swarb.co.uk - law index
These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.
Local Government - From: 1992 To: 1992
This page lists 13 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.
Regina v London Borough of Ealing, Ex parte Lewis (1992) 24 HLR 484
1992
CA
Lloyd LJ, Woolf LJ
Housing, Local Government
The court was asked as to the issue of a local housing authority's power under the 1989 Act, to expend money on "the repair, maintenance, supervision and management of houses and other property". Held: The phrase should be given "a wide construction" (Lloyd LJ) and Woolf LJ: it should receive "a generous interpretation".
Local Government and Housing Act 1989
1 Cites
1 Citers
London Borough of Hounslow v Hare (1992) 89 LGR 714
1992
Local Government
Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council v Wickes Building Supplies Ltd [1993] AC 227; [1992] 3 WLR 170
1992
HL
Lord Goff of Chieveley
Local Government, Litigation Practice
A public authority is not required as a rule to give a cross undertaking in damages in a law enforcement action. As to the legal status of the statutory instrument in question, the courts could "declare it to be invalid" if satisfied that the Minister acted outwith his powers conferred by the primary legislation, whether the order was "ultra vires by reason of its contents (patent defects) or by reason of defects in the procedure followed prior to its being made (latent defects):" and "Under our legal system, however, the courts as the judicial arm of Government do not act on their own initiative. Their jurisdiction to determine that a statutory instrument is ultra vires does not arise until its validity is challenged in proceedings inter partes either brought by one party to enforce the law declared by the instrument against another party or brought by a party whose interests are affected by the law so declared sufficiently directly to give him locus standi to initiate proceedings to challenge the validity of the instrument. Unless there is such challenge and, if there is, until it has been upheld by a judgment of the court, the validity of the statutory instrument and the legality of acts done pursuant to the law declared by it are presumed. It would, however, be inconsistent with the doctrine of ultra vires as it has been developed in English law as a means of controlling abuse of power by the executive arm of Government if the judgment of a court in proceedings properly constituted that a statutory instrument was ultra vires were to have any lesser consequence in law than to render the instrument incapable of ever having had any legal effect upon the rights or duties of the parties to the proceedings. Although such a decision is directly binding only as between the parties to the proceedings in which it was made, the application of the doctrine of precedent has the consequence of enabling the benefit of it to accrue to all other persons whose legal rights have been interfered with in reliance on the law which the statutory instrument purported to declare."
1 Cites
1 Citers
Mole Valley District Council v Smith [1992] 90 LGR 557
1992
Planning, Local Government
The local authority sought to use its powers under the Act to enforce planning control over gypsies.
Local Government Act 1972 222
1 Citers
Swansea City Council v Glass [1992] 1 QB 844; [1992] CLY 2828; [1992] 2 All ER 680; [1992] 3 WLR 123
1992
CA
Taylor LJ
Limitation, Housing, Local Government
The defendant had failed himself to reapir his property, and the Local Authority carried out the work itself under the 1957 Act. It sought to recover the associated costs from the defendant, but he said that their claim was time barred, being more than six years after the work had been concluded. The authority argued that it was not more than six years from when it had served the notices demanding payment. Held: The notices were not the cause of action, but only a condition precedent to bringing an action. Accordingly time ran from the conclusion of the works, and the claim was out of time.
Taylor LJ said: "Section 10(4) provides expressly that where the local authority opts to take summary proceedings to recover their expenses, the limitation period runs from the date of service of the demand or, if there is an appeal, the date when the demand becomes operative. Again, by implication, since no such provision is applied to proceedings in the High Court or County Court, time in those proceedings does not run from the date when the demand is served or becomes operative. It will run from the accrual of the cause of action which, ex hypothesi, is a different time.
The rationale of the distinction between summary and other proceedings probably lies in the respective limitation periods. In summary proceedings the period is six months. If time were to run from the accrual of the cause of action, i.e. when the expenses were incurred, summary proceedings might often be statute-barred before they could be brought, especially where there was an appeal against the demand. In other proceedings, however, the limitation period of six years gives, or should give, the local authority ample time to sue even after an appeal against their demand. In my judgment, the expression, special to section 10(4), that time runs from service of the demand or when it becomes operative, is intended to distinguish summary proceedings from other proceedings. Inclusio unius, exclusio alterius. In other proceedings, time runs from the accrual of the cause of action, i.e. when the four elements identified above are complete. Thus, I conclude that the requirement to serve a demand is a procedural condition precedent to bringing proceedings. It is not part of the cause of action.
I am fortified in this view by consideration of what could result if the local authority were right. Upon their argument, the local authority could delay service of a demand indefinitely. Then, having served their demand long after the works were complete, they would have a further six years in which to take proceedings in the High Court or the county court."
Taylor LJ also nted that: ""Although not on all fours with the present case, these decisions show that a cause of action may well accrue before, for procedural reasons, the plaintiff can bring proceedings. Where the cause of action arises from statute, the question as to what is merely procedural and what is an "inherent element" in the cause of action is one of construction." It is a question of construction of the relevant instrument, whether statute, regulations, rules or contract, in each case as to whether there is such a difference.
Housing Act 1957 10(4) - Limitation Act 1980
1 Cites
1 Citers
B v Harrow London Borough Council and Another; HL 8-Jan-1992 - Gazette, 08 January 1992
Regina v Cornwall County Council Ex Parte Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Guardians Ad Litem Gazette, 29 January 1992
29 Jan 1992
FD
Family, Local Government
A Social Services director exceeded his authority in issuing a generalised cash limit to guardian ad litem's legal costs in children cases.
Lavis v Kent County Council Times, 24 November 1994; (1992) 90 LGR 416; [1993] CLY 2949
18 Feb 1992
QBD
Negligence, Local Government, Road Traffic
The plaintiff had received serious injuries whilst riding his motor cycle at a road junction for which the defendants were responsible. He alleged that they were liable to him for failing to ensure that proper warning signs were placed at the approach to the junction. The defendants were empowered to place such signs, but not under a duty to do so. They applied to strike out the plaintiff's claim as disclosing no cause of action. Held: A Local Authority had a discretion not to erect a particular road sign, but the decision was to be made according to the standards of a competent road engineer. "In my judgment it is perfectly clear that the duty imposed is not capable of covering the erection of traffic signs, and nothing more need be said about that particular provision".
1 Citers
Wentworth v Wiltshire County Council; CA 15-Jul-1992 - Gazette, 15 July 1992
Regina v Margate Justices ex parte Haddow Gazette, 02 September 1992
2 Sep 1992
QBD
Local Government
Justices were not wrong to hear of a Husband's refusal to pay Community Charge on committing the wife.
Parker v Yeo Gazette, 18 November 1992
18 Nov 1992
CA
Elections, Local Government
Work as a local councillor was capable of founding the candidate's qualification to stand in a local election.
South Hams District Council v Shough and Others Gazette, 20 January 1993; Times, 08 December 1992
2 Dec 1992
CA
Nourse LJ, Staughton LJ
Local Government, Housing
There was a possible duty on a council not to evict trespassers claiming to be gypsies. If the authority had a duty to house the applicants, but failed to provide accommodation in accordance with that duty, it could be wrong to make an order supporting an attempt to evict them. The duty to house was a higher duty than the duty to recover possession of land.
Caravan Sites Act 1968 6(1) 7(1) - Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 24
1 Cites
Baker, Regina (on the Application of) v Devon County Council; CA 21-Dec-1992 - [1992] EWCA Civ 16; [1993] COD 253; [1992] 91 LGR 479; [1995] 1 All ER 73; (1994) 6 Admin LR 113
