swarb.co.uk - law index
These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.
Media - From: 1970 To: 1979
This page lists 24 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.
News Media Ownership v Finlay [1970] NZLR 1089
1970
North P
Constitutional, Commonwealth, Media, Defamation
(New Zealand Court of Appeal ) The plaintiff, a Member of Parliament, brought libel proceedings against a newspaper in respect of an article appearing in the newspaper which alleged that the plaintiff had been acting improperly and for purposes of personal profit in making statements in the House. North P said: "Mr McKay was right when he submitted that while violence of language is not in itself enough to take away privilege even though it may provide evidence of malice, yet privilege is lost if the reply becomes a counter attack raising allegations against the plaintiff which are unrelated or insufficiently related to the attack he made on the defendant. In other words he cannot claim the protection of privilege if he decides to bring fresh accusations against his adversary." and, as to a contention that the words complained of were not defamatory:
"In my opinion, there is no substance in this contention, for surely it is plain enough that it is harmful to the trading reputation of a newspaper company to allege that it conducts its business without regard for the public interest, its principal concern being merely with the making of profits."
1 Citers
Anglia Television v Oliver Reed; CA 1971 - [1972] 1 QB 60; [1971] 3 All ER 690
Attorney-General, ex rel McWhirter v Independent Broadcasting Authority [1973] 1 QB 629; [1972] CMLR 882
1972
CA
Lord Denning MR
Media, Elections, Constitutional
The court should not interfere in decisions made by broadcasting companies allocating television time to parties before elections unless it is of the view that they were irrational in not giving enough weight to those matters in allocating it only one broadcast.
The Bill of Rights does not restrict the Crown's prerogative powers in relation to foreign affairs: "the Crown retained, as fully as ever, the prerogative of the treaty-making power" and "Even though the Treaty of Rome has been signed, it has no effect, so far as these courts are concerned, until it is made an Act of Parliament. Once it is implemented by an Act of Parliament, these courts must go by the Act of Parliament. Until that day comes, we take no notice of it."
1 Citers
Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd; HL 1973 - [1973] 3 All ER 54; [1973] 3 WLR 298; [1974] AC 273
Anderson v New York Telephone Co; 1974 - (1974) 35 NY 2d 746
Regina v Socialist Worker Printers and Publishers Ltd, Ex parte Attorney-General [1975] 1 All ER 142 DG; [1974] 3 WLR 801; [1975] QB 637
1974
CA
Widgery LCJ, Milmo Ackner LJJ
Contempt of Court, Media
In a blackmail case, the court ordered non publication of the names of the complainants. Thinking they were not bound, the defendants published the names. Held: The publishers and Mr Michael Foot were held to be in contempt of court in disclosing the names in defiance of the trial judge's direction. An act of contempt required an intention to do an act calculated to interfere with the due course of justice. The act here was a flagrant affront to the court's authority. It would result in a reduced confidence of witnesses that they could give evidence wihout fear, and the contempt was made out.
Lord Widgery CJ set out the reasons for giving anonymity to blackmail complainants: "all of us concerned in the law know that for more years than any of us can remember it has been a commonplace in blackmail charges for the complainant to be allowed to give his evidence without disclosing his name. That is not out of any feelings of tenderness towards the victim of the blackmail, a man or woman very often who deserves no such consideration at all. The reason why the courts in the past have so often used this device in this type of blackmail case where the complainant has something to hide, is because there is a keen public interest in getting blackmailers convicted and sentenced, and experience shows that grave difficulty may be suffered in getting complainants to come forward unless they are given this kind of protection . . the Crown at this stage had presented a prima facie case of contempt . . because to my mind it is quite evident that if witnesses in blackmail actions are not adequately protected, this could affect the readiness of others to come forward in other cases."
Even so the public should be admitted to a trial: "The great virtue of having the public in our courts is that discipline which the presence of the public imposes upon the court itself. When the court is full of interested members of the public, as indeed one can say it is today, it is bound to have the effect that everybody is more careful about what they do, everyone tries just that little bit harder and there is a disciplinary effect on the court which would be totally lacking if there were no critical members of the public or press present.
When one has an order for trial in camera, all the public and all the press are evicted at one fell swoop and the entire supervision by the public is gone. Where one has a hearing which is open, where the names of the witnesses are withheld, virtually all the desirable features of having the public present are to be seen. The only thing which is kept from their knowledge is the name of the witness."
1 Citers
Regina v Poulson and Pottinger [1974] Crim LR 141
1974
CACD
Waller J
Criminal Practice, Media
The trial judge said that he did not see how the press could report the evidence in the case without running the risk of being in contempt of other criminal proceedings which had already begun against Poulson and other defendants in respect of similar offences.
