swarb.co.uk - law index
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Local Government - From: 1980 To: 1984
This page lists 20 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.
Staden v Tarjanyi (1980) 78 LGR 614
1980
Lord Lane CJ
Local Government
The court considered the validity of a byelaw. Lord Lane CJ said: "to be valid, a byelaw, carrying as this one does penalties for infringement, must be certain and clear in the sense that anyone engaged upon the otherwise lawful pursuit . . must know with reasonable certainty when he is breaking the law and when he is not breaking the law." The invalid byelaw might have been saved if the uncertainty had been "delineated by, if you like, the nuisance to those on the ground or annoyance to those on the ground."
1 Citers
De Falco v Crawley Borough Council [1980] QB 460
1980
CA
Lord Denning MR
Local Government
The court discussed the effect of statutory guidance in the form of a code: "the council of course had to have regard to the code: see section 12 of the statute; but, having done so, they could depart from it if they thought fit".
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Page Motors Limited v Epsom and Ewell Borough Council (1980) 78 LGR 505
1980
QBD
Balcombe J
Nuisance, Local Government, Damages
The plaintiff company were tenants of land adjoining land owned by the defendant council. Gypsies came to occupy the defendant's land over several years and in increasing numbers. The Authority had obtained a possession order but had failed to enforce it being concerned that with no proper site elsewhere to move onto further damage would be caused. The plaintiffs claimed for damages in their reduced turnover. Held: The plaintiffs succeeded. The defendants had the power and duty to provide alternative sites, and their delay of five years was unreasonable. The choice not to enforce the possession orders was from the Council's own desire to avoid disturbance elsewhere, and therefore amounted to an adoption of the nuisance. However, the drop in turnover would not necessarily reflect directly in a loss of profit, and the plaintiff's had to give credit for the associated reduction in their rating assessment.
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Provident Mutual Life Assurance Association v Derbyshire City Council [1981] 1 WLR 173
1981
HL
Lord Roskill
Local Government, Rating
The particular individual on whom the task of forming the relevant opinion had been imposed by statute could not possibly perform all the tasks delegated to the relevant financial officer. He had, and needed, a staff to perform his functions, and it was a member of his staff who had formed the relevant opinion. The question was not whether there had been a delegation so that the decision was not that of the treasurer but of the subordinate; the question was whether the treasurer had authorised the subordinate to act as his agent in forming the opinion.
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British Railways Board v Tonbridge and Malling District Council (1981) 79 LGR 565
1981
CA
Oliver LJ
Utilities, Local Government
The court was asked whether a culvert under a railway carried a sewer or a watercourse. It appeared that the construction of the railway had interrupted natural watercourses which drained a large catchment area, and the culvert was to carry the water away despite the obstacle created by the railway embankment. If it was a sewer the Board could seek to have it vested in the local authority under section 17 of the Public Health Act 1936, but this did not apply if it was not a sewer but a watercourse. Held: Oliver LJ said: "Granted that in certain circumstances that which started life as a watercourse can become a sewer, that is not easily established where all that has happened is that water, whether surface water or foul water, has been made to flow through an outfall into an existing natural stream. One has to ask whether the circumstances are such that the stream has substantially lost its original character and taken on the character of a sewer and that does not occur simply because the stream is made to carry a quantity of sewage." and
"What is clear is that something very much more than the mere discharge of sewage into a stream (and, a fortiori, the mere discharge of pure surface water) is required before its status is changed to that of a sewer (see, for instance, Glasgow, Yoker & Clydebank Railway Company v. MacIndoe (1896) 24 R. (Ct. of Sess.) 160). Thus, for instance, if circumstances are such that what was originally an agricultural stream comes to carry sewage in such substantial quantities that its character is completely changed (as occurred in Falconar v. Corporation of South Shields (1895) 11 T.L.R. 223) it may no doubt become a sewer within the ordinary meaning of the word."
