swarb.co.uk - law index
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Negligence - From: 1900 To: 1929
This page lists 53 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.
Beard v London General Omnibus Company [1900] 2 QB 53; [1900-3] All ER Rep 112; [1900] LJQB 895; [1900] 83 LT 362; [1900] 48 WR 658; [1900] 16 TLR 499
1900
CA
Negligence, Vicarious Liability
One of the defendant's conductors, in order to save time, drove the bus quickly around some side streets, negligently injuring the plaintiff, who now sought damages against the bus company. Held: The plaintiff had failed to provide any evidence that the conductor had been authorised to drive the bus, and therefore failed to establish that they had any resonsibility in negligence for his acts. The action failed.
De Lasalle v Guildford; CA 1901 - [1900-3] All ER 495; [1901] 2 KB 215
Cooper v Caledonian Railway Co (1902) 4 F 880
1902
Scotland, Damages, Negligence
Recovery of damages for psychiatric injury.
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Dublin United Tramways Co Ltd v Martin Fitzgerald; HL 1903 - [1903] AC 99
Gordon v M'Hardy (1903) 6 F 210
1903
Lord Justice-Clerk
Negligence, Contract, Scotland
The pursuer sought to recover damages from a retail grocer on account of the death of his son by ptomaine poisoning, caused by eating tinned salmon purchased from the defender. The pursuer averred that the tin, when sold, was dented, but he did not suggest that the grocer had cut through the metal and allowed air to get in, or had otherwise caused injury to the contents. Held: The action was irrelevant: "I do not see how the defender could have examined the tin of salmon which he is alleged to have sold without destroying the very condition which the manufacturer had established in order to preserve the contents, the tin not being intended to be opened until immediately before use."
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Earl v Lubbock [1905] 1 KB 253
1905
CA
Sir Richard Henn Collins MR, Stirling LJ, Mathew LJ
Negligence, Employment
The plaintiff was injured when a wheel came off a van which he was driving for his employer, and which it was the duty of the defendant, under contract with the employer, to keep in repair. The county court judge and the Divisional Court both hold that, even if negligence was proved, the action would not lie. Held: The defendant was under no duty to the plaintiff and that there was no cause of action.
Matthew LJ said: "The argument of counsel for the plaintiff was that the defendant's servants had been negligent in the performance of the contract with the owners of the van, and that it followed as a, matter of law that anyone in their employment, or, indeed, anyone else who sustained an injury traceable to that negligence, had a cause of action against the defendant. It is impossible to accept such a wide proposition, and, indeed, it is difficult to see how, if it were the law, trade could be carried on. No prudent man would contract to make or repair what the employer intended to permit others to use in the way of his trade."
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Cavalier v Pope; HL 22-Jun-1906 - [1906] AC 428; [1906] UKHL 1
Hastie v Magistrates of Edinburgh 1907 SC 1102
1907
Lord President
Negligence
There are certain risks against which the law, in accordance with the dictates of common sense, does not give protection - such risks are "just one of the results of the world as we find it".
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Biddle v Hart [1907] 1 KB 649
1907
Lord Scroll
Negligence
A stevedore's workman, whilst unloading a ship, was injured owing to a defect in the tackle, and he was suing his master. The learned Judge withdrew the case from the jury, on the ground that the stevedore was not responsible for a defect in the ship's tackle because the tackle did not belong to him. Held: Lord Scroll said: "In my opinion, if the employer uses plant which is net his own for the purpose of doing something which he has engaged to do, it cannot possibly be said that he has no duty whatever in relation to that plant. Otherwise he would be able to take anything that came from anybody and to use anything in the work he was engaged upon without making any inquiry at all, and then say, in the event of an injury arising from a defect in the plant, that he had nothing to do with it, and so escape liability. That, to my mind, is unreasonable, and is not consistent with the second section. What I take to be the meaning of that is that if the employer uses plant which does not belong to him, he may have a duty in regard to the persons employed to take reasonable care to see that it is proper for the purpose for which it is need. It may be that in a case of this character, although he had that duty, yet, if he had dealt with these shipowners before and had never had any cause for complaint, the jury might think that he had reasonably discharged that duty. On the other hand, when you have evidence that the plant was old and had been in use for a long time, the jury might say they ware not satisfied that reasonable care had been taken to see that it was in a proper condition. Once establish the duty the question la, What would the jury consider a discharge of that duty?".
