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Negligence - From: 1930 To: 1959

This page lists 128 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.


 
 Moulton v Poulter; CA 1930 - [1930] 2 KB 183
 
Arneil v Paterson [1931] AC 560
1931

Viscount Dunedin, Viscount Hailsham
Damages, Negligence
Viscount Dunedin spoke of a hypothetical case in which two dogs had worried a sheep to death: "Would we then have to hold that each dog had half killed the sheep?"
Viscount Hailsham said: The owner of one of the two dogs which had worried the sheep was liable for the whole damage because 'each of the dogs did in law occasion the whole of the damage which was suffered by the sheep as a result of the action of the two dogs acting together'
1 Citers



 
 Fardon v Harcourt-Rivington; 1932 - [1932] All ER Rep 81; (1932) 146 LT 391
 
Farr v Butters Brothers and Co [1932] 2 KB 606; [1932] All ER 339; (1932) 147 LT 427; (1932) 101 LJKB 768
1932


Negligence
Breaking the chain of causation in a negligence claim.
1 Citers


 
M'Lean v Bell (1932) TLR 467
1932

Lord Wright
Negligence, Scotland
The House considered liability in negligence after a motor accident.
Lord Wright said: "In one sense, but for the negligence of the pursuer (if she was negligent) in attempting to cross the road, she would not have been struck, and as a matter simply of causation, the facts formed a necessary element in the final result, since without them no accident could have occurred. The decision, however, of the case must turn not simply on causation, but on responsibility; the plaintiff's negligence may be what is often called causa sine qua non, yet as regards responsibility it becomes merely evidential or matter of narrative, if the defendant acting reasonably could and ought to have avoided the collision."
1 Citers



 
 Bottomley v Bannister; CA 1932 - [1932] 1 KB 458
 
Donoghue (or M'Alister) v Stevenson [1932] AC 562; [1932] SC (HL) 31; [1932] ScLT 317; [1932] All ER Rep 1; (1932) 101 LJPC 119; (1932) 147 LT 281; [1932] SLT 317; (1932) 48 TLR 494; (1932) 37 Com Cas 350; [1932] UKHL 100; [1932] Sol Jo 396; [1932] WN 139; [1932] SC 31; (1933) 4 DLR 337; 533 CA 47
26 May 1932
HL
Atkin, Thankerton MacMillan, Buckmaster Tomlin LL
Negligence, Consumer, Scotland
The appellant drank from a bottle of ginger beer manufactured by the defendant. She suffered injury when she found a half decomposed snail in the liquid. The glass was opaque and the snail could not be seen. The drink had been bought for her by a friend, so she was unable to rely upon any contract. Held: The English and the Scots law on the subject are identical. The pursuer was entitled to recover damages for negligence. The manufacturer intended that the contents be consumed without the opportunity first to examine them, and unless reasonable care was taken in the preparation a consumer may suffer injury. The cases of George v. Skivington and `the dicta in Heaven v. Pender "should be buried so securely that their perturbed spirits shall no longer vex the law." (Majority) The nature of an article "may very well call for different degrees of care". "the person dealing with [an inherently dangerous article] may well contemplate persons as being within the sphere of his duty to take care who would not be sufficiently proximate with less dangerous goods; so that not only the degree of care but the range of persons to whom the duty is owed may be extended."
Lord Atkin said: ". . the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be - persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Hamlyn ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Cutler v United Dairies [1933] 2 KB 297; [1933] 102 LJKB 663; [1933] LT 436
1933
CA
Scrutton LJ, Slesser LJ
Negligence, Animals
A horse pulling one of the defendant's vans was seen running loose without a driver. It left the roadway onto private land. The driver caught up and called for help. The plaintiff jumped into the field and was injured trying to restrain the horse. There was evidence that the horse had bolted twice before. Held: Any negligence of the defendants did not contribute to the accident. The plaintiff's actions amounted to a novus actus interveniens, and since he must have expected to run a risk of injury, they also allowed the defence of volentia no fit injuria.
1 Citers


 
Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co v McMullan [1933] UKHL 4; 1934 SLT 114; [1934] AC 1; 1933 SC (HL) 64
10 Jul 1933
HL
Lord Wright
Negligence
Lord Wright coined the term "statutory negligence". He affirmed the need for "damage" as an essential element of actionable negligence, saying: "In strict legal analysis, negligence means more than heedless or careless conduct, whether in omission or commission; it properly connotes the complex concept of duty, breach, and damage thereby suffered by the person to whom the duty was owing: on all this the liability depends."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Honeywll and Stein Ltd v Larkin Brothers Ltd; 1934 - [1934] 1 KB 191

 
 Honeywill v Larkin; CA 1934 - [1934] 1 KB 191

 
 Haynes v Harwood; CA 1935 - [1935] 1 KB 146
 
Grant v Australian Knitting Mills [1935] All ER Rep 209; [1936] AC 85; 105 LJPC 6; 154 LT 185; [1935] UKPC 2; [1935] UKPC 62
21 Oct 1935
PC
Lord Wright
Personal Injury, Negligence, Commonwealth, Contract
(Australia) The Board considered how a duty of care may be established: "All that is necessary as a step to establish a tort of actionable negligence is define the precise relationship from which the duty to take care is deduced. It is, however, essential in English law that the duty should be established; the mere fact that a man is injured by another's act gives in itself no cause of action. If the act is deliberate, the party injured will have no claim in law even though the injury was intentional so long as the other party is merely exercising a legal right; if the act involves lack of due care, again no case of actionable negligence will arise unless the duty to be careful exists." and "the appellant is not required to lay his finger on the exact person in all the chain who was responsible, or specify what he did wrong. Negligence is found as a matter of inference from the existence of the defect taken in connection with all the known circumstances"
Lord Wright said: "Mr. Greene further contended on behalf of the manufacturers that if the decision in Donoghue's case [1932] AC 562, 591, were extended even a hair's-breadth, no line could be drawn, and a manufacturer's liability would be extended indefinitely. He put as an illustration the case of a foundry which had cast a rudder to be fitted on a liner: he assumed that it was fitted and the steamer sailed the seas for some years: but the rudder had a latent defect due to faulty and negligent casting, and one day it broke, with the result that the vessel was wrecked, with great loss of life and damage to property. He argued that if Donoghue's case were extended beyond its precise facts, the maker of the rudder would be held liable for damages of an indefinite amount, after an indefinite time, and to claimants indeterminate until the event. But it is clear that such a state of things would involve many considerations far removed from the simple facts of this case. So many contingencies must have intervened between the lack of care on the part of the makers and the casualty that it may be that the law would apply, as it does in proper cases, not always according to strict logic, the rule that cause and effect must not be too remote: in any case the element of directness would obviously be lacking. Lord Atkin deals with that sort of question in Donoghue's case where he refers to Earl v. Lubbock [1905] 1 K.B. 253, 259: he quotes the commonsense opinion of Mathew L.J.: 'It is impossible to accept such a wide proposition, and, indeed, it is difficult to see how, if it were the law, trade could be carried on.'
In their Lordships' opinion it is enough for them to decide this case on its actual facts."
Lord Wright also said: "a thing is sold by description, though it is specific, so long as it is sold not merely as the specific thing, but as a thing corresponding to a description "
1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]

 
 Hillen and Pettigrew v ICI (Alkali) Ltd; HL 1936 - [1936] AC 65 HL(E)

 
 James Smith and Sons (Norwood) Ltd v Goodman; CA 1936 - [1936] Ch 216

 
 Joseph Eva Ltd v Reeves; CA 1938 - [1938] 2 All ER 115
 
Philips v Whitely (William) Ltd [1938] 1 All ER 566; [1938] 54 TLR 379; [1938] 82 Sol Jo 196
1938


Negligence, Personal Injury
The plaintiff asked the defendants to arrange for ears to be pierced. The defendant referred her to a third party jeweller. The jeweller appeared to take proper steps to keep the wounds disinfected, but an abcess developed. Held: A jeweller could not be expected to take the same steps as would be taken by a surgeon, and in this case had taken all reasonable steps to avoid infection. It had not been shown that the infection entered the ear at the time when it was pierced.


 
 Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English; HL 1938 - [1938] AC 57; [1937] UKHL 2
 
Lewis v Denye [1939] 1 KB 540
1939
CA
Parcq LJ
Negligence
Parcq LJ said: "In order to establish the defence of contributory negligence, the defendant must prove, first, that the plaintiff failed to take 'ordinary care for himself,' or, in other words, such care as a reasonable man would take for his own safety, and, secondly, that his failure to take care was a contributory cause of the accident. The doctrine of contributory negligence 'cannot be based upon a breach of duty to the negligent defendant.'" The onus is to be discharged on the balance of probabilities.
1 Citers



 
 Dann v Hamilton; 1939 - [1939] 1 KB 509

 
 Burfitt v A and E Kille; 1939 - [1939] 2 KB 743

 
 Old Gate Estates Ltd v Toplis and Harding and Russell; 1939 - [1939] 3 All ER 209; [1939] 161 LT 227

 
 Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries; HL 1940 - [1940] AC 152
 
