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Negligence - From: 1960 To: 1969

This page lists 47 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Watson v Fram Reinforced Concrete Co (Scotland) Ltd 1960 SC 92; 1960 SC (HL) 92
1960
HL
Lord Reid, Lord Keith of Avonholm, Lord Denning
Scotland, Negligence, Limitation
A workman had been injured through the breaking of a defective part in the machine with which he was working. He brought an action of damages against his employers, and later convened as second defenders the manufacturers of the machine, who had supplied it to his employers, on averments that the accident had been caused by the fault of the manufacturers in that they failed to supply his employers with a machine which was safe for use by their servants. The machine had been supplied on 7 July 1955 and the accident had happened on 9 August 1956, but the manufacturers were not convened in the action until 25 March 1959. Held: The three-year limitation period provided by section 6(1)(a) of the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions &c.) Act 1954 ran from the date when the workman suffered the injury and that, accordingly, the action against the manufacturers was not time-barred. "a cause of action accrues as soon as a wrongful act has caused personal injury beyond what can be regarded as negligible."
Lord Reid said: 'The ground of any action based on negligence is a concurrence of duty and damage and I cannot see how there can be that concurrence unless the duty still exists and is breached when the damage occurs.' and "It appears to me that default in the sense of breach of duty must persist after the act or neglect until the damage is suffered. The ground of any action based on negligence is the concurrence of breach of duty and damage, and I cannot see how there can be that concurrence unless the duty still exists and is breached when the damage occurs. Suppose that the damage occurred a year or two years after the manufacture and sale of the article: then undoubtedly the injured person can sue. But how could he sue if the manufacturer could say that his default had ceased a year before the injured person ever came near the dangerous article? Whatever be the true view with regard to the act or neglect, I think that the appellant is entitled to say that the respondents' 'default giving rise to the action' existed at the time when he suffered his injuries."
Lord Keith of Avonholm said: "Now this is a Donoghue v Stevenson type of case, and such a case undoubtedly introduces specialities into the law of negligence. But, on any view, I see difficulty in saying that there was negligence at the date of supply. At that date on the pursuer's pleadings there was no reason why the manufacturers should have known of the dangerous state of the strut. It can hardly be expected that they had a legal duty to take it to pieces and inspect it before sending it out. Undoubtedly there was an act of carelessness on the part of some workman when the pin was welded to the strut and the manufacturers would be vicariously responsible for that carelessness. But can it be said that at either date there was an act of negligence in the legal sense? The manufacturers owed a duty to anyone who should handle the machine to take reasonable steps to see that it was safe. They owed a duty not to injure, but until someone was injured there was no breach of duty. Only then could it be said that an act of negligence had been committed. That, I think, necessarily follows from the judgment of this House in Donoghue v Stevenson." and "Applying the ratio of these decisions there was, in my opinion, no act, neglect or default within the meaning of the statute affecting the pursuer until he was injured. A fortiori there was no act, neglect or default giving rise to his action before that date. It was then for the first time that there arose a breach of duty which made its impact on the pursuer. Time, in my opinion, commenced to run against the pursuer under the statute from that date."
Lord Denning said: "I think the true principle is contained simply in this: 'You must not injure your neighbour by your fault.' It is the doing of damage to him which, in my opinion, is the breach of duty giving rise to the action. It is no doubt correct to say, as Lord MacMillan did say (at p.71), that the manufacturer 'is under a duty to take care in the manufacture of these articles.' That is a duty which he owes to all those who may have occasion to use the article: and it is a duty which is broken at the time when he is negligent in making the article. But it is not a breach of duty to any particular individual. And it is not that breach of duty which gives rise to the action. There is another duty also to be considered: and that is the duty which Lord Atkin put in this wise (at p.44): 'You must not injure your neighbour': which I would expand so as to say that there is a duty on every man not to injure his neighbour by his want of reasonable care. This is a duty which he owes, not to the world at large, but to his neighbour. It is broken only when his neighbour is injured and not before. Then, and then only, is there a breach of duty giving rise to an action." and . . "The words 'act, neglect or default' are perhaps a little tautologous: for 'act' in legal terminology often includes an omission as well as an act of commission: and 'default' certainly includes 'neglect'. But tautologous as they may be, the words are apt to cover all breaches of legal duty, no matter whether it be by leaving undone those things which we ought to have done, or by doing those things which we ought not to have done."
Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act 1954 6(1)(a)
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Hedley Byrne and Co Ltd v Heller and Partners Ltd Unreported, 20 December 1960
20 Dec 1960

