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Local Government - From: 1849 To: 1899

This page lists 22 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
The Queen v The Inhabitants of Barnsley [1849] EngR 628; (1849) 12 QB 193; (1849) 116 ER 840
12 May 1849


Benefits, Local Government
It is not necessary that a lunatic, chargeable to a parish, should be sent to an asylum or licensed house. The justice before whom he is brought is to decide whether he is a proper person to he confined or not; and, if not corifined, he may Be removed to his parish as an ordinary pauper. An idiot, aged thirty, living with his parents in parish B., became chargeable; and thereupon he and they were removed by order of justices to parish T., their place of settlement. The order was never appealed against. The father retained his house in B, in the care of two of his children, who were emancipated; and, when removed, he intended to return as soon as he could. After four days, the paupers did return to the house in B, with the consent of the overseers of T, who promised to send weekly relief to the parents for the son : but the son again became chargeable to B; and another order was made, finding the son and parents chargeable, and ordering their removal to T. The famiIy had resided in B. for five years next before the makirig of this order, excepting only the four days above mentioned. On appeal (not stating as a ground that the parents were not chargeable at the date of the second order), and case stated by the sessions : Held that the five years' residence was broken by the removal to parish T., arid that the paupers were not irremoveable from B. under stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, s. I.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Tupper v Newton [1853] EngR 962; (1853) 14 CB 114; (1853) 139 ER 48
11 Nov 1853


Local Government

[ Commonlii ]
 
Armstrong v Bowdidge [1855] EngR 519; (1855) 16 CB 358; (1855) 139 ER 797
1 Jun 1855


Local Government

[ Commonlii ]
 
Ward v Lee (1857) 7 E&B 426; [1857] EngR 309; [1857] 119 ER 1305
1857

Wightman J
Local Government
Wightman J said: "The clause at the end of the 128th section is not for the repayment of 'damages' recovered against a person acting bona fide in the execution of the Act, but for the repayment of his [expenses]; which may well be construed, consistently with our view of the meaning of the section, to be repayment of the [expenses] he may have been put to in defending an action brought against him personally, and in which he may have been successful on the ground that he was acting bona fide in the execution of the Act, and therefore not liable."

 
Bowes v The City Of Toronto [1858] EngR 365; (1858) 11 Moo PC 463; (1858) 14 ER 770; [1858] UKPC 10
15 Feb 1858
PC

Local Government, Equity
The mayor of a city who bought discounted debentures issued by the city was in the same position as an agent vis-a-vis the city, and was to be treated as holding the debentures on trust for the city.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Lundie (1862) 8 Jur NS 640
1862
QBD
Cockburn CJ
Local Government, Crime
A byelaw provided: "if any person shall stock or depasture, inter alia, a vicious horse on any part of the common pastures, then, and in every such case, the person or persons so offending, and the owner or owners of the said stock and cattle, shall respectively forfeit and pay for every such offence the sum of £5." The defendant said it was void. Held: The byelaw was valid as against a person responsible for depasturing a vicious horse on the common notwithstanding that it might be unreasonable and therefore ultra vires as against an innocent owner. Cockburn CJ said: "It has been contended that this byelaw is unreasonable, because the owner of such an animal might innocently, and without knowledge or intention, be brought within its scope, and become liable to the penalties thereby imposed. But, admitting so far the justice of this objection, it seems to me that we may, consistently with the authorities, reject this portion, and act upon the remainder of the byelaw, which is perfectly good and reasonable. I think, therefore, the conviction should stand."
1 Citers


 
Ellis v The Mayor, Aldermen, And Burgesses of The Borough of Bridgnorth [1863] EngR 786; (1863) 15 CB NS 52; (1863) 143 ER 702
6 Jul 1863


Land, Local Government

[ Commonlii ]
 
Thomas Goad Blain v The Overseers Of The Township Of Pilkington [1864] EngR 771; (1864) 18 CB NS 6; (1864) 141 ER 341
18 Nov 1864


Local Government

[ Commonlii ]
 
Nicol v Magistrates of Aberdeen (1870) 9 M 306
1870

Lord President Inglis
Scotland, Local Government
A very strong case is required before a court could intefere with the exercise of a statutory discretion given to a local authority in a matter affecting the community.
1 Citers