Camkin v Bishop [1941] 2 All ER 713
1941
CA
Goddard, Scott LJJ
Negligence, Personal Injury, Education
The Court heard an appeal by the school from a finding of liability where boys from the school were allowed to help a farmer by working in a field, unsupervised, and one of them was struck so badly in the eye by a clod of earth thrown amongst them during horseplay that his eye was lost. The claim against the headmaster that he was under a duty to arrange for the supervision of the boys whilst they were doing the work Held: The appeal succeeded.
Scott LJ said: "The defendant, as headmaster, owed no duty to the boys to refuse to let them go to help the farmer in his need of labour without an under-master, or an under-nurse for that matter, in charge. The incident might have happened just as easily on a natural history expedition, or on any other country outing, on which the boys were regularly allowed to go without supervision. Indeed, it might have happened even if a master had gone for he might have been temporarily absent and the two boys who quarrelled might have done so during his absence."
Goddard LJ said: "The question we have to determine is whether there was any breach of duty by the headmaster, his duty being that of an ordinary careful parent. I ask myself whether any ordinary parent would think for a moment that he was exposing his boy to risk in allowing him to go to a field with others to weed beet or lift potatoes, occupations far safer than bicycling about on the roads in these days.
I confess that I have some difficulty in appreciating the view taken by the judge. He found that the defendant failed in his duty by reason of a lack of supervision. If this means anything, it must mean that it is the duty of a headmaster to see that boys are always under supervision, not only while at work, but also at play, or when they are free, because at any time they may get into mischief. I should like to hear the views of the boys themselves on this proposition. Would any reasonable parent forbid his boy of 14 to go out with his school-fellows because they might possibly get up to mischief, as all boys will at times? Here at this school on free afternoons the boys are allowed out, their bounds being some 8 miles, and they are left to themselves, provided they are back by a certain hour. No complaint is made of this freedom. If there is nothing wrong in that, how can it be wrong to let a boy go with others to such a harmless occupation as doing some farm work of the most innocuous character? As Clauson LJ put it during the argument, if the headmaster is not guilty of any breach of duty in allowing the boys to go off for walks and so on by themselves, how can he become liable because during the walk they go and work in a field and meet with some accident while thus engaged? If he is liable in this case, so will he be if some boy does a mischievous act in the playing field which injures another while a master or prefect does not happen to be present, or while out for a walk climbs a tree and breaks his legs . .
Nor was there any duty on the master to ask the farmer to supervise the boys for their safety. How could it occur to anyone that there was any danger in the occupation? If every master is to take precautions to see that there is never ragging or horseplay among his pupils, his school would indeed be too awful a place to contemplate. Of course there was no supervision on this occasion. Nor was there any duty to provide it, having regard to the innocuous nature of the occupation. This case bears no anology to those in which boys have been allowed to handle dangerous chemicals or to be in proximity to dangerous machinery. There was no evidence, in my opinion, of any breach of duty whatever.
Boys of 14 and 16 at a public school are not to be treated as if they were infants at creches, and no headmaster is obliged to arrange for constant and perpetual watching out of school hours. For one boy to throw something at another is an ordinary event of school life, but the fact that there was in this particular case a disastrous and wholly unexpected result is no reason for throwing responsibility on the master."
1 Citers


 
Slater v Worthington's Cash Store Ltd [1941] 1 KB 48
1941


Negligence, Nuisance
The defendant property owner was held to be liable for failing to remove snow from his roof, so that a minor avalanche injured a passer-by on the pavement.
1 Citers


 
Haseldine v Daw and Son Ltd [1941] 2 KB 343; [1941] 3 All ER 156; 111 LJKB 45; 165 LT 185
1941
CA
Scott LJ
Negligence
A lift engineer had failed adequately to repair a lift which as result later fell to the bottom of its shaft. The plaintiff was consequently injured. Scott LJ said: "The common law has throughout its long history developed as an organic growth, at first slowly under the hampering restrictions of legal forms of process, more quickly in Lord Mansfield's time, and in the last one hundred years at an ever-increasing rate of progress as new cases, arising under new conditions of society, of applied science, and of public opinion, have presented themselves for solution by the courts."
1 Citers


 
East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v Kent [1941] AC 74; [1940] UKHL 3
1941
HL
Lord Romer, Lord Atkin
Negligence, Local Government, Utilities
An exceptionally high spring tide caused many breaches of the banks of the River Deben, and extensive flooding, including the respondent's farm. By section 6 of the 1930 Act, the appellants had a statutory power to maintain the flood defences, but no duty to do so. They had however entered onto land to begin works. Held: A statutory power could not in itself generate a common law duty of care. The respondents aregued that they had a duty to do and were in breach.
Lord Atkin (dissenting) said: "By going onto the land and commencing the work, the Catchment Board had done an act which created a common law duty to complete the work with reasonable despatch."
and "I treat it therefore as established that a public authority whether doing an act which it is its duty to do, or doing an act which it is merely empowered to do, must in doing the act do it without negligence, or as it is put in some of the cases must not do it carelessly or improperly. Now quite apart from a duty owed to a particular individual which is the question in this case I suggest that it would be difficult to lay down that a duty upon a public authority to act without negligence or not carelessly or improperly does not include a duty to act with reasonable diligence by which I mean reasonable dispatch. I cannot imagine this House affording its support to a proposition so opposed to public interests where there are so many public bodies exercising statutory powers and employing public money upon them."
Land Drainage Act 1930 6
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Thomas and Evans Ltd v Mid-Rhondda Co-operative Society [1941] 1 KB 381
1941
CA
Sir Wilfred Greene MR
Negligence, Nuisance
The defendants set out to re-construct a wall along the side of the river to protect their land and an adjacent highway from flooding. In doing so they pulled down the wall, leaving gaps which they intended to fill by a new building. The river suddenly rose and the respondents' land was flooded. Held: The appellants were not liable either in nuisance or in negligence. Sir Wilfred Greene MR said: "If this wall had been erected by the freeholder and taken down by the freeholder the next day, or a week, or a year afterwards, with the result that the flood water took the course which it would have taken if the wall had never been there, I cannot see, on any principle known to me, that the respondents would have been entitled to complain. If it were not so, a person, in putting up a defensive work on his own land, would act at his peril, because by the mere fact of erecting it he would be conferring on his neighbours, or persons in the neighbourhood, rights to insist that he should never remove the wall or building that he had put up." He went on to say that "the respondents had no right to have the wall erected, they had no right to insist on its continuance, they had no ground of complaint whatsoever against anybody who rightfully took it down."
1 Citers



 
 Hutchinson v London and North Eastern Railway Co.; CA 1942 - [1942] KB 481

 
 Gold v Essex County Council; CA 1942 - [1942] 2 KB 293

 
 Murdoch v British Israel World Federation; 1942 - [1942] NZR 600

 
 The Pass of Ballater; 1942 - [1942] P 112
 
Bourhill v Young's Executor [1943] AC 92; [1943] SC (HL) 78; 1943 SLT 105; [1942] UKHL 5
5 Aug 1942
HL
Lord MacMillan, Lord Wright, Lord Russell of Killowen
Personal Injury, Damages, Scotland, Negligence
When considering claims for damages for shock, the court only recognised the action lying where the injury by shock was sustained 'through the medium of the eye or the ear without direct contact.' Wright L said: "No doubt, it has long ago been stated and often restated that if the wrong is established the wrongdoer must take the victim as he finds him. That, however, is only true . . on the condition that the wrong has been established or admitted. The question of liability is anterior to the question of the measure of the consequences which go with the liability."
Lord Russell of Killowen: "In considering whether a person owes to another a duty a breach of which will render him liable to that other in damages for negligence, it is material to consider what the defendant ought to have contemplated as a reasonable man. This consideration may play a double role. It is relevant in cases of admitted negligence (where the duty and breach are admitted) to the question of remoteness of damage, ie, to the question of compensation not to culpability, but it is also relevant in testing the existence of a duty as the foundation of the alleged negligence, ie, to the question of culpability not to compensation."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Simon v Islington Borough Council [1943] KB 188
1943
CA
Scott LJ, MacKinnon and Goddard LJJ
Negligence
A cyclist was killed because of the dangerous condition of an abandoned tramway. A rail and the adjoining stone setts were not level with each other. The London Passenger Transport Board had given the highway authority the notice required by statute to the highway authority of their proposal to abandon a tramway. The highway authority gave a statutory counter-notice stating that they proposed themselves to take up, remove and dispose of the tramway equipment and to make good the surface of the highway but they failed to do so. Held: The highway authority were liable for the accident because of the duty of the tramway undertaking under section 25 and section 28 of the 1870 Act. For so long as the Board remained in occupation of the tramway equipment, they remained under those duties. In those circumstances, the principle that a highway authority was not liable for non-feasance was wholly irrelevant and the highway authority stood in the shoes of the Board for the sole purpose of removing the Board's "cast off superfluities". As to the position of the plaintiff, the Court stated: "A breach of that duty causing injury to a person lawfully on the highway was actionable as 'statutory negligence' the phrase used by Lord Wright in Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co Ltd v M'Mullan [1934] AC 1, 23, and it entitled a person injured thereby to recover damages from the tramway company: see s 55 of the Act 1870, and compare Dublin United Tramways Co Ltd v Fitzgerald [1903] AC 99. Alternatively, an action lay in respect of a dangerous condition of the tramway in the public road, causing damage to an individual, for nuisance at common law against the tramway company as owners and occupiers of the plant which gave rise to the nuisance. Even without s 55 we think the position would have been the same." The case was argued on the question of non-feasance which was held to be wholly irrelevant. The duties which arose under the 1870 Act were unencumbered by that consideration.
Tramways Act 1870
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1 Citers


 
Glasgow Corporation v Muir [1943] AC 448; [1943] 2 All ER 44; [1943] SC (HL) 3; [1943] UKHL 2
16 Apr 1943
HL
Lord Thankerton, Lord Macmillan
Negligence
The House considered the proper test to define the standard of care that must be adopted by the reasonable man in a claim for negligence. Held: Lord Clauson said that the test is whether the person owing the duty of care "had in contemplation that, unless some further precautions were taken, such an unfortunate occurrence as that which in fact took place might well be expected".
A court of appeal should be slow to interfere with a judge's conclusions. It should only do so where it took the view that the judge was plainly wrong. The court referred to the 'personal equation' when assessing whether a potential plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of his injury to set the limitation period running.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Steel v Glasgow Iron and Steel Co Ltd 1944 SC 237
1944

