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Nuisance - From: 1900 To: 1929

This page lists 41 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Lowdens v Keaveney [1903] 2 IR 82
1903

Gibson J
Nuisance
There had been a prosecution for wilfully preventing and interrupting the free passage of persons in a public street. There had been a procession with a band playing. Held: It was a question of fact and degree whether such a use of the street was reasonable. Gibson J said: "No body of men has a right to appropriate the highway and exclude other citizens from using it. The question whether user is reasonable or not is a question of fact to be determined by common sense with regard to ordinary experience ".
A procession is prima facie legal, differing from "the collection of a stationary crowd" but a procession may become a nuisance if the right is exercised unreasonably or with reckless disregard of the rights of others. Any unreasonable or excessive use of a highway or activity on or near the highway which renders the highway less commodious to the public is enough to constitute a nuisance.
1 Citers



 
 Dublin United Tramways Co Ltd v Martin Fitzgerald; HL 1903 - [1903] AC 99
 
Harvie v Robertson (1903) 5 F 338
1903

Lord Kinnear
Scotland, Nuisance
The pursuer sought an interdict against the defender from carrying on the operation of lime-burning on his land: "the question whether a proprietor complaining of such injury has a title and interest to interfere does not depend exclusively upon present injury to his land. He is entitled to take into account not only the actual inconvenience and discomfort caused to people living on the ground by noxious fumes, but also the injury to the value of the property and the prospect of using it for advantageous purposes, other than those to which it is actually applied at the moment."
1 Citers


 
Smith v Giddy [1904] 2 KB 448
1904


Nuisance, Damages
Damage was caused to the plaintiff’s fruit trees by trees from the defendant’s premises overhanging his. Held: The plaintiff was not confined to his remedy of cutting the offending trees; he could claim damages.


 
 Colls v Home and Colonial Stores Ltd; HL 2-May-1904 - [1904] AC 179; 73 LJ Ch 484; 90 LT 687; 53 WR 30; 20 TLR 475; [1904] UKHL 1
 
Wincanton Rural District Council v Parsons [1905] 2 KB 34
1905
KB
Kennedy J, Ridley J
Nuisance, Utilities
The defendant had constructed a sewage drain to take discharge from his house. It ran for 250 feet to a catch-pit, and then continued for 70 feet under a highway and was then joined by a drain from another house. For this 70-foot stretch it was also used for carrying the surface water from the highway. This part of the drain (and the catch-pit) had been constructed by the tenant of the neighbouring property to prevent surface water from the highway flowing into his premises. The local authority had never adopted the highway. The plaintiffs complained of a statutory nuisance when the drain broke about six feet beyond the catch-pit, so that sewage collected in the catch-pit. The defendant contended that at this point the drain was a sewer which the plaintiffs were liable to repair themselves. Held: Even if this was the case he had no defence to the charge, and he could at any time have ended the nuisance by ceasing to discharge his sewage into the pipe leading to the catch-pit. The question whether the stretch of drain beyond the catch-pit was or was not a sewer did not fall directly for decision, but was fully argued, and a decision was made on the point. The plaintiffs adduced two reasons for arguing that the drain was not a sewer, of which only one is relevant in the present context. This was to the effect that a drain which carried the sewage from one house and the rainwater from a highway did not come within the statutory definition of a sewer. The defendant on the other hand argued, like Mr Straker nearly 100 years later, that the pipe was a sewer because it drained the surface of the highway in addition to his building. Kennedy J: "I do not think it was a sewer. The pipe in question was not made by the appellants, nor was it adopted by them as a sewer. It was made by private persons for private purposes, to prevent surface water collecting on the highway from running thence onto their premises. And under those circumstances the mere fact that the respondent has for some years discharged the sewage from his house into the pipe cannot convert it into a sewer." Ridley J agreed that the pipe was not a sewer.
1 Citers


