under-Lyme Corporation v Wolstanton Ltd [1947] Ch 92
1947
Evershed J
Nuisance
The tort of nuisance is directed against the plaintiff's enjoyment of his rights over land, and an action of private nuisance will usually be brought by the person in actual possession of the land affected, either as the freeholder or tenant of the land in question, or even as a licensee with exclusive possession of the land.
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Brown v Harrison [1947] 177 LT 281
1947
CA
Somervell LJ
Nuisance, Negligence, Land
Somervell LJ reiterated the relevant test (formulated by the judge at first instance) in these terms: "If there is a danger which is apparent, not only to the expert but to the ordinary layman which the ordinary layman can see with his own eyes, if he chooses to use them, and he fails to do so, with the result that injury is inflicted, as in this case, upon somebody passing along the highroad, the owner is in those circumstances responsible, because in the management of his property he had not acted as a normal reasonable landowner would act."
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Rich v Basterfield [1847] EngR 693
3 Jul 1947
Landlord and Tenant, Nuisance
Although the owner of property may, as occupier, be responsible for injuries arising from acts done upon that property by persons who are there by his permission, though not strictly his agents or servants, such liability attaches only upon parties in actual possession. - Where, therefore, an action was brought against A., the owner of premises, for a nuisance arising from smoke issuing out of a chimney, to the prejudice of the plaintiff in his occupation of an adjoining messuage, on the ground that A, having erected the chimney, and let the premises with the chimney so erected, had impliedly authorised the lighting to a fire therein. Held that the action would not lie. Held, also, that, inasmuch as the premises were in the occupation of B a tenarit, at the time the fires were lighted, A. was entitled to a verdict on a pIea of "not possessed," the allegation as to possession, having reference to the time when the nuisance complained of was committed, and not to the time at which the chimney was erected.
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[ Commonlii ]
Longhurst v Metropolitan Water Board [1948] 2 All ER 834
1948
HL
Nuisance
Water had leaked from a main and disturbed paving stones in the highway. The water board had had no knowledge of or reason to suspect any danger to the public at the place in question. Held: Affirming the Court of Appeal, since the board was acting under statutory authority in maintaining the main, they were not liable in the absence of negligence.
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Almeroth v WE Chivers and Son Ltd [1948] 1 All ER 53
1948
CA
Somervell LJ
Negligence, Personal Injury, Nuisance
The plaintiff when crossing the kerb from a roadway tripped over a small pile of slates and was injured. The slates did not overlap the kerb. Held: The plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence. The slates "might easily not be noticed by a reasonably careful person crossing the road as the plaintiff did", talking to someone. Somervell LJ said that a person walking along a pavement does not have to keep "his eyes on the ground to see whether or not there is any obstacle in his path".
The ordinary principles of causation in tort are applicable to an action in nuisance. The obstacle was capable of being a nuisance despite its small size.
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Hall v Beckenham Corporation; 1949 - [1949 ] 1 KB 716
McGillivray v Stephenson [1950] 1 All ER 942
1950
Nuisance
The court upheld a notice requiring a person to abate a nuisance constituting stinking pigs, which said "and for that purpose to remove the whole of the pigs from the premises, clear up the effect of their past presence, and cease for the future to allow the premises to be used for pig-keeping at all". When making an order to abate a nuisance, the court must specify what is required to be done, but on appeal the quoted words were said to add nothing to the order.
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Jacobs v London County Council; HL 1950 - [1950] AC 361
Lambourn v London Brick Co Ltd [1950] EG 28 July 1950
28 Jul 1950
Land, Negligence, Nuisance
Finnemore J stated that an unreasonable burden must not be placed on the reasonable owner: "the standard to be taken should be that of an ordinary landowner and not an expert. It was neither the duty nor the practice of the ordinary prudent landowner to make a meticulous examination of its individual trees."
