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Negligence - From: 1970 To: 1979

This page lists 40 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Salsbury v Woodland [1970] 1 KB 191; [1969] EWCA Civ 1; [1969] 3 All ER 863; [1969] 3 WLR 29
1970
CA
Widgery LJ, Harman LJ, Sachs LJ
Negligence, Torts - Other
The defendant had instructed independent contractors to remove a large tree in his garden. When they did so, the plaintiff was injured when the car he was in was fouled in a wire brought down by the tree. The defendant householder appealed against a finding of liability saying that he should not be held responsible for the acts of a competent independent contractor. Held: The activity of removing the tree was not an extra-hazardous activity so as to make the defendant liable. Extra-hazardous activities for which a land owner might responsible even though the activities were carried out by an independent contractor, were those "activities which are dangerous even if carried out with caution by those skilled in the activity". And "There are indeed certain categories of cases in which an occupier is under such a primary duty to others that he in effect warrants the safety of his property against those who are injured by what happens upon it, or alternatively is personally responsible for having any work on it done in a competent manner even if he selected a competent independent contractor."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Tan Chye Choo and Ors v Chong Kew Moi [1970] 1 All ER 272
1970
PC

Negligence
Statutory obligations may indicate a standard of care, breach of which would be evidence of negligence.
1 Citers


 
Mekew v Holland and Hannen and Cubitts (Scotland) [1970] CLY 612
1970


Negligence

1 Citers


 
Henderson v Henry E Jenkins and Sons [1970] AC 282; [1970] RTR 70
1970
HL
Lord Pearson
Negligence, Road Traffic
The House described the burden of proof in a claim for negligence and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Lord Pearson said: "In an action for negligence the plaintiff must allege, and has the burden of proving, that the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the defendants. That is the issue throughout the trial, and in giving judgment at the end of the trial the judge has to decide whether he is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the defendants, and if he is not so satisfied the plaintiff's action fails. The formal burden of proof does not shift." However: "if in the course of the trial there is proved a set of facts which raises a prima facie inference that the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the defendants, the issue will be decided in the plaintiff's favour unless the defendants by their evidence provide some answer which is adequate to displace the prima facie inference. In this situation there is said to be an evidential burden of proof resting on the defendants. I have some doubts whether it is strictly correct to use the expression 'burden of proof' with this meaning, as there is a risk of it being confused with the formal burden of proof, but it is a familiar and convenient usage."

 
Levine v Morris [1970] 1 WLR 71
1970

Lord Widgery
Negligence, Road Traffic
Lord Widgery said: "All motorists are guilty of errors of one kind or another, and I think it would be quite unreal if roads were designed on the assumption that no driver would ever err."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383
1970

Windeyer J
Commonwealth, Negligence
The court considered how progress is made in developing the law of liability for damages for psychiatric injury, saying "The field is one in which the common law is still in course of development. Courts must therefore act in company and not alone. Analogies in other courts, and persuasive precedents as well as authoritative pronouncements, must be regarded."
1 Citers



 
 Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office; HL 6-May-1970 - [1970] AC 1004; [1970] 2 WLR 1140; [1970] 2 All ER 94; [1970] UKHL 2

 
 British Railways Board v Herrington; CA 1971 - [1971] 1 All ER 897

 
 Wilks v Cheltenham Homeguard Motor Cycle and Light Car Club; CA 1971 - [1971] 1 WLR 668
 
Brown v Nelson and others [1971] LGR 20
1971

Nield J
Personal Injury, Negligence
A pupil at an approved school went on an Outward Bound course including riding on a cable and pulley slung between two trees. From the cable hung a knotted rope. When the pupil got onto the rope the cable snapped, and he fell with it. He suffered serious injuries from which some years later he died. The Outward Bound confidence course was run by parties independent of the school. Held: The claim was dismissed against the school. Nield J said: "What duty did the school authorities owe to the deceased? They were not the occupiers of the site or of the apparatus. They had, in my view, a general duty to take reasonable steps for the safety of those under their charge and use such care as would be exercised by a reasonably careful parent. Counsel tell me that there is no authority covering the situation where a school makes use of someone else's equipment at premises other than the school premises. In my judgment, where a school must take their pupils to other premises, they discharge their duty of care if they know the premises and if the premises are apparently safe, and if they know that the premises are staffed by competent and careful persons. They further discharge their duty if they permit their pupils there to use equipment which is apparently safe and is under the control of competent and careful persons who supervise the use of such equipment. They do not in such circumstances have an obligation themselves to make an inspection."
1 Citers