Lord Justice Clerk Cooper
Scotland, Damages, Negligence
The question was whether the actions of the deceased had broken the chain of causation when he intervened in an attempt to save property. "This rule of the 'reasonable and probable consequence' is a key that opens several locks; for it not only fixes the nature and the measure of the duty to take care, but it may also aid in determining whether the causal nexus is complete and, perhaps, whether the damages claimed are too remote."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Billings v Reed [1945] KB 11
1945
CA
Lord Greene MR, Mackinnon and Lawrence LJJ
Limitation, Negligence
The plaintiff's wife had been killed by a negligently piloted RAF aeroplane. It was argued that, although this was a war injury, the language of section 3(1) did not exclude a claim based on trespass to the person. Held: Lord Greene MR said: "It seems to me that in this context the phrase "breach of duty" is comprehensive enough to cover the case of trespass to the person which is certainly a breach of duty as used in a wide sense."
Personal Injuries (Emergency Provisions) Act 1939
1 Citers



 
 Baker v Bethnal Green Corporation; CA 1945 - 109 JP 72 CA; [1945] 1 All ER 135; [1945] 43 LGR 75

 
 Alderslade v Hendon Laundry Ltd; CA 1945 - [1945] KB 189
 
Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256; [1945] HCA 27
22 Oct 1945

Latham CJ, Starke, Dixon and McTiernan JJ
Negligence
High Court of Australia - The parents of a child denied liability for harm caused by their son using a shanghai. Held: Dixon J said that: "It is, however, exceptional to find in the law a duty to control another's actions to prevent harm to strangers. The general rule is that one man is under no duty of controlling another man to prevent his doing damage to a third. There are, however, special relations which are the source of a duty of this nature."
1 Citers

[ Austlii ]
 
Woods v Duncan [1946] AC 401; [1946] 1 All ER 420
1946

Viscount Simonds
Negligence, Evidence
Viscount Simonds said: "Before the liability of a defendant to pay damages for the tort of negligence can be established in an action brought by or on behalf of an injured man, three things have to be proved - (1) that the defendant failed to exercise due care; (2) that the defendant owed to the injured man a duty to exercise due care; and (3) that the defendant's failure was the "cause" of the injury in the proper sense of the term."
. . And as to the position where an individual was the defendant and the plaintiff sought to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur: "I will assume against him, though I doubt whether the assumption is justified that this is a case in which the principle of res ipsa loquitur may be applied. But to apply this principle is to do no more than shift the burden of proof. A prima facie case is assumed to be made out which throws upon him the task of proving that he was not negligent. This does not mean that he must prove how and why the accident happened: it is sufficient if he satisfies the court that he personally was not negligent. It may well be that the court will be more easily satisfied of this fact if a plausible explanation which attributes the accident to some other cause is put forward on his behalf; but this is only a factor in the consideration of the probabilities."
1 Citers


 
Morrison Steamship Co Ltd v Greystoke Castle (Cargo Owners) [1946] 2 All ER 696; [1947] AC 265; [1947] LJR 297; [1946] 176 LT 66
1946
HL
Lord Porter, Lord Uthwatt, Lord Roche
Negligence, Damages
A ship was damaged in a collision. Though their goods were not damaged, the owners of cargo on the first ship became liable to the owners of the ship for a general average contribution. The owners sued the other ship owners for their negligence. The primary issue was whether the cargo-owners had only a derivative claim arising from an obligation to contribute towards the expenditure of the carrying vessel or whether they had a direct claim against the non-carrying vessel. Held: (Majority) They could recover, even though the damages were a purely financial loss. The House identified an exemption to the general rule.
Lord Porter said: "But it may be said that this is an answer to the contention that the damage is too remote, but does not deal with the allegation that it does not flow from the tortious act but from the contractual relationship between the ship and its cargo. Sir William McNair put this contention in the words " Liability or damage arising from a "contract with a third party gives no ground for a claim for" damages in an action for negligence against a wrongdoer "unless the liability or damage arose from physical injury" to the plaintiff's person or to property owned by or in the "possession of the plaintiff." For this contention there may be much to be said where the person or thing injured was not engaged, as is cargo when being carried in a ship, on a joint adventure. I do not, however, think it applies to such carriage. It is true that general average is not affected by insurance law but the outlook upon the mutual obligation entered into by ship and cargo owners resulting in the undertaking of a common adventure may be illustrated by the fact that whereas in non-marine cases there is no loss unless the thing insured is injured, in marine insurance cases the loss of the adventure constitutes a loss for which underwriters are liable though the cargo itself be safe."
Lord Uthwatt said: "My Lords, under the law of the sea there is recognized a community between ship and cargo that does not obtain between carrier and customer on land. This is shown by two well settled principles. First, if a collision causing damage to cargo occurs, and the carrying ship and the other vessel are both in fault, cargo could under the old law recover only a moiety of the damage and under statute can now only recover a due proportion determined by the degree of blame. That conception finds no place in land carriage, where there would be joint liability for the whole. Secondly, the liability to contribute to general average expenditure is part of the law of the sea. The principle involved in general average contribution is peculiar to the law of the sea and extends only to sea risks. (Cf. Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co.) The law of the sea apart, neither at law nor in equity can contribution be obtained on the ground that loss incurred by one person has delivered another from a common danger (see Johnson v. Wild (2)), or that expenditure incurred by one person has incidentally benefited another (cf. Ruabon Steamship Co., Ld. v. London Assurance (3).) Agency is not implied from the circumstances, and there is no equity to claim relief. The sufferer both at law and equity must look to gratitude and not to the courts for his recompense. Under the law of the sea, however, ship and cargo are linked together in the fortunes of the voyage and, in a loose sense, there is in some respects a compulsory partnership between ship and cargo in respect to the venture of sea carriage : Bell's Principles, 9th ed., s. 437 ; Bell's Commentaries, 5th ed., vol. I., p. 534. Section 66 of the Marine Insurance Act, 1906, aptly refers to the matter as "the common adventure." A breach of the duty to take care involving only damage to the ship may therefore be and in my opinion is a breach of duty owed to cargo."
Lord Roche put it more broadly: "On the other hand, if two lorries A and B are meeting one another on the road, I cannot bring myself to doubt that the driver of lorry A owes a duty to both the owner of lorry B and to the owner of goods then carried in lorry B. Those owners are engaged in a common adventure with or by means of lorry B, and if lorry A is negligently driven and damages lorry B so severely that whilst no damage is done to the goods in it the goods have to be unloaded for the repair of the lorry and then reloaded or carried forward in some other way and the consequent expense is by reason of his contract or otherwise the expense of the goods owner, then in my judgment the goods owner has a direct cause of action to recover such expense. No authority to the contrary was cited and I know of none relating to land transport."
1 Citers


 
Spicer v Smee [1946] 1 ALL ER 489
1946

Atkinson J
Negligence
A fire resulting from a non-natural user of land (i.e. a fire to which the rule in Rylands v Fletcher applies) was outside the protection of the Act, because, in such circumstances, the relevant fire was not regarded as having been started accidentally. Atkinson J: "A private nuisance arises out of a state of things on one man's property whereby his neighbour's property is exposed to danger",
Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774
1 Citers


 
Sochacki v Sas [1947] 1 ALL ER 344
1947

Lord Goddard CJ
Negligence
A claim was made after the escape of a fire in a domestic fireplace. The defendant had left the room for two or three hours with the fire burning, with no fire guard or fender, Held: The use was not a non-natural use for a house, the room was being used "in the ordinary, natural way in which the room could be used". Lord Goddard CJ said: "Everybody knows fires occur through accidents which happen without negligence on anybody's part."
1 Citers


 
Owners of the "Boy Andrew" v Owners of the "St Rognvald" 1947 SC (HL) 70
1947
HL
Viscount Simon
Negligence
The House should not alter the apportionment of responsibility for an accident assessed by the judge save in exceptional circumstances.
1 Citers


 
Brown v Harrison [1947] 177 LT 281
1947
CA
Somervell LJ
Nuisance, Negligence, Land
Somervell LJ reiterated the relevant test (formulated by the judge at first instance) in these terms: "If there is a danger which is apparent, not only to the expert but to the ordinary layman which the ordinary layman can see with his own eyes, if he chooses to use them, and he fails to do so, with the result that injury is inflicted, as in this case, upon somebody passing along the highroad, the owner is in those circumstances responsible, because in the management of his property he had not acted as a normal reasonable landowner would act."
1 Citers


 
Searle v Wallbank [1947] AC 341; [1947] 1 All ER 12; (1947) 176 LT 104; (1947) 63 TLR 24; [1947] LJR 258
1947
HL
Lord du Parcq, Lord Porter
Animals, Negligence
There existed an ancient common law immunity in respect of animals straying onto a public highway. An owner or occupier of land adjacent to a highway has no legal obligation at common law to highway users so to keep and maintain his hedges, fences and gates as to prevent animals from straying on to it, and that he is not under any duty as between himself and users of it to take reasonable care to prevent any of his animals, not known to be dangerous, from straying on to it.
Lord du Parcq said that there is "an underlying principle of the law of the highway is that all those lawfully using the highway . . must show mutual respect and forbearance." He went on to explain the Fardon case: "Nevertheless, Lord Atkin’s proposition will be misunderstood if it is not read as subject to two necessary qualifications: first, that where no such special circumstances exist negligence cannot be established merely by proof that a defendant has failed to provide against the possibility that a tame animal of mild disposition will do some dangerous act contrary to its ordinary nature, and, secondly, that even if a defendant’s omission to control or secure an animal is negligent, nothing done by the animal which is contrary to its ordinary nature can be regarded, in the absence of special circumstances, as being directly caused by such negligence.”
Lord Porter was careful to distinguish the difference between animals that stray onto a highway, from which no liability flows, and animals that are brought onto a highway deliberately, when reasonable care must be exercised to control them
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Franklin v The Gramophone Company Ltd [1948] 1 KB 542
1948
CA

Negligence
Compliance with statutory obligations, which may be of limited scope, does not necessarily absolve a defendant from liability in negligence. It is only if the section is ambiguous, unclear or open to two reasonable interpretations that its penal effect may indicate the narrower construction.
1 Citers


 
Stansbiev Troman [1948] 2 KB 48
1948
CA
Tucker LJ
Negligence
A decorator working alone in a house went out to buy wallpaper and left the front door unlocked. He was held liable for the loss caused by a thief who entered while he was away. For the purpose of attributing liability to the thief (e.g. in a prosecution for theft) the loss was caused by his deliberate act and no one would have said that it was caused by the door being left open. But for the purpose of attributing liability to the decorator, the loss was caused by his negligence because his duty was to take reasonable care to guard against thieves entering. As to Weld-Blundell: "I do not think that Lord Sumner would have intended that very general statement to apply to the facts of a case such as the present where, as the judge points out, the act of negligence itself consisted in the failure to take reasonable care to guard against the very thing that in fact happened."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Pearson v Coleman Bros [1948] 2 All ER 274
1948


Animals, Negligence
A child, visiting the circus, left the tent to relieve herself. She passed the lions' runway, where she was mauled. She sought damages for personal injury. Held: The only people invited into that enclosure were those who came through the proper entrance. However, having entered the circus as an invitee, and there being no proper facilities, it was foreseeable that a child would not take heed of the warnings, and for this purpose she was an invitee. The circus was liable in negligence.

