swarb.co.uk - law index
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Negligence - From: 1991 To: 1991
This page lists 10 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.
Porter v Strathclyde Regional Council 1991 SLT 446
1991
Scotland, Negligence
The Inner House should not interfere with the Lord Ordinary's apportionment of negligence except in exceptional circumstances which must demonstrate that "he has manifestly and to a substantial degree gone wrong".
1 Citers
Mobil Oil Hong Kong Ltd v Hong Kong United Docklands Ltd. (the "Hua Lien") [1991] 1 Lloyds Rep 309
1991
Negligence
1 Citers
March v E and MH Stramore (1991) 171 CLR 506
1991
Mason CJ
Commonwealth, Negligence
Considerations of policy and value judgments necessarily enter into the assessment of causation.
1 Citers
Hughes v National Union of Mineworkers [1991] 4 All ER 278; [1991] ICR 669
1991
QBD
May J
Police, Negligence
The court struck out as disclosing no cause of action a claim by a police officer who was injured while policing the miners' strike and who alleged that the police officer in charge had deployed his men negligently. Held: The officer in charge plainly owed no duty of care to the plaintiff. While there were circumstances in which a police officer might owe a duty of care to another, such a duty did not extend to circumstances where what was called in question was the immediate operational control of policemen seeking to deal with violent public disorder where the plaintiff's injuries were directly caused by those perpetrating the disorder. "as a matter of public policy, if senior police officers charged with the task of deploying what may or may not be an adequate force of officers to control serious public disorder are to be potentially liable to individual officers under their command if those individuals are injured by attacks from rioters, that would be significantly detrimental to the control of public order. It will no doubt often happen that in such circumstances critical decisions have to be made with little or no time for considered thought and where many individual officers may be in some danger of physical injury of one kind or another. It is not, I consider, in the public interest that those decisions should generally be the potential target of a negligence claim if rioters do injure an individual officer, since the fear of such a claim would be likely to affect the decisions to the prejudice of the very task which the decisions are intended to advance. "
1 Cites
1 Citers
James McNaughton Paper Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson and Co [1991] 1 All ER 134; [1991] 2 QB 113; [1990] EWCA Civ 11
1991
CA
Neill, Nourse, Balcombe LJJ
Negligence
When considering the liability of an auditor in negligence, the fact and nature of any communications direct between the auditor and the potential investor must be allowed for. The court set out a non-exhaustive list of factors to be taken into account in determining whether the threefold test and the assumption of responsibility test for negligence are met.
Neill LJ said: "In some cases the statement will have been prepared or made by the 'adviser' for the express purpose of being communicated to the 'advisee', to adopt the labels used by Lord Oliver. In such a case it may often be right to conclude that the advisee was within the scope of the duty of care. In many cases, however, the statement will have been prepared or made, or primarily prepared or made, for a different purpose and for the benefit of someone other than the advisee. In such cases it will be necessary to look carefully at the precise purpose for which the statement was communicated to the advisee."
Lord Neill set out six headings to establish liability: "(1) the purpose for which the statement was made. (2) the purpose for which the statement was communicated . (3) the relationship between the advisor, the advisee and any relevant third party. (4) the size of any class to which the advisee belongs. (5) the state of knowledge of the advisor. (6) reliance by the advisee."
'from this scrutiny it seems to me to be clear (a) that in contrast to developments in the law in New Zealand, of which the decision in Scott Group Ltd -v- McFarlane [1978] 1 NZLR 553 provides an important illustration, in England a restrictive approach is now adopted to any extension of the scope of the duty of care beyond the person directly intended by the maker of the statement to act upon it; and (b) that in deciding whether a duty of care exists in any particular case it is necessary to take all the circumstances into account; but (c) that, notwithstanding (b), it is possible to identify certain matters which are likely to be of importance in most cases in reaching a decision as to whether or not a duty exists. I propose to examine these matters under a series of headings, though the headings involve a substantial measure of overlap. (1) The purpose for which the statement was made. In some cases the statement will have been prepared or made by the 'adviser' for the express purpose of being communicated to the 'advisee', to adopt the labels used by Lord Oliver. In such a case it may often be right to conclude that the advisee was within the scope of the duty of care. In many cases, however, the statement will have been prepared or made, or primarily prepared or made, for a different purpose and for the benefit of someone other than the advisee. In such cases it will be necessary to look carefully at the precise purpose for which the statement was communicated to the advisee. (2) The purpose for which the statement was communicated.
Under this heading it will be necessary to consider the purpose of, and the circumstances surrounding, the communication. Was the communication made for information only? Was it made for some action to be taken and, if so, what action and by whom? Who requested the communication to be made? These are some of the questions which may have to be addressed.
(3) The relationship between the adviser, the advisee and any relevant third party.
Where the statement was made or prepared in the first instance to or for the benefit of someone other than the advisee it will be necessary to consider the relationship between the parties. Thus it may be that the advisee is likely to look to the third party and through him to the adviser for advice or guidance. Or the advisee may be wholly independent and in a position to make any necessary judgments himself.