1 Citers
In re X (A Minor) (Wardship: Jurisdiction) [1975] 1 All ER 697; [1975] Fam 47
2 Jan 1975
CA
Denning MR, Roskill LJ, Sir John Pennycuick
Children, Media
A child's stepfather obtained an order preventing publication of a book about the child. Held: The circumstances were novel, but 'The court has power to protect the ward from any interference with his or her welfare, direct or indirect.' There was no general remedy for infringement of privacy, because of the importance attached to freedom of the press.
Lord Denning MR said: 'I do not think that the wardship jurisdiction should be extended so as to enable the court to stop publication of this book.'
Roskill LJ said: "I would agree that no limits to that jurisdiction have yet been drawn and it is not necessary to consider here what, if any, limits there are to that jurisdiction. The sole question is whether it should be exercised in this case. The mere fact that the courts have never stretched out their arms so far as is proposed in this case is in itself no reason for not stretching out those arms further than before when necessary in a suitable case. There is never a precedent for anything until it has been done once." (Pennycuick) "It may well be, and I have no doubt it is so, that the courts, when exercising the parental power of the Crown, have, at any rate in legal theory, an unrestricted jurisdiction to do whatever is considered necessary for the welfare of a ward. It is, however, obvious that far-reaching limitations in principle on the exercise of this jurisdiction must exist. The jurisdiction is habitually exercised within those limitations. It would be quite impossible to protect a ward against everything which might do her harm. In particular the jurisdiction must be exercised with due regard to the rights of outside parties . . By 'outside parties' I mean those not in a family or personal relation to the ward . . Specifically, it seems to me, the court must hold a proper balance between the protection of the ward and the right of free publication enjoyed by outside parties and should hesitate long before interfering with that right . . It would be impossible and not, I think, desirable to draw any rigid line beyond which the protection of the ward should not be extended. The distinction between direct and indirect interference with a ward is valuable, though the borderline may be blurred. I am not prepared to say that the court should never interfere with the publication of matter concerning a ward. On the contrary, I think in exceptional circumstances the court should do so."
1 Cites
1 Citers
Attorney-General v Jonathan Cape Ltd; 1976 - [1976] 1 QB 752; [1976] 3 All E R 484
Regina v Coughlan and Young; CACD 1976 - [1976] 63 Cr App R 33
In re F (otherwise A) (A Minor) (Publication of Information) [1976] 3 All ER 274; [1976] 3 WLR 307; [1977] Fam 47
1976
FD
Children, Media, Contempt of Court
Administration of Justice Act 1960 12(1)(a)
1 Citers
Handyside v The United Kingdom; ECHR 7-Dec-1976 - 5493/72; (1976) 1 EHRR 737; [1976] ECHR 5
Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 2 All ER 751; [1977 1 WLR 760
1977
CA
Lord Denning MR, Bridge LJ, Lawton LJ
Litigation Practice, Media, Information
An injunction was sought to restrain publication of confidential information about a well-known pop group, starring Tom Jones and Engelbert Humperdinck. As the group's press agent, the defendant's role had been to see that the group received favourable publicity. However, after parting company, amicably, with the group, the defendant disclosed "no doubt, for a very considerable reward" to the Daily Mirror "secrets" about the group, including episodes of allegedly discreditable nature involving drink, sex and other matters. Held: (ex tempore) The injunction was discharged. The group had sought publicity, giving one view of themselves. Where justification is to be pleaded to a defamation claim then an interim injunction to restrain publication will not be granted.
Bridge LJ said: "It seems to me that those who seek and welcome publicity of every kind bearing upon their private lives so long as it shows them in a favourable light are in no position to complain of an invasion of their privacy which shows them in an unfavourable light." and "If the defendants cannot in due course make good that claim [viz a summary of the stories that they wished to publish], it is quite clear that the plaintiffs will recover very considerable damages for libel, to say nothing of any damages they may recover for breach of confidentiality. But if the defendants substantiate the claim, it is clear that the plaintiffs will recover no damages in libel; and I think that they could only recover nominal damages for the breach of confidentiality, if there was one."
Lawton LJ said: "The defendants have intimated that in so far as there is a claim for damages for libel there will be a plea of justification. Sir Peter, on behalf of the plaintiffs, has accepted, in the circumstances of this case at any rate, that it is pointless to make submissions to the court that his clients should be granted an injunction to restrain further publication of the libel.
What then is the position? The allegation of confidentiality is interwoven with the claim for damages for libel and, once that is understood, it seems to me that the balance of convenience is entirely on the side of allowing the publication to go on. The defendants should know and possibly do that, if they fail in their plea of justification, the damages are likely to be heavy. They may be heavier still by reason of the fact that the offence - because that is what libel is - has been made worse by the circumstances in which Mr. Hutchins has come to reveal what he knows about the plaintiffs. I find it impossible in this case to extricate the libel aspect from the confidentiality aspect. In those circumstances, it seems to me that it would be wrong to allow this injunction to continue."
