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Natural Justice - From: 1994 To: 1994
This page lists 6 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.
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 Regina v The Joint Committee on Surgical Training ex parte Milner; Admn 4-May-1994 - [1994] 7 Admin LR 754
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 Regina v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Ex Parte Carroll; CA 20-May-1994 - Times, 20 May 1994
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Regina v Life Assurance Trust Regulatory Organisation Ltd Ex Parte Tee and Others Times, 30 May 1994
30 May 1994
CA
Natural Justice
LAUTRO should give right to be heard if serving prejudicial notice.
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Invalidity Benefit R(S) 1/94 Gazette, 15 June 1994
15 Jun 1994
SSC
Natural Justice
A tribunal member is not to use his own knowledge of a factual situation to help him make his decision without first giving the parties opportunity for comment.
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Regina v Inner West London Coroner Ex Parte Dallaglio, and Ex Parte Lockwood Croft Independent, 17 June 1994; Times, 16 June 1994; [1994] 4 All ER 139
16 Jun 1994
CA
Simon Brown LJ, Sir Thomas Bingham MR
Coroners, Natural Justice
A coroner's comment that the deceased's relative was 'unhinged' displayed a bias which was irreparable. "The description ‘apparent bias’ traditionally given to this head of bias is not entirely apt, for if despite the appearance of bias the court is able to examine all the relevant material and satisfy itself that there was no danger [possibility] of the alleged bias having in fact caused injustice, the impugned decision will be allowed to stand" and "the court’s task is to ascertain the relevant circumstances and ask itself whether, having regard to these circumstances, there was a real danger of bias on the part of HM Coroner for Inner West London in the sense that he might have unfairly regarded with disfavour the cases of the applicants as parties to an issue under consideration by him."
Simon Brown LJ analysed the case of R v Gough: "From R v. Gough I derive the following propositions: (1) Any court seised of a challenge on the ground of apparent bias must ascertain the relevant circumstances and consider all the evidence for itself so as to reach its own conclusion on the facts. (2) It necessarily follows that the factual position may appear quite differently as between the time when the challenge is launched and the time when it comes to be decided by the court. What may appear at the leave stage to be a strong case of justice `not manifestly and undoubtedly being seen to be done', may, following the court's investigation, nevertheless fail. Or, of course, although perhaps less probably, the case may have become stronger. (3) In reaching its conclusion the court `personifies the reasonable man'. (4) The question upon which the court must reach its own factual conclusion is this: is there a real danger of injustice having occurred as a result of bias? By 'real' is meant not without substance. A real danger clearly involves more than a minimal risk, less than a probability. One could, I think, as well speak of a real risk or a real possibility. (5) Injustice will have occurred as a result of bias `if the decision-maker unfairly regarded with disfavour the case of a party to the issue under consideration by him'. I take `unfairly regarded with disfavour' to mean `was pre-disposed or prejudiced against one party's case for reasons unconnected with the merits of the issue'. (6) A decision-maker may have unfairly regarded with disfavour one party's case either consciously or unconsciously. Where, as here, the applicants expressly disavow any suggestion of actual bias, it seems to me that the court must necessarily be asking itself whether there is a real danger that the decision-maker was unconsciously biased. (7) It will be seen, therefore, that by the time the legal challenge comes to be resolved, the court is no longer concerned strictly with the appearance of bias but rather with establishing the possibility that there was actual although unconscious bias."
1 Cites
1 Citers
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Webb and Hay v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41; (1994) 122 ALR 41; (1994) 68 ALJR 582
30 Jun 1994
Mason CJ and McHugh J
Commonwealth, Natural Justice, Evidence
(Australia) Criminal Law - Jury - Impartiality - Murder trial - Juror giving flowers to victim's mother - Whether juror or jury to be discharged Appropriate test - Reasonable apprehension of lack of impartiality or real danger of lack of impartiality.
Evidence - Criminal trial - Accomplice inculpating accused - Whether accomplice warning necessary - Nature of warning.
The test of whether a bias was found in a member of court because of personal links is whether such links give rise to a reasonable apprehension or suspicion on the part of a fair minded and informed member of the public that there might have been such a bias.
As to the test laid down in Gough: "In considering the merits of the test to be applied in a case where a juror is alleged to be biased, it is important to keep in mind that the appearance as well as the fact of impartiality is necessary to retain confidence in the administration of justice. Both the parties to the case and the general public must be satisfied that justice has not only been done but that it has been seen to be done. Of the various tests used to determine an allegation of bias, the reasonable apprehension test of bias is by far the most appropriate for protecting the appearance of impartiality. The test of 'reasonable likelihood' or 'real danger' of bias tends to emphasise the court's view of the facts. In that context, the trial judge's acceptance of explanations becomes of primary importance. Those two tests tend to place inadequate emphasis on the public perception of the irregular incident.
We do not think that it is possible to reconcile the decision in Gough with the decisions of this Court. In Gough, the House of Lords specifically rejected the reasonable suspicion test and the cases and judgments which had applied it in favour of a modified version of the reasonable likelihood test. In Watson, faced with the same conflict in the cases between the two tests, this Court preferred the reasonable suspicion or apprehension test. That test has been applied in this Court on no less than eight subsequent occasions. In the light of the decisions of this Court which hold that the reasonable apprehension or suspicion test is the correct test for determining a case of alleged bias against a judge, it is not possible to use the 'real danger' test as the general test for bias without rejecting the authority of those decisions.
"Moreover, nothing in the two speeches in the House of Lords in Gough contains any new insight that makes us think that we should re-examine a principle and a line of cases to which this Court has consistently adhered for the last eighteen years. On the contrary, there is a strong reason why we should continue to prefer the reasoning in our own cases to that of the House of Lords. In Gough, the House of Lords rejected the need to take account of the public perception of an incident which raises an issue of bias except in the case of a pecuniary interest. Behind this reasoning is the assumption that public confidence in the administration of justice will be maintained because the public will accept the conclusions of the judge. But the premise on which the decisions in this Court are based is that public confidence in the administration of justice is more likely to be maintained if the Court adopts a test that reflects the reaction of the ordinary reasonable member of the public to the irregularity in question. References to the reasonable apprehension of the 'lay observer', the 'fair-minded observer', the 'fair-minded, informed lay observer', 'fair-minded people', the 'reasonable or fair-minded observer', the 'parties or the public', and the `reasonable person' abound in the decisions of this Court and other courts in this country. They indicate that it is the court's view of the public's view, not the court's own view, which is determinative. If public confidence in the administration of justice is to be maintained, the approach that is taken by fair-minded and informed members of the public cannot be ignored. Indeed, as Toohey J. pointed out in Vakauta (1989) 167 CLR. at p.585 in considering whether an allegation of bias on the part of a judge has been made out, the public perception of the judiciary is not advanced by attributing to a fair-minded member of the public a knowledge of the law and the judicial process which ordinary experience suggests is not the case. That does not mean that the trial judge's opinions and findings are irrelevant. The fair-minded and informed observer would place great weight on the judge's view of the facts. Indeed, in many cases the fair-minded observer would be bound to evaluate the incident in terms of the judge's findings."
1 Cites
1 Citers
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