 
The King v Cotterill [1871] EngR 42 (B); (1817) 1 B & A 67
6 Nov 1871


Local Government
King Charles the Second, by charter granted to the Corporation of Walsall two fairs, to be holden annually within the borough and foreign, and confirmed to them all markets which they then held, with a reservation of the rights of the lord of the manor; it appeared that a market had been holden immemorially in the High-Street of WaIsall until a very late period, when the corporation, finding it inconvenent, removed it out of the High-Street to another and more convenient place within the borough; the corporation had exercised acts of ownership in pulling down an old market-house and erecting a new one; the clerk of the markets, however, had been appointed by the lord of the manor, but he did not receive any toll from the persons frequenting it. The defendant having been indicted for a nuisance in erecting stalls in the High-Street after the removal of the market, the Judge, upon the trial, left it to the jury to say whether the corporation were owners of this market; adding, that if they were, the right of removal was incident to the grant. The jury having found in the affirmative, the Court refused to grant a new trial.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Burgess v Northwich Local Board (1880) 6 QBD 264; [1880] LJQB 219; [1880] 44 LT 154; [1880] JP 256; [1880] 26 Digest (Repl) 352
1880

Lindley J
Land, Torts - Other, Local Government
In the context of the duty of a local parish to maintain a highway, Lindley J said: "An occasional flooding, even if it temporarily renders a highway impassable, is not sufficient to sustain an indictment for non-repair." Counsel accepted that: "There is no authority whatever for indicting a parish in respect of a road being impassable by reason of water, unless of course the water was a consequence of neglect to cleanse ditches or some such omission of duty."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Chapleo v Brunswick Permanent Building Society; 1881 - (1881) 6 QBD 696

 
 Ayr Harbour Trustees v Oswald; 1883 - (1883) 8 AC 623
 
Hornsey Local Board v Monarch Investment Building Society [1889] 24 QBD 1
1889
CA
Lord Esher MR, Lopes LJ, Lindley LJ
Limitation, Local Government
The local authority had incurred expense in paving a street. They were entitled to apportion those expenses amongst the owners of the properties fronting onto that street and summarily to recover from the respective owners the amounts so apportioned. In addition statute provided that such expenses should be charged on the premises in respect of which they were incurred with interest thereon at the rate of 5% until payment. It was not necessary for the amount due to be ascertained on the sale of a house before the Society had a right to receive it. The charge was imposed when the paving works were completed in 1875. The expenses were not apportioned until 1885. In 1887 a demand for payment was made on the defendant and in 1888 the local board sought to enforce the statutory charge against the defendant. The county court judge granted the order, but the Queen's Bench Division reversed him. Held: The appeal failed. The limitation period for a local authority to recover paving expenses ran from the time of imposition even though the charge had not yet been apportioned between the frontagers. The right to receive payment had arisen even though it could not yet enforce payment.
Lord Esher MR "It was strongly argued that the words "present right to receive the same" in this section are equivalent to "present right to enforce payment of the same". If there were some overwhelming reason why that construction should be given to the words; if that were the only construction that would render the procedure sensible, I think possibly the words might receive that construction, but I do not think it would be their ordinary meaning in the English language. A present right to receive is not in ordinary English the same as a present right to enforce payment. Then is there any overwhelming reason why we should read the words otherwise than in their natural sense? So far from that, I think that in the present case to read the words in the way suggested for the plaintiffs would raise insuperable difficulties, whereas to read them in their natural sense makes the whole legislation sensible and easier application. The difficulty that arises on the plaintiffs' construction has been pointed out, viz., that the Board, who have to receive the money, and also to apportion the amount, would have the power to delay the application of the Statute of Limitation for any time they please. When that difficulty was presented, the plaintiffs' Counsel endeavoured to meet it by the ingenious suggestion that, if the apportionment were not made within a reasonable time, the making of it might be enforced by mandamus; and other modes were suggested of meeting the difficulty. But why should we embark on such questions and invent means of overcoming this difficulty, when by reading the words in their ordinary sense no such difficulty arises? . . .
"The charge exists, though the exact amount charged may not be ascertained. It is suggested that a person in whose favour a charge is imposed cannot be entitled to receive an amount which is not ascertained. I do not see why this should be so. A sum may be offered to him, which the person offering it thinks to be the right sum, and which he may also think to be the right sum, although the actual calculation of the exact amount has not been made. What is there in law, or reason, or business, to shew that he is not entitled to receive the sum when so offered to him? I cannot see any difficulty in saying that there is a present right to receive the expenses. In the case where a person has only a reversionary right to receive money, or for some other reason the time when he is entitled to receive the money has not yet arrived, it would be different, and there would be no present right to receive the money. . .
So, reading the words of the section in their ordinary sense, it seems to me that in the present case the Local Board were a body of persons in whose favour a charge existed for a sum of money, who were entitled to receive it, and who were capable of giving a receipt or discharge for it . . . It seems to me therefore that the case comes within the words of the section read in their ordinary sense and that there is no reason for giving them any other construction. Consequently the claim of the plaintiffs is barred by the Statute of Limitations."
Lindley LJ said that expression, a "present right to receive" was "a little ambiguous", but agreed with Lord Esher: ". . . and as distinguishable, as apparently it is meant to be, from "present right to sue", everything works out harmoniously; the moment the time of the coming into existence of the charge is ascertained, the period of limitation will begin to run: whereas, if the opposite construction is adopted, we are at once landed in the curious anomaly that the creditor, that is to say, the person who is entitled to the charge, can by his own act postpone his right to sue indefinitely . . .
The section is dealing with charges on land, and it must be borne in mind that such charges are present charges and future charges, reversionary charges, charges in remainder, and such like. One general form of expression is used to include the whole, and that expression is "present right to receive." It seems to me clear that the meaning is that in each case the moment to be looked to is the moment when the charge comes into present operation; for instance, when reversionary charges are being dealt with, the moment to be looked to is the moment when the reversion falls in and the charge takes effect in possession."
Lopes LJ said that the right to receive what was secured by a charge arose concurrently with the charge: "When, then, does the right accrue to the person or persons in whose favour the charge is imposed to receive the amount secured by the charge? It appears to me that it accrues the moment the charge is imposed on the premises by the statute, that is when the expenses have been incurred and the works completed. It may be that certain things have to be done before the right can be enforced, but the right to receive what is secured by the charge arises concurrently with the charge. The words are 'present right to receive' not 'present right to recover'. The right to receive may exist though the definite sum to be received has not yet been ascertained. There are cases where the legislature requires a notice to be given before an action can be maintained. The right of action however exists as soon as an actionable wrong has been committed, though it cannot be successfully enforced until the statutory requirements are complied with."
Real Property Limitation Act 1874 8
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Manchester Corporation v Williams [1891] 1 QB 94; (1891) 63 LT 805
1891
QBD
Day, Lawrance JJ
Defamation, Local Government
The defendant wrote to a newspaper alleging that "in the case of two if not three departments of our Manchester city council, bribery and corruption have existed and done their nefarious work." Held: The claim disclosed no cause of action. A corporation may sue for a libel affecting property, but not for one merely affecting personal reputation.
Day J said (Times): "This action is brought by the mayor, aldermen, and citizens of the city of Manchester to recover damages from the defendant in respect of that which is alleged by them to be a libel on the corporation. The alleged libel is contained in a letter written by the defendant to the editor of the 'Manchester Examiner and Times', which charged, as alleged by the statement of claim, that bribery and corruption existed or had existed in three departments of the Manchester City Council, and that the plaintiffs were either parties thereto or culpably ignorant thereof, and that the said bribery and corruption prevailed to such an extent as to render necessary an inquiry by a parliamentary commission. Now it is for us to determine whether a corporation can bring such an action, and I must say that, to my mind, to allow such a thing would be wholly unprecedented and contrary to principle. A corporation may sue for a libel affecting property, not for one merely affecting personal reputation. This does not fall within the class of case in respect of which a corporation can maintain an action, but does fall within the second class commented on by Pollock C.B. in his judgment in the case of the Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co. Ltd. v. Hawkins, 4 H. & N. 87, with which I fully agree . .
The charge in the present case is one of bribery and corruption, of which a corporation cannot possibly be guilty, and therefore, in my opinion, this action will not lie."
Lawrance J agreed.
1 Citers