 
Almeroth v WE Chivers and Son Ltd [1948] 1 All ER 53
1948
CA
Somervell LJ
Negligence, Personal Injury, Nuisance
The plaintiff when crossing the kerb from a roadway tripped over a small pile of slates and was injured. The slates did not overlap the kerb. Held: The plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence. The slates "might easily not be noticed by a reasonably careful person crossing the road as the plaintiff did", talking to someone. Somervell LJ said that a person walking along a pavement does not have to keep "his eyes on the ground to see whether or not there is any obstacle in his path".
The ordinary principles of causation in tort are applicable to an action in nuisance. The obstacle was capable of being a nuisance despite its small size.
1 Citers


 
Buckland v Guildford Gas Light and Coke Co [1948] 2 All ER 1086; [1949] 1 KB 410
1948


Negligence, Land
Whether someone is a trespasser vis-a-vis the occupier is relevant only to the foreseeability of his presence.
1 Citers



 
 Hogan v Bentinck Collieries; HL 1949 - [1949] 1 All ER 588

 
 Bolton v Stone; KBD 1949 - [1949] 1 All ER 237

 
 Paris v Stepney Borough Council; CA 1949 - [1949] 2 All ER 843

 
 London Passenger Transport Board v Upson; HL 1949 - [1949] AC 155

 
 Davies v Swan Motor Co (Swansea) Ltd; CA 1949 - [1949] 2 KB 291

 
 Turner v Arding and Hobbs Ltd; CA 1949 - [1949] 2 All ER 911

 
 Monarch Steamship Co Ltd v Karlshamns Oljefabriker A/B; HL 1949 - [1949] AC 196; [1948] UKHL 1; 65 TLR 217; 1949 SC (HL) 1; [1949] AC 196; 1949 SLT 51; (1948-49) 82 Ll L Rep 137; [1949] LJR 772; [1949] 1 All ER 1
 
Hill v William Hill (Park Lane) Limited [1949] 2 All ER 452; [1949] AC 530
1949
HL
Viscount Simon
Negligence, Licensing
The policy behind the 1845 Act was to discourage gambling.
Viscount Simon said: "it is to be observed that though a Parliamentary enactment (like Parliamentary eloquence) is capable of saying the same thing twice over without adding anything to what has already been said, the repetition in the case of an Act of Parliament is not to be assumed. When the legislature enacts a particular phrase in a statute the presumption is that it is saying something which has not been said immediately before. The rule that a meaning should, if possible, be given to every word in the statute implies that, unless there is good reason to the contrary, the words add something which would not be there if the words were left out"
Gaming Act 1845 18
1 Citers



 
 Yachuk v Oliver Blais Co Ltd; PC 1949 - [1949] AC 386
 
Bolton v Stone [1949] 2 All ER 851
2 Jan 1949
CA

Negligence
(Reversed, but dicta of Oliver J approved)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Gorringe v The Transport Commission (1950) 80 CLR 357
1950

Fullagar J
Negligence
(Tasmania)
1 Citers


 
Heskell v Continental Express Ltd [1950] 1 All ER 1033
1950

Devlin J
Negligence, Agency
The court discussed how a warranty of authority could arise in an agent: "An agent who warrants that he has authority need warrant no more than the bare fact. In the absence of special circumstances, he makes no warranty or representation about how he got his authority, whether it is express or implied, specific or general. Still less does he warrant that an event, on which the proper exercise of a general authority may depend, has in fact taken place." Two causes of the damage at issue were equally operative "in that if either had ceased the damage would have ceased": Where the wrong is a tort, it is clearly settled that the wrongdoer cannot excuse himself by pointing to another cause. It is enough that the tort should be a cause and it is unnecessary to evaluate competing causes and ascertain which of them is dominant . . In the case of breach of contract the position is not so clear . . . Whatever the true rule of causation may be I am satisfied that if a breach of contract is one of two causes, both co-operating and both of equal efficacy, as I find in this case, it is sufficient to carry judgment for damages. Reischer v Borwick [1894] 2 QB 548 establishes that for the purposes of a contract of insurance it is sufficient if an insured event is, in this sense, a co-operating cause of the loss. I do not think that Yorkshire Dale SS Co Ltd v Minister of War Transport [1942] AC 691, with its insistence on the ascertainment of "the cause", disapproved this principle. The case decided that the cause of a loss has to be ascertained by the standard of common sense of the ordinary man. Common sense is a blunt instrument not suited for probing into minute points, and I cannot believe that if the ordinary man thinks that two causes are of approximately equal efficacy, he cannot say so without being interrogated on fine distinctions.
1 Citers



 
 Holmes v Ashford; CA 1950 - [1950] 2 All ER 76
 
Lambourn v London Brick Co Ltd [1950] EG 28 July 1950
28 Jul 1950


Land, Negligence, Nuisance
Finnemore J stated that an unreasonable burden must not be placed on the reasonable owner: "the standard to be taken should be that of an ordinary landowner and not an expert. It was neither the duty nor the practice of the ordinary prudent landowner to make a meticulous examination of its individual trees."
1 Citers


 
Paris v Stepney Borough Council [1951] 1 All ER 42; [1951] AC 367; [1950] UKHL 3; [1951] 1 TLR 25; (1951) 115 JP 22
13 Dec 1950
HL
Lord Normand, Lord Simonds, Lord Morton of Henryton
Negligence
(Reversed) The House considered a breach of a duty of care in respect of a man blinded in one eye, when there would be no breach of duty if his sight had not been impaired. Held: The claim succeeded because he was known by his employers to have only one sound eye and they failed to provide him with appropriate goggles. The claim did not succeed on the basis that goggles should have been provided for anyone working in the same process as the plaintiff although still being rendered blind in one eye is a very serious injury even for a man with two sound eyes.
Lord Morton of Henryton said that the more serious the damage that would happen if an accident occurred, the more thorough were the precautions which an employer must take.
Lord Normand said: "If there is no proof that a precaution is usually observed by other persons, a reasonable and prudent man will follow the usual practice in the like circumstances. Failing such proof the test is whether the precaution is one which the reasonable and prudent man would think to obvious that it was folly to omit it." An employer must take into account any particular susceptibility of the employee of which he is or ought to be aware.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
London Graving Dock Co Ltd v Horton [1951] AC 737
1951
HL
Lord Porter
Negligence
An experienced welder had for a month been carrying out work on a ship as an employee of sub-contractors engaged by ship-repairers in occupation of the ship. He was injured, without negligence on his part, owing to the inadequacy of certain staging, constituting an unusual danger, of which he had full knowledge and which, despite complaints, the ship-repairers had not remedied. Held: (Majority) The welder being an invitee, his knowledge of the unusual risk exonerated the ship-repairers from liability for the damage sustained by him and that it was not essential to their defence to establish that he was volens in that he was not under any feeling of constraint in accepting the risk. Lord Porter summarised the facts in Donoghue v Stevenson, and said: "Your Lordships' House held that, assuming the facts alleged to be true, the manufacturer would have escaped if it was natural to expect that the intermediate vendor would take care to see that the contents were in order. The pursuer, however, could recover from the manufacturer because such an examination was not to be expected. The law required the latter to be careful not to run the risk of injuring a person whom he contemplates or ought to contemplate as likely to be injured by his negligence, but an examination by the retail vendor, if rightly expected, could be relied upon by the manufacturer and would have been a complete answer to the claim. Still more so would knowledge by the purchaser of the true position, whether such knowledge was actual or such as the circumstances would warrant the manufacturer to assume. The defence did not have to show that the pursuer drank the contents with a full knowledge of the risk: it would have been enough if examination and consequent knowledge was to be expected. To that extent an argument based on Donoghue v Stevenson seems less forcible than the more obvious contention founded upon the relationship of invitor and invitee. Neither ground, in my opinion, supports the conclusion that the appellants were in breach of their duty of care."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Tinsley v Dudley [1951] 2 KB 18
1951
CA
Jenkins LJ
Agency, Negligence
The plaintiff sought damages after the motorcycle he had parked in the defendant hotelier's closed car park was stolen. Held: An occupier is under no duty to protect goods from the risk of theft by third parties. The publican was not a bailee of the motorcycle in that there had been no transfer of possession to the publican.
Jenkins LJ remarked on the complete absence of any authority suggesting liability for the loss of a vistor's property. He said that such a principle would produce: "a liability of a most comprehensive and sweeping character, and would have entered into a very great number of cases if it existed."

