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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Negligence - From: 1998 To: 1998

This page lists 41 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Jolley v Sutton London Borough Council [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 433
1998
QBD
Geoffrey Brice QC
Negligence
The claimant, a boy was injured when playing around a boat abandoned on land owned by the defendant. He had propped it up to attempt a repair, and was crushed when it fell on him. He said that in not removing the boat they had been negligent. Held: It has long been established that children are or may be attracted to meddle with objects on premises or property which constitute a danger when meddled with. An occupier is under a duty to protect a child from danger caused by meddling with such an object by taking reasonable steps in the circumstances including, where appropriate, removing the object altogether so as to avoid the prospect of injury: "I find that the type of accident and injury which occurred in this case was reasonably foreseeable (albeit that it involved significant meddling with the boat by two young teenage boys and that the injuries proved to be very severe) and that the actions of the plaintiff and/or Karl did not amount to a novus actus. Accordingly, I find the defendants in breach of their duty to the plaintiff as occupiers and (subject to the point on contributory negligence considered below) liable to the plaintiff for the injury, loss and damage which he has sustained." The council was liable, though the claimant was 25% contributorily negligent.
Occupiers' Liability Act 1957 2(2)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Dingley v The Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police 1998 SC 548
1998

Lord President (Lord Rodger of Earlsferry), Lord Prosser
Negligence
The court was asked whether the development of multiple sclerosis had been caused by physical injury sustained in a motor accident. Medical science was not able to demonstrate the connection between the two, and reliance was placed on epidemiological evidence. Held: The court referred to the case of Davie as affording: "[a]uthoritative guidance on the approach which a court should take to expert evidence" and "Perhaps the essential point is that parties who come to court are entitled to the decision of a judicial tribunal. Such a decision may take account of many rather intangible things such as the demeanour of witnesses and the way that they gave their evidence, but, whatever its components may be, such a decision must be reasoned. As Lord Cooper says, an oracular pronouncement will not do." The Lord Ordinary required to test the experts' evidence and, having done so, to use those parts which he accepted and apply them to the facts of the case. If he did not do so it must be inferred that he misdirected himself, and "As with judicial or other opinions, what carries weight is the reasoning, not the conclusion."
Lord Prosser said: "I would wish to make two other general observations, before turning to the issues between the parties. First, there was a certain amount of evidence to the effect that certain views on causation were very widely held, or were no longer widely held. If a particular process of reasoning is widely accepted, then that I think may be persuasive for a court. But the fact that a particular view is widely held, without any persuasive explanation as to why it should be so held, and constitute a conclusion, does not appear to me to be a matter to which a court should give significant weight. Rather similarly, the fact that a particular view was or is held by someone of great distinction, whether he is a witness or not, does not seem to me to give any particular weight to his view, if the reasons for his coming to that view are unexplained, or unconvincing. As with judicial or other opinions, what carries weight is the reasoning, not the conclusion." and
""In ordinary (non-lawyers') language, to say that one regards something as 'probable' is by no means to say that one regards it as 'established' or 'proved'. Yet in the civil courts, where we say that a pursuer must prove his case on a balance of probabilities, what is held to be probable is treated as 'proved'. I do not suggest that any lawyer will be confused by this rather special meaning of the word 'proved'. But speaking very generally, I think that the civil requirement of a pursuer – that he satisfy the court that upon the evidence his case is probably sound – would in ordinary language be regarded as very different from, and less stringent than, a requirement that his case be established or proved. More importantly in the context of such a case as the present, the fact that the two concepts are distinct in ordinary language, but the same in this legal context, seems to me to give rise to a risk of ambiguity or misunderstanding in the expressed opinions of expert witnesses. And this risk will be increased if the expert in question would normally, in the exercise of his profession, adopt an approach to such issues starkly different from that incumbent upon a court. Whether one uses the word 'scientific' or not, no hypothesis or proposition would be seen as 'proved' or 'established' by anyone with any form of medical expertise merely upon the basis that he had come to regard it as probably sound. (Indeed, I think even the word 'probable' would be reserved for situations where the likelihood is thought to be much more than marginal). And even if, in relation to any possible proposition or hypothesis, such an expert even troubled to notice that he had come to the point of regarding it as not merely possible but on balance 'probable', then I think he would regard that point as one from which he must set off on further inquiry, and by no means as being (as it is in the courts) a point of arrival. Mere marginal probability will not much interest him. But it must satisfy a court.""
Lord Prosser discussed the method of proof: "I am not much impressed by one argument advanced for the defender to the effect that the pursuer's argument is essentially 'post hoc, ergo propter hoc', and therefore unsound. Plainly, one will more readily conclude that B is caused by A, or probably caused by A, if one can identify, or at least envisage, some kind of mechanism whereby B might be caused by A. Equally, if one simply cannot identify or envisage such a mechanism, the mere fact that on one occasion B happened after A (and perhaps very quickly after A) would not, in the absence of other indications, lead one easily to conclude that B was caused by A. But no one, certainly in this case, suggests that such a single coincidence is to be interpreted as involving a causal relationship. And once one moves from single coincidence to a number of occasions when B follows (perhaps quickly) upon A, dismissiveness of 'post hoc, ergo propter hoc' reasoning seems to me to become less and less appropriate. Indeed, unless and until one can identify or envisage a connecting mechanism, countless conclusions as to causal relationship are reached precisely upon a form of 'post hoc, ergo propter hoc' reasoning: if B is observed never to occur except shortly after A, the conclusion may be relatively easy – but if B is observed to occur frequently after A, then even if each sometimes occurs without the other, the frequency with which B occurs after A may nonetheless well justify a more or less firm conclusion that A, in certain circumstances, causes B. I do not regard such conclusions as based on false (or indeed simple) logic. The approach is in my opinion inherent not only in conclusions drawn from one's general experience or 'anecdotal evidence'. It is inherent also in much experimental research, and also, as it seems to me, in epidemiology. And while it may always seem somewhat insufficient, until one can find an identifiable possible mechanism, as a basis for claiming that the causal link is proved or established, in either ordinary or scientific terms, that feeling of insufficiency strikes me as much less appropriate if one stops short of such claims and contents oneself with saying that the causal relationship is marginally probable (or is proved or established only as required in civil litigation)."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Polat Marson v St Giles Hotel Limited [1998] EWCA Civ 26
15 Jan 1998
CA