Lord Denning MR said: 'If a group of this kind seek publicity which is to their advantage, it seems to me that they cannot complain if a servant or employee of theirs afterwards discloses the truth about them. If the image which they fostered was not a true image, it is in the public interest that it should be corrected. In these cases of confidentaial information it is a question of balancing the public interest in maintaining the confidence agaiinst the public nterest in knowing the truth."
and "There is a parallel to be drawn with libel cases. Just as in libel, the courts do not grant an interlocutory injunction to restrain publication of the truth or of fair comment. So also with confidential information. If there is a legitimate ground for supposing that it is in the public interest for it to be disclosed, the courts should not restrain it by an interlocutory injunction, but should leave the complainant to his remedy in damages. Suppose that this case were tried out and the plaintiffs failed in their claim for libel on the ground that all that was said was true. It would seem unlikely that there would be much damages awarded for breach of confidentiality. I cannot help feeling that the plaintiffs' real complaint here is that the words are defamatory: and as they cannot get an interlocutory injunction on that ground, nor should they on confidential information."
1 Citers
Stopforth v Goyer (1978) 87 DLR (3d) 373; (1978) 4 CCLT 265
1978
Lief J
Commonwealth, Constitutional, Defamation, Media
(High Court of Ontario) A claim was made for defamation in remarks made by the defendant about the plaintiff to media representative who were present in parliament, just after he left the Ottawa chamber at the conclusion of the question period. The plaintiff had been a senior member of a team having conduct of the delivery of weapons systems to the government. The defendant had been the relevant minister. It was accepted that the defendant was taken to assume that his acceptedly defamatory words would be repulished by the media. The defendant claimed qualified privilege. Held: The defence was not made out. There was no duty falling on him at the time to utter the words he did, and nor was there a reciprocal duty in the press to receive the statement.
1 Citers
Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd; QBD 1978 - [1978] 3 All ER 731; [1978] 3 WLR 395; [1979] QB 31
Regina vNewcastle Chronicle and Journal Ltd, Ex parte Attorney-General Times, 18 January 1978
18 Jan 1978
QBD
Media
1 Citers
Regina v Border Television Ltd, Ex parte Attorney-General Times, 18 January 1978; (1978) 68 Cr App R 375
18 Jan 1978
QBD
Media
The defendant media company was found guilty of contempt for reporting that the defendant had pleaded guilty at the outset of her trial to a number of other charges against her. No warning had been given.
1 Citers
Erven Warnink Besloten Vennootschap v J Townend and Sons (Hull) Limited ('Advocaat') 1A IPR 666; [1979] FSR 397; [1979] AC 731; [1980] RPC 31; [1979] 3 WLR 68; [1979] 2 All ER 927
1979
HL
Lord Diplock, Lord Fraser
Intellectual Property, Media
The trademark was the name of a spirit-based product called ADVOCAAT. The product had gained a reputation and goodwill for that name in the English market and the defendants were seeking to take advantage of that name by misrepresenting that their wine-based product was of the same type as ADVOCAAT. The court considered the law on comparative advertising as prohibited by the law against passing off in its extended form where the goodwill is alleged to reside in a class of producers of a product sharing a common name or get up. Held: Whether the name denoted a product made from ingredients from a particular locality or whether the goodwill in the name was the result of the product being made from particular ingredients regardless of their provenance, since it was the reputation that the product itself had gained in the market by reason of its recognisable and distinctive qualities which had generated the relevant goodwill. In The remedy is intended to prevent unfair trading practices.
Lord Diplock said: "in an economic system which has relied on competition to keep down prices and to improve products there may be practical reasons why it should have been the policy of the common law not to run the risk of hampering competition by providing civil remedies to everyone competing in the market who has suffered damage to his business or goodwill in consequence of inaccurate statements of whatever kind that may be made by rival traders about their own wares. The market in which the action for passing off originated was no place for the mealy mouthed; advertisements are not on affidavit; exaggerated claims by a trader about the quality of his wares, assertions that they are better than those of his rivals even though he knows this to be untrue, have been permitted by the common law as venial 'puffing' which gives no cause of action to a competitor even though he can show that he has suffered actual damage in his business as a result." The goodwill of a manufacturer's business may well be injured by someone else who sells goods which are correctly described as being made by that manufacturer but being of an inferior class or quality are misrepresented as goods of his manufacture of a superior class or quality.
