swarb.co.uk - law index
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Local Government - From: 1930 To: 1959
This page lists 14 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.
The King v Bedwellty Urban District Council, ex parte Price [1934] 1 KB 333
1934
Local Government
1 Citers
Gillett v Kent Rivers Catchment Board [1938] 4 All ER 810
1938
Stable J
Local Government, Utilities
1 Citers
Smith v Cawdle Fen, Ely (Cambridge) Commissioners [1938] 4 All ER 64; (1938) 82 Sol Jo 890; (1938) 37 LGR 22; (1938) 160 LT 61
1938
du Parcq J
Utilities, Local Government
The plaintiff's land had been damaged by flooding. The defendants had power to execute works which might have prevented the floods. Held: The defendants were under no duty, having only a power. The statute did not direct or require the defendant to do such work.
1 Citers
Attorney-General v Poole [1938] 1 Ch 23
1938
Charity, Local Government, Land
Open space land had been conveyed to Poole Corporation "in fee simple to the intent that the same may for ever hereafter be preserved and used as an open space or as a pleasure or recreation ground for the public use." Held: There was no express reference in the Conveyance to the 1906 Act but the Court of Appeal thought it applied in any event.
Open Spaces Act 1906
1 Citers
East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v Kent [1941] AC 74; [1940] UKHL 3
1941
HL
Lord Romer, Lord Atkin
Negligence, Local Government, Utilities
An exceptionally high spring tide caused many breaches of the banks of the River Deben, and extensive flooding, including the respondent's farm. By section 6 of the 1930 Act, the appellants had a statutory power to maintain the flood defences, but no duty to do so. They had however entered onto land to begin works. Held: A statutory power could not in itself generate a common law duty of care. The respondents aregued that they had a duty to do and were in breach.
Lord Atkin (dissenting) said: "By going onto the land and commencing the work, the Catchment Board had done an act which created a common law duty to complete the work with reasonable despatch."
and "I treat it therefore as established that a public authority whether doing an act which it is its duty to do, or doing an act which it is merely empowered to do, must in doing the act do it without negligence, or as it is put in some of the cases must not do it carelessly or improperly. Now quite apart from a duty owed to a particular individual which is the question in this case I suggest that it would be difficult to lay down that a duty upon a public authority to act without negligence or not carelessly or improperly does not include a duty to act with reasonable diligence by which I mean reasonable dispatch. I cannot imagine this House affording its support to a proposition so opposed to public interests where there are so many public bodies exercising statutory powers and employing public money upon them."
Land Drainage Act 1930 6
1 Cites
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[ Bailii ]
Allchin v Coulthard [1942] 2 KB 228
1942
CA
Lord Greene MR
Local Government
Lord Greene MR discussed the meaning of the word 'fund': "The word 'fund' may mean actual cash resources of a particular kind (e.g. money in a drawer or a bank), or it may be a mere accountancy expression used to describe a particular category which a person uses in making up his accounts. The words 'payment out of' when used in connection with the word 'fund' in its first meaning connote actual payment e.g. by taking the money out of the drawer or drawing a cheque on the bank. When used in connection with the word 'fund' in its second meaning they connote that, for the purposes of the account in which the fund finds a place, the payment is debited to that fund, an operation which of course has no relation to the actual method of payment or the particular cash resources out of which the payment is made . . A fund in the second category is merely an accountancy category. It has a real existence in that sense, but not in the sense that a real payment can be made out of it as distinct from being debited to it."
1 Citers
Allchin v Coulthard [1943] AC 607
1943
HL
Local Government
Affirmed.
1 Cites
HE Green and Sons v Minister of Health (No 2) [1948] 1 KB 34; [1947] 2 All ER 469
1947
Denning J
Land, Local Government
The plaintiff challenged a compulsory purchase order, saying that the purpose of the order went beyond the statutory purpose. Held: The provision of "houses" must be taken to include the provision of ancillary facilities. Denning J said that he was satisfied that the local authority did not mean to restrict itself in its letting of the houses, it was to build on the land it was attempting to acquire, to those who were of any particular class. That did not however, invalidate the exercise of the powers: "The next question is whether the order is invalid because, in addition to houses being put up on this land, the co-operation proposed to put up nurseries, a health centre, a youth centre, shops, a public house, and so forth. It is said, and truly said, that in providing or contemplating the provision of those amenities, the co-operation intend that they should be available, not only to the persons living in the houses that are going to be put up in this estate, but also for persons from the neighbouring areas. It is said that makes the proposal invalid. This contention depends on the true interpretation of s 80. That section, contemplates that, providing the Minister consents, the land may be used, not only for houses, but also for shops, recreation grounds, and other buildings, which 'will serve a beneficial purpose in connecxion with the requirements of the persons for whom the housing accommodation is provided.' It is said if this proposed health centre, shops, etc, are in connexion with the requirements of other persons, in addition to those of this estate, that makes it outside the powers of s 80. I do not think that is a correct interpretation. The fact that it will also serve a beneficial purpose for other persons does not make it any the less a beneficial purpose for the persons in this housing estate. I see no reason for introducing the limitation which is suggested, and I do not think the proposed development is invalid."
1 Citers
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation; CA 10-Nov-1947 - [1947] 2 All ER 680; [1948] 1 KB 223; 1947 WL 10584; (1948) 92 SJ 26; [1948] LJR 190; [1948] 45 LGR 635; (1948) 112 JP 55; 63 TLR 623; [1947] EWCA Civ 1
Shelley v London County Council [1948] 1 KB 274
1948
CA
Lord Greene MR
Housing, Local Government
Taking into account the scope and policy of the Housing Acts, local authorities' powers of management of housing accommodation should be construed "in the widest possible sense."
1 Citers
Hall v Beckenham Corporation; 1949 - [1949 ] 1 KB 716
Tithe Redemption Commission v Runcorn Urban District Council [1954] 2 WLR 51; [1954] Ch 383
1954
CA
Denning LJ
Land, Local Government
The court considered the effect of a strip of land being designated as a public right of way. Denning LJ said: "The statute . . vest[s] in the local authority the top spit, or perhaps, I should say, the top two spits of the road for a legal estate in fee simple determinable in the event of it ceasing to be a public highway."
Local Government Act 1929 29
1 Cites
1 Citers
National Deposit Friendly Society Trustees v Skegness Urban District Council; HL 1959 - [1959] AC 293
Rhyl Urban District Council v Rhyl Amusements Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 465; [1959] 1 All ER 257
1959
Local Government, Landlord and Tenant
The tenant said that the landlord local authority had accepted his surrender of his lease by granting a new one, but the new lease was void as ultra vires. Held: Not even the surrender of their old lease on the promise to grant the new one assisted them. The old lease would not be deemed surrendered unless the new lease was granted by deed. The defendants made a new lease, which was void: "It would be absurd if the same result were to be achieved as had been intended by the Agreement and which led to that Agreement being ultra vires, merely because the court has declared the Agreement void and put a notional contract of employment in its place. It would be achieving by a different means the same improper purpose, and that is something which the law cannot contemplate."
1 Citers