Road Traffic, Negligence

[ Bailii ]
 
Darren Jason Hammond Tina Andrea Smith v Victor Gill Ronald Sydney Page [1998] EWCA Civ 29
16 Jan 1998
CA

Road Traffic, Personal Injury, Negligence

[ Bailii ]

 
 Carroll and Others v Fearon and Others and Related Actions; CA 26-Jan-1998 - Times, 26 January 1998
 
Ann Fleet v Wrexham Maelor Hospital NHS Trust [1998] EWCA Civ 256
17 Feb 1998
CA

Negligence, Personal Injury
The plaintiff appealed refusal of her claim for damages having slipped in the snow at work in the grounds of the hospital. Held: The appeal was dismissed. "It is an inescapable fact of life that in this country sudden snow falls will, from time to time, make walking hazardous. It is undoubtedly the duty of the hospital to have a snow clearance plan or policy to combat those dangers for persons walking in its grounds, so far as is reasonably practicable, but no amount of policy or planning will guarantee freedom from hazard after the sudden fall of a blanket of snow, especially if the snow is continuing to fall. "

 
Highton v Norweb Plc [1998] EWCA Civ 375
2 Mar 1998
CA

Negligence, Contract

[ Bailii ]
 
Janet Gladys Bateman v David Goodman [1998] EWCA Civ 412
6 Mar 1998
CA

Road Traffic, Personal Injury, Negligence

[ Bailii ]
 
Ursula Riniker v J Glynn (Skips) Ltd [1998] EWCA Civ 462
13 Mar 1998
CA

Negligence

[ Bailii ]
 