 
 Lloyde v West Midlands Gas Board; CA 1971 - [1971] 2 All ER 1240; [1971] 1 WLR 749
 
Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691; [1971] 3 All ER 581; [1971] EWCA Civ 6; [1971] RTR 425
30 Jun 1971
CA
Lord Denning MR, Salmon, Megaw LJJ
Negligence
The plaintiff gave a friend's wife driving lessons. An experienced driver himself, he checked her insurance first. The learner crashed into a lamp-post, and he was injured. She was convicted of careless driving, and he sought damages. The judge held that he had voluntarily assumed the risk. He appealed dismissal of his claim at first instance. Held: The appeal succeeded. The plaintiff, by checking on his position under the car insurance before agreeing to give the lessons, had shown expressly that he did not consent to run the risk of injury which might occur through the learner's known lack of skill, so that she could not rely on the defence of volenti non fit iniuria to bar his claim.
Lord Denning MR said: "This brings me to the defence of volenti non fit iniuria. Does it apply to the instructor? In former times this defence was used almost as an alternative defence to contributory negligence. Either defence defeated the action. Now that contributory negligence is not a complete defence, but only a ground for reducing the damages, the defence of volenti non fit iniuria has been closely considered, and, in consequence, it has been severely limited. Knowledge of the risk of injury is not enough. Nor is a willingness to take the risk of injury. Nothing will suffice short of an agreement to waive any claim for negligence. The plaintiff must agree, expressly or impliedly, to waive any claim for any injury that may befall him due to the lack of reasonable care by the defendant: or, more accurately, due to the failure of the defendant to measure up to the standard of care that the law requires of him." The duty of care owed by a learner driver to her instructor is to be judged by the same objective standard as that owed to passengers and other road users by qualified drivers.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 O'Connell v Jackson; CA 7-Jul-1971 - [1971] CLY 3115; [1972] 1 QB 270; [1971] EWCA Civ 5; [1971] 3 All ER 129; [1971] 2 Lloyd's Rep 354; [1971] 3 WLR 463; [1972] RTR 51; [1971] 2 LLR 354

 
 O'Connell v Jackson; CA 7-Jul-1971 - [1971] CLY 3115; [1972] 1 QB 270; [1971] EWCA Civ 5; [1971] 3 All ER 129; [1971] 2 Lloyd's Rep 354; [1971] 3 WLR 463; [1972] RTR 51; [1971] 2 LLR 354
 
Mutual Life And Citizens' Assurance Co Ltd And Another v Evatt [1971] 2 WLR 23
16 Nov 1971
PC
Lord Reid, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Hodson, Lord Guest and Lord Diplock
Negligence, Financial Services
The plaintiff had been an investor with the defendant. He asked them about an associated company. He was given advice which was incorrect. He claimed damages for negligence. Held: The company was not itself in the business of giving such advice. The advice had been gratuitous. The company had appreciated that he might act on the advice. However they owed him no duty of care, and therefore were not liable in damages. The company made no claim to have the necessary skill to give advice on investments, and their only duty was to give honest advice, which they had done. Lord Reid and Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest dissenting.
1 Cites

[ lip ]
 
Dutton v Bognor Regis Urban District Council [1972] 1 All ER 462; [1972] 2 WLR 299; [1972] 1 QB 373; [1972] CLY 2352
1972
CA
Lord Denning MR
Damages, Negligence
The court considered the liability in negligence of a Council whose inspector had approved a building which later proved defective. Held: The Council had control of the work and with such control came a responsibility to take care in performing all associated tasks.[Lord Denning MR said: "If Mr Tapp's submissions were right, it would mean that if the inspector negligently passes the house as properly built and it collapses and injures a person, the council are liable : but if the owner discovers the defect in time to repair it - and he does repair it - the council are not liable. That is an impossible distinction. They are liable in either case".
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Duchess of Argyll v Beuselinck [1972] 2 Lloyd's Rep 172
1972
ChD
Megarry J
Negligence, Legal Professions
The court found that the plaintiff's solicitor had not been under a duty to give tax advice in the context of the particular transaction. The performance must be judged in the light of the events known at the time. The court advised against the use of hindsight.
Megarry J said: "In this world there are few things that could not have been better done if done with hindsight. The advantages of hindsight include the benefit of having a sufficient indication of which of the many factors present are important and which are unimportant. But hindsight is no touchstone [of negligence]. The standard of care to be expected of professional men must be based on events as they occur, in prospect and not in retrospect . . on any footing, the duty of care is not a warranty of perfection . . a marginal case does not make negligence." and "hindsight is not the touchstone of negligence."
1 Citers