After citing a passage from the speech of Lord Maugham in the George Legge case and went on to say:
"In the instant case there has been nothing approaching the situation envisaged by Lord Maugham in the passage I have read. All that has happened is that outfalls have been constructed channelling the surface drainage of the built-up area into the existing streams so as to increase to some extent the flow of surface water which they carry away; and it is, Mr Nugee submits, quite impossible to say that these streams have become, as a result of such increased flow of surface water, "sewers" within the ordinary meaning of the word.
We find Mr Nugee's argument persuasive. On the facts as found or agreed at the trial it is, in our judgment, clear that there has been no alteration in the essential character of the three watercourses and the culvert since 1840 and the mere fact that the surface drainage of the built-up area has been collected and diverted into them through a number of outfalls so as to produce a significant increase in the volume of water carried off, cannot possibly constitute them, either individually or collectively, sewers or a sewer within the ordinary meaning of that term."
Public Health Act 1936 17
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In re P (A Minor); 1981 - [1981] 80 LGR 301
Solloway v Hampshire County Council (1981) 79 LGR 449; [1981] 1 WLR 1
1981
CA
Dunne LJ, Sir David Cairns
Nuisance, Local Government, Negligence
Tree root damage had occurred following two successive very hot and dry summers in 1975 and 1976, in an area where the subsoil was almost all gravel but where, as it happened, under the plaintiff's house there were pockets of clay. An issue arose as to the foreseeability of there being pockets of clay in the gravel upon which the damaged houses predominantly sat. Another issue concerned the question whether any operation on the trees, short of felling them, would have eliminated the risk posed by the roots if there were exceptionally dry weather and if those roots were passing through clay. At first instance, judgment was given for the plaintiffs in nuisance. Held: The council's appeal succeeded. The judge had been wrong to hold that damage to the plaintiff's house from the tree roots was a reasonably foreseeable risk. The existence of clay pockets under a house such that of the plaintiff was no more than an outside chance, and balancing that risk with the steps that would have been necessary for the defendants to have dealt with the risk, there was no breach of duty on the part of the defendant council.
Dunne LJ said: "The duty in respect of the nuisance arises if the encroachment of the roots is known, or ought to be known, to the owner, occupier or other person responsible for the tree and its maintenance, if the encroachment is such as to give rise to a reasonably foreseeable risk that such encroachment will cause damage."
Sir David Cairns said: "To say that a risk of damage is reasonably foreseeable means that it is foreseeable, not merely as a theoretical possibility but as something, the chance of which occurring, is such that a reasonable man would consider it necessary to take account of it. The risk of being struck by lightning when one goes for a walk is not a reasonably foreseeable risk. I should be prepared to hold that the risk in this case was not a reasonably foreseeable risk. If, however, it could be said to be a reasonably foreseeable risk, I am satisfied that it was a risk, such that the cost and inconvenience of taking any effective steps to remove it or reduce it would be quite out of proportion to that risk. There is nothing in the evidence to show that No. 72 Shirley Avenue was any more at risk than any other house in the Avenue. Nor is there anything to show that any operation on the trees, short of felling, would have made the roots safe if there were exceptionally dry weather and if the roots of any particular tree were passing through clay".
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Dunlop v Woolahara Municipal Council [1981] 1 All ER 1202
1981
PC
Lord Diplock
Negligence, Local Government
A council had no liabiity in a private action for damages for a breach of statutory duty in its handling of a planning application. While doubting that it was so, Lord Diplock left open the question whether an individual injuriously affected by either the refusal of planning permission on the part of a planning authority or by the grant of planning permission to neighbouring property owners had a right of action for damages against the planning authority.