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Caminer v Northern and London Investment Trust Ltd [1951] AC 88
1951
HL
Lord Normand, Lord Porter, Lord Reid, Lord Oaksey, Lord Radcliffe
Nuisance, Negligence
An elm tree, standing on land adjoining a busy London highway, fell, injuring the plaintiffs, who were using the thoroughfare. The House considered the duty of a land owner to inspect trees on his land adjoining the highway. Held: Lord Normand observed that although the defendants had not complied with their duty, "it is no less plain that, if they had, it would have made no difference. The tree was just such a tree as [the expert witness] says the owner might consider safe."
Where a person takes it upon himself to perform a task in circumstances where a reasonable man would think it necessary to call in an expert the standard of care and degree of foreseeability the law will require of him may well be that of an expert.
Lord Reid outlined the extent of the duty: "So in my judgment the appellants can only succeed in this appeal if they can show that there was something about this particular tree which should have suggested that lopping or other action was necessary. What inspection will suggest will depend on the knowledge and experience of the inspector, and there has been some controversy about the degree of knowledge and experience necessary for adequate inspection. Plainly it would be no use to send a person who knew nothing about trees. The alternatives put forward were that he should be an expert or that he should have at least such knowledge and experience of trees as a landowner with trees o his land would generally have. As the question depends on what a reasonable man would do I think that it may be put in this way. Would a reasonable and careful owner, without expert knowledge but accustomed to dealing with his trees and having a countryman's general knowledge about them, think it necessary to call in an expert to advise him or would he think it sufficient to act at lest in the first instance on his own knowledge and judgment? The evidence in this case does not suggest to me that he would, and does not convince me that he should call in an expert. There must be many owners of elm trees beside busy roads and if it were proper for them to seek expert advice I would expect, making every allowance for the facts that not all owners are reasonable and careful and that even reasonable people frequently omit to do what they know they ought to do, that it would appear that expert advice was not infrequently sought. But the evidence in this case does not bear this out."
Lord Radcliffe raised some questions as to the liability of a tree-owner which he did not finally answer. In the course of his discussion he said: "It would be conceded, I believe, that there is somehow a difference between the legal responsibilities of the owner of a mature forest tree, in a built-up area, immediately adjacent to a busy street, and the responsibilities of the owner of a stand of timber bordering a country lane. But is the difference only this, that the latter is entitled to take more chances at the expense of his neighbours than the former? I am not certain of the logic, for a tree or its branch only falls once; and it must be poor consolation to an injured passer-by in the country lane to be assured that the chances were all against his being at the place of the accident at the moment when it occurred."
Lord Normand said: "The Court of Appeal applied what is, I think, the proper test - the conduct to be expected from a reasonable and prudent land-owner - and held on the evidence that the appellants had satisfied this test because there was nothing dangerous in the appearance of the tree, no sign of disease, advanced age, disproportion of crown to stem, or rising roots . . The test of the conduct to be expected from a reasonable and prudent landlord sounds more simple than it really is. For it postulates some degree of knowledge on the part of landlords which must necessarily fall short of the knowledge possessed by scientific arboriculturists but which must surely be greater than the knowledge possessed by the ordinary urban observer of trees or even of the countryman not practically concerned with their care."
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Mint v Good; CA 1951 - [1951] 1 KB 517
Harper v GN Haden and Sons; CA 1953 - [1933] Ch 298
Pride of Derby and Derbyshire Angling Association Ltd v British Celanese Ltd; CA 1953 - [1953] Ch 149
Southport Corporation v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1953] 3 WLR 773; [1953] 2 All ER 1204
1953
QBD
Devlin J
Nuisance
An oil tanker ran aground in an estuary. The master jettisoned 400 tons of oil cargo to prevent the tanker breaking her back. The tide carried the oil slick on to a foreshore causing damage. The foreshore owners sued the shipowners in trespass, nuisance and negligence. However, the only negligence alleged on the pleadings was faulty navigation by the master for which it was said the owners were vicariously liable. The owners' case was that the stranding was due to faulty steering gear caused by a crack in the stern frame. The defence of necessity was raised. Held: The defence succeeded. Devlin J spoke in terms of an imminent danger to life rendering it necessary to inflict damage on another's property. However, the doctrine of necessity could not operate to defeat liability for a negligent act committed by the defendant that was causative of the danger or emergency.