 
Powell v Phillips [1972] 3 All ER 864
1972
CA
Stephenson LJ
Negligence
After a dance, the plaintiff, a girl of nineteen, was walking along the pavement of a poorly lit street at about 10.45 p.m. with an escort. The pavement was covered with snow and slush. From time to time, they had to step off it and walked in the roadway in or near the gutter. Her escort was walking in front close to the kerb with the plaintiff some way behind slightly to his right. The plaintiff was struck from behind by the defendant's car. The plaintiff's escort testified that he neither heard nor saw the car which struck the plaintiff but that he saw it drive past him at a fast speed of about 30 to 40 miles an hour with full beams on. Held: The driver was entirely responsible.
Stephenson LJ assumed the girl, clad in a dark blue coat and naval blue trousers without "wearing or carrying anything white, light-coloured or reflective, walking in the roadway nest to the kerb and not on the pavement and not on the right hand side of the road facing oncoming traffic but with her back to it", to be in breach of the Highway Code: "The perfect pedestrian would, I suppose, have crossed to the other side every time he found the left hand pavement uncomfortable to walk on and, if he found the other pavement no better, would have walked in the roadway on the other side facing the traffic and carrying a lamp. But the question is not what was ideal but what was required by common sense; was the common sense codified in these three rules for pedestrians applicable to the conduct of this particular road user on foot, the plaintiff, at this time and place? More precisely, has the defendant proved that the plaintiff failed to take reasonable care for her own safety by leaving the pavement when they got too slushy in order to walk a few feet out in the road for distance of about 20 yards in the straight street in a built up area with street lights on? My answer to that is an unhesitating 'No'. Even if it were 'Yes, there was some negligence on her part', I should not feel able to find that it made any real contribution to the accident. If she had been on the pavement, she would not have been injured, and if the defendant had proved that he was driving at a reasonable speed with suitable lights on and at least tried to give a proper lookout, I might not have regarded his negligence as substantially the sole cause of the accident."
A breach of the Highway Code by a road user, itself creates no presumption calling for an explanation or a presumption of negligence but is one of the circumstances on which one party is entitled to rely in establishing negligence.
1 Citers


 
Berry v Stone Manganese and Marine Ltd [1972] 1 Lloyd's Rep 182
1972


Personal Injury, Negligence
The plaintiff sought damages in common law negligence respect of noise at work which "amounted to about 115 to 120 decibels, whereas the. . tolerable noise is about 90" and no ear muffs had been provided. Held: The claim succeeded.
1 Citers


 
Boothman v British Northrop Ltd [1972] KIR 113
1972
CA
Stephenson LJ
Negligence
Once relevant fault on the part of the plaintiff has been established, a reduction on account of his fault in the damages recoverable is obligatory Stephenson LJ: "Speaking for myself, I do not find that the words of section 1(1) of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 give any support to the view that the court can disregard negligence on the part of a plaintiff contributing to an accident if it thinks it just and equitable so to do. What the section says is that "the damages recoverable in respect thereof" – that is, in respect of damage suffered by any person "as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person" – "shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share of the responsibility for the damage".
It has been held that the principle of de minimis applies to this as to other branches of the law and that where the contribution of a plaintiff's negligence is virtually negligible it should be disregarded and the damages should be awarded him in full. If one looks at the words of section 1 (1) of the Act of 1945 they do not seem to leave much room for an application of the de minimis principle. But they certainly, in my view, do not encourage, and I very much doubt if they permit, not a reduction "to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable" but no reduction at all because the court thinks it just and equitable that there should be no reduction. The judge having found (as I think, rightly) contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, I do not think it is open to Mr Carman to argue that even if that finding stands he should not have his damages reduced at all."
Law reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 1
1 Citers



 
 British Railways Board v Herrington; HL 16-Feb-1972 - [1972] AC 877; [1972] 2 WLR 537; [1971] 1 All ER 749; [1972] UKHL 1
 
