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Negligence - From: 2003 To: 2003

This page lists 29 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Cruz-Vargas v R J Reynolds Tobacco Company [2003] 348 F3d 271 (1st Cir.2003)
2003


Negligence, International
(United States Court of Appeals, 1st Circuit) Relatives of a deceased smoker brought a negligence and strict liability suit against a tobacco company, alleging that it was responsible for his death. The action was brought in the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. There was evidence that "the average consumer in Puerto Rico during the 1950's, during the 1960's" was aware both of health risks, such as cancer and cardiovascular disease, associated with smoking and that "smoking was or could be difficult to quit". In discussing the evidence regarding common knowledge, the Court of Appeals said: "This case calls for us to evaluate application of the common knowledge doctrine in the context of tobacco litigation. The doctrine stems from the principle that a manufacturer cannot be held liable under either strict liability or negligence for failure to warn of a danger commonly known to the public. See, e.g., Guevara v Dorsey Labs., Div. of Sandoz, Inc., 845 F 2d 364, 367 (1st Cir. 1988) ('The duty to warn in general is limited to hazards not commonly known to the relevant public'); Aponte Rivera v Sears Roebuck, 44 P.R. Offic. Trans. 7, 144 D.P.R. 830 (1998) ('[A] manufacturer need not warn of a hazard if the average consumer ordinarily has knowledge of the dangers of the product.'). [...]
A products liability plaintiff alleging failure to warn must prove
'(1) the manufacturer knew, or should have known of the risk inherent in the product; (2) there were no warnings or instructions, or those provided were inadequate; (3) the absence of warnings made the product inherently dangerous; (4) the absence of adequate warnings or instructions was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.'
Aponte Rivera, 44 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 6. Under the common knowledge doctrine, however, a defendant neither breaches a duty nor causes the product to be inherently dangerous when the allegedly omitted warning concerns a danger of which the public is well aware. [...]
The crux of appellants' entreaty on appeal is that neither the strict liability nor the negligence claim requires any affirmative showing, and thus the burden rested entirely on Reynolds. Whether or not this is a correct view of the law, after searching the record we have found no evidence which supports appellants' allegations that there was a lack of common knowledge and thus we are compelled to find that Reynolds met its burden in any event."
(5) In Roysdon v R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988), a smoker and his wife brought an action against a tobacco manufacturer to recover for disease allegedly caused by smoking. The United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, inter alia affirmed the dismissal by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee of the plaintiffs' failure to warn claim. At p.236, para.10, the Court of Appeals said:
"[T]he district court took judicial notice that 'tobacco has been used for over 400 years and that its characteristics have also been fully explored. Knowledge that cigarette smoking is harmful to health is widespread and can be considered part of the common knowledge of the community.'
Roysdon, 623 F.Supp. at 1192. Remembering that this action was limited to the ten years preceding the filing of this complaint [on 5 July 1984], we think this approach was appropriate. The extensive information regarding the risks of smoking available to the public during that time precluded the existence of a jury question as to whether cigarettes are unreasonably dangerous. We find that whether there was knowledge regarding Mr Roysdon's specific medical problem is irrelevant in light of the serious nature of the other diseases known at that time to be caused by cigarette smoking."
1 Citers


 
Akers and others v Motor Insurers' Bureau and Another [2003] EWCA Civ 18
14 Jan 2003
CA

Personal Injury, Road Traffic, Negligence

[ Bailii ]
 
Procter and Gamble (Health and Beauty Care) Ltd and others v Carrier Holdings Ltd and Another [2003] EWHC 83 (TCC)
24 Jan 2003
TCC

Negligence, Contract, Limitation

[ Bailii ]
 
Grealis v Opuni Times, 07 February 2003; [2003] EWCA Civ 177
28 Jan 2003
CA
Kennedy, Mantell, Mance, LJJ
Road Traffic, Negligence
The claimant appealed dismissal of his claim for damages. The defendant car driver had knocked him from his cycle. The only evidence of negligence was that the car driver was driving in excess of the speed limit. Held: The former rule that breaches of traffic regulations were not ipso facto to be considered as evidence of negligence should not be followed. However, even though the car driver contributed, the cyclist claimant remained 80% responsible in this case.
[ Bailii ]
 