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Stevenson v Glasgow Corporation 1908 SC 1034
1908
Lord M'Laren
Negligence, Land
Lord M'Laren said: "in a town, as well as in the country, there are physical features which may be productive of injury to careless persons or to young children against which it is impossible to guard by protective measures. The situation of a town on the banks of a river is a familiar feature; and whether the stream be sluggish like the Clyde at Glasgow, or swift and variable like the Ness at Inverness, or the Tay at Perth, there is always danger to the individual who may be so unfortunate as to fall into the stream. But in none of these places has it been found necessary to fence the river to prevent children or careless persons from falling into the water. Now, as the common law is just the formal statement of the results and conclusions of the common sense of mankind, I come without difficulty to the conclusion that precautions which have been rejected by common sense as unnecessary and inconvenient are not required by the law."
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De La Bere v Pearson Ltd [1904-7] All ER Rep 755; [1908] 1 KB 280
1908
Vaughan Williams LJ, Barnes P
Negligence, Media
The defendant newspaper offered that its editor would give financial advice to readers who cared to seek it. He answered one enquiry for the name of a good stockbroker, with a reference to a person who, had he made enquiries, he would have discovered to be an undischarged bankrupt, and the plaintiff sought damages having reied upon the advice. Held: There was sufficient consideration in the plaintiff consenting to the publication of his letter in the newspaper (Vaughan Williams). The consideration lay in the plaintiff addressing the inquiry (Barnes P)
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Cooke v Midland Great Western Railway of Ireland; HL 1909 - [1909] AC 229 HL(I); [1908-10] All ER 16
Dominion Natural Gas Co Ltd v Collins [1909] AC 640
1909
Lord Dunedin
Negligence
The defendants had installed a gas apparatus to provide natural gas on the premises of a railway company. They had installed a regulator to control the pressure and their men negligently made an escape-valve discharge into the building instead of into the open air. The railway workmen, the plaintiffs, were injured by an explosion in the premises. Held: They were liable. Those who sent forth inherently dangerous articles were subject to a common law duty to take precautions. Though there was no relation of contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants: "There may be, however, in the case of anyone performing an operation, or setting up and installing a machine, a relationship of duty. What that duty is will vary according to the subject-matter of the things involved. It has, however, again and again been held that in the case of articles dangerous in themselves, such as loaded firearms, poisons, explosives, and other things ejusdem generis, there is a peculiar duty to take precaution imposed upon those who send forth or install such articles when it is necessarily the case that other parties will come within their proximity."
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Kemp and Dougall v Darngavil Coal Co 1909 S C 1314
1909
Lord Kinnear
Negligence, Scotland
A man cannot be charged with negligence if he has no obligation to exercise diligence.
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Morton v William Dixon Ltd [1909] ScotCS CSIH_5
19 Mar 1909
IHCS
Lord President Dunedin
Negligence, Employment
set out the liability of an employer: "Where the negligence of the employer consists of what I may call a fault of omission, I think it is absolutely necessary that the proof of that fault of omission should be one of two kinds, either - to shew that the thing which he did not do was a thing which was commonly done by other persons in like circumstances, or - to shew that it was a thing which was so obviously wanted that it would be folly in anyone to neglect to provide it."Caparo Industries
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[ Bailii ]
Parsons v Barclay and Co Ltd and Goddard; CA 1910 - (1910) 103 LT 196; [1908-10] All ER Rep 429; [1910] 26 TLR 628
Grand Trunk Railway Co of Canada v Barnett; PC 1911 - [1911] AC 361 PC
Clelland v Robb; 1911 - 1911 SC 253
Blacker v Lake and Elliot Ld (1912) 106 LT 533
1912
HL
Lord Sumner
Contract, Negligence
A brazing lamp which, by exploding owing to a latent defect, injured a person other than the purchaser of it, and the vendor was held not liable to the party injured. The House considered earlier cases on liability for defectively manufactured goods: "The breach of the defendant's contract with A. to use care and skill in and about the manufacture or repair of an article does not of itself give any cause of action to B. when he is injured by reason of the article proving to be defective."