 
Caminer v Northern and London Investment Trust Ltd [1951] AC 88
1951
HL
Lord Normand, Lord Porter, Lord Reid, Lord Oaksey, Lord Radcliffe
Nuisance, Negligence
An elm tree, standing on land adjoining a busy London highway, fell, injuring the plaintiffs, who were using the thoroughfare. The House considered the duty of a land owner to inspect trees on his land adjoining the highway. Held: Lord Normand observed that although the defendants had not complied with their duty, "it is no less plain that, if they had, it would have made no difference. The tree was just such a tree as [the expert witness] says the owner might consider safe."
Where a person takes it upon himself to perform a task in circumstances where a reasonable man would think it necessary to call in an expert the standard of care and degree of foreseeability the law will require of him may well be that of an expert.
Lord Reid outlined the extent of the duty: "So in my judgment the appellants can only succeed in this appeal if they can show that there was something about this particular tree which should have suggested that lopping or other action was necessary. What inspection will suggest will depend on the knowledge and experience of the inspector, and there has been some controversy about the degree of knowledge and experience necessary for adequate inspection. Plainly it would be no use to send a person who knew nothing about trees. The alternatives put forward were that he should be an expert or that he should have at least such knowledge and experience of trees as a landowner with trees o his land would generally have. As the question depends on what a reasonable man would do I think that it may be put in this way. Would a reasonable and careful owner, without expert knowledge but accustomed to dealing with his trees and having a countryman's general knowledge about them, think it necessary to call in an expert to advise him or would he think it sufficient to act at lest in the first instance on his own knowledge and judgment? The evidence in this case does not suggest to me that he would, and does not convince me that he should call in an expert. There must be many owners of elm trees beside busy roads and if it were proper for them to seek expert advice I would expect, making every allowance for the facts that not all owners are reasonable and careful and that even reasonable people frequently omit to do what they know they ought to do, that it would appear that expert advice was not infrequently sought. But the evidence in this case does not bear this out."
Lord Radcliffe raised some questions as to the liability of a tree-owner which he did not finally answer. In the course of his discussion he said: "It would be conceded, I believe, that there is somehow a difference between the legal responsibilities of the owner of a mature forest tree, in a built-up area, immediately adjacent to a busy street, and the responsibilities of the owner of a stand of timber bordering a country lane. But is the difference only this, that the latter is entitled to take more chances at the expense of his neighbours than the former? I am not certain of the logic, for a tree or its branch only falls once; and it must be poor consolation to an injured passer-by in the country lane to be assured that the chances were all against his being at the place of the accident at the moment when it occurred."
Lord Normand said: "The Court of Appeal applied what is, I think, the proper test - the conduct to be expected from a reasonable and prudent land-owner - and held on the evidence that the appellants had satisfied this test because there was nothing dangerous in the appearance of the tree, no sign of disease, advanced age, disproportion of crown to stem, or rising roots . . The test of the conduct to be expected from a reasonable and prudent landlord sounds more simple than it really is. For it postulates some degree of knowledge on the part of landlords which must necessarily fall short of the knowledge possessed by scientific arboriculturists but which must surely be greater than the knowledge possessed by the ordinary urban observer of trees or even of the countryman not practically concerned with their care."
1 Citers


 
Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850; [1951] 1 All ER 1078; [1951] UKHL 2
10 May 1951
HL
Porter, Read, Radcliffe, Oaksey, Normand LL
Negligence
The plaintiff was injured by a prodigious and unprecedented hit of a cricket ball over a distance of 100 yards. He claimed damages in negligence Held:When looking at the duty of care the court should ask whether the risk was not so remote that a reasonable person would not have anticipated it. It was not negligent for a cricket club to do nothing about the risk of someone being injured by a cricket ball hit out of the ground. They were carrying on a lawful and socially useful activity, and would have had to stop playing cricket at that ground. Even though injury was foreseeable it was still in all the circumstances reasonable to do nothing about it. There had to be a balance between the likely severity of the accident and the cost of putting it right.
Read L: "My Lords, it was readily foreseeable that an accident such as befell the respondent might possibly occur during one of the appellants' cricket matches. Balls had been driven into the public road from time to time and it was obvious that, if a person happened to be where a ball fell, that person would receive injuries which might or might not be serious. On the other hand it was plain that the chance of that happening was small. " Lord Radcliffe: "I can see nothing unfair in the appellants being required to compensate the respondent for the serious injury that she has received as a result of the sport that they have organized on their cricket ground at Cheetham Hill. But the law of negligence is concerned less with what is fair than with what is culpable, and I cannot persuade myself that the appellants have been guilty of any culpable act or omission in this case." and “unless there has been something which a reasonable man would blame as falling beneath the standard of conduct that he would set for himself and require of his neighbour, there has been no breach of legal duty."
Porter L: "But the question remains: Is it enough to make an action negligent to say that its performance may possibly cause injury, or must some greater probability exist of that result ensuing in order to make those responsible for its occurrence guilty of negligence." and "It is not enough that the event should be such as can reasonably be foreseen; the further result that injury is likely to follow must also be such as a reasonable man would contemplate, before he can be convicted of actionable negligence. Nor is the remote possibility of injury occurring enough; there must be sufficient probability to lead a reasonable man to anticipate it. The existence of some risk is an ordinary incident of life, even when all due care has been, as it must be, taken." and "The quantum of danger must always be a question of degree. It is not enough that there is a remote possibility that injury may occur: the question is, would a reasonable man anticipate it? I do not think that he would, and in any case, unless an appellate body are of opinion that he clearly ought to have done so, the tribunal upon whom lies the duty of finding the facts is the proper judge of whether he would or not."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Christmas v Caledonian Club [1952] 1 KBD 141
1952


Negligence, Personal Injury
A window cleaner. employed by independent contractors, came to clean the windows of a club. One window was defective, falling onto and trapping his hand, causing him to fall. Held: He had no cause of action against the club. The landowner was concerned to see that the windows are safe for his guests to open and close, but he need not be concerned to see that they are safe for a window cleaner to hold on to. The risk of a defective window is a special risk, but it is ordinarily incident to the calling of a window cleaner, and so he must take care for himself, and not expect the householder to do so.
1 Citers


 
Leicester v Pearson [1952] 2 All ER 71; [1952] 2 QB 668; [1952] 1 TLR 1537
1952


Road Traffic, Negligence
Road signs and layouts creating a pedestrian crossing did not create an absolute precedence for a pedestrian. The driver must use reasonable endeavours in the circumstances to give a a pedestrian preference. Where an accident occurs, the fact if it be so that the driver was free of negligence, will afford a full defence.

 
Edwards v Railway Executive [1952] 2 All ER 430; [1952] AC 737
1952
HL
Lord Porter, Lord Goddard, Lord Oaksey
Negligence, Personal Injury, Land
A boy aged 9 was injured on a railway line. He had been warned not to go onto the land and had found his way through a defective fence. He claimed in negligence. The fence had been breached by children with some frequency for many years before the accident. When defects were observed by the Defendant's employees, repairs were duly effected. These were required with frequency. The evidence was that the fence was intact on the accident date. Held: He was a trespassr and not a licensee.
Lord Goddard said: "repeated trespass of itself confers no licence . . how is it to be said that (an occupier) has licensed what he cannot prevent . . Now, to find a licence there must be evidence either of express permission or that the landowner has so conducted himself that he cannot be heard to say that he did not give it . . What then have they done in this case to lead anyone to suppose that they may go on to their property to play ?"
Lord Oaksey said: "In my opinion, in considering the question whether a licence can be inferred, the state of mind of the suggested licensee must be considered. The circumstances must be such that the suggested licensee could have thought and did think that he was not trespassing but was on the property in question by the leave and licence of its owner."
Lord Porter said that the first question to be decided was: "whether there was any evidence from which it could be inferred that children from the recreation ground had become licensees to enter the respondent's premises and toboggan down the embankment . . There must, I think, be such assent to the user relied upon as amounts to a licence to use the premises. Whether that result can be inferred or not must, of course, be a question of degree, but in my view a court is not justified in likely inferring it . . The onus is on the appellants to establish their licence, and in my opinion they do not do so merely by showing that, in spite of a fence now accepted as complying with the Act requiring the respondents to fence, children again and again broke their way through. What more, the appellants asked, could the respondents do? Report to the Corporation? But their caretaker knew already. Prosecute? First you have to catch your children and even then would that be more effective? In any case I cannot see that the respondents were under any obligation to do more than keep their premises shut off by a fence which was duly repaired when broken and obviously intended to keep intruders out."
1 Citers



 
 Merrington v Ironbridge Metal Works Ltd; QBD 1952 - [1952] 2 All ER 1101; (1953) 117 JP 23
 
Best v Samuel Fox and Co Ltd [1952] AC 716
1952

Lord Morton of Henryton
Personal Injury, Negligence
The court considered liability for injury to secondary victims. Lord Morton of Henryton: "it has never been the law of England that an invitor, who has negligently but unintentionally injured an invitee, is liable to compensate other persons who have suffered, in one way or another, as a result of the injury to the invitee. If the injured man was engaged in a business, and the injury is a serious one, the business may have to close down and the employees be dismissed; a daughter of the injured man may have to give up work which she enjoys and stay at home to nurse a father who has been transformed into an irritable invalid as a result of the injury. Such examples could easily be multiplied. Yet the invitor is under no liability to compensate such persons, for he owes them no duty and may not even know of their existence."
1 Citers


 
Drinkwater v Kimber [1952] 2 QB 281
1952
CA
Morris LJ, Singleton LJ
Damages, Negligence
The female plaintiff had been injured in a collision caused by the concurrent negligence of her husband and the defendant. She could not succeed in a negligence action against her husband, so the defendant could not recover under the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935 any contribution to the damages awarded against the defendant to the wife. To overcome this difficulty, by a counter claim against the husband the defendant sought contribution under the Act of 1945. Held: The defendant could not recover under the Act of 1945. That Act gave the defendant no claim against the husband in respect of the wife's injuries and the defendant's liability to the wife was not "damage" suffered by him within the meaning of section 1(1). The Act did not give the defendant a cause of action against the husband; it did not purport to create any new variety of claim; it seemed clear that the word "damage" referred to that which was suffered and for which a "claim" might be made and for which "damages" are recoverable. If the section applied, the court would have to record the total damages which would have been recoverable by the defendant from the husband if the defendant had not been at fault. If the defendant had not been negligent the total damages recoverable would have been nil. To award £135, being the contribution claimed from the husband, would have been "a strange phenomenon of contraction."
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 1(1)
1 Citers



