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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Natural Justice - From: 1970 To: 1979

This page lists 23 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.


 
 Gaiman v The National Association for Mental Health; ChD 1970 - [1970] 3 WLR 42; [1971] Ch 317; [1970] 2 All ER 362
 
Regina v Gaming Board for Great Britain, ex Parte Benaim [1970] EWCA Civ 7; [1970] 2 QB 417; [1970] 2 All ER 528; [1970] 2 WLR 1009
23 Mar 1970
CA
Lord Denning MR, Wilberforce L, Phillimore LJ
Licensing, Natural Justice
A Gaming Club, Crockfords, sought the restoration of its gaming licence. It had historically found ways of circumventing the earlier Gaming Acts restrictions. The 1968 Act created the Gaming Board to assess their probity. They challenged the refusal saying that the hearing had not observed the rules of natural justice.
Lord Denning MR said: "Seeing the evils that have led to this legislation, the Board can and should investigate the credentials of those who make application to them. They can and should receive information from the police in this country or abroad, who know something of them. They can, and should, receive information from any other reliable source. Much of it will be confidential. But that does not mean that the applicants are not to be given a chance of answering it. They must be given the chance, subject to this qualification? I do not think they need tell the applicant the source of their information, if that would put their informant in peril: or otherwise be contrary to the public interest. Even in a criminal trial, a witness cannot be asked who is his informer. "
Gaming Act 1960 - Gaming Act 1963 - Gaming Act 1968
[ Bailii ]

 
 Wiseman v Borneman; HL 1971 - [1971] AC 297; [1971] 3 All ER 275
 
Leary v National Union of Vehicle Builders [1971] Ch 34
1971

Megarry J
Employment, Natural Justice
The court faced questions on a trades union's decision as to the membership of the applicant. Held: As a general rule, a failure of natural justice could not be cured by a sufficiency of natural justice on appeal.
1 Citers



 
 Fleet Mortgage and Investment Company Limited v Lower Maisonette; 1972 - [1972] 1 WLR 765
 
Cassell and Co Ltd v Broome (No 2) [1972] AC 1136
24 Feb 1972
HL
Lord Kilbrandon
Natural Justice, Constitutional, Costs
Their Lordships varied an order for costs already made by the House in circumstances where the parties had not had a fair opportunity to address argument on the point. As the ultimate court of appeal, the House has power to correct any injustice caused by an earlier order. There is no relevant statutory limitation on the jurisdiction of the House in this regard and therefore its inherent jurisdiction remains unfettered. There is a constitutional right to freedom of expression in England.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Uxbridge Justices, ex parte Burbridge Times, 20 June 1972
20 Jun 1972

Lord Widgery CJ
Natural Justice
When considering the fairness of a particular tribunal hearing a case, the test was whether 'a reasonable and fair-minded person sitting in the court and' knowing all the relevant facts have a 'reasonable suspicion that a fair trial for' the applicant 'was not possible'."
1 Citers