 
Hargroves, Aronson and Co v Hartopp [1905] 1 KB 472
1905
CA
Lord Alverstone
Nuisance, Landlord and Tenant
The tenants of a building of which the defendants were landlords sought damages after a rainwater gutter became stopped up and the defendants failed to clear it out for a few days after receiving notice of the stoppage. Held: The landlords were in breach of a duty of care to the plaintiffs and were liable for the damage done. If a building owner retains common parts which have to be maintained to protect the safe use of the demised properties, he has an obligation to take reasonable care that the parts he retains are not in such a condition as to cause damage to the tenant or to the premises demised.
Lord Alverstone said: "A person who maintains an artificial thing like a gutter used for the very purpose of carrying off the rainwater from the roof in an improper condition after notice may be said, in my opinion to be guilty of an act of commission, and he is, in my opinion, under a duty to take care that as a result of that act no damage happens to the occupants of the house."
1 Citers


 
Attorney-General v Scott [1905] 2 KB 160
1905

Jelf J
Nuisance
A highway authority should "maintain the road according to an up-to-date standard."
1 Citers


 
Smith v Wilson (1903) 2 IR 45
1905


Nuisance

1 Citers


 
Midwood v Manchester Corporation [1905] 2 KB 597
1905


Nuisance
A plaintiff with standing to sue should be entitled to recover in nuisance for damage to chattels.
1 Citers



 
 Rushmer v Polsue and Alfieri Limited; CA 1906 - [1906] Ch D 234
 
Lyttelton Times Company Ltd v Warners Ltd [1907] AC 476
1906
PC
Lord Loreburn LC
Landlord and Tenant, Nuisance
(New Zealand) The plaintiffs owned a hotel in Christchurch, next to the premises in which the defendants operated a printing press running 24 hours. They made an agreement under which the defendants would rebuild their premises and grant a lease of the upper floors to the plaintiffs for use an additional hotel bedrooms. Unfortunately the noise and vibrations of the press beneath caused substantial inconvenience to the occupants of the bedrooms. The plaintiffs claimed an injunction to restrain the defendants from working their press. They said that the defendants knew that they intended to use the premises as bedrooms and were under an implied obligation not to interfere with their convenient use. Held: The plaintiffs also knew that the defendants intended to use their premises for printing.
Loreburn LC said: "When it is a question of what shall be implied from the contract, it is proper to ascertain what in fact was the purpose, or what were the purposes, to which both intended the land to be put, and having found that, both should be held to all that was implied in this common intention . . [If] it be true that neither has done or asks to do anything which was not contemplated by both, neither can have any right against the other." and "Ought the fact that one of the parties was the grantor and the other the grantee of a lease to dominate the decision of the case? If A lets a plot to B, he may not act so as to frustrate the purpose for which in the contemplation of both parties the land was hired . . The fact that one lets and one hires does not create any presumption in favour of either in construing an expressed contract. It was argued that the common intention was that the plaintiffs should have reasonably quiet bedrooms. If it was so, that was only one half of the common intention. The other half was that the defendants should keep on printing. One cannot bisect the intention and enforce one half of it when the effect of doing so would be to frustrate the other half." and
"In this case their Lordships think that both parties agreed upon a building scheme with the intention that the building should be used for bedrooms and also for a printing house according to a design agreed upon. Both parties believed these two uses could co-exist without clashing, and that was why both of them accepted the scheme. Neither would have embarked upon it if he had not thought his intended enjoyment of the building would be permitted, and both intended that the other should enjoy the building in the way contemplated. They were mistaken in their anticipation. But if it be true that neither has done or asks to do anything which was not contemplated by both, neither can have any right against the other."
1 Citers