McNair J
Negligence
The defendants were two bankers, who gave banker's references as to the credit of a customer. The references were relied upon by the plaintiff, who claimed damages in negligence after they had suffered losses. Held: The defendants were liable.
1 Citers


 
Gardiner v Motherwell Machinery and Scrap Co Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 1424; [1961] 3 All ER 831
1961
HL
Lord Reid, Lord Cohen, Lord Hodson, Lord Guest
Negligence
The pursuer had worked for the defenders for three months, demolishing buildings, and had contracted dermatitis. He claimed that they had not provided him with adequate washing facilities and that failure caused the dermatitis. On appeal the defenders successfully contended that the pursuer had failed to prove any connection between his disease and the work which he had been doing. The pursuer appealed. Held: Lord Reid said: "In my opinion, when a man who has not previously suffered from a disease contracts that disease after being subjected to conditions likely to cause it, and when he shows that it starts in a way typical of disease caused by such conditions, he establishes a prima facie presumption that his disease was caused by those conditions. I think that the facts proved in this case do establish such a presumption. That presumption could be displaced in many ways. The respondents sought to show, first, that it is negatived by the subsequent course of the disease and, secondly, by suggesting tinea pedis as an equally probable cause of its origin. I have found the case difficult, but on the evidence as it stands I have come to the opinion that they have failed on both points. If the appellant's disease and consequent loss should be attributed to the work which he was doing in the respondents' service, it was not argued that they are not liable." Lord Cohen and Lord Guest agreed, as did Lord Hodson although with some initial hesitation. Lord Guest described the question as a pure question of fact whether on the balance of probabilities the dermatitis had arisen from the pursuer's employment. The House would seem to have regarded the pursuer as establishing a prime facie case which the defenders had failed to displace.
1 Citers


 
Hilder v Associated Portland Cement Co [1961] 3 All ER 709; [1961] 1 WLR 1434
1961

Ashworth J
Negligence
A motor cyclist was killed after being hit by a ball kicked by a boy playing in a field adjoining the highway. Held: The failure of the motor cyclist to wear a crash helmet was not contributory negligence on his part, because (a) no advice on the matter appeared in the Highway Code current when the accident occurred in February, 1959, and (b) there was no regulation requiring the wearing of helmets. However Ashworth J said: "having regard to Mr. Hilder's slow speed and relatively low height off the ground, I am by no means certain that, if he had been wearing a helmet, his skull would not have been fractured. Accordingly, if the claim succeeds, it succeeds in full."
1 Citers


 
Quintas v National Smelting Co Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 401
1961
CA
Sellers LJ
Negligence
Sellers LJ said: 'It has often been held that there is a high responsibility on a defendant who fails to comply with his statutory duty, which is absolute and has penal sanctions. A workman is not to be judged so severely.'
1 Citers


 
Hedley Byrne and Co Ltd v Heller and Partners Ltd [1961] 3 All ER 891; [1962] 1 QB 396; [1961] 3 WLR 1225; (1961) 105 Sol Jo 910
1961
CA
Pearson LJ
Negligence
A banker giving a gratuitous reference is not required to do his best by, for instance, making inquiries from outside sources which are available to him, though this would make his reference more reliable. All that he is required to do is to conform to that standard of skill and competence and diligence which is generally shown by persons who carry on the business of providing references of that kind. Person LJ asked: "Is he then expected in business hours in the bank's time, to expend time and trouble in searching records, studying documents, weighing and comparing the favourable and unfavourable features and producing a well-balanced and well-worded report? That seems wholly unreasonable."
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1 Citers


 
Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock and Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound No 1) [1961] AC 388; [1961] UKPC 1
18 Jan 1961
PC
Viscount Simonds, Lord Reid
Negligence, Commonwealth
Complaint was made that oil had been discharged into Sydney Harbour causing damage. The court differentiated damage by fire from other types of physical damage to property for the purposes of liability in tort, saying "We have come back to the plain common sense stated by Lord Russell of Killowen in Bourhill v. Young [1943] A.C. 92. 101. As Denning L.J. said in King v. Phillips [1953] 1 Q.B. 429, 441: 'there can be no doubt that the test of liability for shock is foreseeability of injury by shock.' Their Lordships substitute the word 'fire' for 'shock' and endorse this statement of the law." and "a man must be considered to be responsible for the probable consequences of his act. To demand more of him is too harsh a rule, to demand less is to ignore that civilised order requires the observance of a minimum standard of behaviour." He should be responsible "not because they are natural or necessary or probable, but because, since they have this quality, it is judged by the standard of the reasonable man that he ought to have foreseen them." and "After the event even a fool is wise. But it is not the hindsight of a fool; it is the foresight of the reasonable man which alone can determine responsibility." (Viscount Simonds) Lord Reid: 'In the present case there was no justification whatever for discharging the oil into Sydney Harbour. Not only was it an offence to do so, but it involved considerable loss financially. If the ship's engineer had thought about the matter, there could have been no question of balancing the advantages and disadvantages. From every point of view it was both his duty and his interest to stop the discharge immediately.'
Viscount Simonds: "Their Lordships conclude this part of the case with some general observations. They have been concerned primarily to displace the proposition that unforeseeability is irrelevant if damage is "direct". In doing so they have inevitably insisted that the essential factor in determining liability is whether the damage is of such a kind as the reasonable man should have foreseen. This accords with the general view thus stated by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562, 580: 'The liability for negligence whether you style it such or treat it as in other systems as a species of 'culpa,' is no doubt based upon the general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay.' . . . Thus foreseeability becomes the effective test."
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[ Bailii ]