(5) The state of knowledge of the adviser. The precise state of knowledge of the adviser is one of the most important matters to examine. Thus it will be necessary to consider his knowledge of the purpose for which the statement was made or required in the first place and also his knowledge of the purpose for which the statement was communicated to the advisee. In this context knowledge includes not only actual knowledge but also such knowledge as would be attributed to a reasonable person in the circumstances in which the adviser was placed. On the other hand any duty of care will be limited to transactions or types of transactions of which the adviser had knowledge and will only arise where "the adviser knows or ought to know that [the statement of advice] will be relied upon by a particular person or class of persons in connection with that transaction:" per Lord Oliver in the Caparo case [1990] 2 A.C. 605, 641.
It also necessary to consider whether the adviser knew that the advisee would rely on the statement without obtaining independent advice
(6) Reliance by the advisee
In cases where the existence of a duty of care is in issue it is always useful to examine the matter from the point of view of the plaintiff. As I have ventured to say elsewhere the question "Who is my neighbour?" prompts the response "Consider first those who would consider you to be their neighbour." One should therefore consider whether and to what extent the advisee was entitled to rely on the statement to take the action that he did take. It is also necessary to consider whether he did in fact rely on the statement, whether he did use or should have used his own judgment and whether he did seek or should have sought independent advice. In business transactions conducted as arms' length it may sometimes be difficult for an advisee to prove that he was entitled to act on a statement without taking any independent advice or to prove that the adviser knew, actually or inferentially, that he would act without taking such advice.'
1 Cites
1 Citers
[ Bailii ]
Nash v Eli Lilly and Co [1991] 2 Med LR 182
1991
QBD
Hidden J
Limitation, Negligence
The court discussed the relevance of knowledge obtainable by the plaintiff's solicitor for limitation purposes. Held: Hidden J said "My conclusion is therefore that there is no binding authority on whether facts ascertainable by a plaintiff with the help of legal advice come within or without the terms of S14(3)(b). For my part I doubt whether in most ordinary circumstances they do".
Limitation Act 1989 14(3)(b)
1 Cites
1 Citers
Morgan Crucible Company Plc v Hill Samuel and Co Ltd [1991] Ch 285
1991
ChD
Hoffmann J
Litigation Practice, Negligence
The court laid down the procedure on a strike out application: "On an application to strike out a pleading under RSC Ord.18, r.19(1)(a) no evidence is admissible and since it is only the pleading itself which is being examined, the court is required to assume that each and every one of the facts pleaded (unless manifestly incapable of proof) is true and will be capable of proof at the trial. In some instances, the court may regard the assumption as somewhat unrealistic, but it nevertheless has to be made." The court set out the main principles under which a party can be liable for economic loss in negligence.
Rules of the Supreme Court Ord.18, r.19(1)(a)
1 Citers
Cunningham v Reading Football Club Ltd Independent, 20 March 1991
20 Mar 1991
Drake J
Negligence, Personal Injury
The plaintiff sought damages after being injured by a piece of concrete thrown by a hooligan at a football match. Held: Where a land owner could reasonably expect that visiting fans might use broken off pieces of concrete and hurl them at others, and did not ensure that such pieces were removed, it could be liable in damages as occupier.
Occupier' Liability Act 1957
Watts and Co v Morrow Gazette, 08 January 1992; [1991] 4 All ER 939; [1991] 1 WLR 1421; [1991] EWCA Civ 9
30 Jul 1991
CA
Bingham LJ, Sir Stephen Brown LJ, Bingham LJ
Damages, Negligence
The plaintiff had bought a house on the faith of the defendant's report that there were only limited defects requiring repair. In fact the defects were much more extensive. The defendant surveyor appealed against an award of damages after his negligent survey of a property. The plaintiff sought damages for distress, and the cost of making good the defects. The appellant argued that he should pay or only the diminution in value of the house by reason of the existence of those defects. Held: The correct level of damages to be awarded are for the diminution in value of the property with those faults, not the cost of repairing the faults. "A contract breaker is not in general liable for any distress, frustration, anxiety, displeasure, vexation, tension or aggravation which his breach of contract may cause to the innocent party. This rule is not, I think, founded on the assumption that such reactions are not foreseeable, which they surely are or may be, but on considerations of policy. But the rule is not absolute. Where the very object of a contract is to provide pleasure, relaxation, peace of mind or freedom from molestation, damages will be awarded if the fruit of the contract is not provided or if the contrary result is procured instead. If the law did not cater for this exceptional category of case it would be defective. A contract to survey the condition of a house for a prospective purchaser does not, however, fall within this exceptional category. In cases not falling within this exceptional category, damages are in my view recoverable for physical inconvenience and discomfort caused by the breach and mental suffering directly related to that inconvenience and discomfort. If those effects are foreseeably suffered during a period when defects are repaired I am prepared to accept that they sound in damages even though the cost of the repairs is not recoverable as such." Exceptions mayinclude "where the very object of the contract is to provide pleasure, relaxation, peace of mind or freedom from molestation", but this is an "exceptional category".
1 Cites
1 Citers
[ Bailii ]
Thompson v Johnson and Johnson Pty Ltd [1991] 2 VR 449; [1991] VicRp 84; [1991] Aust Torts Reports 68-587
30 Nov 1991
International, Negligence, Personal Injury
(Supreme Court of Victoria)
[ Austlii ]