 
Foster v Warblington Urban District Council [1906] 1 KB 648
1906
CA
Stirling LJ
Nuisance
A nuisance was caused by the discharge of sewage by the defendant council into oyster beds. The plaintiff was an oyster merchant who had for many years been in occupation of the oyster beds which had been artificially constructed on the foreshore, which belonged to the lord of the manor. The plaintiff excluded everybody from the oyster beds, and nobody interfered with his occupation of the oyster beds or his removal and sale of oysters from them. Held: He could sue the defendant Council in nuisance, notwithstanding that he could not prove his title.
Stirling LJ said: "I think, therefore, that, as against a private individual, the plaintiff would have a right of action, and I do not think that this case can be governed by the decision in the case of Corporation of Truro v. Rowe. There the contest arose between the owners of the foreshore and a person who claimed simply to be availing himself of a public right of fishing. Here the contest arises, in my view, between the person who is in occupation of a portion of the foreshore and a wrongdoer. Whether the plaintiff would be able to resist the claims of the owner of the foreshore, whoever he may be, or the owner of a several fishery, if such fishery exists, or of a member of the public exercising a right of fishery, if there be such a right in the present case, seems to me immaterial for the purposes of this case . ." Since jus tertii is not a defence to an action of nuisance, a person who is in exclusive possession of land may sue even though he cannot prove title to it.
1 Citers



 
 Polsue and Alfieri v Rushmer; HL 1907 - [1907] AC 121

 
 Malone v Laskey; CA 1907 - [1907] 2 KB 141
 
Heath v Mayor of Brighton (1908) 98 LT 718; (1908) 72 JP 225; (1908) 24 TLR 414
1908


Nuisance
The plaintiffs were trustees of a church. The defendant built an electricity sub station next door. The plaintiffs sought an injunction, saying that the humming sound emitted could be heard in the church. Held: The special requirements for quiet required in a church did not impose any higher standard from neighbours as regards the special use made of land. The plaintiffs had not established that the noise was a sufficient interference to support an injunction.

 
Acton District Council v London United Tramways [1909] 1 KB 68
1909
KBD

Nuisance
The court was asked whether the removal of four or five inches of snow from the tramway in Acton High Street was within the duty to maintain the highway imposed by section 28 of the Act of 1870. Held: It was not.
Tramways Act 1870 28
1 Citers



 
 Barker v Herbert; CA 1911 - (1911) 2 KBD 633
 
Ayers v Hanson, Stanley and Prince [1912] 56 SJ 735
1912


Landlord and Tenant, Nuisance

1 Citers



 
 Adams v Ursell; 1913 - [1913] 1 Ch 269

 
 Rickards v Lothian; PC 11-Feb-1913 - [1913] AC 263; [1913] UKPC 1
 
Charing Cross Electricity Supply Co v Hydraulic Power Co [1914] 3 KB 772
1914


Nuisance
A high pressure water main laid under a city street could constitute something dangerous brought onto the defendant's land and which involved a risk of damaging the plaintiffs' property.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Lyons Son and Co v Gulliver [1914] 1 Ch 631; 83 LJ Ch 281
1914
CA
Cozens-Hardy MR, Swinfen-Eady LJ
Nuisance
The defendants operated the Palladium theatre. People wanting to attend queued either along the footpath or along the roadway itself in front of the premises from which the plaintiff neighbour carried on its business as lace merchants and wholesale drapers. At trial, the judge had that the people in the queue were marshalled so as to form a stationary crowd standing on the pavement or in the road by the kerbstone in front of the plaintiff's premises, sometimes as many as five deep. In consequence "pedestrians going from or to the plaintiff's premises had, at the time when the queue was there, to make their way through the crowd forming the queue or go around by the end so as to get inside the queue; and vehicles were prevented, and necessarily prevented, or hindered, from access to the side of the pavement immediately in front of the plaintiff's premises". Held: The obstruction was actionable as a private nuisance by the neighbour, and could be restrained by a private injunction. Queuing such as was found constituted "a serious nuisance and annoyance, by which the plaintiffs are specially affected". That the police had failed to clear the obstruction by regulating the queues was not a defence. Nor was it arguable that potential customers could elbow their way through the crowd, or politely ask them to make way.
The court specifically said that their decision did not mean that a "queue is at all times in all places and under all circumstances necessarily a nuisance".
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Whatling v Rees [1914] 84 LJKB 1122
1914