 
 The "Spontaneity"; 1962 - [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep 460
 
Houghland v R R Low (Luxury Coaches) Ltd [1962] CLY 157; [1962] 2 All ER 159; [1962] 1 QB 694
1962
CA
Ormerod LJ, Bankes LJ
Negligence, Torts - Other
A passenger's bag had been placed in one coach that had broken down was intended to be transferred to a second coach. When the second coach arrived at the passenger's destination the bag was not in the hold. Held: The duty of care of a bailee is the standard one. It is for the person in possession of the goods to prove any loss or damage to goods in their possession is not caused by their own actions or fault.
Where the defendant's possession of the goods was unintentional and there was no lack of care, detinue will not lie.
Ormerod LJ said "once the failure of the bailee to hand over the articles in question has been proved, there is a prima facie case, and the plaintiff is entitled to recover unless the defendant can establish a defence to the satisfaction of the court"
Bankes LJ said: "I think that the law still is that, if a bailee is sued in detinue only, it is a good answer for him to say that the goods were stolen without any default on his part, as the general bailment laid in the declaration pledges the plaintiff to the proof of nothing except that the goods were in the defendant's hands and were wrongfully detained . ."
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Smith v Leech Brain and Co Ltd [1962] 2 QB 405
1962
CA
Lord Parker LCJ
Negligence, Damages
The reasoning in The Wagon Mound did not affect the rule that a tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him.
Lord Parker CJ said: "The test is not whether these employers could reasonably have foreseen that a burn would cause cancer and that [the victim] would die. The question is whether these employers could reasonably foresee the type of injury he suffered, namely, the burn. What, in the particular case, is the amount of damage which he suffers as a result of that burn, depends upon the characteristics and constitution of the victim."
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McWilliams v Sir William Arrol and Company Ltd [1962] UKHL 3; [1962] 1 WLR 295; [1962] 1 All ER 623; [1961] UKHL 8; 1962 SLT 121; 1962 SC (HL) 70
21 Feb 1962
HL
Lord Chancellor, Viscount Simonds, Lord Reid, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Devlin
Negligence, Health and Safety, Personal Injury
Damages were sought after the death of the pursuer's husband working for the respondent. The trial judge had been satisfied that even if the defendants had performed their duty at common law and pursuant to statute, and had provided the deceased steel erector with a safety harness, he would not have worn it, even working 70ft above ground, and he therefore suffered no loss as a consequence of the breach of duty complained of. Held: The claim failed. The House, applying the "but for" test held that the breach of duty did not cause his death. Once the employer is shown to be in breach of duty to provide equipment, the assumption is that it would have been used, because a reasonable employee would use it, unless the employer proves otherwise.
Lord Reid said: "In the end when all the evidence has been brought out it rarely matters where the onus originally lay: The question is which way the balance of probability has come to rest".
Factories Act 1937
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[ Bailii ]
 
Wooldridge v Sumner [1963] 2 QB 43
1963
CA
Diplock LJ
Negligence
A spectator was injured at a horse show. Held: The court considered the defence of volenti non fit injuria: "The maxim in English law presupposes a tortious act by the defendant. The consent that is relevant is not consent to the risk of injury but consent to the lack of reasonable care that may produce that risk… and requires on the part of the plaintiff at the time at which he gives his consent full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk that he ran." A spectator has a special relationship with a competitor which varied with the nature and rules of the sport. A spectator accepted the risk of injury following mistakes of judgement and from lack of skill by and in competitors, up to the point where a participant showed a reckless disregard for his safety, or acted in a way calculated to risk injury.
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 Hughes v Lord Advocate; HL 21-Feb-1963 - [1963] AC 837; [1963] 1 All ER 705; 1963 SC (HL) 31; [1963] UKHL 1; [1963] UKHL 8
 