New South Wales v Lepore [2003] HCA 4; (2003) 212 CLR 511; (2003) 195 ALR 412; (2003) 77 ALJR 558; (2003) 24 Leg Rep 2
6 Feb 2003

Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Mchugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ
Commonwealth, Negligence
Austlii (High Court of Australia) 1. Appeal allowed in part
2. Paragraph 2 of the order of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales made on 23 April 2001 set aside, and in its place, order that the judgment entered in the District Court on 16 April 1999 be wholly set aside and that there be a new trial.
3. Appellant to pay the costs of the appeal to this Court.
4. Costs of the new trial to abide its outcome.
Callian J (majority) said: "Education authorities do not owe to children for whose education they are responsible (absent relevant contractual provision to the contrary) a particular or unique non-delegable duty of care, in practical terms, giving rise to absolute liability. There is no doubt that the ordinary standard of care in the case of such authorities is a very high one. Their duties include the engagement of reliable, and carefully screened, properly trained employees, and the provision: of suitable premises; an adequate system for the monitoring of employees; and, I would think, because, regrettably, the incidence of sexual abuse seems to have been more common than had previously been thought, an efficient system for the prevention and detection of misconduct of that kind. In saying what I have, I do not intend to state comprehensively a catalogue of the duties to which the relationship of education authority and pupil may give rise. But I do agree with the Chief Justice that absent fault on the part of an education authority, it will not be personally liable in situations of the kind with which these cases are concerned".
McHugh J. (minority: he alone would have found non-delegable duties in the particular circumstances) said: "a State education authority owes a duty to a pupil to take reasonable care to prevent harm to the pupil. The duty cannot be delegated. If, as is invariably the case, the State delegates the performance of the duty to a teacher, the State is liable if the teacher fails to take reasonable care to prevent harm to the pupil . . The duty arises on the enrolment of the child. It is not confined to school hours or to the commencement of the teachers' hours of employment at the school. If the authority permits a pupil to be in the school grounds before the hours during which teachers are on duty, the authority will be liable if the pupil is injured through lack of reasonable supervision. In Geyer v Downs this Court held that the education authority was liable for injuries suffered by a pupil playing in the school grounds at about 8.45am although teachers at the school were not required to be on duty at that time . . The duty extends to protecting the pupil from the conduct of other pupils or strangers and from the pupil's own conduct The measure of the duty is not that which could be expected of a careful parent.
Murphy and Aickin JJ rejected the parent analogy in Geyer v Downs saying that it was unreal to apply that standard to "a schoolmaster who has the charge of a school with some 400 children, or of a master who takes a class of thirty or more children".
1 Citers

[ Austlii ]
 
Morris v Lokass and Motor Insurers' Bureau Unreported, 17 February 2003
17 Feb 2003
CC
Judge McKenna
Negligence, Limitation
(Birmingham County Court ) The court considered a request to exercise its discretion to allow a claim to proceed despite the writ having been issued outside the limitation period. Held: The court accepted the distinction proposed for the defendant that as between the claimant's solicitors' professional indemnity insurers and the MIB the loss should fall on the former, who had received a premium, and not on the MIB, who had not.
1 Citers


 
Richard Vowles v David Evans, and The Welsh Rugby Union Limited Times, 13 March 2003; Gazette, 22 May 2003; [2003] EWCA Civ 318; [2003] ECC 24; [2003] 1 WLR 1607; [2003] PIQR P29
11 Mar 2003
CA
Lord Justice Sedley Lord Justice Clarke Lord Phillips M.R.
Personal Injury, Negligence
The claimant had been injured in a rugby match, and had recovered damages from the referee, who now appealed. Held: The relationship was proximate, and the injury reasonably forseeable, and if the referee failed to exercise reasonable care, liability could follow. The referee accepted a role of enforcing rules to minimise danger in a dangerous sport. Here the referee had failed to enforce rules intended to protect players, and it was a decision taken whilst play was stopped, not running play.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Adjei v King [2003] EWCA Civ 414
19 Mar 2003
CA