Nuisance

1 Citers


 
Hall v The Manchester Corporation [1915] Law Journal Chancery 732
1915

Lord Parker
Nuisance, Housing
Lord Parker set out the test which to be applied when considering whether a property was fit for human habitation: "I desire to add that if the corporation are minded to make a new order under section 41 dealing with the houses in question, they would do well to consider the following points. In deciding whether a house is unfit for human habitation, reference must necessarily be made to some standard of fitness or unfitness. The fact that the corporation have a certain standard of fitness which they desire to impose on the area subject to their jurisdiction, and that the building in question falls short of that standard will not, in my opinion, necessarily render the house unfit within the meaning of the section. Thus the absence of such air spaces at the front and back as are prescribed by the by-laws in respect of new houses would not, in my opinion, be alone sufficient to justify the corporation in making an order under the section. The standard to be applied seem to be that of the ordinary reasonable man. This test may seem vague, but it will be found quite sufficient except in cases on the borderline, and in such cases the corporation will proceed at their own risk and must expect litigation."
1 Citers


 
Malzy v Eichholz [1916] 2 KB 308
1916
CA
Lord Cozens-Hardy MR
Nuisance, Landlord and Tenant
A landlord is not liable in damages to his lessee under a covenant for quiet enjoyment in respect of a nuisance caused by another of his lessees, even if he knows the lessee is causing the nuisance and takes no steps to prevent it. To be liable for nuisances committed by his tenant, it is not enough for them to be aware of the nuisance and take no steps to prevent it, he must either participate directly in the commission of the nuisance, or must be taken to have authorised it by letting the property.
Lord Cozens-Hardy MR said: "It is quite a novel doctrine to me that permission by a lessee to use demised premises for a purpose which may or may not involve or create a nuisance is a wrong act on the part of the landlord, and that the landlord can be rendered liable merely because a person does carry on that business in such a manner as to create a nuisance. It would be different, of course, if it were let for a purpose which necessarily involved a nuisance, but this letting did not necessarily involve a nuisance. That is quite plain from the plaintiff's own evidence. He says there was no ground for complaint until the Dents came into possession."
1 Citers


 
Great Central Railway v Hewlett [1916] 2 AC 511
1916
HL

Nuisance
A railway company had been empowered to erect in a highway certain gateposts and in a war-time blackout a taxi-driver had run into them. The company was found not liable for the accident. Held: The accident was caused by the post which had been legalised by the empowering act and by the elimination of light due to the exigencies of war. A mere power to maintain posts did not impose an obligation to warn the public of their existence.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Malzy v Eicholz [1916] 2 KB 308; (1916) LJKB 1132; (1916) LT 9; (1916) 32 TLR 506; (1916) 60 Sol Jo 511
1916
CA
Lord Cozens-Hardy MR
Landlord and Tenant, Nuisance
A tenant claimed against his landlord seeking to make him responsible for the nuisance of a co-tenant. Held: The claim failed.
Lord Cozens-Hardy MR said: "A lessor is not liable in damages to his lessee under a covenant for quiet enjoyment for a nuisance caused by another of his lessees because he knows that the latter is causing the nuisance and he does not himself take any steps to prevent what is being done. There must be active participation on his part to make him responsible for the nuisance. A common lessor cannot be called upon by one of his tenants to use for the benefit of that tenant all the powers he may have under agreements with other persons."
A landlord will be liable for breach of a covenant for quiet enjoyment only if the disturbance was by the landlord, his servants or agents.
Lord Cozens-Hardy MR said: "It is quite a novel doctrine to me that permission by a lessee to use demised premises for a purpose which may or may not involve or create a nuisance is a wrong act on the part of the landlord, and that the landlord can be rendered liable merely because a person does carry on that business in such a manner as to create a nuisance. It would be different, of course, if it were let for a purpose which necessarily involved a nuisance, but this letting did not necessarily involve a nuisance. That is quite plain from the plaintiff's own evidence. He says there was no ground for complaint until the Dents came into possession."
1 Citers