Doughty v Turner Ltd [1964] 1 All ER 98; [1964] 1 QB 518; [1963] EWCA Civ 3; [1964] 2 WLR 240; [1964] 1 All ER 98; [1964] QB 518
1964
CA
ord Pearce, Harman, Diplock LJJ
Negligence, Personal Injury
The cover on a cauldron of exceedingly hot molten sodium cyanide was accidentally knocked into the cauldron and the plaintiff was damaged by the resultant explosion. Held: The plaintiff’s claim failed. The defendant employer owed a duty of care in respect only of a foreseeable risk, that of splashing of the liquid if the cover fell into it.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Commissioner for Railways v Quinlan; PC 9-Mar-1964 - [1964] 1 All ER 897; [1964] 2 WLR 817; [1964] AC 1054; [1964] UKPC 9

 
 Haley v London Electricity Board; HL 28-Jul-1964 - [1964] 3 All ER 185; [1964] 3 WLR 479; [1965] AC 778; [1964] UKHL 3

 
 Morris v C W Martin and Sons Ltd; CA 1965 - [1966] 1 QB 716; [1965] 3 WLR 276; [1965] 2 Lloyds Rep 63; [1965] 2 All ER 725
 
Qinn v Scott [1965] 1 WLR 1004
1965
QBD
Glyn-Jones J
Negligence, Land
A tree fell across the highway, injuring the plaintiff. Held: The claim succeeded. he decay of the tree (which was owned by the National Trust), was there to be seen and the tree should have been felled. Glyn-Jones J said: "The duty of the Trust is to take such care as a reasonable landowner - and that means a prudent landowner - would take to prevent unnecessary danger to users of the highway adjoining the Trust's land. There is not to be imputed in the ordinary landowner the knowledge possessed by the skilled expert in forestry . . But, in my opinion, there may be circumstances in which it is incumbent on a landowner to call in somebody skilled in forestry to advise him, and I have no doubt but that a landowner on whose land this belt of trees stood, adjoining a busy highway, was under a duty to provide himself with skilled advice about the safety of the trees"
1 Citers


 
Richley (Henderson) v Faull [1965] 1 WLR 1454; [1965] 3 All ER 109
1965

McKenna J
Road Traffic, Negligence
The court considered the burden of proof of negligence after damage was caused by a car skidding onto the wrong side of the road.
McKenna J said: "I, of course, agree that where the respondent’'s lorry strikes the plaintiff on the pavement or, as in the present case, moves onto the wrong side of the road into the plaintiff's path, there is a prima facie case of negligence, and that this case is not displaced merely by proof that the defendant’'s car skidded. It must be proved that the skid happened without the defendant’'s default. I respectfully disagree with the statement that the skid by itself is neutral. I think that the unexplained and violent skid is in itself evidence of negligence. It seems hardly consistent to hold that the skid which explained the presence of the respondent’'s lorry on the pavement or, as here, on the wrong side of the road, is neutral, but that the defendant must fail unless he proves that the neutral event happened without his default. Whether I am right in this or wrong, the conclusion is the same: the defendant fails if he does not prove that the skid which took him to the wrong place happened without his default."
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Rootes v Shelton (1968) ALR 33; (1967) 116 CLR 383
1965

Barwick CJ, Kitto J
Negligence, Commonwealth
(High Court of Australia) Barwick CJ said: "By engaging in a sport or pastime the participants may be held to have accepted risks which are inherent in that sport or pastime: the tribunal of fact can make its own assessment of what the accepted risks are: but this does not eliminate all duty of care of the one participant to the other. Whether or not such a duty arises, and, if it does, its extent, must necessarily depend in each case upon its own circumstances. In this connection, the rules of the sport or game may constitute one of those circumstances: but, in my opinion, they are neither definitive of the existence nor of the extent of the duty; nor does their breach or non-observance necessarily constitute a breach of any duty found to exist."
Kitto J said: "in a case such as the present, it must always be a question of fact, what exoneration from a duty of care otherwise incumbent upon the defendant was implied by the act of the plaintiff in joining in the activity. Unless the activity partakes of the nature of a war or of something else in which all is notoriously fair, the conclusion to be reached must necessarily depend, according to the concepts of common law, upon the reasonableness, in relation to the special circumstances, of the conduct which caused the plaintiff's injury. That does not necessarily mean the compliance of that conduct with the rules, conventions or customs (if there are any) by which the correctness of conduct for the purpose of the carrying on of the activity as an organised affair is judged; for the tribunal of fact may think that in the situation in which the plaintiff's injury was caused a participant might do what the defendant did and still not be acting unreasonably, even though he infringed the 'rules of the game'. Non-compliance with such rules, conventions or customs (where they exist) is necessarily one consideration to be attended to upon the question of reasonableness; but it is only one, and it may be of much or little or even no weight in the circumstances."
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Weller v Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute [1966] 1 QB 56
1966