Barry Rowe v Brian Whitehead and David William Jennings (T/a Djr Pallet Services) [1998] EWCA Civ 513
23 Mar 1998
CA

Negligence

[ Bailii ]
 
Blantern v William Birch and Sons Limited Tucker and Tunstalls Limited [1998] EWCA Civ 575
31 Mar 1998
CA

Negligence, Personal Injury

[ Bailii ]
 
John Gary Britland v East Midland Motor Services Ltd [1998] EWCA Civ 590
1 Apr 1998
CA

Negligence, Road Traffic, Personal Injury

[ Bailii ]
 
Marvin John Pearson v Anthony Lightning Times, 30 April 1998; Gazette, 20 May 1998; [1998] EWCA Civ 591
1 Apr 1998
CA
Lord Justice Simon Brown, Lord Justice Otton, Sir Christopher Slade
Personal Injury, Negligence
The parties were golfers playing different holes at the same time. The shot of one hit the other in the eye. The shot was a recovery shot over where he should have known others would be playing. Where a golfer hit a shot which was difficult but carried a clear if small risk of injury to someone else on the course, then he was liable in negligence for a resulting injury. The outcome of any case concerning golf course injuries must depend on its particular facts.
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
W 1-6 v Essex County Council and Another Times, 09 April 1998; Gazette, 20 May 1998; [1998] 3 WLR 534; [1998] EWCA Civ 614; [1998] 3 All ER 111
2 Apr 1998
CA

Negligence, Local Government, Employment
A Local Authority had a duty of care to a fostering family when allocating children. A child was known to have a history of sexual abuse and was fostered with a family with other children, and no warning had been given.
Foster parents sued the council for breach of contract and for alleged negligence for breach of duty of care. Held: There was no contractual relationship between the foster parents and the local authority. "although the Specialist Foster Carer Agreement had a number of features which one would expect to find in a contract, such as the payment of an allowance and expenses, provisions as to National Insurance, termination and restriction on receiving a legacy or engaging in other gainful employment and other matters to which the judge referred... I do not accept that this makes the agreement a contract in the circumstances of this case. A contract is essentially an agreement that is freely entered into on terms that are freely negotiated. If there is a statutory obligation to enter into a form of agreement the terms of which are laid down, at any rate in their most important respects, there is no contract"
Race Relations Act 1976
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Harris v Evans and Health and Safety Executive; CA 24-Apr-1998 - Times, 05 May 1998; [1998] EWCA Civ 709; [1998] 1 WLR 1285; [1998] 3 All ER 523
 
Williams and Another v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd and Another Times, 01 May 1998; Gazette, 28 May 1998; [1998] UKHL 17; [1998] 1 WLR 830; [1998] BCC 428; (1998) 17 Tr LR 152; [1998] 1 BCLC 689; [1998] 2 All ER 577
30 Apr 1998
HL
Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Steyn, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Clyde, Lord Hutton
Company, Negligence
A company director was not personally reliable in negligence for bad advice given by him as director unless it could clearly be shown that he had willingly accepted such personal responsibility. A special relationship involving an assumption of personal liability must be established before a company director can become liable for negligent misstatement under the Hedley Byrne principles. Lord Steyn: "The touchstone of liability is not the state of mind of the defendant. An objective test means that the primary focus must be on things said and done by the defendant or on his behalf. Obviously the impact of what a defendant says or does must be judged in the light of the relevant contextual scene. Subject to this qualification the primary focus must be on exchanges (in which term I include statements and conduct) which cross the line between the defendant and the plaintiff." As to whether he was liable as a joint tortfeasor: "In any event, the argument is unsustainable. A moment's reflection will show that, if the argument were to be accepted in the present case, it would expose directors, officers and employees of companies carrying on business as providers of services to a plethora of new tort claims. The fallacy in the argument is clear. In the present case liability of the company is dependent on a special relationship with the plaintiffs giving rise to an assumption of responsibility. Mr Mistlin was a stranger to that particular relationship. He cannot therefore be liable as a joint tortfeasor with the company. If he is to be held liable to the plaintiffs, it could only be on the basis of a special relationship between himself and the plaintiffs. There was none. I would therefore reject this alternative argument."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ House of Lords ] - [ Bailii ]

