Links: Home | swarblaw - law discussions

swarb.co.uk - law index


These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  















Northern Ireland - From: 1980 To: 1984

This page lists 6 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Armagh District Council v Fair Employment Agency [1983] NI 346
1983
CANI
Lowry LJ
Northern Ireland, Discrimination
The court considered an allegation of discrimination made as to the appointment of a wages clerk by a district council. Held: Lord Lowry said: "It must not be forgotten that when the Act uses the word 'discrimination or 'discriminate' it is referring to an employer who makes a choice between one candidate and another on the ground of religious belief or political opinion; it is not speaking of an incidental disadvantage which is due to a difference between the religion of the employer and of the candidate but of a deliberate, intentional action on the part of the appointing body or individual.
Here I must dispose of a misleading argument which was raised before the learned county court judge but not seriously pursued in this court. An action may be deliberate without being malicious. Most acts of discrimination are both, but the only essential quality is deliberation. If a Protestant employer does not engage a Roman Catholic applicant because he genuinely believes that the applicant will not be able to get on with Protestant fellow workmen, he is discriminating against the applicant on the ground of his religious belief, although that employer's motives may be above reproach. If women are allowed to stop work five minutes early in order to avoid being endangered when the day's work ends, it has been decided that the men in the workforce are discriminated against on the ground that they are men. The employer's decision to keep the men at work longer, though reached in good faith, was deliberately based on the fact that they were men.
Accordingly, it can be stated that, although malice (while often present) is not essential, deliberate intention to differentiate on the ground of religion, politics, sex, colour or nationality (whatever is aimed at by the legislation) is an indispensable element in the concept of discrimination. The distinction is sometimes expressed as one between motive and intention. In Peake v. Automotive Products Ltd. [1977] Q.B. 780, the case about releasing women early from their work, Phillips J. stated, at p. 787: 'it seems to us that [counsel] is confusing the motive or the purpose of the act complained of with the factual nature of the act itself. Section 1(1)(a) requires one to look to see what in fact is done amounting to less favourable treatment and whether it is done to the man or the woman because he, is, a man or a woman. If so, it is of no relevance that it is done with no discriminatory motive.' This idea runs through all the cases."
Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976 16(2)


 
 Lynch v British Broadcasting Corporation; QBNI 1983 - [1983] NI 193 QBD

 
 NA v Department for Social Development (Rp) (Retirement Pension ); NISSCS 7-Jan-1983 - [1983] NICom 01

 
 McKee v Chief Constable for Northern Ireland; HL 1984 - [1985] 1 All ER 1; [1984] NI 169; [1984] 1 WLR 1358
 
Regina v O'Neill [1984] 13 NIJB
1984
CANI
Gibson LJ
Northern Ireland, Criminal Sentencing
The court gave sentencing guidelines for offences of robbery. Gibson LJ said: "In circumstances such as obtain nowadays in Northern Ireland where firearms are frequently used to rob banks and post offices this Court would re-affirm that a sentence of 13 years or upwards should not now be considered outside the norm for a deterrent sentence for this type of offence. Indeed, it would be appropriate for a judge to regard a sentence within the range of 10 to 13 years as a starting point for consideration, which sentences may be increased if there is a high degree of planning and organisation, or if force is actually used, or if the accused has been involved in more than one such crime. Equally it would be appropriate to reduce the sentence if the degree of preparation or the efficiency of performance is low, or if the money and weapons have been recovered, or if the accused has shown contrition and pleaded guilty to the charge, or if there are other special features which ought to be treated as grounds for reduction of the penalty."
1 Citers


 
Livingstone v Ministry of Defence [1984] NILR 356
1984
CANI
Hutton J
Torts - Other, Northern Ireland, Armed Forces
The plaintiff was injured when a soldier fired a baton round after some soldiers were attacked by rioters. The round had been deliberately fired, but not to strike the plaintiff. The claim was in negligence and assault and battery. The trial judge dismissed the claim in negligence but did not give a ruling on the question of battery. Held: The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, rejecting the argument that there could be no battery because the plaintiff was not the chosen target: "In my judgment when a soldier deliberately fires at one rioter intending to strike him and he misses him and hits another rioter nearby, the soldier has "intentionally" applied force to the rioter who has been struck. Similarly if a soldier fires a rifle bullet at a rioter intending to strike him and the bullet strikes that rioter and passes through his body and wounds another rioter directly behind the first rioter, whom the soldier had not seen, both rioters have been "intentionally" struck by the soldier and, assuming that the force used was not justified, the soldier has committed a battery against both."
1 Citers


 
Copyright 2014 David Swarbrick, 10 Halifax Road, Brighouse, West Yorkshire HD6 2AG.