Road Traffic, Negligence

[ Bailii ]
 
A v Ministry of Defence and another Times, 16 May 2003; Gazette, 03 July 2003
16 Apr 2003
QBD
Bell J
Personal Injury, Negligence, Armed Forces
The claimant's father a member of the armed forces had been posted to Germany, and his wife, A's mother had gone with him. A had been born in Germany, but suffered injury at birth through the negligence of the doctor's appointed by the defendant English hospital. Held: Declarations that the defendant and the English hospitals with the duty of appointment of the German doctors were responsible were refused, and that action lay in Germany. The duty to make such an appointment was particular to the Armed Forces, but was limited to the exercise of due care in selection, and did not extend to a duty in respect of the treatment itself. The duty was not non-delegable.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Baddeley and Another v Barker [2003] EWCA Civ 742
7 May 2003
CA

Nuisance, Negligence

[ Bailii ]
 
Goodman v Keeves [2003] EWCA Civ 800
19 May 2003
CA
Tuckey LJ
negligence, Personal Injury
The claimant was a back seat passenger in a car. She could have used a seat belt but would have had to recover it from below the seat. She suffered severe injuries in a crash. The court considered extent of contributorily negligence.
[ Bailii ]
 
Health and Safety Executive v Thames Trains Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 720
22 May 2003
CA

Negligence, Transport, Health and Safety

[ Bailii ]
 
Great North Eastern Railway Ltd v Railcare Ltd [2003] EWHC 1608 (Comm)
15 Jul 2003
ComC

Transport, Negligence

[ Bailii ]
 
B and others v Attorney General and others [2003] UKPC 61; [2003] 4 All ER 833
16 Jul 2003
PC
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead Lord Hutton Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough Lord Rodger of Earlsferry Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe
Negligence
(New Zealand) Children were removed from their home. The father was interviewed for suspected child abuse, but no charges were laid. He sought damages in negligence for the way the matter had been handled. Children whose allegations against adopted parents were not investigated also sought damages. Held: The Privy Council upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand to allow a claim brought by children in respect of the allegedly negligent way in which a social worker and clinical psychologist had investigated a complaint that a father had sexually abused one of his daughters. But no common law duty of care was owed to the father. His interests and those of the children were 'poles apart'. It would not be satisfactory to impose a duty of care in favour of alleged victims and at the same time a duty in favour of alleged perpetrators.

Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead: "To whom is the duty of care owed? Clearly the duty is owed to the child or young person in respect of whom the statutory duty to arrange for a prompt inquiry exists in the particular case. In the present case that is [daughter 1] as much as [daughter 2]. If [daughter 2's] abuse allegation was well founded [daughter 1] also was at risk. But their Lordships consider no common law duty of care was owed to the father. He stands in a very different position. He was the alleged perpetrator of the abuse. In an inquiry into an abuse allegation the interests of the alleged perpetrator and of the children as the alleged victims are poles apart. Those conducting the inquiry must act in good faith throughout. But to impose a common law duty of care on the department and the individual professionals in favour of the alleged victims or potential victims and, at one and the same time, in favour of the alleged perpetrator would not be satisfactory. Moreover, a duty of care in favour of the alleged perpetrator would lack the juridical basis on which the existence of a common law duty of care was largely founded in Prince's case. The decision in Prince's case rests heavily on the feature that the duty imposed on the Director-General by s 5(2)(a) of the 1974 Act is for the benefit of the particular child. Self-evidently this statutory duty was not imposed for the benefit of alleged perpetrators of abuse. To utilise the existence of this statutory duty as the foundation of a common law duty in favour of perpetrators would be to travel far outside the rationale in Prince's case."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ PC ]
 
Rowe v Kingston-Upon-Hull City Council and Another [2003] EWCA Civ 1281; [2003] ELR 771
24 Jul 2003
CA