 
 Jones v Livox Quarries; CA 25-Apr-1952 - [1952] 2 QB 608; [1952] EWCA Civ 2; [1952] 1 TLR 1377
 
Lewis v Carmarthenshire County Council [1953] 1 WLR 1439
1953
CA

Negligence, Education
The primary duty of care of a school toward a pupil ends at the school gate, although the school will have a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that young children who are not old enough to look after themselves do not leave the school premises unattended.
1 Citers



 
 Griffiths v Evans; CA 1953 - [1953] 2 All ER 1364; [1953] 1 WLR 1424

 
 Pilkington v Wood; 1953 - [1953] 1 Ch 770

 
 Thompson v Bankstown Municipal Corporation; 1953 - (1953) 87 CLR 619

 
 Baker v Market Harborough Co-Operative Society Ltd; CA 1953 - [1953] 1 WLR 1472

 
 Dunster v Abbott; CA 1953 - [1953] 2 All ER 1572 CA; [1954] 1 WLR 58

 
 Stapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd; HL 25-Jun-1953 - [1953] AC 663; [1953] UKHL 4; [1953] 2 All ER 478; [1953] 3 WLR 279

 
 Hawkins v Coulsdon and Purley Urban District Council; CA 1954 - [1954] 1 All ER 97 CA; [1954] 2 WLR 122; [1954] 1 QB 319
 
Davis v St Mary's Demolition and Excavation Co Ltd [1954] 1 All ER 57; [1954] 1 WLR 592; 98 Sol Jo 217
1954


Negligence
The defendants were demolishing some houses, behind which was an open space on which children were known to play. A child wandered onto the site and a wall fell causing injury. Held: Although the plaintiff was a trespasser, the presence of chidren on the land was so liklely that they were within the class of people to whom a duty of care was owed. Precautions should have been taken, and the defendant was liable.
1 Citers


 
Greene v Chelsea Borough Council [1954] 2 QBD 127
1954
CA
Lord Denning MR
Personal Injury, Land, Negligence
Lord Denning MR said: "Knowledge or notice of the danger is only a defence when the plaintiff is free to act upon that knowledge or notice so as to avoid the danger".
1 Citers


 
Solomons v R Gertzenstein Ltd [1954] 1 QB 565
1954
QBD
Lord Goddard
Negligence, Torts - Other
A fire which started with an electrical short circuit, went on to set fire to some wood and in due course to a stack of paper. Held: Section 86 of the 1774 Act applied to excuse the defendant. Lord Goddard said: "In my opinion it was a short circuit that set fire to the wood in the neighbourhood of the ventilator and that in turn set fire to the stack of paper. Pausing here, it does not appear that this paper ever burnt freely; no doubt it caused a lot of smoke, and I accept the evidence that there was some flame seen, but it was not that stack apparently that caused the sudden sheet of flame which caused the real damage here. The cause of that is obscure; the only explanation was that offered by the fire officers, that the heating of the paint and varnish caused an accumulation of gas which suddenly ignited and rushed upwards. However, I do not propose to deal further with this because I cannot hold that placing packing paper and cardboard cartons in this recess behind the balustrade was negligent. Business of the sort carried on by the first defendants necessitates having a stack of packing and wrapping material at hand. This material is not highly inflammable like loose tissue paper or shavings would be. It is common knowledge that it takes a good deal to get closely packed thick paper well alight, though it will smoulder. But in any case I cannot see how it can be negligent to store this paper in what was a convenient recess any more than it would be to store it in one of the rooms occupied by the first defendants. They had no reason to suppose that there was likely to be a short circuit which would fire the panelling in the immediate neighbourhood of the stack, which I may mention was never burnt through. On the evidence before me I am not prepared to find that the fire was caused by the negligence of any of the defendants, and I hold that it was accidental and need only refer on this matter to Collingwood v Home and Colonial Stores Ltd."
Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 86


 
 Roe v Ministry of Health; CA 1954 - [1954] 2 QB 66; [1954] 2 All ER 131; [1954] 2 WLR 915; [1954] EWCA Civ 7
 
National Coal Board v England [1954] AC 403; [1954] 1 All ER 546
1954
HL
Lord Reid, Lord Oaksey, Lord Porter
Vicarious Liability, Negligence
The plaintiff sought damages after being injured when a co-worker fired a shot. The employee however had himself coupled the detonator to the cable rather than leaving it to the shotfirer, and had his cimmitted a criminal offence. He had been found a quarter responsible, and the NCB sought to rely on the doctrine of ex turpi causa. The trial judge considered a 50% apportionment to be appropriate, on the basis that the plaintiff and the defendant's employee were equally to blame. Held: The House accepted that he had been contributorily negligent but rejected the defence of illegality.
The damages should be reduced by only 25%. Lord Reid observed at p 427 that it was not right to disturb the trial judge's apportionment lightly, but that "the difference between holding the parties equally to blame and holding the one's share of responsibility to be three times that of the other is so substantial that we should give effect to it".
Lord Oaksey approved Nicol v NCB: "I agree with the judgment of Lord Guthrie in Nicol v National Coal Board . . that it cannot be said to be necessarily outside the course of the employment of a workman that he performs his work in a manner which is in breach of a statutory regulation. Here it was within the shot-firer's employment to fire the shot electrically, but he did it without due care and in breach of the regulation. Unless there is something in the statute which creates the obligation indicating the intention that no action shall be brought a common law in respect of its breach, the ordinary rules of the common law of tort are applicable, including the doctrine respondeat superior."
Lord Porter said: "My Lords, save in one case I cannot find that such a plea has ever been put forward in circumstances similar to these as excusing common law negligence. If it were sound it would be a defence to many actions in which it was not raised and might also be a defence to many claims for compensation. Conceivably it may be a defence in certain cases between the participes criminis, but the argument that it may be a defence between the two persons involved does not support a conclusion that a third party whose servant is one of two involved in disobeying a regulation and so participating in a criminal offence is thereby absolved from liability." Applying the Cakebread case, "I cannot believe that a breach of a statutory obligation drafted to ensure the adoption of a careful method of working is a 'turpis causa' within the meaning of the rule. Indeed, the adage itself is generally applied to a question of contract and I am by no means prepared to concede where concession is not required that it applies also to the case of a tort. This view is, in my opinion, in conformity with the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 which, after enacting that a claim shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of one person where the damage is caused partly by the fault of another, then goes on to define 'fault' as meaning 'negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or omission . .'."
Lord Reid said that the 1945 Act worked to disapply the ex turpi doctrine in all forms of tort in favour of apportionment: "Reading the appropriate part of this definition back into section 1 makes it provide that where a person suffers damage as the result partly of his own breach of statutory duty which would, apart from this Act, give rise to the defence of contributory negligence his claim shall not be defeated . . [W]hatever the former position may have been, it is now clear that the appellants cannot rely on this defence [viz turpitude]."
Lord Asquith of Bishopstone said: "The defendants relied on the maxim 'ex turpi causa non oritur actio' as absolving them of liability.
. . The vast majority of cases in which the maxim has been applied have been cases where, there being an illegal agreement between A and B, either seeks to sue the other for its enforcement or for damages for its breach. That, of course, is not this case. Cases where an action in tort has been defeated by the maxim are exceedingly rare. Possibly a party to an illegal prize fight who is damaged in the conflict cannot sue for assault (Boulter v Clark (1747) Bull N.P. 16, See: (1817) Bull N. P.).
. . If two burglars, A and B, agree to open a safe by means of explosives, and A so negligently handles the explosive charge as to injure B, B might find some difficulty in maintaining an action for negligence against A. But if A and B are proceeding to the premises which they intend burglariously to enter, and before they enter them, B picks A's pocket and steals his watch, I cannot prevail on myself to believe that A could not sue in tort . . The theft is totally unconnected with the burglary."
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 1(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Kelly v Farrans Ltd [1954] NI 41
1954

Lord MacDermott
Negligence
Lord MacDermott discussed the plea of volentia non fit injuria: 'The question raised by a plea of volenti non fit iniuria is not whether the injured party consented to run the risk of being hurt, but whether the injured party consented to run that risk at his own expense so that he and not the party alleged to be negligent should bear the loss in the event of injury. In other words, the consent that is relevant is not consent to the risk of injury but consent to the lack of reasonable care that may produce that risk.'

 
Watt v Hertfordshire County Council [1954] EWCA Civ 6; [1954] 2 All ER 368; [1954] 1 WLR 835
7 May 1954
CA
Singleton, Denning, Morris LJJ
Negligence
The plaintiff fireman was injured assisting at an incident when using taking and unsecured jack to an incident. Held: His appeal failed.
Denning LJ said: "It is well settled that in measuring due care one must balance the risk against the measures necessary to eliminate the risk. To that proposition there ought to be added this. One must balance the risk against the end to be achieved. If this accident had occurred in a commercial enterprise without any emergency there could be no doubt that the servant would succeed. But the commercial end to make profit is very different from the human end to save life or limb. The saving of life or limb justifies taking considerable risk, and I am glad to say there have never been wanting in this country men of courage ready to take those risks, notably in the Fire Service.
In this case the risk involved in sending out the lorry was not so great as to prohibit the attempt to save life. I quite agree that fire engines, ambulances and doctors' cars should not shoot past the traffic lights when they show a red light. That is because the risk is too great to warrant the incurring of the danger. It is always a question of balancing the risk against the end.!
[ Bailii ]
 
Southport Corporation v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1954] EWCA Civ 5; (1954) 118 JP 411; [1954] 2 QB 182; [1954] 2 All ER 561; [1954] 3 WLR 200; [1954] 1 Lloyd's Rep 446
3 Jun 1954
CA
Denning, Morris LJJ
Nuisance, Negligence, Torts - Other
The defendant's tanker came aground, spilling fuel, for which the corporation claimed damages. The corporation appealed against rejection of that claim. Held: In order to support an action for private nuisance the defendant must have used his own land or some other land in such a way as injuriously to affect the enjoyment of the plaintiff's land. It was not an essential element in liability for a nuisance that it should emanate from land belonging to the defendant, although commonly it does.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Creed v McGeoch and Sons Ltd [1955] 1 WLR 1005; [1955] 3 All ER 123
1955