1 Citers
Graham v Teesdale and Another; 1981 - [1981] 81 LGR 117
Regina v Basildon District Council, ex parte Brown; CA 1981 - (1981) 79 LGR 655
Page Motors v Epsom Borough Council; CA 9-Jul-1981 - [1981] 80 LGR 337
Bromley London Borough Council v Greater London Council; HL 17-Dec-1981 - [1983] AC 768; [1982] 1 All ER 153; [1981] UKHL 7; [1982] 2 WLR 62
Chief Constable of Kent v V [1982] CLY 2495; [1983] QB 34
1982
Lord Justice Donaldson, Lord Denning MR, Slade LJ
Extradition, Local Government, Litigation Practice
In order to obtain an injunction with respect to property in the possession of a defendant, the right sought to be enforced need not be a proprietary right of the claimant, nor a right for the benefit of the claimant itself. (Slade LJ dissenting)
1 Citers
Richmond on Thames London Borough Council v Attorney-General (1982) 81 LGR 156
1982
Local Government
1 Citers
Walters v Babergh District Council [1983] 82 LGR 235
1983
Woolf J
Local Government
An action was brought for for negligence and/or breach of statutory duty under the 1936 Act. The plaintiff alleged that Melford Rural District Council ("Melford": the Defendant Council's predecessor) had failed to inspect with reasonable care the foundations of the house that he was building. However, by the time the plaintiff noticed the defects, Melford had ceased to exist as a result of local government reorganisation. The plaintiff therefore sued the defendant, Babergh District Council ("Babergh"), on the basis that "all property and liabilities vesting in or attaching to" Melford had been transferred to Babergh by virtue of section 16(3)(a) of the Local Authorities (England)(Property, etc.) Order 1973. The issue in the case was whether "liabilities" should be limited to crystallised liabilities or whether it should also include potential or contingent liabilities. Held: The general purpose of the Act and the regulations made under it was to "ensure that the reorganisation would not affect events which would otherwise have occurred further than is absolutely necessary because of that reorganisation. That the public should be able to look to the new authority precisely in respect of those matters which it could look to the old authority; that the public's position should be no better or no worse." The word "liabilities" should be construed to include "contingent or potential liabilities" : "The whole tenor of the order is designed to ensure that the reorganisation should not effect (sic) events which would otherwise have occurred further than is absolutely necessary because of that reorganisation. That the public should be able to look to the new authority precisely in respect of those matters which it could look to the old authority; that the public's position should be no better or no worse."
Local Government Act 1972 - Public Health Act 1936 - Local Authorities (England)(Property, etc.) Order 1973
1 Citers
Dennis v Charnwood Borough Council; CA 1983 - [1983] CLY 2535; [1983] 81 LGR 275
Regina v Eastleigh Borough Council, Ex parte Betts; In re Betts [1983] 2 AC 613; [1983] UKHL 9; [1983] 3 WLR 397; [1984] Fam Law 25; [1983] 2 All ER 111
27 Jul 1983
HL
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Edmund-Davies, Lord Roskill, Lord Brightman
Housing, Local Government
Mr Betts applied to Eastleigh for accommodation under the 1977 Act. They said that he had no local connection and referred his application to Blaby where the applicant and his family had formerly been living. Blaby accepted the referral and offered accommodation, but he refused it and made a further application to Eastleigh. In relation to that application Eastleigh took the view that, in referring the earlier application under section 5 of the 1977 Act, they had discharged their duty to the applicant. The applicant sought judicial review of that decision on the grounds that Eastleigh (in that context, the notifying authority) had been wrong to decide that the applicant had no local connection with their own district. The basis for that decision was that the applicant's connection with Eastleigh did not fall within the working definition of 'normal residence' set out in the Agreement on Procedures for Referrals of the Homeless. Held: The authority's appeal succeeded. The question was whether the respondents had a "local connection" with the appellants' area within section 18(1)(a) for the purposes of section 5(1). Held: "local connection" was not a defined expression, the effect of which was to allow a reader to construe it by substituting "is or was normally resident in," or "is employed in," or "has family associations with" for the words "has a local connection with". The section was intended to specify those factors alone upon which a local connection could be founded. The fundamental question was the existence of a local connection: "In construing section 5 it is only to be expected that the emphasis falls on 'local connection', and not on past or present residence or current employment, etc. The Act is one which enables a homeless person in certain circumstances to jump over the heads of all other persons on a housing authority's waiting list, to jump the queue. One would not expect any just legislation to permit this to be done unless the applicant has in a real sense a local connection with the area in question. I accept that 'residence' may be changed in a day, and that in appropriate circumstances a singe day's residence may be enough to enable a person to say that he was normally resident in the area in which he arrived only yesterday. But 'local connection' means far more than that. It must be built up and established; by a period of residence; or by a period of employment; or by family associations which have endured in the area; or by other special circumstances which spell out a local connection in real terms."