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Latham v R Johnson and Nephew Ltd; CA 1913 - [1913] 1 KB 398
White v Steadman; 1913 - [1913] 3 KB 340
Bates v Batey & Ld; 1913 - [1913] 3 KB 351
British Columbia Electric Railway Co Ltd v Loach; HL 1916 - [1916] 1 AC 717
Glamorgan Coal Company Ltd v Glamorganshire Standing Joint Committee [1916] 2 KB 206
1916
CA
Pickford LJ, Viscount Finlay, Lord Carson
Negligence, Police
The court considered the duties on police constables to protect property. Held. Pickford LJ said: "[The defendants] are the police authority and have to make proper police arrangements to maintain the peace. If one party to a dispute is threatened with violence by the other party he is entitled to protection from such violence whether his contention in the dispute be right or wrong."
. . and "If one party to a dispute is threatened with violence by the other party he is entitled to protection from such violence whether his contention in the dispute be right or wrong, and to allow the police authority to deny him protection from that violence unless he pays all the expense in addition to the contribution which with other ratepayers he makes to the support of the police is only one degree less dangerous than to allow that authority to decide which party is right in the dispute and grant or withhold protection accordingly. There is a moral duty on each party to the dispute to do nothing to aggravate it and to take reasonable means of self-protection, but the discharge of this duty by them is not a condition precedent to the discharge by the police authority of their own duty."
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MacPherson v Buick Motor Co; 1916 - (1916) 217 NY 382
Robinson v National Bank of Scotland [1916] SC (HL) 154; [1916] UKHL 4; 1916 1 SLT 336
10 Apr 1916
HL
Lord Haldane, Earl Loreburn
Scotland, Negligence, Torts - Other, Banking
The pursuer claimed for false and fraudulent misrepresentation againt his bankers. Held: A duty of care is not only owed in cases of fiduciary relationship in the narrow sense of relationships which had been recognised by the court of Chancery as being of a fiduciary character. There are other special relationships.
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[ Bailii ]
Nash v Rochford Rural District Council [1917] 1 KB 384
1917
CA
Warrington LJ, Scrutton LJ
Local Government, Negligence
A claim was made against the local highway authority for personal injury resulting from the defective construction of a highway drain. The plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant highway authority had been responsible for the construction of the drain in question, but did satisfy the court of first instance that the drain had been constructed by the defendant's predecessors in title and that their liability passed to the defendant by virtue of section 25 of the 1894 Act which transferred all rights and liabilities of the previous highway authorities. Held: "liability" within the meaning of section 25 of the 1894 Act was limited to liabilities that have already accrued at the time of transfer, as opposed to "potential or contingent" liabilities. However the latter alternative would be inconsistent with the doctrine that highway authorities are not responsible for nonfeasance and that it was strongly influenced by this consideration. Warrington LJ: "Would the provisions of the Act of 1894 render the district council liable for the consequences of the negligent act of the surveyor? To so hold would, I think, be inconsistent with the doctrine now well established that a highway authority is responsible for misfeasance only, and though of course it is competent to Parliament to abolish that doctrine altogether, or to make it inapplicable where the act of misfeasance is that of a preceding authority, I do not think one ought to hold that such a result has happened unless the words are clear. In the present case I cannot find either in s.25 or in the definition in s.100 any sufficient intention to pass on the responsibility for a wrongful act not their own and by itself affording no cause of action. The preceding authority was not in fact under any liability inasmuch as the damage essential to the existence of liability had not arisen."