Widgery J
Negligence
The plaintiff auctioneers sought damages in negligence from the defendants in having failed to prevent an outbreak of foot and mouth disease which led to damage to their business. Held. Widgery J said: "Mr. Eveleigh says that, since the defendants should have foreseen the damage to his clients but nevertheless failed to take proper precaution against the escape of the virus, their liability is established. It may be observed that if this argument is sound, the defendants' liability is likely to extend far beyond the loss suffered by the auctioneers, for in an agricultural community the escape of foot and mouth disease virus is a tragedy which can foreseeably affect almost all businesses in that area. The affected beasts must be slaughtered, as must others to whom the disease may conceivably have spread. Other farmers are prohibited from moving their cattle and may be unable to bring them to market at the most profitable time; transport contractors who make their living by the transport of animals are out of work; dairymen may go short of milk, and sellers of cattle feed suffer loss of business. The magnitude of these consequences must not be allowed to deprive the plaintiffs of their rights, but it emphasises the importance of this case."
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Wheat v E Lacon and Co Ltd [1966] AC 552; [1966] UKHL 1; [1965] 3 WLR 142
1966
HL
Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Denning, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Pearce, Lord Pearson
Land, Negligence
The Appellant's husband, fell while going down the back stairs of a public house called "The Golfer's Arm" at Great Yarmouth. He was found lying on the floor of the vestibule at the bottom of the stairs and died later. She appealed against rejection of her claim and appeal. Held: The word "occupier" has a different meaning according to the subject matter in which it is employed. Lord Pearson used the phrase "control associated with and arising from presence in and use of activity in the premises. There can be more than one occupier of the same premises for the purpose of the 1957 Act.
Lord Denning defined an occupier for the purposes of the Act by examples the second of which was:- "Secondly, where an owner let floors or flats in a building to tenants, but did not demise the common staircase or roof or some other parts, he was regarded as having retained control of all parts not demised by him. Accordingly he was held to be under a duty in respect of those retained parts to all persons coming lawfully on to the premises... But the old cases still apply so as to show that the Landlord is responsible for all parts not demised by him, on the ground that he is regarded as being sufficiently in control of them to impose on him a duty of care to all persons coming lawfully on to the premises." and "the structure was reasonably safe including the handrail and that the system of lighting was efficient, but I doubt whether they were bound to see that the lights were properly switched on or the rugs laid safely on the floor."
Occupiers Liability Act 1957 - Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934
[ Bailii ]
 
Beedie v Norrie 1966 SC 207
1966


Negligence, Scotland
Chapter 26 of the Rules of the Court of Session 1994, which is headed Third Party Procedure, enables questions arising out of claims by a defender against a third party for contribution, relief or indemnity and liability to be disposed of in the same action as that in which the defender is himself being sued.
Rules of the Court of Session 1994 824 - Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 3(2)
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Gough v Thorne [1966] 3 All ER 398
1966
CA
Salmon LJ, Lord Denning MR
Negligence
The court was asked as to the standard of duty of care expected of a child. Salmon LJ said: "The question as to whether the Plaintiff can be said to have been guilty of contributory negligence depends on whether any ordinary child of 13 can be expected to have done any more than this child did. I say ´any ordinary child'. I do not mean a paragon of prudence; nor do I mean a scatter-brained child; but the ordinary girl of 13."
Lord Denning MR said: "A judge should only find a child guilty of contributory negligence if he or she is of such an age as to be expected to take precautions for his or her own safety; and then he or she is only to be found guilty if blame should be attached to him or her. A child has not the road sense nor the experience of his or her elders. He or she is not to he found guilty unless he or she is blameworthy."
1 Citers