Limitation, Negligence, Human Rights
The claimant sought damages for a breach of duty by his teachers which had happened before 1991. He argued that 3(1) of the HRA should affect the construction of section 14(1) of the 1980 Act.
Limitation Act 1980 14 33 - Human Rights Act 1980 14(1)
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Eagle v Chambers [2003] EWCA Civ 1107; Times, 01 September 2003; [2004] RTR 115
24 Jul 2003
CA
Ward, Waller, Hale LJJ
Negligence, Road Traffic, Personal Injury, Damages
The claimant was severely injured when run down by the defendant driving his car. She was in Blackpool, and drunk and wandering in the highway. The defendant was himself at or near the drink driving limit. She appealed against a finding that she was 60% to blame. Held: Courts have consistently required drivers to recognise that they control dangerous machinery. It would be rare for a driver not to have greater responsibilty than a pedestrian for injury. In this case the claimant would be held 40% responsible.
Lady Justice Hale said: "The potential 'destructive disparity' between the parties can readily be taken into account as an aspect of blameworthiness" and "It is rare indeed for a pedestrian to be found more responsible than a driver unless the pedestrian has suddenly moved into the path of an oncoming vehicle. That is not this case. The Court has consistently imposed upon the drivers of cars a high burden to reflect the fact that the car is potentially a dangerous weapon".
Hale LJ said that the court could not avoid comparing the two parties: "We also accept that this court is always reluctant to interfere with the trial judge's judgment of what apportionment between the parties is 'just and equitable' under the 1945 Act. But a finding as to which, if either, of the parties was the more responsible for the damage is different from a finding as to the precise extent of a less than 50 per cent contribution. There is a qualitative difference between a finding of 60 per cent contribution and a finding of 40 per cent which is not so apparent in the quantitive difference between 40 per cent and 20 per cent. It is rare indeed for a pedestrian to be found more responsible than a driver unless the pedestrian has suddenly moved into the path of an oncoming vehicle. That is not this case. The court 'has consistently imposed upon the drivers of cars a high burden to reflect the fact that the car is potentially a dangerous weapon': Latham LJ in Lunt v Khelifa [2002] EWCA Civ 801."
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 1(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Daniel Ibekwe v London General Transport Services Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1075
25 Jul 2003
CA
Lord Justice Brooke Lady Justice Arden Lord Justice Scott Baker
Negligence, Employment

[ Bailii ]
 
John Stewart Hamilton and others v Allied Domecq Plc [2003] ScotCS 216
1 Aug 2003
OHCS
Lord Abernethy
Negligence, Torts - Other

1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
KLB v British Columbia [2003] SCC 51; [2003] SCJ No 51; [2003] 2 SCR 403
2 Oct 2003

McLachlin CJ and Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel and Deschamps JJ
Commonwealth, Negligence
Canlii (Supreme Court of Canada) Torts - Liability - Intentional torts - Abuse of children by foster parents - Whether government can be held liable for harm children suffered in foster care - Whether government negligent - Whether government vicariously liable for torts of foster parents - Whether government liable for breach of non-delegable duty - Whether government liable for breach of fiduciary duty.
Limitation of actions - Torts - Intentional torts - Abuse of children by foster parents - Whether government can be held liable for harm children suffered in foster care - Whether tort actions barred by Limitation Act - Limitation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 266, ss. 3(2), 7(1)(a)(i).
Torts - Damages - Intentional torts - Abuse of children by foster parents - Whether government can be held liable for harm children suffered in foster care - Proper basis for assessing damages for child abuse by parent or foster parent.
The court considered the difficulty of setting down a unifying principle of the idea of a non-delegable duty: "It may be that there is no single common law concept of non-delegable duty. Instead, the phrase seems to have been used to describe a number of situations in which special, non-delegable duties arise. If this is correct, then rather than seeking to state the doctrine in terms of a single principle, we should look to the different situations in which such duties have been found — an approach consonant with the traditional methods of the common law. In Lewis (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia, 1997 CanLII 304 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1145, at para. 20, Cory J. suggested that these different situations comprise a "spectrum of liability", and that "[w]ithin that spectrum there are a variety of legal obligations which may, depending on the circumstances, lead to a principal's liability for the negligence of an independent contractor."
1 Citers

[ Canlii ]

 
 Silven Properties Limited, Chart Enterprises Incorporated v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc, Vooght, Harris; CA 21-Oct-2003 - [2003] EWCA Civ 1409; Times, 27 October 2003; Gazette, 20 November 2003; [2004] 1 WLR 997; [2004] 4 All ER 484
 