 
Maxwell v Department of Trade and Industry [1974] QB 523; [1974] 2 All ER 122
1974
CA
Lord Denning MR
Natural Justice
The plaintiff complained that adverse findings had been made against him by inspectors acting under the companies acts. The inspectors conducted their inquiries in private and heard evidence from individuals. They then informed the persons in respect of whom adverse evidence had been given about the thrust of that evidence but did not provide them with a transcript of the evidence. No cross-examination of witnesses took place. Held: There was no obligation to furnish draft findings to those persons against whom adverse evidence had been given.
Lord Denning MR considered just what fairness demanded when writing a report which was critical of a person, saying: "Forbes J. [to whom the applicant had applied for an injunction to restrain the inspectors from proceeding with their investigation] thought that, in order to do what was fair, after hearing the evidence and studying the documents, the inspectors ought to come to a conclusion (which was necessarily tentative) and put the substance of that conclusion to the witness. He was led to that view by the observation of Sachs LJ in Re Pergamon Press Ltd [1970] 3 All ER at 544, [1971] Ch 405. I do not think that is right. Just think what it means. After hearing all the evidence the inspectors have to sit down and come to tentative conclusions. If these are such as to be critical of any of the witnesses, they have to re-open the inquiry, recall those witnesses, and put to them the criticisms which they are disposed to make. What will be the response of those witnesses? They will at once want to refute the tentative conclusions by calling other witnesses, or by asking for further investigations. In short, the inquiry will develop into a series of minor trials in which a witness will be accused of misconduct and seek to answer it. That would hold up the inquiry indefinitely. I do not think it is necessary. It is sufficient for the inspectors to put the points to the witnesses as and when they come in the first place. After hearing the evidence, the inspectors have to come to their conclusions. These need not be tentative in the least. They can be final and definite, ready for their report."
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Race Relations Board, Ex parte Selvarajan; CA 1975 - [1975] 1 WLR 1686; [1976] 1 All ER 12

 
 Fairmount Investments Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment; HL 1976 - [1976] 2 EGLR 18; [1976] 1 WLR 1255; [1976] 2 All ER 865

 
 Regina v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council, ex parte Hook; CA 1976 - [1976] 1 WLR 1052

 
 Regina v The Secretary of State for the Environment, ex Parte Ostler; CA 16-Mar-1976 - [1976] EWCA Civ 6; [1977] 1 QB 122
 
Maharaj v Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago [1977] 1 All ER 411
11 Oct 1976
PC
Lord Salmon
Commonwealth, Contempt of Court, Natural Justice
A judge of the High Court had committed the barrister appellant to prison for seven days for contempt in the face of the court. The barrister was granted special leave to appeal to the Board against the committal order. Held: Allowing the appeal. The judge had, however inadvertently, failed to serve a fundamental rule of natural justice, that a person accused of an offence should be told plainly enough to give him an opportunity to put forward any expkanation or excuse that he may wish to advance: "In charging the appellant with contempt, Maharaj J did not make plain to him the particulars of the specific nature of the contempt with which he was charged. This must usually be done before an alleged contemnor can properly be convicted and punished . . In their Lordships' view, justice certainly demanded that the judge should have done so in this particular case. Their Lordships are satisfied that his failure to explain that the contempt with which he intended to charge the appellant was what the judge has described in hiw written reasons as a 'vicious attack on the integrity of the Court' vitiates the committal for contempt."
Lord Salmon said: "Their Lordships recognise how important it is not to waste judicial time. But if this can be avoided only by finding against a party without giving him a fair chance of being heard, then such a price for saving judicial time is far too high."
Lord Salmon said: "No point was taken on the hearing of the petition for special leave that such an appeal does not lie to Her Majesty in Council, nor was any such point taken in the respondent's case. The point was however raised for the first time as a preliminary objection at the hearing of this appeal. Their Lordships can deal with it quite shortly.
It was conceded on behalf of the respondent that the point would have been unarguable before 1962, since it has long been well settled that it is competent for Her Majesty in Council to entertain appeals against orders of courts of record overseas imposing penalties for contempt of court. Their Lordships consider that the point is equally unarguable now for they can discover nothing in the Trinidad and Tobago Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1962 or the Trinidad and Tobago (Procedure in Appeals to Privy Council) Order in Council 1962 which touches Her Majesty's power in Council to entertain appeals against orders of courts of record overseas imposing penalties for contempt of court."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Home Secretary, ex parte Hosenball; CA 1977 - [1977] 1 WLR 766; [1977] 3 All ER 452
 
Rustenberg Platinum Mines v Pan American Airways [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep 564
1977

Ackner J
Natural Justice
A party should be given advance notice of an intention to make serious allegations of wilful misconduct.
1 Citers