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Farrel v Mowlem [1954] Lloyds LR 440
1954
Devlin J
Nuisance
The defendant had without justification laid a pipe across a pavement and the plaintiff tripped over it and was injured. Held: The defendant was liable in nuisance. Devlin J said, as to the pipe: "No doubt it is a comparatively harmless sort of nuisance in that most members of the public may be expected to see the pipe, and it will not cause them any grave inconvenience, but that does not prevent it being a nuisance in law", and as to nuisance: "I think the law still is that any person who actually creates a nuisance is liable for it and for the consequences which flow from it whether he is negligent or not."
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Southport Corporation v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1954] EWCA Civ 5; (1954) 118 JP 411; [1954] 2 QB 182; [1954] 2 All ER 561; [1954] 3 WLR 200; [1954] 1 Lloyd's Rep 446
3 Jun 1954
CA
Denning, Morris LJJ
Nuisance, Negligence, Torts - Other
The defendant's tanker came aground, spilling fuel, for which the corporation claimed damages. The corporation appealed against rejection of that claim. Held: In order to support an action for private nuisance the defendant must have used his own land or some other land in such a way as injuriously to affect the enjoyment of the plaintiff's land. It was not an essential element in liability for a nuisance that it should emanate from land belonging to the defendant, although commonly it does.
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[ Bailii ]
Trevetts v Lee [1955] 1 WLR 113
1955
CA
Lord Evershed MR
Nuisance
Lord Evershed MR said: "The law as regards obstruction to highways is conveniently stated in a passage in Salmond on Torts, 13th edition: 'A nuisance to a highway consists either in obstructing it or in rendering it dangerous'. Then a numbed of examples are given which seem to me to show that prima facie at any rate when you put an obstruction to a highway you mean something which permanently or temporarily removes the whole or part of the highway from the public use altogether."
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Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Southport Corporation [1955] 3 All ER 864; [1956] AC 218
1955
HL
Earl Jowitt
Nuisance, Negligence
A tanker, the Inverpool, was grounded in difficult weather by its master when he feared its back was broken. Substantial volumes of oil leaked, and the local authority sought to recover the costs of the clean up. At first instance, the defence of necessity had succeeded, but this wa reversed at the Court of Apeal. Held: The appeal was dismissed.
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Munro v Southern Dairies; 18-Apr-1955 - [1955] VLR 332; [1955] ALR 793; [1955] VicLawRp 60
Thompson-Schwab v Costaki; CA 1956 - [1956] 1 All ER 652; [1956] 1 WLR 335
Perry v Kendricks Transport Ltd [1956] 1 WLR 85; [1956] 1 ALL ER 154; [1955] EWCA Civ 5
1956
CA
Parker LJ
Nuisance, Negligence
The Act gave a defence to liability for a fire which started accidentally, this did not cover a fire which started by negligence.
Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774
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[ Bailii ]
Morton v Wheeler 1956 CA 33
1956
CA
Lord Denning MR
Nuisance, Road Traffic
Sharp spikes by the side of a highway were said to be a nuisance. Lord Denning MR said: "As all lawyers know, the tort of public nuisance is a curious mixture. It covers a multitude of sins. We are concerned to-day with only one of them, namely, a danger in or adjoining a highway. This is different, I think, from an obstruction in the highway. If a man wrongfully obstructs a highway, or makes it less commodious for others (without making it dangerous) he is guilty of a public nuisance because he interferes with the right of the public to pass along it freely." and "Danger stands, however, on a different footing from obstruction."
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Morton v Weaver Unreported, 31/01/1956
31 Jan 1956
CA
Lord Denning MR
Nuisance, Road Traffic
The court distinguished between obstructions of a highway and dangers created on it. Lord Denning MR asked: "How are we to determine whether a state of affairs in or near a highway is a danger?" and answered "This depends, I think, on whether injury may reasonably be foreseen. If you take all the cases in the book, you will - find that if the state of affairs is such that injury may reasonably be anticipated by persons using the highway it is a public nuisance .... But if the possibility of injury is so remote that the reasonable man would dismiss it out of hand, saying 'Of course, it is possible, but not in the least probable', then it is not a danger."
