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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Natural Justice - From: 1960 To: 1969

This page lists 13 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Regina v Barnsley Licensing Justices, Ex parte Barnsley and District Licensed Victuallers' Association [1960] 2 QB 167
1960

Devlin J
Natural Justice, Magistrates
Even though a person may in good faith believe that he was acting impartially, his mind may unconsciously be affected by a bias. Devlin LJ said: "Bias is or may be an unconscious thing and a man may honestly say that he was not actually biased and did not allow his interest to affect his mind, although, nevertheless, he may have allowed it unconsciously to do so."
1 Citers


 
The University of Ceylon v EFW Fernando [1960] UKPC 6; [1960] 1 All ER 631; [1960] 1 WLR 223
16 Feb 1960
PC
Viscount Simonds, Tucker, Jenkins, Morris of Borth-y-Gest LL,MD De Silva
Commonwealth, Natural Justice
(Ceylon) The plaintiff had complained of his suspension as a student by the appellant. The suspension had been lifted and the Inquiry leading to it had been set aside as null and void. It had been alleged that he had had advance knowledge of an exam paper. He did not know what evidence was given against him, and he was not given an oportunity to cross examine the witness.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Kanda v Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] AC 322; [1962] UKPC 2; [1962] 2 WLR 1153
2 Apr 1962
PC
Lord Denning, Lord Hodson, Lord Devlin
Commonwealth, Natural Justice, Constitutional
A police officer had been dismissed. He complained that he had not been allowed to see the report of the Board of Inquiry which contained prejudicial material and which had been relied upon by the officer adjudicating his case. Held: The failure amounted to a denial of a reasonable opportunity of being heard in answer to the charge and was unfair. Where a conflict was found between an existing law and a provision of the constitution, the Constitution had to prevail.
Lord Denning said: "In the opinion of their Lordships, however, the proper approach is somewhat different. The rule against bias is one thing. The right to be heard is another. Those two rules are the essential characteristics of what is often called natural justice. They are the twin pillars supporting it. The Romans put them in the two maxims: Nemo judex in causa sua: and Audi alteram partem. They have recently been put in the two words, Impartiality and Fairness. But they are separate concepts and are governed by separate considerations. In the present case inspector Kanda complained of a breach of the second. He said that his constitutional right had been infringed. He had been dismissed without being given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a right in the accused man to know the case which is made against him. He must know what evidence is given and what statements have been made affecting him: and then he must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict them . . it follows, of course, that the Judge or whoever has to adjudicate must not hear evidence or receive representations from one side behind the back of the other. The Court will not enquire whether the evidence or representations did work to his prejudice. Sufficient that they might do so. The Court will not go into the likelihood of prejudice. The risk of it is enough. No one who has lost a case will believe he has been fairly treated if the other side has had access to the Judge without his knowing.” Lord Denning considered the conflict between the provisions under review and the Malaysian constitution: "If there was in any respect a conflict between the existing law and the Constitution . . then the existing law would have to be modified so as to accord with the Constitution." and "In a conflict of this kind between the existing law and the Constitution, the Constitution must prevail. The court must apply the existing law with such modifications as may be necessary to bring it into accord with the Constitution."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
In re K (Infants) [1963] Ch 381
1963
ChD
Ungoed Thomas J
Children, Natural Justice
Ungoed Thomas J discussed the balance of interests in a wardship case, as it affected disclosure of documents: "However, where the paramount purpose is the welfare of the infant, the procedure and rules of evidence should serve and certainly not thwart that purpose . . In general publicity is vital to the administration of justice. Disclosure to the parties not only enables them to present their case fully but it provides in some degree the advantages of publicity; and it further ensures that the court has the assistance of those parties in arriving at the right decision. So when full disclosure is not made, it should be limited only to the extent necessary to achieve the object of the jurisdiction and no further."
1 Citers


 
In Re K (Infants); Official Solicitor v K [1965] AC 201; [1963] 3 All ER 191
2 Jan 1963
HL
Lord Devlin
Children, Administrative, Natural Justice
The House considered the propriety of a tribunal chairman seeing material not placed before the parties. This was a wardship case. Held: Where the interests of the parents and the child conflicted, "the welfare of the child must dominate".
Lord Devlin spoke of "the fundamental principle of justice that the judge should not look at material that the parties before him have not seen".
Referring to "the ordinary principles of a judicial inquiry", he continued: "They include the rules that all justice shall be done openly and that it shall be done only after a fair hearing; and also the rule that is in point here, namely, that judgment shall be given only upon evidence that is made known to all parties. Some of these principles are so fundamental that they must be observed by everyone who is acting judicially, whether he is sitting in a court of law or not; and these are called the principles of natural justice. The rule in point here is undoubtedly one of those." and "[w]here the judge sits purely as an arbiter and relies on the parties for information, the parties have a correlative right that he should act only on information which they have had the opportunity of testing. Where the judge is not sitting purely, or primarily, as an arbiter, but is charged with the paramount duty of protecting one outside the conflict, a rule that is designed for just arbitrament cannot in all circumstances prevail."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 In Re K (Infants); CA 2-Jan-1963 - [1963] Ch 381