 
 McInnes v Onslow-Fane; ChD 1978 - [1978] 3 All ER 211; [1978] 1 WLR 1520
 
Regina v Leicestershire Fire Authority ex parte Thompson (1978) LOR 373
1978


Natural Justice
The proceedings of a watch committee are fatally flawed by the presence of the chief officer.
1 Citers


 
Cannock Chase District Council v Kelly [1978] 1 WLR
1978
CA
Megaw LJ
Litigation Practice, Natural Justice
Megaw LJ set out a definition of 'bad faith': "I would suggest - that it seems to me that an unfortunate tendency has developed of looseness of language in the respect - that bad faith or, as it is sometimes put, "lack of good faith," means dishonesty, not necessarily for a financial motive, but still dishonesty. It always involves a grave charge. It must not be treated as pseudonym of honest though mistaken [conclusion], taking into consideration of a factor which in law is irrelevant."
1 Citers



 
 Bentley Engineering Co Ltd v Mistry; EAT 1978 - [1979] ICR 47; [1978] IRLR 436

 
 Khanum v Mid Glamorgan Area Health Authority; EAT 1979 - [1979] ICR 40
 
George v Secretary of State for the Environment (1979) 77 LGR 689; (1979) 38 P & CR 609; (1979) 250 EG 339
1979
CA
Lord Denning MR, Cumming-Bruce LJ
Natural Justice, Judicial Review, Litigation Practice
The claimant challenged a decision made under the 1946 Act. Held: It will only be upon rare occasions that the interests of justice will require that leave be given for cross-examination of deponents on their affidavits in applications for judicial review.
Lord Denning MR said: "I also accept the submission that there can be no such thing as a ‘technical’ breach of the rules of natural justice, since the concept of natural justice is not concerned with the observation of technicalities but with matters of substance.
The question is whether, as a result of any failure in procedure or the like, there was a breach of natural justice.
One should not find a breach of natural justice unless there has been substantial prejudice to the applicant as a result of the mistake or error that has been made . ."
Cumming-Bruce LJ described the kind of situations within judicial review proceedings, where which cross-examination should be ordered: "The kind of situations in which I would expect cross-examination to be ordered is where the affidavits of one party are so unsatisfactory that, although they cannot be regarded without cross-examination as worthless evidence, they cannot be confidently accepted as evidence of fact without cross-examination. On the facts of this case . . I would have thought, on reading the affidavits, that there was an overwhelming inference that the evidence was both ingenuous and ingenious and so suspicious that, without cross-examination, it should anyway be rejected. If however, Sir Douglas Frank was not prepared, as he was not, to go as far as that, it was in my view, his duty to admit the cross-examination in order to determine whether the evidence was unreliable."
Lord Denning MR gave three reasons for the judicial reluctance to order cross-examination in cases of judicial review: "(i) that because the affidavits will usually speak as to what took place before a judicial or quasi-judicial body they may have to be sworn by a planning inspector or a magistrate, or someone of that kind. Since it is undesirable that such a person should be subjected to cross-examination, the applicant should not be liable to cross-examination either;
(ii) experience shows that on procedural questions arising on judicial review there is very little conflict on the affidavits; and
(iii) if cross-examination is permitted there will be a temptation to try and undermine the actual findings of the inferior body."
Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedure) Act 1946
1 Citers



 
 Calvin v Carr; PC 15-Jan-1979 - [1979] UKPC 1; [1979] 2 All ER 440; [1980] AC 574; [1979] 2 WLR 755
 
Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission C-85/76; [1979] EUECJ C-85/76; [1979] ECR 461
13 Feb 1979
ECJ