 
 Mayor of Bradford v Pickles; HL 29-Jul-1895 - [1895] AC 587; [1895] UKHL 1
 
Regina v Mayor of Plymouth [1896] 1 QB 158
1896


Local Government
Legislation was the only power that constituent councils had of controlling the expenditure of a fisheries committee, but any restrictions and conditions as to expenditure in connection with the appointment of a fishery officers had to be imposed before the appointment of that officer.
1 Citers


 
Strickland v Hayes [1896] 1 QB 290
1896
CA
Lindley LJ
Local Government
Lindley LJ discussed the validity of a byelaw where part appeared invalid: "I have no doubt whatever that those words are bad. But that being so, is the rest of the byelaw bad? There is plenty of authority for saying that if a byelaw can be divided, one part may be rejected as bad while the rest may be held to be good. In the present case there is, I think, no difficulty whatever in severing the byelaw. If the words 'on any land adjacent thereto' are omitted, the rest of the byelaw reads quite grammatically. The byelaw is, therefore, distinctly severable."
1 Citers


 
Bradford v Mayor of Eastbourne [1896] 2 QB 205
1896

Lord Russell CJ
Land, Local Government, Utilities
Lord Russell CJ said of section 13: "the vesting . . is not a giving of the property in the sewer and in the soil . . but giving such ownership and such rights only as are necessary for the purpose of carrying out the duties of a local authority"
Public Health Act 1875 13
1 Citers


 
Harris v Northamptonshire County Council (1897) 61 JP 599
1897


Local Government
At common law a highway authority is under a duty to remove obstructions from a highway.
1 Citers