Local Government Act 1894 25
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Coldman v Hill; CA 1918 - 120 LT 412; [1919] 1 KB 443; [1918] All ER Rep 438
Hood v Anchor Line (Henderson Bros) Ltd [1918] UKHL 2; [1918] AC 837; (1918) 2 SLT 118; 1918 SC (HL) 143
1 Jul 1918
HL
Scotland, Negligence, Personal Injury
[ Bailii ]
Musgrove v Pandelis [1919] 2 KB 43
2 Jan 1919
CA
Bankes LJ, Warrington LJ, Duke LJ
Nuisance, Negligence
The plaintiff ((M) rented first floor rooms above the defendant's garage. The defendant's employee spilt petrol which was lit, and negligently failed to control it causing a fire, damaging the plaintiff's rooms. Held: The Act did not provide a defence if the fire started accidentally but was then continued and not extinguished by the negligence of the householder.
Bankes LJ set out of the common law before liability for fire was restricted by statute, saying: "A man was liable at common law for damage done by fire originating on his own property (1) for the mere escape of the fire; (2) if the fire was caused by the negligence of himself or his servants, or by his own wilful act; (3) upon the principle of Rylands v Fletcher. This principle was not then known by that name, because Rylands v Fletcher was not then decided; but it was an existing principle of the common law as I shall show presently." Filliter v Phippard had decided that a fire negligently begun was not protected by the statute; and asked: "Why, if that is the law as to the second head of liability, should it be otherwise as to the third head, the liability on the principle of Rylands v Fletcher? If that liability existed, there is no reason why the statute should alter it and yet leave untouched the liability for fire caused by negligence or design. That the principle of Rylands v Fletcher existed long before that case was decided is plain. In Vaughan v Menlove Tindal CJ says: "There is a rule of law which says you must so enjoy your own property as not to injure that of another." Park J says: "Although the facts in this case are new in specie, they fall within a principle long established, that a man must so use his own property as not to injure that of others." Rylands v Fletcher is merely an illustration of that old principle, and in my opinion Lush J was right in saying that this case, if it falls within that principle, is not within the protection of the statute."
Warrington LJ approved the comment of Lush J at first instance: "If this motor car with the petrol in its tank was potentially dangerous, such as a man's own fire, then it was the defendant's duty to see that the potential danger did not become an actual danger causing damage to his neighbour. The Act of Geo. 3 is no protection against that liability."
Duke LJ used different reasoning. Although he applied Rylands v Fletcher applied, he went on to consider whether the fire was accidental for the purposes of section 86. He said: "I do not see how this case can be taken out of the principle of Rylands v Fletcher, which was thus stated by Lord Cairns LC in the very words of Blackburn J: "The true rule of law is, that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril." He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff's default or perhaps that it was the consequence of vis major or the act of God. In the present case there was petrol which was easily convertible into an inflammable vapour; there was the apparatus for producing a spark; and added to those there was a person supposed to control the combustion but inexperienced and unequal to the task. Taking together the presence of the petrol, and the production of the inflammable gas, or those combustibles together with the inexperience of the person placed in charge of them, it is impossible to say that this is not an instance of the principle laid down by Blackburn J."
. . "That would dispose of this case but for the defendant's contention that he is excused by s. 86 of the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act, 1774. In my opinion the terms of that enactment fall far short of showing a definite intention to relieve a defendant in such a case as this. The actions against which the statute gives protection are in respect of fires which shall accidentally begin. I have the greatest doubt whether this fire began accidentally at any stage. If it was all one fire, it was begun not accidentally but intentionally. If progressive stages may be regarded it was not a fire which began accidentally without negligence at the stage when it became a conflagration involving goods and premises. The question may some day be discussed whether a fire, spreading from a domestic hearth, accidentally begins within the meaning of the Act, if such a fire should extend so as to involve the destruction of property or premises. I do not covet the task of the advocate who has to contend that it does. In the present case the fire, so far as it was a means of mischief, resulted from the negligent omission to turn off the petrol tap, an act which would have stopped the flow of petrol. All the witnesses who had any experience of such matters drew a distinction between fire in a carburettor, where the vapour can be instantly out off, and such a fire as occurred in this case. The learned judge has found that this fire was due to negligence. I cannot disagree with him. Whatever may be the effect of the Act of Geo. 3 upon the nice questions that have been discussed, this case is outside any possible protection of that statute."
Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774
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Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1920] AC 956
1920
HL
Lord Sumner
Negligence
The plaintiff had been successfully sued for a libel contained in a document which he had supplied to his accountant. Held: He could not recover the damages he had had to pay to the defamed party from his accountant, who had negligently left the document about so that it came to the former's attention.
Lord Sumner said: "In general, even though A is in fault, he is not responsible for injury to C which B, a stranger to him, deliberately chooses to do. Though A may have given the occasion for B's mischievous activity, B then becomes a new and independent cause."
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Hardy v Central London Railway Co [1920] 3 KB 459
1920
CA
Negligence
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M'Kibbin v Glasgow Corporation [1920] SC 590
1920
Lord Justice-Clerk Scott Dickson, Lord Dundas, Lord Salvesen
Scotland, Negligence
The pursuer, a woman with limited vision was injured falling into a hole for which the defender had responsibility. The defender replied that the hole was protected by a water hydrant. Held: The claim failed. There was evidence that the protection of the water hydrant was not adequate even as regards persons with good sight.
Lord Justice-Clerk Scott Dickson said: "I demur to the view that blind people are not entitled to walk about the streets unless accompanied by some person in charge of them . . this pursuer was entitled to be on the street; and was entitled, in my judgment, to assume that the street was reasonably safe for her."
Lord Dundas said: "It would not be easy to lay down in a sentence or a couple of sentences the whole law applicable to the subject; something must always depend upon the facts to which you are going to apply the law. I think in each case the jury would have to consider, with regard to a blind person, whether that blind person was, in the circumstances, fairly and reasonably treated by the Corporation or other defenders - whether he had or had not been duly warned and reasonably guarded."
Lord Salvesen (who was the presiding judge at the trial) said: "The streets of any city are open to be used by persons of more or less defective eyesight, hearing, and capacity and I think, as a general proposition in law, that the Magistrates must take note of that fact and, if they are guilty of negligence, they cannot escape the consequences by saying that a more vigilant person than the one who was injured would in all probability have escaped injury."
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In re Polemis and Furness, Withy and Co [1921] 3 KB 560
1921
CA
Scrutton L.J
Damages, Negligence
A wrongdoer was liable for all the direct consequences of his negligent act, even though those consequences could not reasonably have been anticipated. "Once the act is negligent, the fact that its exact operation was not foreseen is immaterial."
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Admiralty Commissioners v SS Volute (Owners), The Volute [1921] All ER Rep 193; [1922] 1 AC 129
1921
HL
Lord Birkenhead LC
Damages, Negligence
When assessing negligence the court must ask whether it was "so much mixed up with the state of things brought about" by the defendant that "in the ordinary plain common sense of this business" it must be regarded as having contributed to the accident. It is preferable to deal with causation as a question of fact "dealt with broadly, and upon common-sense principles as a jury would probably deal with it." There are cases where two acts of negligence "come so closely together, and the second act of negligence is so much mixed up with the state of things brought about by the first act that the party secondly negligent . . Might . . invoke the prior negligence as being part of the cause of the collision so as to make it a case for contribution."