Spartan Steel and Alloys Ltd v Martin and Co (Contractors) Ltd. [1972] EWCA Civ 3; [1972] 3 WLR 502; [1973] QB 27; [1972] 3 All ER 557
22 Jun 1972
CA
Lord Denning MR, Edmund-Davies J, Lawton LJ
Negligence
Damage was negligently inflicted by the defendants on the power line which they knew to be the direct electricity supply to the plaintiff’s factory. Held. Damages were recovered for depreciation in value of one spoiled melt, plus consequential loss of profit on that melt. However, the plaintiff could not claim damages in tort "based on lost sale contracts yet to be made at an unknown date in the future because such contracts and alleged losses are not immediately consequential on the physical damage of the tort". It was a parasitic claim.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Rider v Rider [1973] 1 QB 505; [1973] RTR 178
1973
CA
Sachs LJ
Road Traffic, Negligence
The plaintiff was a passenger in a car which her husband was driving and which collided with a van. The husband had been driving too fast. The edge of the tarmac on the road abutted grass verges at a lower level and the edge had been inadequately repaired and in places "bitten off" so as to have become uneven. The trial judge found that the nearside wheels of the car had encountered an indentation on the edge of the tarmac and that such was, as to two thirds, the cause of the husband's loss of control. The highway authority was, as to two thirds, responsible for the collision. The driver who lost control of his vehicle as a result of carriageway edge deterioration was found one third to blame on the basis that he had special knowledge of the state of the road and was therefore driving too fast. Held: The highway authority's appeal was dismissed.
Sachs LJ described the authority's statutory duty: "it is in my judgment clear that the corporation's statutory duty under section 44 of the Act of 1959" (the precursor of the current statutory position) "is reasonably to maintain and repair the highway so that it is free of danger to all users who use that highway in the way normally to be expected of them -- taking account, of course, of the traffic reasonably to be expected on the particular highway. Motorists who thus use the highway, and to whom a duty is owed, are not to be expected by the authority all to be model drivers. Drivers in general are liable to make mistakes, including some rated as negligent by the courts, without being merely for that reason stigmatised as unreasonable or abnormal drivers; some drivers may be inexperienced, and some drivers may find themselves in difficulties from which the more adept could escape. The highway authority must provide not merely for model drivers, but for the normal run of drivers to be found on their highways, and that includes those who make the mistakes which experience and common sense teaches are likely to occur."
1 Citers



 
 McGhee v National Coal Board; HL 1973 - [1973] 1 WLR 1; [1973] SC (HL) 37; [1972] 3 All ER 1008; [1972] UKHL 7; [1972] UKHL 11
 
Rouse v Squires [1973] EWCA Civ 9; [1972] 2 All ER 903; [1973] 2 WLR 925; [1973] RTR 550; [1973] QB 889
22 Mar 1973
CA

Road Traffic, Negligence

1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Froom v Butcher [1974] 1 WLR 1297
24 Jun 1974

Nield J
Negligence
The plaintiff was a front seat passenger injured in a crash. The defendant sought to have the damages award reduced for the contributory negligence of the plaintiff in not wearing a seat belt. Held: There was considerable disagreement between people as to the wisdom of wearing seatbelts. In the absence of such agreement us, the plaintiff could not be said to be negligent: "I do not feel that the courts are justified in invading the freedom of choice of the motorist by holding it to be negligence, lack of care or fault, to act upon an opinion firmly and honestly held and shared by many other sensible people."
1 Citers



 
 Snelling v Whitehead; HL 1975 - Unreported, 1975

 
 Froom v Butcher; CA 21-Jul-1975 - [1976] QB 286; [1975] EWCA Civ 6; [1975] 3 All ER 520