 
 Faramus v Film Artistes' Association; HL 1964 - [1964] AC 925; [1964] 1 All ER 25

 
 Ridge v Baldwin (No 1); HL 1964 - [1964] AC 40; [1963] UKHL 2
 
St Johnstone Football Club v Scottish Football Association Ltd 1965 SLT 171
1965


Natural Justice, Scotland
The Supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session was available to check whether the proceedings leading to a disciplinary decision of the Scottish Football Association, a private association, had been conducted in accordance with natural justice.
1 Citers


 
Chien Sing-Shou v The Building Authority [1967] UKPC 17; [1967] 1 WLR 1155; [1967] 2 All ER 1228
12 Jun 1967
PC
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest
Commonwealth, Natural Justice
(Hong Kong) The Board considered the Hong Kong Architects' Disciplinary Board which, by section 5 of the Buildings Ordinance 1955, comprised five members: three architects, the Building Authority or his representative, and "a legal adviser". The appellant contended that any advice on matters of law by the legal adviser should have been given in the presence of the parties; and a failure to follow such a procedure was a breach of common law natural justice. Held: Since the legal adviser was a full member of the board, if, during the deliberation of the board, he gave legal advice to the other members of the board on matters relating to the proceedings, then he stood in the same position as one of the architect members who gave a view on some matter of architectural opinion. In neither case was the member required to disclose to the parties the advice or opinion he had given in the private deliberations; unless, for example, some new point of law arose during the course of the deliberations, in respect of which it would be procedurally unfair to proceed without giving the parties an opportunity to comment.
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, giving the judgment of the Privy Council, emphasised that: "At all times, however, the legal adviser occupies the position of being a full member of a body charged with the duty of acting judicially in making due enquiry."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Metropolitan Properties Company (FGC) Limited v Lannon [1968] RVR 490; [1968] EWCA Civ 5; [1968] 3 All ER 304; [1968] 3 WLR 694; (1968) 19 P & CR 856; [1969] 1 QB 577
11 Jul 1968

Lord Denning MR, Danckwerts LJ, Edmund Davies LJ
Housing, Natural Justice
Tenants of apartments asked the Rent Officer to fix the fair rents. On appeal, the rents were then set at a rate lower even than they had requested. The rents would serve as a guide for other local rents. The landlords now complained that the chairman of the Rent Assessment Committee had been assisting his own father in negotiating a rent for such a local property, and had represented other tenants. They complained of bias. Held: He should not have sat. It was accepted that he had had no pecuniary interest himself, and had acted scrupulously. It was a question of whether there was any appearance of bias.
Lord Denning MR considered the test for apparent bias, and said: "The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless if right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision cannot stand."
Rent Act 1965
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Atkinson v Government of the United States [1971] AC 197; [1969] 3 All ER 1317
1969
HL
Lord Reid, Lord Upjohn
Extradition, Natural Justice, Magistrates
The House heard an appeal from the magistrates' refusal to commit the accused in the course of extradition proceedings. Held: There is no abuse of process jurisdiction in extradition proceedings. There is no power to state a case in relation to committal proceedings.
Lord Reid said: "It is now well recognised that the court has power to expand procedure laid down by statute if that is necessary to prevent infringement of natural justice and is not plainly contrary to the intention of Parliament. There can be cases where it would clearly be contrary to natural justice to surrender a man although there is sufficient evidence to justify committal. Extradition may be either because the man is accused of an extradition crime or because he has been convicted in the foreign country of an extradition crime. It is not unknown for convictions to be obtained in a few foreign countries by improper means, and it would be intolerable if a man so convicted had to be surrendered. Parliament can never have so intended when the Act of 1980 was passed. But the Act does provide a safeguard. The Secretary of State always has power to refuse to surrender a man committed to prison by the magistrate. It appears to me that Parliament must have intended the Secretary of State to use that power whenever in his view it would be wrong, unjust or oppressive to surrender the man."
Lord Upjohn said: "Of course, in a most literal sense, in making an order of committal the magistrates are making a judicial order or determination; it is a judicial proceeding and it is an order or determination in the sense that in the result the accused then stands his trial . . But here there is no judicial determination of the rights of the parties in that sense; no 'rights' are decided. All that the committing magistrates have 'decided' or 'determined' is that there is prima facie case which should go before the adjudicating tribunal; they are acting judicially but they are not truly an adjudicating body at this stage, they are merely carrying out a step in the complex of proceedings which by our law precedes the trial of an indictable offence."
Extradition Act 1980
1 Citers



 
 John v Rees and Others; Martin and Another v Davis and Others; ChD 1969 - [1970] 1 Ch 345; [1969] 2 All ER 275
 
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