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Everett v Griffiths; HL 1921 - [1921] 1 AC 631; 90 LJKB 737; 125 LT 230; 85 JP 140
Glasgow Corporation v Taylor; HL 18-Nov-1921 - [1922] 1 AC 44; 1922 SC (HL) 1; [1921] All ER Rep 1; [1921] UKHL 2; 1921 2 SLT 254; 29 ALR 846; [1921] UKHL 3
Hodge and Sons v Anglo-American Oil Co (1922) 12 Ll L Rep 183
1922
Scrutton LJ, Bankes LJ
Negligence
The plaintiffs, London barge repairers claimed after an explosion on the Anglo-American Oil Company's oil tank barge Warwick, when she was being repaired by the plaintiffs, to whom she had been sent for that purpose by the defendants. As a result of the explosion several lives were lost and considerable damage done. In the second action, which was in the nature of a test action, the plaintiff, a boilermaker employed by Messrs Hodge & Sons, claimed damages for personal injuries caused by the explosion. Held: Scrutton LJ said: "Personally, I do not understand the difference between a thing dangerous in itself, as poison, and a thing not dangerous as a class, but by negligent construction dangerous as a particular thing. The latter, if anything, seems the more dangerous of the two; it is a wolf in sheep's clothing instead of an obvious wolf." and "The law, therefore, seems to be: (1) That if the barge which has carried petrol is an article dangerous in itself, it is the duty of the owners to take proper and reasonable precautions to prevent its doing damage to people likely to come into contact with it. These precautions may be fulfilled by entrusting it to a competent person with reasonable warning of its dangerous character, if that danger is not obvious. If such precautions are not taken, the owner will be liable to third persons with whom he has no contact for damage done by the barge, which they could not have avoided with reasonable care. . . (2) If the barge which has carried petrol is not dangerous in itself, but becomes dangerous because it has been insufficiently cleaned, and the owner is ignorant of the danger, the owner is not liable for damage caused by it to persons with whom he has no contract. (Earl v Lubbock [1905] 1 K.B. 253) . . (3) In the case of a thing dangerous in itself, where either the danger is obvious or the owner has given proper warning to the person entrusted with it, not being his servant, the owner is not liable for negligence of such person causing injury to a third party; such negligence is nova causa interveniens."
Bankes LJ: "It is in these circumstances that the question of liability arises. The Anglo-American Oil Co were, in my opinion, under a double duty, (a) the duty of using reasonable means for securing the efficient cleaning out of the tank, and (b) the duty of giving any necessary warning of the dangerous character of the tank even after a proper and sufficient cleaning. The first duty, in my opinion, extended to all those who necessarily came into contact with the tank in the course of carrying out the repairs, including therefore the plaintiff Willmott. With regard to the second duty, a warning would not, in my opinion, be required where the person who would otherwise be entitled to warning was already aware of the danger, or [...] might reasonably be assumed to be aware of it. Messrs Miller obviously required no warning; they were perfectly well aware of the danger. Messrs Hodges were in relation to the Anglo-American Oil Co in a different position to Messrs Miller: but I assume that the Anglo-American Oil Co were aware that the barge was being sent to Messrs Hodges for repair. If so, Messrs Hodges would be entitled to a warning unless they, like Messrs Miller, are to be taken to have been aware of the danger. Having regard to what must be the state of knowledge among ship and barge repairers on the Thames as to the danger of dealing with cleaned petrol tanks, I think that the Anglo-American Oil Co were entitled to assume that Messrs Hodges needed no warning as to that danger. . . I do not think that the present is a case in which the Anglo-American Oil Co were under any duty to Messrs Hodges' workmen to give them any individual warning. Whether a warning to an employer of the dangerous character of an article sent to him for repair is a sufficient warning to the workmen directed by the employer to carry out those repairs must be a question of fact depending upon the particular circumstances of each case. There are in this case, in my opinion, no such special circumstances as placed the Anglo-American Oil Co under any duty to give any warning to the plaintiff Willmott or to the other employees of Messrs Hodges."
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Rutter v Palmer [1922] All ER Rep 367; [1922] 2 KB 87; [1922] 91 LJKB 657; [1922] 127 LT 419
1922
Scrutton LJ
Negligence, Contract
A party is not exempted by his contract from his own negligence 'unless adequate words are used.'
Scrutton LJ said: "For the present purposes a rougher test will serve. In construing an exemption clause certain general rules may be applied: First the defendant is not exempted from liability for the negligence of his servants unless adequate words are used; secondly, the liability of the defendant apart from the exempting words must be ascertained; then the particular clause in question must be considered; and if the only liability of the party pleading the exemption is a liability for negligence, the clause will more readily operate to exempt him.''