European, Commercial, Natural Justice
ECJ Observance of the right to be heard is required in all proceedings in which sanctions, in particular fines or penalty payments, may be imposed as a fundamental principle of community law. It must be respected even if the proceedings in question are administrative proceedings.
In the matter of competition and in the context of proceedings for a finding of infringements of articles 85 or 86 of the treaty, observance of the right to be heard requires that the undertakings concerned must have been afforded the opportunity to make known their views on the truth and relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged and on the documents used by the commission in support of its claim that there has been an infringement.
The obligation on the commission under article 20 (2) of regulation no 17 to observe professional secrecy must be reconciled with the right to be heard. By providing undertakings from whom information has been obtained with a guarantee that their interests, which are closely connected with observance of professional secrecy, are not jeopardized, that provision enables the commission to collect on the widest possible scale the requisite data for the fulfilment of its task of supervision without the undertakings being able to prevent it from doing so ; the commission may not however use, to the detriment of an undertaking in proceedings for a finding of an infringement of the rules on competition, facts or documents which it cannot in its view disclose if such a refusal of disclosure adversely affects that undertaking's opportunity to make known effectively its views on the truth or implications of those facts or documents or again on the conclusions drawn by the commission from them.
Europa
If a product could be used for different purposes and if these different uses are in accordance with economic needs, which are themselves also different, there are good grounds for accepting that this product may, according to the circumstances, belong to separate markets which may present specific features which differ from the standpoint both of the structure and of the conditions of competition. However this finding does not justify the conclusion that such a product together with all the other products which can replace it as far as concerns the various uses to which it may be put and with which it may compete, forms one single market. The concept of the relevant market in fact implies that there can be effective competition between the products which form part of it and this presupposes that there is a sufficient degree of interchangeability between all the products forming part of the same market in so far as a specific use of such products is concerned.
The dominant position referred to in article 86 of the treaty relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of the consumers. Such a position does not preclude some competition, which it does where there is a monopoly or a quasimonopoly, but enables the undertaking which profits by it, if not to determine, at least to have an appreciable influence on the conditions under which that competition will develop, and in any case to act largely in disregard of it so long as such conduct does not operate to its detriment.
Very large market shares are highly significant evidence of the existence of a dominant position. Other relevant factors are the relationship between the market shares of the undertaking concerned and of its competitors, especially those of the next largest, the technological lead of the undertaking over its competitors, the existence of a highly developed sales network and the absence of potential competition.

Europa The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened and which, through recourse to methods different from those which condition normal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition.
An undertaking which is in a dominant position on a market and ties purchasers - even if it does so at their request - by an obligation or promise on their part to obtain all or most of their requirements exclusively from the said undertaking abuses its dominant position within the meaning of article 86 of the treaty, whether the obligation in question is stipulated without further qualification or whether it is undertaken in consideration of the grant of a rebate. The same applies if the said undertaking, without tying the purchasers by a formal obligation, applies, either under the terms of agreements concluded with these purchasers or unilaterally, a system of fidelity rebates, that is to say discounts conditional on the customer's obtaining all or most of its requirements from the undertaking in a dominant position.
Obligations of this kind to obtain supplies exclusively from a particular undertaking, whether or not they are in consideration of rebates or of the granting of fidelity rebates intended to give the purchaser an incentive to obtain his supplies exclusively from the undertaking in a dominant position, are incompatible with the objective of undistorted competition within the common market, because they are not based on an economic transaction which justifies this burden or benefit but are designed to deprive the purchaser of or restrict his possible choices of sources of supply and to deny other producers access to the market.

Europa The abuse of a dominant position and the restriction of competition as attributes of the contracts in question are not avoided by the so-called'' english'' clause contained in them whereby the purchasers undertake to notify the undertaking in a dominant position of any more favourable offer made to them by competitors and are free, if that undertaking does not adjust its prices to the said offer, to obtain their supplies from competitors. In these circumstances a clause of this kind is such as to enable the undertaking in a dominant position to realize an abuse of that dominant position.
The effect of fidelity rebates is to apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties in that two purchasers pay a different price for the same quantity of the same product depending on whether they obtain their supplies exclusively from the undertaking in a dominant position or have several sources of supply.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
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