 
McCarthy v Wellington City [1966] NZLR 481
1966


Commonwealth, Land, Negligence
A person storing dangerous explosives on his premises owed a duty of care to keep them secure to all persons foreseeably likely to be injured as a result of a breach of that duty.
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McHale v Watson [1966] ALR 513; [1966] 115 CLR 199
7 Mar 1966
HCA
Kitto J
Negligence, Commonwealth
(High Court of Australia) A girl was injured playing tag with her friends at school. A boy threw a sharpened object which bounced off a post and hit her. The level of duty of care owed by a child was questioned: "The standard of care being objective, it is no answer for him, [that is a child] any more than it is for an adult, to say that the harm he caused was due to his being abnormally slow-witted, quick-tempered, absent- minded or inexperienced. But it does not follow that he cannot rely in his defence upon a limitation upon the capacity for foresight or prudence, not as being personal to himself, but as being characteristic of humanity at his stage of development and in that sense normal. By doing so he appeals to a standard of ordinariness, to an objective and not a subjective standard."
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[ Austlii ]
 
Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty (The Wagon Mound) (No 2) [1967] 2 AC 617; [1966] UKPC 1
25 May 1966
PC
Lord Reid, Lord Goff
Negligence
When considering the need to take steps to avoid injury, the court looked to the nature of defendant's activity. There was no social value or cost saving in this defendant's activity. "In the present case there was no justification whatever for discharging the oil into Sydney Harbour. Not only was it an offence to do so, but it involved considerable loss financially. If the ship's engineer had thought about the matter, there could have been no question of balancing the advantages and disadvantages. From every point of view it was both his duty and his interest to stop the discharge immediately." and "foreseeability of harm of the relevant type by the defendants was a prerequisite for the recovery of damages in nuisance and under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher". Held: The defendants were liable for damage which was only a very remote possibility. "It is not sufficient that the injury suffered by the respondents' vessels was the direct result of the nuisance if that injury was in the relevant sense unforeseeable." The risk must be real” in the sense that a reasonable person “would not brush [it] aside as far-fetched”: "But it does not follow that, no matter what the circumstances may be, it is justifiable to neglect a risk of such a small magnitude. A reasonable man would only neglect such a risk if he had some valid reason for doing so, e.g. that it would involve considerable expense to eliminate the risk. He would weigh the risk against the difficulty of eliminating it . . . A person must be regarded as negligent if he does not take steps to eliminate a risk which he knows or ought to know is a real risk and not a mere possibility which would never influence the mind of a reasonable man." (Lord Reid)
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[ Bailii ]

 
 Goldman v Hargrave; PC 13-Jun-1966 - [1967] 1 AC 645; [1966] 3 WLR 513; [1966] 2 All ER 989; [1966] UKPC 2; [1966] UKPC 12
 
Gough (an Infant) v Thorns [1966] EWCA Civ 5; [1966] 1 WLR 1387; [1966] 3 All ER 398
1 Jul 1966
CA
Lord Denning MR, Danckwerts, Salmon LJJ
Negligence, Children
The plaintiff child was injured in a road traffic accident. She appealed from a finding that she had been contributorily negligent. Held: The appeal succeeded.
Lord Denning MR said: "A very young child cannot be guilty of contributory negligence. An older child may be. But it depends on the circumstances. A judge should only find a child guilty of contributory negligence if he or she is of such an age as to be expected to take precautions for his or her own safety: and then he or she is only to be found guilty if blame should be attached to him or her. A child has not the road sense or the experience of his or her elders. He or she is not to be found guilty unless he or she is blameworthy."
[ Bailii ]

 
 Anderson (W B ) and Sons Ltd v Rhodes (Liverpool) Ltd; 1967 - [1967] 2 All ER 850
 
Brewer v Delo [1967] 1 Lloyd's Law Reports 488
1967

Hinchcliffe J
Negligence
A golfer had hooked his tee shot so that his ball struck another player playing an adjacent hole some 200 yards ahead. Held: The action failed on the ground that the consequences were not foreseeable, alternatively the risk was so slight that it could properly be ignored. The duty of the golfer must be based on a reasonable foreseeability of damage. "... in the circumstances, a reasonable person would not foresee that the act of driving off would cause damage that, even if damage was foreseeable, the possibility of injury to person on sixth fairway involved risk so small that reasonable man would be justified in disregarding it; that, therefore, defendant was not in breach of his duty to take care and plaintiff's claim failed."
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 Mason v Levy Auto Parts of England; 1967 - [1967] 2 QB 530