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United Zinc and Chemical Co v Britt (1922) 258 U S 268
1922
Holmes J
Negligence, International
There was no evidence of children being in the habit of going near the poisoned pool at issue. Speaking of trespassers, Holmes J said "the owner of the land would have owed no duty to remove even hidden danger; it would have been entitled to assume that they would obey the law and not trespass"
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Mercer v South Eastern and Chatham Railway Companies' Managing Committee [1922] 2 KB 549
1922
KBD
Negligence, Personal Injury
A claimant was knocked down by a train when he went through an unlocked gate onto the railway line. The defendants were held liable, because it was their practice, known to the plaintiff, to keep the gate locked when trains were passing, but the gate was left unlocked on this occasion.
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Fairman v Perpetual Investment Building Society [1923] AC 74; 92 LJKB 50
1923
HL
Lord Wrenbury, Lord Sumner, Lord Atkinson
Litigation Practice, Negligence, Landlord and Tenant
The defendants owned a block of flats that were tenanted. The plaintiff lived as a lodger with her sister in one of the flats. She was injured when walking down the steps from her flat; the steps were part of the common property under the control of the landlord. The plaintiff argued that she was an invitee of the landlord and thus was owed a higher standard of care than would have been owed to a licensee. Held: An invitee of a tenant was only a licensee of the landlord when using the stairway. In fact, the plaintiff would have lost on the facts, whether she was an invitee or a licensee, because the defect in the step on which she had slipped was perfectly obvious.
Lord Wrenbury stated: "There are some things which a reasonable person is entitled to assume, and as to which he is not blameworthy if he does not see them when if he had been on the alert and had looked he could have seen them." His Lordship then instanced the case of a staircase with a missing stair, or a ladder in which a rung has been removed, and went on to say that no reasonable person would expect that a step or a rung had been removed and added pungently: "he has nevertheless suffered from what has generally been called "a trap" although if had stopped and looked he would have seen that the step or rung had been removed. He was not guilty of negligence, he was not bound to look out for such an unexpected danger as that, although if he had proceeded cautiously and looked out it would have been obvious to him."
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Job Edwards Ltd v Birmingham Navigations Proprietors [1924] 1 KB 341
1923
Bailhache J
Negligence, Nuisance
Rubbish was tipped on land belonging to a canal company and on adjoining land belonging to mine owners. The rubbish on the mine owners' land was found to be on fire, and the canal company feared that the fire might spread to their own land. Having called on the mine owners to extinguish the fire, the canal company entered the mine owners' land (by agreement) and put out the fire. The court was asked as to whether the mine owners were liable to contribute to the cost. Held: The mine owners had no duty to prevent the spread of the fire: "where a fire occurs through no fault of the landowner, without his knowledge, and, as in this case, on matter brought on his land without his knowledge and against his will, he is not responsible for the spreading of such a fire to the adjoining land, but the neighbour is entitled to go upon his land and prevent the fire from spreading."
Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 86
1 Citers
Glasbrook Brothers Limited v Glamorgan County Council [1925] AC 270; [1924] UKHL 3
1925
HL
Viscount Cave LC, Viscount Finlay
Police, Negligence
A colliery manager asked for police protection for his colliery during a strike. He wanted police officers to be billeted on the premises. The senior police officer for the area was willing to provide protection by a mobile force, but he refused to billet police officers at the colliery unless the manager agreed to pay for the additional service at a specified rate. The manager promised to do so, but when the police submitted their bill the company refused to pay it on the ground that it was the duty of the police to prove necessary police protection without payment. Held: Any attempt by a police authority to extract payment for services which fell within the plain obligations of the police force should be firmly discountenanced by the courts. The police were however entitled to charge for special billeting of policemen at a colliery during a strike. It was lawful for the police to seek to charge for services which their public obligations would not otherwise oblige them to provide.
The police are under an absolute and unconditional obligation to take all steps which appear to them to be necessary for keeping the peace, for preventing crime or for protecting property from criminal injury.