 
 Dick v Burgh of Falkirk; HL 1976 - 1976 SC (HL) 1
 
Esso Petroleum Company Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801; [1976] EWCA Civ 4; [1976] 2 All ER 5
6 Feb 1976
CA
Lord Denning MR, Ormrod, Shaw LJJ
Torts - Other, Damages, Negligence, Contract
Statements had been made by employees of Esso in the course of pre-contractual negotiations with Mr Mardon, the prospective tenant of a petrol station. The statements related to the potential throughput of the station. Mr Mardon was persuaded by the statements to enter into the tenancy; but he suffered serious loss when the actual throughput proved to be much lower than had been predicted. Mr Marden did his best but he lost his capital and incurred a large bank overdraft as a result of his trading losses. Held: Mr. Mardon was entitled to recover damages from Esso, on the basis of either breach of warranty or (on this point affirming the decision of the judge below) negligent misrepresentation. A contractor is not free to carry on with a disastrous contract and then seek to recover any losses on the basis of fraud. A special relationship, giving rise to a duty of care, may arise between the parties negotiating a contract if information is given in connection with the contract.
Lord Denning MR held: "A professional man may give advice under a contract for reward; or without a contract, in pursuance of a voluntary assumption of responsibility, gratuitously without reward. In either case he is under one and the same duty to use reasonable care: see Cassidy v. Ministry of Health [1951] 2 K.B. 343, 359-360. In the one case it is by reason of a term implied by law. In the other, it is by reason of a duty imposed by law. For a breach of that duty he is liable in damages: and those damages should be, and are, the same, whether he is sued in contract or in tort." and: "He is only to be compensated for having been induced to enter into a contract which turned out to be disastrous for him. Whether it be called breach of warranty or negligent misrepresentation, its effect was not to warrant the throughput but only to induce him to enter the contract. So the damages in either case are to be measured by the loss he suffered. Just as in Doyle v Olby he can say: 'I would not have entered into this contract at all but for your representation. Owing to it, I have lost all the capital I put into it. I also incurred a large overdraft. I have spent four years of my life in wasted endeavour without reward: and it will take sometime to re-establish myself.' For all such loss he is entitled to recover damages."
Ormrod and Shaw LJJ agreed that Mr. Mardon was entitled to recover damages either for breach of warranty or for negligent misrepresentation.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v Dredge "Willemstad" [1976] HCA 65; (1976) 136 CLR 529
9 Dec 1976

Gibbs, Stephen, Mason, Jacobs and Murphy JJ.
Commonwealth, Damages, Negligence, Transport
Austlii (High Court of Australia) Negligence - Duty of care - Foreseeability of harm - Economic loss not consequential upon damage to person or property - Damage to property of one person - Economic loss suffered by person as a result - Pipeline carrying oil to plaintiff's depot - Damaged by defendant's negligence - Supply interrupted - Pipeline and depot owned by different persons - Expense incurred by plaintiff in arranging alternative means of delivery - Whether recoverable - Remoteness of loss or damage.
Shipping and Navigation - Action in rem - Action against ship - Negligence - Master not sued as defendant - Appearance entered by master - No proprietary interest in ship - Whether master liable to judgment.
A pipeline was damaged and the owner of the terminal (who was not the owner of the pipeline) incurred expense in transporting refined oil to the terminal while the pipeline was out of use. Held. The plaintiff was entitled to recover that expense from the dredger which had damaged the pipeline. Jacobs J said that the duty of care owed to the owner of the pipeline was also owed to "a person whose property was in such physical propinquity to the place where the acts of omissions of the dredge . . had their physical effect that a physical effect on the property of that person was foreseeable as the result of such acts or omissions".
1 Citers

[ Austlii ]
 
Geyer v Downs and another [1977] 17 ALR 408
1977

Murphy and Aickin JJ
Negligence, Commonwealth
(High Court of Australia) A pupil suffered injuries when hit by a softball bat by a fellow pupil at playing the game in the school playground before school. There was no supervision. The jury awarded the appellant damages. The verdict was set aside by the court of appeal. Held: The appeal to the High Court was allowed: "It was urged for the respondent that there was no duty of supervision owed to the children before “school hours”. That expression was taken in the present case to mean the period of time beginning at 9.00 am, at which the “Daily Routine” stated that the playgrounds were to be supervised. Reliance was also placed upon the departmental instruction 5.2.4.1 as set out, supra, which it was said produced the result that the headmaster had no power or authority to require teachers to supervise the playground otherwise than during the hours 9.00 am to 3.30 pm as set out in that instruction. It was said therefore that the headmaster could not be regarded as negligent by failing to take measures to provide supervision of the playground prior to 9.00 am when he had no authority to direct any teacher to be present to perform that function. So to regard the case is to take an unduly restricted view of the relevant circumstances. There is no case which lays down that there is no duty of supervision prior to “school hours”, however that expression may be understood. The point seems to have been seldom referred to. In Ward v Hertfordshire County Council [1970] 1 All ER 535 at 538; [1970] 1 WLR 356 at 361, Salmon LJ expressly reserved the question whether lack of supervision could give rise to a cause of action in a case where the injury occurs at 8.50 am but “the school does not start until 8.55 am”. There seems no basis for treating it as a rule that there can be no duty of supervision outside “ordinary school hours” or “before school started”. The question must depend upon the nature of the general duty to take reasonable care in all the circumstances. It is not enough to look only at the departmental instructions and to say that the duty of supervision arises only during the periods referred to in those instructions."
1 Citers