 
 Bale v Merton, Sutton and Wandsworth Health Authority; CA 8-May-1998 - [1998] EWCA Civ 800
 
Audrey Burslem v Mcphails Coaches [1998] EWCA Civ 801
8 May 1998
CA

Negligence

[ Bailii ]

 
 Nobes, Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Schofield; CA 14-May-1998 - Times, 15 May 1998; [1998] EWCA Civ 838

 
 Hussain and Another v Lancaster City Council; CA 14-May-1998 - Times, 27 May 1998; Gazette, 10 June 1998; [1998] EWCA Civ 834; [2000] QB 1; [1999] 4 All ER 125
 
McCluskey v Wallace [1998] ScotCS CSIH_120; 1998 SLT 1357; 1998 Rep LR 86; 1998 SC 711; [1998] CSIH 120; 1998 GWD 20-1005
14 May 1998
SCS
Lord Justice-Clerk (Cullen), Lord McCluskey and Lord Murray
Scotland, Personal Injury, Negligence
A child aged 10 had crossed the road without taking reasonable care to check whether traffic was coming. She was struck by a driver who was driving at an appropriate speed but had failed to notice her, and could have avoided her if he had been paying proper attention. Held: The assessment of the child's contributory negligence at 20% was upheld.
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Peter Cuthbert v Geeta Bannister [1998] EWCA Civ 848
18 May 1998
CA

Road Traffic, Negligence

[ Bailii ]

 
 Perrett v Collins, Underwood PFA (Ulair) Limited (T/a Popular Flying Association); CA 22-May-1998 - Times, 23 June 1998; [1998] EWCA Civ 884; [1998] 2 Lloyd's LR 255

 
 Regina v London Borough of Sutton, ex parte Jolley; CA 19-Jun-1998 - Gazette, 15 July 1998; Times, 23 June 1998; [1998] EWCA Civ 1049; [1998] 1 WLR 1546
 
Culwick v Devon County Council [1998] EWCA Civ 1103
29 Jun 1998
CA

Personal Injury, Negligence

[ Bailii ]
 
Domicrest Ltd v Swiss Bank Corporation Times, 16 July 1998; [1999] QB 548; [1998] EWHC 2001 (QB)
7 Jul 1998
QBD

Jurisdiction, Negligence
An English claimant sued a Swiss bank for a negligent mis-statement made in a telephone call between England and Switzerland. The Swiss banker represented that the transmission of a copy payment order by the bank to the claimant was a guarantee that payment would be made for the amount referred. The claimant relied on the representations to release goods in Switzerland and Italy on receipt of the copy payment order from the bank rather than waiting until it had been paid. The bank refused to pay on three copy payments orders in respect of goods which had been released from store in Switzerland and Italy. Held: The place of the damage was in Switzerland and Italy, where the goods were released without payment, rather than England, where the Swiss purchaser would have paid the price. The reasons for that finding were (a) that it was by reference to the loss of the goods that the damages were pleaded; and (b) that the essence of the complaint was that the goods were released prior to payment. Where negligent misstatement is alleged, the law governing the action is that of the country where the statement was made. The tortious act occurs when the statement is made not when and where the statement is relied upon.
Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1988
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Haddow v Tendring District Council and Richard C S Colley [1998] EWCA Civ 1183
9 Jul 1998
CA

Negligence

[ Bailii ]
 
Kenneth Swann and Susan Mary Swann v Mervyn Thomas Seal [1998] EWCA Civ 1217
15 Jul 1998
CA

Negligence

[ Bailii ]
 