 
Kruse v Johnson [1898] 2 QB 91; [1895-99] All ER 105
1898

Lord Russell of Killowen CJ, Mathew J
Administrative, Crime, Local Government
The validity of a by-law prohibiting the playing of music in a public place within fifty yards of any dwelling after being requested by a constable or resident of that dwelling to desist was upheld. A private citizen taxed with a criminal charge which is unfounded, because based upon an ultra vires byelaw or administrative decision, may challenge that decision. Where an authority which is clothed with statutory powers orders something to be done and accompanies this with some sanction or penalty for a failure to do it, this restricts the freedom of action by persons who are affected by it, who would otherwise be free to do as they pleased. Legislation of this kind ought to be supported if possible, looking to the character of the body which is legislating, the subject matter and the nature and extent of the authority which is given to the body to legislate in matters of this kind.
Lord Russell of Killowen said as to powers exercised by private bodies: "the court should jealously watch the exercise of these powers, and guard against their unnecessary or unreasonable exercise to the public disadvantage, bearing in mind that their primary purpose is to make money for its shareholders".
He defined a by-law as: "an ordinance affecting the public, or some portion of the public, imposed by some authority clothed with statutory powers ordering something to be done or not to be done, and accompanied by some sanction or penalty for its non-observance."
As to by-laws, he said that: "an oppressive, gratuitous interference with personal rights and freedoms devoid of rational justification would be unreasonable and ultra vires but a by-law was not unreasonable 'merely because particular judges may think that it goes further than is prudent or necessary or convenient, or because it is not accompanied by a qualification or an exception which some judges may think ought to be there'” and "[when] called upon to consider the by-laws of public representative bodies clothed with . . ample authority . . and exercising that authority accompanied by . . checks and safeguards . . the consideration of such by-laws ought to be approached from a different standpoint. They ought to be supported if possible. They ought to be, as has been said, "benevolently" interpreted and credit ought to be given to those who have to administer them that they will be reasonably administered . . I think courts of justice ought to be slow to condemn as invalid any by-law so made under such conditions, on the ground of supposed unreasonableness."
Mathew J (dissenting) included certainty among the conditions of validity of a by-law.
1 Citers


 
Sandgate UDC v Kent CC (1898) 79 LT 425
1898

Lord Halsbury LC
Local Government
The court considered an arbitration award relating to responsibilities for the cost of maintaining a so-called "Esplanade" adjoining the highway, and a sea-wall and groynes which had been built to protect it from inundation. The statute enabled the highway authority to recover from the county council a contribution towards the cost of "maintenance and repair" of the highway. Lord Halsbury LC set out the scope of the highway authority's duties. A distinction had been drawn by the arbitrator between works which were part of the road "strictly speaking", and that part of the works which was "so necessary to the maintenance of the main road, that unless the construction was there the main road might be washed away". Lord Halsbury said: "It was argued before the arbitrator that in point of law the expenses, as regards that part, were not recoverable because it was not part of the main road. To my mind that contention is absurd. Is it common sense to say that where the obligation is to maintain the road and keep it in repair, you can by neglect, allow that duty to be so disregarded that in time the road may be washed away, so that your liability or obligation ceases? Such a proposition is, to my mind, absolutely monstrous. The obligation at common law, and the same obligations have been handed on to the various bodies which in turn have received by statute the obligations and duties in respect of roads, is absolute, that they must keep in repair the roads in their parish Can anything be more clear than this, that the obligation is absolute in the first instance on the proper body whoever it be?
Then the proposition appears to be this, that if you take a main road, not merely the via trita, but that part of it which is said to be dedicated to the public, your jurisdiction must be limited to, and does not go an inch beyond that which is the highway. If that be so, if you want to cut a gutter to prevent the road from being flooded, or to take a culvert under it, where is your culvert to start? Have you no jurisdiction to dig a hole to allow the water to go through the culvert, so as to preserve the road? The truth is that you might put forward half a dozen hypotheses to show that such a construction of the law would reduce the whole thing to an absurdity, and render the administration of the road authority absolutely impossible I have no hesitation in saying that, assuming a thing to be necessary for the preservation of the road, and assuming that the local authority is under obligation to keep up the road, the law of England is that you shall keep up that road by whatever means are appropriate and necessary to do it. " As to the repair of the groynes, he specifically rebutted the contention that the word "maintenance" had no independent meaning: "Then the proposition is this. You cannot do anything of this sort to maintain the road; you must allow it to go out of repair each year, although that would involve extraordinary and unnecessary expense to the parish or local body, whatever it might be; you must do that because your only power is to repair the road. In that argument I think that the word 'maintenance' appears to have escaped the attention of those so arguing: the maintenance of the road is quite as much a part of the duty as the 'repair'…"
Local Government Act 1888 11(2)
1 Citers


 
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