Lord Brightman spoke of the national 'Agreement on Procedures for Referrals of the Homeless': "it is obvious that time consuming and expensive disputes might arise between housing authorities as to the existence of a 'local connection'. Such disputes are not in the interest either of housing authorities or of homeless persons. The purposes of the Act demand speedy solutions to questions of doubt. To avoid such disputes, and to settle them quickly and cheaply if they arise, certain steps have been taken on behalf of housing authorities. First, in order to facilitate agreements between notifying authorities and notified authorities as required by section 5(7) a national 'Agreement on Procedures for Referrals of the Homeless' was negotiated between the Association of District Councils, the Association of Metropolitan Authorities and the London Boroughs Association at the time when the Bill was being considered by Parliament. This agreement has been adhered to by the majority of housing authorities. Secondly, by the Housing (Homeless Persons) (Appropriate Arrangements) Order 1978 (SI 1978 No 69), the Secretary of State for the Environment, in exercise of his powers under section 5(8) has established the 'Appropriate Arrangements' set out in the schedule to the order for the purpose of settling unresolved disputes between housing authorities. These arrangements are in a form which was agreed by the three associations who negotiated the Agreement on Procedures. They provide for any disputed question under section 5 to be determined speedily either by a person agreed upon by the authorities concerned or by a person chosen from a panel. These arrangements came into operation on January 21, 1978, that is to say a few weeks after the Act of 1977 came into force. There is evidence that he Agreement on Procedures has worked well, and that as a result there have only been about 50 references under the order since the Act came into force.
The Agreement on Procedures does not purport to impose a legally binding code on housing authorities who adhere to it. It is merely a policy document."
Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 5(1) 18(1)(a)
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[ Bailii ]
Stoke-On-Trent City Council v B and Q (Retail) Ltd [1984] 1 AC 754
1984
HL
Lord Templeman
Local Government
The defendants had been trading on Sundays in breach of s.47 of the Shops Act 1950, which, by s.71(1) imposed on every local authority the duty to enforce within their district the provisions of that Act. Parliament has given local authorities a special status to bring proceedings in their own name, thereby overcoming the difficulties which existed at common law in bringing civil proceedings in aid of public law. However the court should be slow to grant powers which risked the infringer in sanctions more onerous than the penalty imposed for the offence. S.222(1) confers on a local authority power to institute and maintain proceedings to enforce obedience to the criminal law within their district, being a power additional to the power at common law enabling the Attorney-General to proceed in such matters either ex officio or by relator action.
Local Government Act 1972 222(1) - Shops Act 1950 47 71(1)
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Regina v Amber Valley District Council ex parte Dickson (? Jackson) [1985] 1 WLR 2998; [1984] 3 All ER 501
1984
QBD
Woolf J
Local Government
One group on the council decided to support a proposed planning application. It was then asked whether that prevented a member of the group sitting on the committee which would assess it. There was an affidavit from the leader of the majority group in which he stated that all material considerations would be taken into account when the planning committee came to deal with the application. Held: Members of the group could not be so disqualified.