 
 The Polyglory; 1977 - [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep 353
 
Owens v Brimmell [1977] QB 859
1977

Watkins J
Negligence
Both the driver and his passenger had drunk about eight to nine pints of beer, and on their way home the driver lost control of his car so that it collided with a lamppost. The passenger sued in negligence. The driver said the passenger was contributorily negligent. Held: The court cited Canadian and Australian authorities and the ALI Restatement of the Law of Torts (Restatement, Second, Torts) section 406. Watkins J: "... [I]t appears to me that there is widespread and weighty authority for the proposition that a passenger may be guilty of contributory negligence if he rides with the driver of a car whom he knows has consumed alcohol in such quantity as is likely to impair to a dangerous degree that driver's capacity to drive properly and safely. So, also, may a passenger be guilty of contributory negligence if he, knowing that he is going to be driven in a car by his companion later, accompanies him upon a bout of drinking which has the effect, eventually, of robbing the passenger of clear thought and perception and diminishes the driver's capacity to drive properly and carefully. Whether this principle can be relied upon successfully is a question of fact and degree to be determined in the circumstances out of which the issue is said to arise."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Higginbotham v Mobil Oil Corporation Long [1977] USCA5 438; [1977] 545 F 2d 422
7 Mar 1977

d'Auvergne J
International, Negligence, Transport
(United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit) The court considered the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an action for damages after a helicopter crash where there was no clear explanation for the crash. Held: d'Auvergne J said: "Major improvements in design and manufacturing technology, in pilot training and in ground control, communications, and navigational aids, among other things, have combined to give air travel an estimable safety record . . Logic, experience and precedent compel us to reject the argument that airplane crashes ordinarily occur in the absence of default by someone connected with the design, manufacture, or operation of the craft".
1 Citers

[ Worldlii ]

 
 Anns and Others v Merton London Borough Council; HL 12-May-1977 - [1978] AC 728; [1977] CLY 2030; [1977] 2 All ER 492; [1977] UKHL 4

 
 Evans v Glasgow District Council; 1978 - [1978] CLY 1789

 
 Haydon v Kent County Council; CA 1978 - [1978] QB 343; [1978] 2 All ER 97

 
 Bird v Pearce; CA 1979 - [1979] RTR 369
 
Dodd Properties (Kent) Ltd v Canterbury City Council [1980] 1 WLR 433; [1980] 1 All ER 928; [1979] EWCA Civ 4
21 Dec 1979
CA
Donaldson LJ, Megaw LJ
Damages, Negligence
The defendants had, in the course of building operations, caused nuisance and damage to the plaintiff's building. The dispute was very lengthy, the costs of repair increased accordingly, and the parties now disputed the date at which damages fell to be assessed. Held: It was not apparent why a tortfeasor must take his victim as he finds him in terms of exceptionally high or low earning capacity, but not in terms of pecuniosity or impecuniosity which may be their manifestation. It was commercially prudent for the plaintiff to wait to see if they could recover the costs of repairs. Referring to the Liesbosch: "As I understand Lord Wright's speech, he took the view that, in so far as the plaintiffs had in fact suffered more than the loss assessed on a market basis, the excess flowed directly from their lack of means and not from the tortious act, or alternatively it was too remote in law. In modern terms, I think that he would have said that it was not foreseeable."
Megaw LJ said: 'In any case of doubt, it is desirable that the judge, having decided provisionally as to the amount of damages, should, before finally deciding, consider whether the amount conforms with the requirement of Lord Blackburn's fundamental principle. If it appears not to conform, the judge should examine the question again to see whether the particular case falls within one of the exceptions of which Lord Blackburn gave examples, or whether he is obliged by some binding authority to arrive at a result which is inconsistent with the fundamental principle.'
And: "In this context the Defendants submitted that all owners of property suffered a loss of value when the market fell. They asked the hypothetical question - what would the Plaintiffs have done with their money if they had not bought the shop? If they are compensated for the fall in value of the shop, are they not being compensated for a loss which they would have suffered even if the Defendants had not been at fault, and therefore being over-compensated?"
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
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