Ashworth J
Negligence, Health and Safety
The question of who is an occupier will depend on the particular facts of each case and especially upon the nature and extent of the occupation or control in fact enjoyed or exercised by the defendant over the premises. The defendant contractor was held to be the occupier only of the length of the road under construction but not the land flanking the road.
1 Citers



 
 Perry v Thomas Wrigley Ltd; 1955 - [1955] 3 All ER 243; [1955] 1 WLR 1164
 
John Summers and Sons Ltd v Frost [1955] AC 740; [1955] 1 All ER 870
1955
HL
Viscount Simonds, Lord Reid
Health and Safety, Negligence
The normal rule that penal statutes must be strictly construed has not been allowed to stand in the way of the protection given to the workman by the statutory language. The House considered the requirement under section 14(1) of the 1937 Act that "Every dangerous part of any machinery … shall be securely fenced unless it is in such a position or of such construction as to be as safe to every person employed or working on the premises as it would be if securely fenced", and had applied to the concept of dangerousness an approach dating back to Hindle v Birtwhistle [1897] 1 QB 192, namely that a machine or part is dangerous "if in the ordinary course of human affairs danger may reasonably be anticipated from the use of them without protection", and that it was "impossible to say that because an accident had happened once therefore the machine was dangerous". Lords Reid and Keith at pp 765-766 and 774 expressly endorsed the relevance of determining whether the degree of danger was such that there was "a reasonably foreseeable cause of injury".
Lord Reid aid that an employer considering the use of dangerous equipment must allow for possible lapses by a workman.
Viscount Simonds said that it was elementary that it is necessary to consider not only the risk run by a skilled and careful man who never relaxes his vigilance.
Factories Act 1937 14(1)
1 Citers


 
Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Southport Corporation [1955] 3 All ER 864; [1956] AC 218
1955
HL
Earl Jowitt
Nuisance, Negligence
A tanker, the Inverpool, was grounded in difficult weather by its master when he feared its back was broken. Substantial volumes of oil leaked, and the local authority sought to recover the costs of the clean up. At first instance, the defence of necessity had succeeded, but this wa reversed at the Court of Apeal. Held: The appeal was dismissed.
1 Cites


 
Williams v Owen [1955] 1 WLR 1293
1955
QBD
Finnemore J
Negligence, Torts - Other
Mr Williams left his car overnight in the hotel garage. A fire broke out and destroyed his car. Held: The strict liability of an innkeeper was limited to loss of his guest's goods rather than to their destruction.
As to section 86 of the 1774 Act, he said: "I think that this liability of the innkeeper was a custom of the realm. It is true it is embodied in common law rules, but then common law is the legal expression of custom, and it seems to me that that also would be an answer in this particular case. I suppose that by 1774 the legislature had appreciated what Lord Goddard CJ laid down in Sochacki v Sas: "Everybody knows fires occur through accidents which happen without negligence on anybody's part." Parliament in 1774 apparently thought it right that they should make it plain that whatever customs or usages there were to the contrary, in this country a man should not be held to be responsible for a fire which occurred accidentally - which I take to mean "without negligence on his part."
Those are two points which I think would be enough to decide that there is in this case no absolute liability on the part of the innkeeper, first, because there was injury to the car and not theft or loss; and, secondly, because, in any event, as it was a fire the Act of 1774 would limit the liability of the innkeeper, so far as a fire is concerned."
Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 86
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Cameron v Hamilton's Auction Marts Ltd; 1955 - 1955 SLT (Sh Ct) 74

 
 Randall v Tarrant; CA 1955 - [1955] 1 WLR 255

 
 Angus v National Coal Board; SCS 9-Feb-1955 - [1955] ScotCS CSIH_1; 1955 SLT 245

 
 Carmarthenshire County Council v Lewis; HL 17-Feb-1955 - [1955] 1 All ER 565 HL(E); [1955] 2 WLR 517; [1955] AC 549; [1955] UKHL 2

 
 Morris v West Hartlepool Steam Navigation; HL 1956 - [1956] AC 552
 
Slater v Clay Cross Co Ltd [1956] 2 QB 264; [1956] 3 WLR 236
1956

Lord Denning MR
Negligence
The plaintiff was injured walking down a narrow railway tunnel. The tunnel had been regularly used by locals as a short cut. Held: Though there was a risk in doing so, that did not mean that she had accepted also the risk that the train driver would drive negligently. The chance which she took was no doubt limited to the danger from a train operated properly, in the 'ordinary and accustomed way'. Lord Denning MR said: "knowledge of the danger is only a bar where the party is free to act on it so that the injury can be said to be due solely to his own fault . . Where knowledge of the danger is not such as to render the accident solely the fault of the injured party, then it is not a bar to the action but only a ground for reducing the damages."
1 Citers



 
 Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd; CA 1956 - [1956] 2 QB 180

 
 Staveley Iron and Chemical Co Ltd v Jones; HL 1956 - [1956] AC 627
 
Perry v Kendricks Transport Ltd [1956] 1 WLR 85; [1956] 1 ALL ER 154; [1955] EWCA Civ 5
1956
CA
Parker LJ
Nuisance, Negligence
The Act gave a defence to liability for a fire which started accidentally, this did not cover a fire which started by negligence.
Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw; HL 1-Mar-1956 - [1956] 1 All ER 615 HL(Sc); [1956] 2 WLR 707; [1956] AC 613; 1956 SC (HL) 26; [1956] UKHL 1
 
Southern Railway of Peru Ltd v Owen [1957] AC 334; [1956] UKHL 4; 37 Tax Cas 602; [1956] 2 All ER 728
21 Jun 1956
HL
Lord Radcliffe
Negligence, Income Tax
When drawing up accounts where the company faces contingent laibilities and provision has to be made, the principles upon which such provisions are made does not depend upon (Lord Radcliffe) "any exact analysis of the legal form of the relevant obligation" but upon estimates of what in practice is likely to happen.
The House noted the difference between what is required by way of accounting standards in a financial statement so that a full picture may be presented on the financial position of the company and what is profit for the purpose of profits taxes. Lord Radcliffe said: "All this is very important, because, of course, accountants are very specially concerned with the problems that attend the true ascertainment of a year’s profit and the establishment of techniques that assist in this. But, for all that, there is nothing in the case that seems to me to fix on the point that is really the heart of this appeal. The requirements that an auditor may make before signing a balance sheet (I assume that the words used in the case are meant to cover the statutory reference to the profit and loss account) do, no doubt, cover his opinion that that account gives a “true and fair view” of the profit for the financial year, but I do not think that such requirements are necessarily the same thing as the auditor’s opinion that some particular provision could not be omitted without compromising the true and fair view. It is not possible completely to equate the balance shown by a company’s profit and loss account with the balance of profit arising from the trade for the year.’
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
J Doltis Limited v Issac Braithwaite and Sons (Engineers) Limited [1957] 1 Ll L Rep 522
1957


Negligence

1 Citers


 
Billings (AC) and Sons Ltd v Riden [1958] AC 240; [1957] 3 WLR 496; [1957] 3 All ER 1; [1957] UKHL 1; [1957] 1 QB 46
1957
HL
Lord Somervell of Harrow, Lord Cohen, Lord Reid
Negligence, Land
A building contractor may assume a duty of care to a visitor, though the contractor was not viewed as the occupier, the occupier being separately liable to the injured plaintiff. However, "if the Plaintiff knew the danger, either because he was warned or from his own knowledge or observation, the question is whether the danger was such that in the circumstances no sensible man would have incurred it or, in other words, whether the Plaintiff's exposing himself to the danger was a want of common or ordinary prudence on his part. If it was not, then the fact that he voluntarily or knowingly incurred the danger does not entitle the defendant to escape from liability."
Lord Reid said: "There may be many cases in which warning is an adequate discharge of the duty . . but there are other cases when that is not so" and illustrated this view by reference to case law. He continued: "The conclusion to be drawn from these cases appears to me to be that there is no magic in giving a warning. If the plaintiff knew the danger, either because he was warned or from his own knowledge and observation, the question is whether the danger was such that in the circumstances no sensible man would have incurred it or, in other words, whether the plaintiff's exposing himself to the danger was a want of common or ordinary prudence on his part. If it was not, the fact that he voluntarily or knowingly incurred the danger does not entitle the defendant to escape from liability." The laintiff need not be a "paragon of circumspection".
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Nicholson v Atlas Steel Foundry and Engineering Co Ltd; HL 1957 - [1957] 1 WLR 613; [1957] 1 All ER 776
 
Balfour v Barty-King [1957] 1 ALL ER 156; [1957] 1 QB 496
1957

Lord Goddard
Negligence
A fire started as the result of the negligent use of a blow torch by an independent contractor, damaging the plaintiff's property. The use of fire had, therefore, been deliberate. The plaintiff argued that "If negligence be shown, it matters not against whom, the fire is not accidental." Held: The claim succeeded. The existence of negligence in the defendant's agent was enough to set aside the operation of the 1774 Act.
Lord Goddard said: "The precise meaning to be attached to "accidentally" has not been determined, but it is clear from these last two cited cases that where the fire is caused by negligence it is not to be regarded as accidental. Although there is a difference of opinion among eminent text writers whether at common law the liability was absolute or depended on negligence, at the present day it can safely be said that a person in whose house a fire is caused by negligence is liable if it spreads to that of his neighbour, and this is true whether the negligence is his own or that of his servant or his guest, but he is not liable if the fire is caused by a stranger.
Who, then, is a stranger? Clearly a trespasser would be in that category, but if a man is liable for the negligent act of his guest, it is, indeed, difficult to see why he is not liable for the act of a contractor whom he has invited to his house to do work on it, and who does the work in a negligent manner."
Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 86
1 Citers