 
 Corporation of Greenock v Caledonian Railway Company; HL 1917 - [1917] AC 556

 
 Greenock Corp v Caledonian Railway Co; HL 23-Jul-1917 - [1917] UKHL 3; [1917] AC 556; 1917 SC (HL) 56

 
 Miles v Forest Rock Granite Co (Leicestershire) Ltd; 1918 - [1918] 34 TLR 500
 
Musgrove v Pandelis [1919] 1 KB 314
1919

Lush J
Torts - Other, Nuisance
Mr Musgrove rented rooms above a domestic garage, in which Mr Pandelis kept a car. Mr Pandelis sent his chauffeur, Mr Coumis, to clean the car. Mr Coumis had to move the car within the garage. For that purpose he went to the bonnet and turned on the petrol tap to allow the flow of petrol from the tank to the carburettor, and started the engine, when suddenly there was an explosion, and flames were seen to be coming from the carburettor. There was no woodwork within eighteen inches of the carburettor, and if Mr Coumis had immediately turned off the tap of the pipe leading from the petrol tank the petrol in the carburettor would have soon burnt out, and the fire would have been prevented from spreading. But instead of doing so Mr Coumis wasted his time in looking for a cloth which he failed to find. He then went to the bonnet to turn off the tap, but was too late, for owing to the continued flow of the petrol into the carburettor the fire had spread to the body of the car. The garage itself then caught fire and the whole building was burnt, including Mr Musgrove's rooms overhead, together with a quantity of furniture belonging to him. Held: The petrol was "liable to cause a fire" and "not unlikely to get on fire". Mr Coumis was negligent in not immediately turning off the petrol tap.
Lush J said: "But, nevertheless, I am of opinion that the statute affords the defendant no protection; for though the fire in the carburettor was accidental in a popular sense, I do not think it was accidental in the sense in which that term is used in the statute. If a man brings on to his premises a dangerous thing which is liable to cause fire, such as a motor car with petrol in it, the carburettor of which is not unlikely to get on fire when the engine is started, and a fire results, though without any negligence on his part, he must be held liable, the statute notwithstanding, for the rule is that he must keep such a thing under control at his peril."
Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774
1 Citers