Woolf J: "I fully accept, particularly having regard to the authorities to which I have referred, that there is an obligation on the district council to deal fairly with the applications by KLF for planning permission and that in that sense the principles of natural justice apply to the consideration of an application for planning permission. Furthermore, I agree that this court has the right to intervene to prevent an application being dealt with in an unfair manner or contrary to the principles of natural justice by the district council. However, I cannot accept that Webster J's test can be applied in this situation [That was a reference to Steeples v Derbyshire County Council [1984] 3 All ER 468]. It is much easier for the court to interfere on the basis of procedural unfairness than on the basis of bias of the sort alleged in this case. It is to be noted that it is not alleged here that the district council had entered into any contract which precluded them from exercising an independent judgment as was alleged against the Derbyshire County Council. Nor is it alleged that any individual district councillor has some personal financial interest. My conclusion as to what the evidence shows in this case is that it indicates that the majority of the district council can only be said to be 'biased' in the sense that they are, as the respondents' counsel contends, 'politically predisposed' in favour of the development in respect of which planning permission is sought. It has become the Labour group's policy to support the development. It is therefore likely that any Labour member of the planning committee will be more ready to grant planning permission than he would be if the Labour group had remained adverse to the development. But does this have the fact of disqualifying the Labour majority from considering the planning application? It would be a surprising result if it did [disqualify] since in the case of a development of this sort, I would have thought that it was almost inevitable, now that party politics play so large a part in local government, that the majority group on a council would decide on the party line in support of the proposal. If this was to be regarded as disqualifying the district council from dealing with the planning application, then if that disqualification is to be avoided, the members of the planning committee at any rate will have to adopt standards of conduct which I suspect will be almost impossible to achieve in practice."
CS Woolf J: "The rules of fairness of natural justice cannot be regarded as being rigid. They must alter in accordance with the context. Thus in the case of highways, the department can be both the promoting authority and the determining authority. When this happens, of course any reasonable man would regard the department as being predisposed towards the outcome of the inquiry. The department is under an obligation to be fair and to carefully consider the evidence given before the inquiry but the fact that it has a policy in the matter does not entitle a court to intervene. So in this case I do not consider the fact that there is a declaration of policy by the majority group can disqualify a district council from adjudicating on a planning application. It may mean that the outcome of the planning application is likely to be favourable to an applicant and therefore unfavourable to objectors. However, Parliament has seen fit to lay down that it is the local authority which have the power to make the decision and an applicant for planning permission in the normal way are entitled to have a decision from the local authority if the Secretary of State decides not to intervene. The legislation could have given a right of appeal to the objectors in the same way as it is given to applicants but this it has not done and they are dependent on the limited powers of this court to intervene by way of judicial review. "
Woolf J: "I do not say that the court can never intervene. Indeed I do not question Webster J's decision to do so in respect of the conduct of the county council. However in this case, while the Labour majority undoubtedly had a policy, there is no evidence before me on which it would be right to hold that they would not (despite the policy) consider the objections to the planning application on their merits. I would make it absolutely clear that they are under a duty to do so. However, in this case I have an affidavit from the leader of the majority Labour group on the district council that when the planning committee come to consider the application all material considerations will be taken into account. He furthermore indicates that the decision will be taken in light of the report prepared by the council's officers. That report is in evidence before me; it is a detailed and balanced report which has not been criticised by the applicants. In these circumstances, it seems to me that it would be quite wrong of me to infer that the planning committee would not do precisely what Mr Cook deposes that he believes that they will do, namely take into account all material considerations."
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Steeples v Derbyshire County Council [1984] 3 All ER 468
1984
Webster J
Local Government
The Council owned park land which they wanted to develop as a leisure centre with recreational facilities. They agreed with a company who was to manage the development that they would undertake to use their best endeavours to obtain outline planning permission, with a financial penalty if they failed to use such best endeavours. The planning committee were not informed of the financial arrangements. Held: The owner of adjoining land had a proprietary interest to challenge the grant of permission and to have sound grounds for doing so in that the grant made, while fairly and properly made, had not been in accordance with natural justice, because a reasonable man, not present when the decision was made and unaware that it had in fact been fairly made, but aware of the terms of the council's agreement with the company, would think that there was a real likelihood that the agreement had had a material and significant effect on the planning committee's decision to grant permission.
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