 
 Richards v W F White and Co; 1957 - [1957] 1 Lloyd's Reports 367
 
Pigney v Pointers Transport Services Ltd [1957] 1 WLR 1121
1957

Pilcher J
Negligence, Personal Injury
Mr Pigney had suffered severe head injuries in an accident in the course of his employment with the defendant. He committed suicide eighteen months later. Held: The court considered whether the accident could be the cause of the suicide: "It is reasonably clear that when the deceased hanged himself he was not insane under the M'Naughten Rules. I should infer that the deceased must have known what he was doing when he took his own life and must have known that what he was doing was wrong. To put the matter in ordinary language, the deceased took his life in a fit of depression brought about by a condition of acute anxiety neurosis induced by the accident and injury which he had sustained eighteen months earlier.
On these facts I have to make up my mind whether the suicide of the deceased constituted a novus actus interveniens which serves to break the chain of causation between his injury and his death, or whether upon the ordinary principles which cover remoteness of damage in cases of tort, the death of the deceased man was caused by the injury he received due to the defendants' lack of care for his safety. I have no doubt on the evidence that the deceased would not have committed suicide if he had not been in a condition of acute neurotic depression induced by the accident. In this sense the injury which he sustained in the accident was a causa sine qua non of the accident. It is equally clear that the immediate cause of his death was that he hanged himself in a fit of acute depression. That he might do this was clearly a matter which could not reasonably have been foreseen by the defendants.
. . . I have next to consider whether the fact that the deceased took his own life at a time when he was, as I find, sane under the M'Naughten Rules debars his widow and administratrix from successfully prosecuting her claim against the defendants under the Fatal Accidents Act on the ground of public policy. . . . I prefer to base my decision on the grounds already stated, namely, that the deceased's irrational and no doubt felonious act in taking his own life did not break the chain of causation between his accident and his death."
1 Citers


 
Woods v Martins Bank Ltd [1958] 3 All ER 166; [1958] 1 WLR 1018; [1959] 1 QB 55
1958

Salmon J
Banking, Negligence, Litigation Practice
If a bank chooses to give advice to a customer, then the Bank’s obligation is to advise with ordinary skill and care. The liability is primarily on contract: “In my judgment, the limits of a banker’s business cannot be laid down as a matter of law. The nature of such a business must in each case be a matter of fact . .” and “I find that it was and is within the scope of the Defendant Bank’s business to advise on all financial matters and that as they did advise him they owed a duty to the Plaintiff to advise him with reasonable care and skill.”
Salmon J discussed the duty of the lawyers for a party to make full disclosure: "It cannot be too clearly understood that solicitors owe a duty to the court, as officers of the court to make sure, as far as possible, that no relevant documents have been omitted from their client's list".
Salmon J discussed the duties of legal advisers: "it cannot be too clearly understood that solicitors owe a duty to the court, as officers of the court, to go through the documents disclosed by their client to make sure, as far as possible, that no relevant documents have been omitted from their client's [list]."
1 Citers


 
Green v Fibreglass Ltd [1958] 2 QB 245
1958


Negligence
The law might impose a duty of care which was non-delegable.
1 Citers


 
Davie v New Merton Board Mills [1958] 1 All ER 67
1958
CA
Parker LJ
Negligence
Parker LJ pointed out that the reasoning in Biddle was inconsistent with other decisions to the effect that there is no duty of care in respect of premises over which the master has no control, but it is consistent with alternative ratios that the duty had been discharged.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Schuster v City of New York 154 NE2d 534; 5 NY2d 75; 180 NYS2d 265; 5 NY 2d 75
1958


Police, Negligence, International
Court of Appeals of New York - The victim was a public spirited young man whose murder had no obvious explanation other than retribution for his cooperation with the police. Held: It may be possible to create a case of circumstantial evidence so strong as to lead the mind inevitably to the conclusion that injury to a person who supplied information to the police resulted from his having supplied such information.
1 Citers


 
Cowan v National Coal Board 1958 SLT 19
1958

Lord Cameron
Negligence, Damages
An employee of the defenders suffered an injury to his eye in the course of his employment. He became nervous and depressed and committed suicide about four months after the accident. His widow and children sought damages from the National Coal Board for his death. Held: The House assoilized the defenders on the ground that the employee's suicide was not reasonably foreseeable.
Lord Cameron: "I think that the true test of whether the death of the deceased was caused by the negligence of the defenders is whether the death naturally and directly arose out of the supposed wrong done to him and was therefore such a consequence as might reasonably be supposed to have been in the view of the wrongdoer. This introduces the idea of foreseeability, but it is the foreseeability of the 'reasonable man' - an impersonal test and one not dependent on the actual wrongdoer's own capacity for foresight." and "Now in the present case if it were held to be established that the deceased had received a comparatively moderate injury through the negligence of the defenders and had thereafter had become depressed and worried because of fear for his future working capacity or physical health and then had committed suicide under the influence of such depression and worry no doubt it might be inferred that the suicide was consequent upon that injury and the result of it, in the sense that but for the injury the suicide would in all probability not have occurred, but it does not follow that such a result could properly be described in the ordinary course of language as the 'natural and direct' result of the initial injury so as to make the delinquent liable in damages to the dependents of the deceased for the suicide. In the present case not only is there no proof of injury to the skull or brain but there is no physical connection between the initial injury (assuming it to have been caused by the defender's negligence and the assumed suicide."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Wilson v Tyneside Window Cleaning Co [1958] EWCA Civ 2; [1958] 2 WLR 900; [1958] 2 QB 110; [1958] 2 All ER 265
24 Apr 1958
CA
Jenkins, Pearce, Parker LJJ
Health and Safety, Negligence
Pearce LJ said that if an employer sends an employee to work, "for instance in a respectable private house", he could not be held negligent for not visiting the house himself "to see if the carpet in the hall created a trap".
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Gaynor v Allen [1959] 2 QB 403
1959

McNair J
Road Traffic, Police, Negligence
McNair J considered that when looking at the driving of a police officer, the standard remained that of the experienced skilled and careful driver. McNair considered a submission: "that if the motor-cyclist had been a civilian he would undoubtedly have been guilty of some negligence in driving at 60mph, though not necessarily entirely to blame for the accident. To show that a police officer was driving at that speed on a restricted road does not prima facie show negligence" Held: McNair J said: "The driver of this police motor-cycle on this occasion must be judged, as regards civil liability, in exactly the same way as any other driver of a motor-cycle in similar circumstances. He, like any other driver, owed a duty to the public to drive with due care and attention and without exposing the members of the public to unnecessary danger."
1 Citers


 
Baxter v Stockton-on-Tees Corporation [1959] 1 QB 441
1959

Jenkins LJ
Negligence
The court was asked to set out the responsibilities of the local authority as highway authority for any failure to construct, maintain and provide signage on its roads: "As to the hypothetical case against the county council, there is, as we have said, authority for the proposition that a highway authority constructing a road for the public use under statutory powers owes a duty to the public to take reasonable care to construct the road properly, so that it will be reasonably safe for the purposes for which it is intended to be used" and "It would not have sufficed for the purposes of a charge of negligence against the county council merely to show that the system of traffic signs or the lighting arrangements might have been improved upon."
1 Citers


 
Ward v T E Hopkins and Son Ltd [1959] 3 All ER 225
1959


Negligence, Personal Injury
It is for the court to decide whether a person counts as a rescuer with entitlement to damages for psychiatric injury after witnessing an accident.

 
Sullivan v Gallagher and Craig (No 2) 1959 SC 243; [1960] SLT 70
1959
SCS

Scotland, Evidence, Negligence
The pursuer was injured at work. As a dock worker he was asked to operate a rented truck. The court was asked whether the employer was under a duty to inspect.


 
 Davie v New Merton Board Mills Ltd; HL 1959 - [1959] AC 604; [1959] 1 All ER 346; [1959] 2 WLR 331; [1959] 2 Lloyds Rep 587
 
Baker v TE Hopkins and Son Ltd [1959] EWCA Civ 4; [1959] 1 WLR 966; [1959] 3 All ER 225
24 Jul 1959
CA
Morris, Ormerod, Willmer LJJ
Health and Safety, Negligence, Personal Injury
The defendant had employed to clean a well. In error a petrol pump was sued, which discharged carbon monoxide into the well. On two workers getting into difficulties, a doctor sought to rescue them. All three died in the well. The employer denied negligence as regards the death of the Doctor. Held: " Bearing in mind that danger invites rescue, the court should not be astute to accept criticism of the rescuer's conduct from the wrongdoer who created the danger. Moreover, I think it should be remembered that it is fatally easy to be wise after the event. It is not enough that, when all the evidence has been sifted and all the facts ascertained in the calm and deliberate atmosphere of a court of law, the rescuer's conduct can be shown ex post facto to have been misguided or foolhardy. He is entitled to be judged in the light of the situation as it appeared to him at the time, i.e., in a context of immediate and pressing emergency. Here Dr. Baker was faced with a situation in which two men were in danger of speedy death at the bottom of the well, unless something were done very quickly. He was a doctor, and he had been specially summoned to help. Any man of courage in his position would have felt impelled to act, even at the risk of his own safety. Time was pressing; immediate action was necessary if the men in danger were to be helped; there was virtually no opportunity for reflection, or for estimating the risks involved in an act of rescue. If Dr. Baker in such circumstances had instinctively gone straight down the well, without stopping to take any precautions at all, it would, I think, have been difficult enough to criticise him. But in point of fact he did take the very wise precaution of securing himself with a rope, whereby those on the surface could pull him up if he himself were overcome. The immediate cause of his death was the sheer mischance of the rope becoming caught on some obstruction, so as to make it impossible for those on the surface to pull him to safety. I do not think that, having regard to the emergency in which he was acting, he is to be blamed for not foreseeing and guarding against the possibility of such a mischance. On the contrary, I entirely agree with the view expressed by the judge that the defendants, whose negligence brought about the danger, must accept the risk of mischances of this kind. In all the circumstances, I find it impossible to accept the contention that Dr. Baker was guilty of any negligence either causing or contributing to his death."
[ Bailii ]
 
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