 
Musgrove v Pandelis [1919] 2 KB 43
2 Jan 1919
CA
Bankes LJ, Warrington LJ, Duke LJ
Nuisance, Negligence
The plaintiff ((M) rented first floor rooms above the defendant's garage. The defendant's employee spilt petrol which was lit, and negligently failed to control it causing a fire, damaging the plaintiff's rooms. Held: The Act did not provide a defence if the fire started accidentally but was then continued and not extinguished by the negligence of the householder.
Bankes LJ set out of the common law before liability for fire was restricted by statute, saying: "A man was liable at common law for damage done by fire originating on his own property (1) for the mere escape of the fire; (2) if the fire was caused by the negligence of himself or his servants, or by his own wilful act; (3) upon the principle of Rylands v Fletcher. This principle was not then known by that name, because Rylands v Fletcher was not then decided; but it was an existing principle of the common law as I shall show presently." Filliter v Phippard had decided that a fire negligently begun was not protected by the statute; and asked: "Why, if that is the law as to the second head of liability, should it be otherwise as to the third head, the liability on the principle of Rylands v Fletcher? If that liability existed, there is no reason why the statute should alter it and yet leave untouched the liability for fire caused by negligence or design. That the principle of Rylands v Fletcher existed long before that case was decided is plain. In Vaughan v Menlove Tindal CJ says: "There is a rule of law which says you must so enjoy your own property as not to injure that of another." Park J says: "Although the facts in this case are new in specie, they fall within a principle long established, that a man must so use his own property as not to injure that of others." Rylands v Fletcher is merely an illustration of that old principle, and in my opinion Lush J was right in saying that this case, if it falls within that principle, is not within the protection of the statute."
Warrington LJ approved the comment of Lush J at first instance: "If this motor car with the petrol in its tank was potentially dangerous, such as a man's own fire, then it was the defendant's duty to see that the potential danger did not become an actual danger causing damage to his neighbour. The Act of Geo. 3 is no protection against that liability."
Duke LJ used different reasoning. Although he applied Rylands v Fletcher applied, he went on to consider whether the fire was accidental for the purposes of section 86. He said: "I do not see how this case can be taken out of the principle of Rylands v Fletcher, which was thus stated by Lord Cairns LC in the very words of Blackburn J: "The true rule of law is, that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril." He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff's default or perhaps that it was the consequence of vis major or the act of God. In the present case there was petrol which was easily convertible into an inflammable vapour; there was the apparatus for producing a spark; and added to those there was a person supposed to control the combustion but inexperienced and unequal to the task. Taking together the presence of the petrol, and the production of the inflammable gas, or those combustibles together with the inexperience of the person placed in charge of them, it is impossible to say that this is not an instance of the principle laid down by Blackburn J."
. . "That would dispose of this case but for the defendant's contention that he is excused by s. 86 of the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act, 1774. In my opinion the terms of that enactment fall far short of showing a definite intention to relieve a defendant in such a case as this. The actions against which the statute gives protection are in respect of fires which shall accidentally begin. I have the greatest doubt whether this fire began accidentally at any stage. If it was all one fire, it was begun not accidentally but intentionally. If progressive stages may be regarded it was not a fire which began accidentally without negligence at the stage when it became a conflagration involving goods and premises. The question may some day be discussed whether a fire, spreading from a domestic hearth, accidentally begins within the meaning of the Act, if such a fire should extend so as to involve the destruction of property or premises. I do not covet the task of the advocate who has to contend that it does. In the present case the fire, so far as it was a means of mischief, resulted from the negligent omission to turn off the petrol tap, an act which would have stopped the flow of petrol. All the witnesses who had any experience of such matters drew a distinction between fire in a carburettor, where the vapour can be instantly out off, and such a fire as occurred in this case. The learned judge has found that this fire was due to negligence. I cannot disagree with him. Whatever may be the effect of the Act of Geo. 3 upon the nice questions that have been discussed, this case is outside any possible protection of that statute."
Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774
1 Cites

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 Attorney General v Cory Brothers and Co Ltd; HL 1921 - [1921] 1 AC 521; (19210) 90 LJ Ch 221; (19210) 125 LT 98; (19210) 85 JP 129; (19210) 37 TLR 343; (19210) 19 LGR 145
 