He went on to say: "Inasmuch as the test of danger is what may reasonably be foreseen, it is apparent that cases of public nuisance . . have an affinity with negligence." Nevertheless: "There is a real distinction between negligence and nuisance. In an action for private damage arising out of a public nuisance, the court does not look at the conduct of the defendant and ask whether he was negligent. It looks at the actual state of affairs as it exists in or adjoining the highway, without regard to the merits or demerits of the defendant. If the state of affairs is such as to be a danger to persons using the highway . . it is a public nuisance. Once it is held to be a danger, the person who created it is liable unless he can show sufficient justification or excuse."
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Davey v Harrow Corporation [1957] 2 WLR 941; [1957] 2 All ER 305; [1958] 1 QB 60
1957
CA
Lord Goddard CJ
Land, Nuisance
The Plaintiff's house was damaged by roots penetrating from trees on adjoining land. At first instance, Sellers J found that the damage was caused by the trees, but they were not proven to be the property of the defendants. On appeal and after further evidence it was found that the trees had been growing for some time on the defendants land. Held: The defendants were liable in nuisance for damage caused by encroaching roots whether self sown or planted. Where a boundary hedge is delineated on an Ordnance Survey map by a line, the line indicates the centre of the existing hedge. This accords with the practice of the OS and courts can take notice of that practice as prima facie evidence of what a line on a map indicates. "After that Fisher -v- Winch and this, courts in future can take notice of this practice of the Ordnance Survey (that the boundary line on the map indicated the centre of the existing hedge) as at least prima facie evidence of what a line on the map indicates." As to damage by roots: "once it is established that encroachment by roots is a nuisance, it must follow that if damage is thereby caused, an action on the case will lie."
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Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd; CA 1957 - [1957] 1 All ER 894; [1958] EWCA Civ 1; (1957) 121 JP 323; [1957] 2 QB 169; [1957] 2 WLR 770
Armstrong v Sheppard and Short Ltd [1959] 2 QB 384; [1959] 2 All ER 651; [1959] 3 WLR 84; (1959) 123 JP 401; (1959) Sol Jo 508
1959
CA
Lord Evershed MR
Estoppel, Equity, Nuisance, Torts - Other, Land
The plaintiff had a path at the rear of his property. The defendant constructed a sewer under the path, and asked the plaintiff for permission. He gave it informally, not knowing at the time that he owned the land. The sewer was constructed. Though suffering no inconvenience, on discovering his ownership, the plaintiff requested the removal of the sewer and its manhole, and an associated injunction. The judge at trial found a trespass, but gave only nominal damages and refused an injunction. Held: The plaintiff was not debarred from objecting when his acquiescence arose through ignorance. However the trespass was trivial, and no injunction was granted.
As to the cross appeal, though the trespass was forgiven by the consent, that could not answer the claim as to the continuing discharge since that would amount to an easement which would require a formal grant.
Lord Evershed MR said: "it is true to say that if a man, having a proprietary right, proves an infringement of that right, prima facie he is entitled to an injunction: but that needs some qualification. It is not a matter of unqualified right; and one ground for denying an injunction would be that the wrong done is, in the circumstances, trivial. That proposition is founded on the well-known case of Imperial Gas Light and Coke Co. (Directors) v. Broadbent . . The judge was here dealing with the claim as I have formulated it: and he came to the conclusion that the circumstances of this case were special, and, as his judgment shows, that the damage was trivial . . But there were other good grounds, and formidable grounds (as I think) for refusing the plaintiff an injunction. That he misled the defendants is beyond a peradventure. It is no less clear that he attempted to mislead the court. He asserted - contrary to the fact - that he had never had any conversation with the defendants about the matter at all; and in his evidence in chief he so swore, untruly. It is not, therefore, surprising that the judge came to the conclusion that he should grant no equitable relief; and in my judgment, on the facts of this case, he was well entitled to take that view."
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