Viscount Cave LC said: "No doubt there is an absolute and unconditional obligation binding the police authorities to take all steps which appear to them to be necessary for keeping the peace, for preventing crime, or for protecting property from criminal injury; and the public, who pay for this protection through the rates and taxes, cannot lawfully be called upon to make a further payment for that which is their right." and
"But it has always been recognized that, where individuals desire that services of a special kind which, though not within the obligations of a police authority, can most effectively be rendered by them, should be performed by members of the police force, the police authorities may (to use an expression which is found in the Police Pensions Act, 1890) "lend" the services of constables for that purpose in consideration of payment. Instances are the lending of constables on the occasions of large gatherings in and outside private premises, as on the occasions of weddings, athletic or boxing contests or race meetings, and the provision of constables at large railway stations." and
"There may be services rendered by the police which, although not within the scope of their absolute obligations to the public, may yet fall within their powers, and in such cases public policy does not forbid their performance."
Viscount Finlay said: "If a particular person desires protection of a special sort and the police can give this without interfering with the discharge of other duties elsewhere, it is difficult to see on what ground of public policy it should be illegal that a charge should be made in respect of special protection." and "There is no doubt that it is the duty of the police to give adequate protection to all persons and their property. In discharging this duty those in control of the police must exercise their judgment as to the manner in which the protection should be afforded."
Viscount Finlay said: "There is no doubt that it is the duty of the police to give adequate protection to all persons and to their property ... Beyond all question it is the duty of the police to give protection to the persons and property of all His Majesty's subjects."
1 Cites
1 Citers
[ Bailii ]
Reavis v Clan Line Steamers Ltd; 1925 - 1925 SC 725
Letang v Ottawa Electric Railway Co [1926] AC 725
1926
Negligence
To accept a plea of non fit injuria, there has to be a finding that the plaintiff freely and voluntarily, with full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk he ran, impliedly agreed to incur it.
1 Citers
The Calgarth [1927] P 93
1927
CA
Scrutton LJ
Negligence, Land
A ship foundered while using a navigable channel other than in the ordinary way of navigation. Scrutton LJ said: "When you invite a person into your house to use the staircase, you do not invite him to slide down the bannisters, you invite him to use the staircase in the ordinary way in which it is used."
1 Citers
Baron Vernon v Metagama; HL 19-Dec-1927 - [1927] UKHL 2; 1928 SLT 117; (1927-28) 29 Ll L Rep 253; 1928 SC (HL) 21
Dew v United British Steamship Co (1928) 139 LT 628
1928
CA
Negligence
1 Citers
Oliver v Saddler and Co; HL 1929 - [1929] AC 584
Mullen v Barr and Co Ld, and M'Gowan v Barr and Co Ld; 1929 - 1929 SC 461
Church v Dugdale and Adams Ltd (1929) 22 BWCC 444
1929
CA
Lord Hamworth MR
Negligence
The court was asked whether an employer was responsible in law to a workman who having been injured so as to leave the employer liable under the Workers' Compensation Acts, later committed suicide. Held: Lord Hamworth MR said: "It is necessary to find not merely that there has been suicide, not merely at the time of the suicide that there was some depression and some delusions, but you must find that the condition of the man was such that the accident disabled him from exercising a judgment, and in that sense caused the accident. If you find merely that in consequence of the accident he is brooding in fear of poverty, or in distress, or in a mental condition which is consistent with the condition of a person not suffering from the accident, there you do not find and are not entitled to draw the inference that his mind has become so unhinged as to dethrone his power of volition and in that sense there is no proof and no necessary connection between the accident and the suicide."
1 Citers
Addie (Robert) and Sons (Collieries) Ltd v Dumbreck [1929] AC 358; 1928 SC 547; [1929] UKHL 3; 1929 SC (HL) 51; [1929] AC 358
25 Feb 1929
HL
Negligence
No occupier is under any duty to potential trespassers, whether adults or children, to do anything to protect them from danger on his land, however likely it may be that they will come and run into danger and however lethal the danger may be.
1 Cites
1 Citers
[ Bailii ]