1 Cites
1 Citers
McWhirter and Wilson v Independent Television Authority [1979] SC 351
1979
OHCS
Media, Scotland, Elections, Judicial Review
The Independent Broadcasting Authority in the exercise of its powers under the Act were susceptible to judicial review.
Television Act 1964
Whitehouse v Lemon; Whitehouse v Gay News Ltd [1979] 1 QB 10
1979
CA
Roskill LJ
Crime, Media
Roskill LJ discussed the reasoning behind allowing prosecutions for blasphemous libel: "The state only became interested in the offence if the actions of the alleged offender affected the safety of the state."
1 Cites
1 Citers
Wilson v Independent Broadcasting Authority [1979] SC 351 OH; [1979] SLT 279
1979
OHCS
Lord Ross
Elections, Media, Scotland
In the lead up to the Scottish referendum on Devolution, the Authority required the broadcasters to carry party political broadcasts for each of the four main parties. Three parties favoured voting yes in the referendum, and the authority was injuncted by those opposing the Yes campaign. Held: The injunction was set aside. The Act required the Authority to maintain a balance of approximately for each case. The court considered how the broadcasting media should achieve balance during elections.
Lord Ross said: "I see no reason in principle why an individual should not sue in order to prevent a breach by a public body of a duty owed by that public body to the public. It may well be that the Lord Advocate could be a petitioner if the interests of the public as a whole were affected..., but I see no reason why an individual should not sue provided always that the individual can qualify an interest.
Having considered the petitioners' averments, I am of the opinion that the petitioners have averred sufficient interest.
(1) They are voters and the Referendum gives them the choice to say 'Yes' or 'No'.
(2) They belong to an organisation or group who apparently believe that the question should be answered 'No'.
(3) It is implicit in the name of the organisation or group that the petitioners wish to persuade other voters to vote 'No'.
It is plain from the petition and the answers that the petitioners and the political parties believe that the programmes are likely to be influential upon the electorate in Scotland, and if that is so, the petitioners have an interest to see that the respondents do not act in breach of any statutory duties in relation to such programmes."
Broadcasting Act 1990
1 Citers
Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd; HL 1-Feb-1979 - [1979] AC 440; [1978] 3 All ER 731; [1979] 2 WLR 247
The Sunday Times v The United Kingdom (No 1) 6538/74; (1979) 2 EHRR 245; [1979] ECHR 1
26 Apr 1979
ECHR
G Balladore Pallieri, President
Human Rights, Crime, Media
The court considered the meaning of the need for an offence to be 'in accordance with law.' Held: "In the Court's opinion, the following are two of the requirements that flow from the expression 'prescribed by law'. First, the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a 'law' unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. Those consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty: experience shows this to be unattainable. Again, whilst certainty is highly desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice."
and "Where there has been an interference with the Art. 10(1) right, it is not sufficient that its subject-matter fell within a particular category or was caught by a legal rule formulated in general or absolute terms; the Court has to be satisfied that the interference was necessary having regard to the facts and circumstances prevailing in the specific case before it".
Article 10(1) confers not only the right to "impart" information and ideas but also the right to "receive" them.
Article 10(2) specifically identifies "maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary" as a legitimate aim which may justify interference with freedom of expression. The phrase has a wide scope . .
The term 'judiciary' ('pouvoir judiciaire') comprises the machinery of justice or the judicial branch of government as well as the judges in their official capacity. The phrase 'authority of the judiciary' includes, in particular, the notion that the courts are, and are accepted by the public at large as being, the proper forum for the ascertainment of legal rights and obligations and the settlement of disputes relative thereto; further, that the public at large have respect for and confidence in the courts' capacity to fulfil that function."
and "The Court would reiterate its opinion that the phrase 'in accordance with the law' does not merely refer back to domestic law but also relates to the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law, which is expressly mentioned in the preamble to the Convention. The phrase thus implies - and this follows from the object and purpose of Article 8 - that there must be a measure of legal protection in domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights safeguarded by paragraph 1. Especially, where a power of the executive is exercised in secret, the risks of arbitrariness are evident. Undoubtedly, as the Government rightly suggested, the requirements of the Convention, notably in regard to foreseeability, cannot be exactly the same in the special context of interception of communications for the purposes of police investigations as they are where the object of the relevant law is to place restrictions on the conduct of individuals. In particular, the requirement of foreseeability cannot mean that an individual should be enabled to foresee when the authorities are likely to intercept his communications so that he can adapt his conduct accordingly. Nevertheless, the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort to this secret and potentially dangerous interference with the right to respect for private life and correspondence."
European Convention on Human Rights 10
1 Citers
[ Worldlii ] - [ Bailii ]
Church of Scientology v Sweden; ECHR 5-May-1979 - 7805/77; [1979] ECHR 9