Mond v Hyde and Another [1998] 3 All ER 833; [1998] EWCA Civ 1226
16 Jul 1998
CA
Beldam, Aldous, Ward LJJ
Insolvency, Negligence
The Court was asked whether an Official Receiver in Bankruptcy is, on grounds of public policy, immune from an action for damages at the suit of the trustee who has suffered financial loss by relying upon a negligent statement made to him by the Official Receiver in the course of the bankruptcy proceedings.
[ Bailii ]
 
Owners of the Ship Herceg Novi v Owners of the Ship Ming Galaxy Times, 30 July 1998; [1998] EWCA (Civ) 1223
16 Jul 1998
CA

Transport, Negligence, Jurisdiction
A claim for daages was made after ships collided, and one sank. Held: The judge had been wrong not to stay an action here where the proper jurisdiction was Singapore. That higher damages might be available under a different convention applying here did not mean that a party should be deprived of justice in Singapore. There is no one dominant international standard.
[ Bailii ]

 
 Ahmed v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police; CA 28-Jul-1998 - [1998] EWCA Civ 1305
 
Darby v Warwickshire Constabulary and Another [1998] EWCA Civ 1340
30 Jul 1998
CA
Beldam, Buxton LJJ
Police, Negligence

[ Bailii ]
 
Gates v Mckenna [1998] EWHC 2006 (QB); (1999) 46 BMLR 9; [1998] Lloyd's Rep Med 405
14 Aug 1998
QBD
Toulson J
Personal Injury, Negligence
The plaintiff suffered schizophrenia after taking part in an on-stage hypnosis performance by the defendant. Held. The claim failed: "it is highly improbable that the onset of the plaintiff's schizophrenia had anything to do with his participation in the hypnotism show in which he took part. The only conceivable way in which there could be a causative link would be by classifying the experience as a life event and postulating that the stress which it generated was responsible for triggering the disease."
Hypnotism Act 1952
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Griffiths v Brown; Griffiths v Lindsay Times, 23 October 1998
23 Oct 1998
QBD

Negligence
A taxi driver's duty extended to setting his passenger down by the kerb. His duty did not extend so as to make him responsible to a drunken passenger who failed then to cross the road safely.

 
Marion Clark v A Fiegel and Paul Stapley T/a Corporation Balloon Company; Paul Stapley; Payne Marsh and Stillwell (a Firm) and John Aspinal Qc [1998] EWCA Civ 1629
28 Oct 1998
CA

Negligence

[ Bailii ]

 
 Osman v The United Kingdom; ECHR 28-Oct-1998 - Times, 05 November 1998; 23452/94; 87/1997/871/1083; [1999] 1 FLR 193; [1998] ECHR 101; 5 BHRC 293; (2000) 29 EHRR 245; [1999] Fam Law 86; [1998] HRCD 966; [1999] Crim LR 82; (1999) 163 JPN 297; (1999) 11 Admin LR 200
 
Hossain v Thompson [1998] EWCA Civ 1719
6 Nov 1998
CA

Road Traffic, Negligence
Application for leave to appeal.
[ Bailii ]
 
O'Connell v Plymouth City Council (1) [1998] EWCA Civ 1723
6 Nov 1998
CA

Negligence

[ Bailii ]

 
 Watson v Gray and Another; QBD 26-Nov-1998 - Times, 26 November 1998

 
 Chief Constable of Northumbria v Costello; CA 3-Dec-1998 - Times, 15 December 1998; [1998] EWCA Civ 1898; [1998] EWCA Civ 3536; (1999) 11 Admin LR 81; [1999] ICR 752; [1999] 1 All ER 550
 
Kent v Dr Griffiths, Dr Roberts, London Ambulance Service Times, 23 December 1998; Gazette, 27 January 1999; [1998] EWCA Civ 1941
11 Dec 1998
CA

Negligence, Health Professions
Though there is no duty at large to help someone in need of urgent assistance, an ambulance service, by accepting a 999 call, may have accepted a duty to the caller. It remained open to argue as to whether it was fair just and reasonable to impose duty.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
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