 
 Chin Keow v Government of Malaysia; PC 1967 - [1967] 1 WLR 813
 
McArdle v Admac Roofing Co and Others [1967] 1 All ER 583
1967


Health and Safety, Negligence

1 Citers


 
McArdle v Andmac Roofing Co [1967] 1 All ER 583
1967


Negligence

1 Citers


 
McKillen v Barclay Curle and Co Ltd 1967 SLT 41
1967

Lord President Clyde
Negligence, Damages, Scotland
The Lord Ordinary had awarded the pursuer damages for tuberculosis, on the basis that in the accident he had fractured a rib and this had reactivated his pre-existing tuberculosis. Held: The pursuer had failed to prove the causal connexion between the fractured rib and the tuberculosis, since there was no corroboration of the evidence of the pursuer's expert witness. They accordingly allowed the reclaiming motion. In Scots law a wrongdoer takes his victim as he finds him. Foreseeability had no relevance to the determination of the measure of damage, once liability had been established.
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 Czarnikow (C ) Ltd v Koufos; The Heron II; HL 17-Oct-1967 - [1967] 3 All ER 686; [1969] 1 AC 350; [1967] 3 WLR 1491; [1967] UKHL 4
 
Brown v Thompson [1968] 1 WLR 1003
1968
CA
Winn LJ
Negligence, Damages
A car driver drove into the back of a stationary lorry but was nevertheless held only 20% responsible. Held: A court of appeal should only exceptionally interfere with a judge's apportinment of responsibility for an accident.
Winn LJ said: "When it is necessary for a court to ascribe liability in proportions to more than one person, it is well established that regard must be had not only to causative potency of the acts or omissions of each of the parties, but to their relative blameworthiness.", and after quoting from the Miraflores, he continued: "It is worthy of note, I think, that that being a case where three ships had been involved in a collision, Lord Pearce said that what was essential was to compare the fault of each with the fault of the other two; the emphasis is upon fault not solely with the causation of damage."
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 1(1)
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 Flannigan v British Dyewood Co Ltd; SCS 1969 - [1969] SLT 223
 
Kerry v Carter [1969] 1 WLR 1372
1969
CA
Lord Denning MR
Negligence
The court considered the apportionment of responsibility under the 1945 Act.
Lord Denning MR said: "We have been referred to cases on this subject, particularly the recent case of Brown v Thompson [1968] 1 WLR 1003. Since that case it seems to have been assumed in some quarters that this court will rarely, if ever, alter an apportionment made by the judge. Such is a misreading of that case. I think that the attitude of this court was correctly stated in that case, at p 1012, by Edmund Davies LJ when he quoted from the judgment of Sellers LJ in Quintas v National Smelting Board [1961] 1 WLR 401, 409. This court adopts in regard to apportionment the same attitude as it does to damages. We will interfere if the judge has gone wrong in principle or is shown to have misapprehended the facts: but, even if neither of these is shown, we will interfere if we are of opinion that the judge was clearly wrong. After all, the function of this court is to be a Court of Appeal. We are here to put right that which has gone wrong. If we think that the judge below was wrong, then we ought to say so, and alter the apportionment accordingly." (p 1376)
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945
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Greenhalgh v British Railways Board [1969] 2 All ER 114
1969


Negligence


 
M'Kew v Holland and Hannen and Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd [1969] 3 All ER 1621; 1969 SC 14
1969

Lord Justice Clerk (Grant)
Scotland, Negligence, Damages

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Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office [1969] 2 QB 412; [1969] 2 WLR 1008; [1969] 2 All ER 564
1969
CA

Negligence

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Margarine Union GmbH v Cambay Prince Steamship Co Ltd [1969] 1 QB 219
1969

Roskill J
Transport, Contract, Negligence
The practice of issuing delivery orders for parcels out of a bulk cargo were ineffective and the intended buyers were left without remedy against the carrier.
Roskill J said: "In my judgment, there is nothing in Hedley Byrne to affect the common law principle that a duty of care which arises from a risk of direct injury to person or property is owed only to those whose person or property may foreseeably be injured by a failure to take care. If the plaintiff can show that the duty was owed to him, he can recover both direct and consequential loss which is reasonably foreseeable, and for myself I see no reason for saying that proof of direct loss is an essential part of his claim. He must, however, show that he was within the scope of the defendant's duty to take care."
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Clarke v Winchurch [1969] 1 All ER 275; [1969] 1 WLR 69
1969
CA
Lord Justice Phillimore
Negligence, Road Traffic
A car driver, was pulling out across the front of a stationary bus in order to turn right down the road in the direction opposite to that in which the bus was facing. He collided with a moped which had overtaken the bus on its offside. The car was only about a yard beyond the offside of the bus at the time of the collision. Held. (majority) The driver was not negligent. Lord Justice Phillimore said: "the first defendant came out extremely slowly and extremely carefully. In effect he inched his way out beyond the line of the bus . . If you have a small vehicle like a bicycle or motorcycle, you are in the fortunate position of taking up so little roadspace that you can slide along in the offside . . but if you choose to do this it does seem to me to warrant a very, very high degree of care indeed because you are blinded to a great extent to what goes on on the lefthand side of the road. You must therefore continue to ride or drive in such a way that you can immediately deal with an emergency."