Silven Properties Ltd and Another v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc and Others [2003] EWCA Civ 1409; [2004] 4 All ER 484; [2004] 1 WLR 997
21 Oct 2003
CA
Aldous LJ, Tuckey LJ, Lightman J
Banking, Negligence
The claimants complained that the receivers appointed by the bank had failed to get the best price for properties charged to the bank and sold, in that they had failed to obtain planning permissions which would have increased the values of the properties. Held. The court was being asked "whether the express appointment in the mortgage of receivers as agents of the mortgagor leads to the assumption by receivers who accept such appointment of responsibilities and duties which differ from those owed by the mortgagees, and it is important that any doubt in this regard should be resolved in the interests of mortgagees, mortgagors and receivers."
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Houghton v Stannard [2003] EWHC 2666 (QB)
29 Oct 2003
QBD

Road Traffic, Negligence

1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Great North Eastern Railway Limited v Hart and Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions and Network Rail Infrastructure Limited [2003] EWHC 2450 (QB)
30 Oct 2003
QBD
The Hon Mr Justice Morland
Negligence, Transport
A driver had crashed through a barrier before a bridge, and descended into the path of a train. Ten people died. He now sought a contribution order against the Secretary of State for the condition of the barrier which was said to be faulty. Held: " . . . in building Little Heck Bridge on which the M62 motorway was to be carried and under which there was a main line railway track the department was under a duty to take reasonable care that not only the users of the motorway but also people and property who could foreseeably be on the railway track would not be exposed to an unreasonable risk of injury." However it was " . . . a matter for the professional judgment of highway and bridge designers and engineers to determine what the length of the approach safety fencing or barrier should be. " In this case there was no such negligence.
Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 1(1) - Highways Act 1959
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Lund v JL Tiedemanns Tobaksfabrik A.S HR - 2002 - 00753a
31 Oct 2003

Judge Flock
International, Negligence
(Supreme Court of Norway) A request was made for a declaratory judgment finding that a tobacco manufacturer was liable for damages on a strict liability basis with respect to an injured party who after over 40 years of cigarette smoking developed lung cancer and died. Held: "The parties have in their arguments before the Supreme Court concentrated to a large degree on what knowledge of the health risks of smoking the normal consumer had during the space of time from 1950 to 1975. The appellant has acknowledged that the knowledge of both the general public as well as that of [the deceased] Robert Lund of the risks in 1975 had been brought to such a level that continued smoking after that took place at his own risk." The judge commented on the evidence: "The parties are in agreement that the question of the relationship between smoking and damage to health is not related to what the individual injured party - Robert Lund in our case - knew or did not know." he referred to various reports, including one by the Norwegian General Director of Health in 1964, and concluded: "Despite the fact that extremely many cigarette smokers continued not to accept the consequences of the medical knowledge that the research had brought to light, I am of the opinion that the consumers had in any event received such information in 1964 concerning health damage that a normally intelligent person would include it in his assessment of how he wished to conduct his life. Such as I see it, there cannot be any doubt that Robert Lund's smoking after this point in time took place at his own risk." The judge then considered the ten year period between 1954, when Robert Lund began smoking the particular brand of tobacco in question, to 1964: "My overall impression of the material that was submitted on the situation from the first half of the 1950s up to 1964 is that medical science at that time had still not secured reliable knowledge concerning a direct causal relationship between cigarette smoking and lung cancer and other serious injuries to health." However: "During this last 10-year period prior to the final conclusions being able to be drawn, the relationship between smoking and damage to health was not unknown to the average man or woman. However due to the lack of completely clear evidence it was to a greater degree than later left to the individual as to the extent to which one wished to believe what one read and heard now and then about the harmful effects of tobacco. And then as now, it was completely up to the individual as to whether one chose to take the chance. What is crucial for me is that it also must have been generally known at the time that cigarette smoking could involve a risk of serious health damage, and that the risk of such damage in any event to some extent would increase if the consumption of cigarettes was large. Such as I view the case, no more fine-meshed of an analysis is needed on this point."
1 Citers