Rainham Chemical Works Ltd (in liquidation) and others v Belvedere Fish Guano Co Ltd [1921] 2 AC 465
1921
HL
Lord Buckmaster
Nuisance
At a time of war, a process was invented where picric acid was manufactured from dinitrophenol (DNP) and nitrate of soda. DNP had been used mainly for the manufacture of dyes, and was a stable compound which did not explode easily. It was not in itself dangerous. Nitrate of soda was not an explosive but wood or bags impregnated with moist nitrate of soda will, when dry, burn fiercely if ignited. A hot flame is needed to ignite it and when ignited, large quantities of DNP become a dangerous explosive. While neither DNP nor nitrate of soda was, in itself, dangerous, they became a source of danger if stored in quantities and in close proximity to one another. It was proved that that was the cause of a massive explosion which caused damage to neighbouring property. On the evidence the manufacture of picric acid from DNP and nitrate of soda might or might not be dangerous in its character, but in that case it was being manufactured under dangerous conditions, and those dangerous conditions caused the accident. Accordingly the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher became applicable. It was not, per Lord Carson, "seriously argued" that the defendant company was not liable for the damages caused by the explosion. Before Scrutton LJ, the trial judge, it was admitted that the person in possession of the DNP was liable under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher for the consequences of the explosion. Held: The disputed question was whether responsibility lay at the door of the defendant company or the personal defendants who had a licence from the inventor to manufacture the required picric acid.
Lord Buckmaster said: "Now, the foundation of the action was a claim based upon the familiar doctrine established by the case of Fletcher v. Rylands, which depends upon this - that even apart from negligence the use of land by one person in an exceptional manner that causes damage to another, and not necessarily an adjacent owner, is actionable: . .In the present case the use complained of was that for the purpose of making munitions, which was certainly not the common and ordinary use of the land, two substances, namely, nitrate of soda and dinitrophenol, were stored in close proximity, with the result that on a fire breaking out they exploded with terrific violence. It may be accepted that it was not known to either of the defendants that this danger existed, but that in itself affords no excuse, and the result is that the plaintiffs' cause of action is well founded and the only matter for determination is against whom the action should be brought." . . and "If the company was really trading independently on its own account, the fact that it was directed by Messrs Feldman and Partridge would not render them responsible for its tortious acts unless, indeed, they were acts expressly directed by them. If a company is formed for the express purpose of doing a wrongful act or if, when formed, those in control expressly direct that a wrongful thing be done, the individuals as well as the company are responsible for the consequences, but there is no evidence in the present case to establish liability under either of these heads."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Job Edwards Ltd v Birmingham Navigations Proprietors [1924] 1 KB 341
1923

Bailhache J
Negligence, Nuisance
Rubbish was tipped on land belonging to a canal company and on adjoining land belonging to mine owners. The rubbish on the mine owners' land was found to be on fire, and the canal company feared that the fire might spread to their own land. Having called on the mine owners to extinguish the fire, the canal company entered the mine owners' land (by agreement) and put out the fire. The court was asked as to whether the mine owners were liable to contribute to the cost. Held: The mine owners had no duty to prevent the spread of the fire: "where a fire occurs through no fault of the landowner, without his knowledge, and, as in this case, on matter brought on his land without his knowledge and against his will, he is not responsible for the spreading of such a fire to the adjoining land, but the neighbour is entitled to go upon his land and prevent the fire from spreading."
Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 86
1 Citers



 
 Job Edwards Ltd v Birmingham Navigations Proprietors; CA 1924 - [1924] 1 KB 341; [1924] 93 LJKB 261; [1924] 68 Sol Jo 501

 
 Ilford Urban District Council v Beal and Judd; 1925 - [1925] 1 KB 671

 
 Moss v Christchurch Rural District Council; 1925 - [1925] 2 KB 750
 
Noble v Harrison [1926] 2 KB 332
1926
CA
Rowlatt J
Nuisance
A tree shed a limb onto a passer-by, causing personal injury. The Court of Appeal reversed the original finding in favour of the claimant because the defect could not have been discovered by inspection. A land-owner may become liable for a naturally occuring danger arising on his land if he fails to remedy it within a reasonable time of being made aware of it, or from when he ought to have been aware of it. Rowlatt J said: "a person is liable for a nuisance constituted by the state of his property: (1) if he causes it; (2) if by neglect of some duty he allowed it to arise; and (3) if, when it has arisen without his own act or default, he omits to remedy it within a reasonable time after he did or ought to have become aware of it". However: "I see no ground for holding that the owner is to become an insurer of nature, or that default is to be imputed to him until it appears, or would appear upon proper inspection, that nature can no longer be relied upon . ."
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 St Anne's Well Brewery Co v Roberts; 1928 - (1928) 140 LT 1
 
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