 
Chapman v Hearse, Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC 467; [1969] 3 All ER 1528; [1969] UKHL 8
26 Nov 1969
HL
Lord Reid
Negligence, Damages
The plaintiff, a pedestrian had been struck by the defendant's car while crossing the road. The plaintiff had negligently failed to see the defendant's car approaching. The defendant had a clear view of the plaintiff prior to the collision, but was driving at an excessive speed or failing to keep a proper look-out or both. The judge found that the plaintiff was 25% to blame. On appeal, the Court of Appeal increased that apportionment to 50%. The effects of the first tort, which caused injuries to the claimant's left leg, were obliterated by the second: he was shot in the same leg in an armed robbery, and the leg had to be amputated. It was argued that the Defendant could not be regarded as having caused an injury which would have occurred in any event. Held: The argument failed. The House restored the trial judge's assessment of 75/25 in favour of the pedestrian. The plaintiff's disability could be regarded as having two causes and, where the later injuries became a concurrent cause of the disabilities caused by the injury inflicted by the defendant, they could not reduce the amount of the damages which the defendant had to pay for those disabilities. So the defendants had to pay the same sum by way of damages for the plaintiff's stiff leg, even though it had actually been amputated. Lord Reid made comparisons between the respective blameworthiness of a cyclist and motorist.
Lord Reid made general observations about apportionment in cases of this kind: "The Court of Appeal recognised that the trial judge's assessment ought not to be varied unless 'some error in the judge's approach is clearly discernible.' But they appear to have thought it impossible to differentiate when both parties had a clear view of each other for 200 yards prior to impact and neither did anything about it. I am unable to agree. There are two elements in an assessment of liability, causation and blameworthiness. I need not consider whether in such circumstances the causative factors must necessarily be equal, because in my view there is not even a presumption to that effect as regards blameworthiness.
A pedestrian has to look to both sides as well as forwards. He is going at perhaps three miles an hour and at that speed he is rarely a danger to anyone else. The motorist has not got to look sideways though he may have to observe over a wide angle ahead: and if he is going at a considerable speed he must not relax his observation, for the consequences may be disastrous . . In my opinion it is quite possible that the motorist may be very much more to blame than the pedestrian."
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945
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McKew v Holland and Hannan and Cubitts [1969] 3 All ER 1621; [1969] UKHL 9; [1969] UKHL 12
26 Nov 1969
HL
Lord Reid
Personal Injury, Negligence
The appellant had been injured in the course of his employment for which the respondents were liable. Sometimes his left leg would gave way beneath him. He was descending a steep staircase without a handrail when the leg collapsed and he tried to jump down the stairs so that he would land in a standing position rather than falling over down the stairs. He suffered a severe fracture of his ankle. Held: Lord Reid: "In my view the law is clear. If a man is injured in such a way that his leg may give way at any moment he must act reasonably and carefully. It is quite possible that in spite of all reasonable care his leg may give way in circumstances such that as a result he sustains further injury. Then that second injury was caused by his disability which in turn was caused by the defender's fault. But if the injured man acts unreasonably he cannot hold the defender liable for injury caused by his own unreasonable conduct. His unreasonable conduct is novus actus interveniens. The chain of causation has been broken and what follows must be regarded as caused by his own conduct and not by the defender's fault or the disability caused by it. Or one may say that unreasonable conduct of the pursuer and what follows from it is not the natural and probable result of the original fault of the defender or of the ensuing disability. I do not think that foreseeability comes into this. A defender is not liable for a consequence of a kind which is not foreseeable. But it does not follow that he is liable for every consequence which a reasonable man could foresee. What can be foreseen depends almost entirely on the facts of the case, and it is often easy to foresee unreasonable conduct or some other nouvs actus interveniens as being quite likely. But that does not mean that the defender must pay for damage caused by the nouvs actus. It only leads to trouble that if one tries to graft on to the concept of foreseeability some rule of law to the effect that a wrongdoer is not bound to foresee something which in fact he could readily foresee as quite likely to happen. For it is not at all unlikely or unforeseeable that an active man who has suffered such a disability will take some quite unreasonable risk. But if he does he cannot hold the defender liable for the consequences.
So in my view the question here is whether the second accident was caused by the appellant doing something unreasonable."
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