 
Heine v Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken GmbH 2 O 294/02
14 Nov 2003


International, negligence
(Second Chamber for Civil Matters of the Arnsberg Regional Court, Germany) The Plaintiff claimed damages and compensation for pain due to harm to his health from smoking cigarettes manufactured by the Defendant. He also sought information about the addition of addiction-promoting substances and a finding with regard to consequential damages. He cited the Defendant's failure to provide warnings, product manipulation and a fundamental flaw in the cigarette product. Held: There was no liability from the point of view of producer liability due to a fault in construction or instruction: "There is no construction fault in cigarettes. Cigarettes are not a faulty product, in spite of the health risks arising from their consumption. The dangers arising from this have indisputably been known to consumers and the Plaintiff for a long time and were consciously accepted. Everyone knows that in the long term smoking can lead to serious, potentially even fatal harm to health, that it can lead to addiction which makes it hard to stop smoking. Consumers cannot justifiably expect that cigarettes are constructed in such a way that they do not give rise to these dangers. For instance, in the jurisdiction which this chamber follows it has long been recognised that the producer does not have to avert dangers which are typically linked with the use of a product and known to the users or recognised and accepted by them [...]. The decisive aspect therefore is that smokers are responsible for their own acts. They must themselves bear the consequences of their independent behaviour and cannot pass them on to the cigarette manufacturers." and "The Defendant has also not committed a so-called instruction fault by neglecting warnings on his products. The Plaintiff did not concretely assert that the Defendant had not met the legal duty of information and this is not evident. There are no further duties of information for the Defendant. . . The manufacturer of a product must only indicate the most important features. He must not meet any special duties of information if certain product risks are generally known. . . However, all risks linked with the consumption of cigarettes have been known to the consumers for a long time. This also includes the possible addictive effect of cigarette consumption. This does not concern special knowledge - such as how health is harmed by cigarette consumption. Therefore the judiciary has basically unanimously rejected a further duty of information [...]. Thus there does not have to be separate information about an allegedly addiction-increasing effect of additives. Because the effect of these substances, i.e. in lay terms that smoking is addictive - as always - is not news to the consumer."
1 Citers


 
John James William Booth v Simon White [2003] EWCA Civ 1708
18 Nov 2003
CA

Personal Injury, Negligence
The claimant sought damages after being injured in a car driven by the defendant. The defendant now appealed an award at 1005, saying that the plaintiff had known that he had been drinking. The defendant was known to be a heavy drinker, and he said that the plaintiff should have asked him first how much he had drunk. Held: The appeal failed. "The law requires the passenger to make an assessment of the driver when deciding whether, in the interest of his own safety, he should have a lift. " but "the law would take a wrong turning if we were to require an interrogation in this type of case, of the type . . suggested."
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Roadrunner Properties Ltd v Dean and Another [2003] EWCA Civ 1816; [2004] 1 EGLR 73
21 Nov 2003
CA
Chadwick LJ
Negligence, Construction, Landlord and Tenant, Land
Where an application is made under the 1996 Act, as to the issue of causation of damage, a court can properly take a reasonably robust approach where the damage to the adjoining owner's property is of the sort one would expect to result from the building owner's work.
Parety Wall etc Act 1996
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Cooper v Carillion Plc [2003] EWCA Civ 1811
2 Dec 2003
CA

Personal Injury, Negligence

[ Bailii ]
 
Thames Cruises Limited v George Wheeler Launches Limited, Kingwood Launches Limited [2003] EWHC 3093 (Ch)
16 Dec 2003
ChD
The Honourable Mr Justice Peter Smith
Equity, Transport, Negligence, Company
The parties had previously worked to gether to provide ferry services on the Thames. A new tender to operate the services was not submitted. It was alleged that the Defendants had inequitably seized for themselves a business opportunity which the parties had agreed to secure jointly, and that the new licence was held in trust for all parties. Held: There was no partnership; each company operated separately. Even so, the defendants were in breach of the agreement they made to make a joint tender and it was not conscionable for them to have made a bid without reference to the Claimant and to retain the benefit of that bid without recompense to the Claimant.
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
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