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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Litigation Practice - From: 1992 To: 1992

This page lists 59 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Giles v Thompson [1993] 3 All ER 321
1992
CA
Steyn LJ
Litigation Practice, Legal Professions, Costs
The interest that the rule of champerty exists to protect (the individual interest) is that of the opposite party. Steyn LJ described contingency fee agreements as "nowadays perhaps the most important species of champerty" and were "still unlawful". He added that, while champerty had not "wither[ed] away", its "scope . . has been shrunk greatly". The correct question was whether "in accordance with contemporary public policy, the agreement has in fact caused the corruption of public justice. The court must consider the tendency of the agreement."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Tigner Welsh London Company Limited v Spiro (1992) 126 SJ 525
1992


Litigation Practice

1 Citers



 
 Kenneth Allison Ltd v AE Limehouse Ltd; HL 1992 - [1992] 2 AC 105
 
Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council v Wickes Building Supplies Ltd [1993] AC 227; [1992] 3 WLR 170
1992
HL
Lord Goff of Chieveley
Local Government, Litigation Practice
A public authority is not required as a rule to give a cross undertaking in damages in a law enforcement action. As to the legal status of the statutory instrument in question, the courts could "declare it to be invalid" if satisfied that the Minister acted outwith his powers conferred by the primary legislation, whether the order was "ultra vires by reason of its contents (patent defects) or by reason of defects in the procedure followed prior to its being made (latent defects):" and "Under our legal system, however, the courts as the judicial arm of Government do not act on their own initiative. Their jurisdiction to determine that a statutory instrument is ultra vires does not arise until its validity is challenged in proceedings inter partes either brought by one party to enforce the law declared by the instrument against another party or brought by a party whose interests are affected by the law so declared sufficiently directly to give him locus standi to initiate proceedings to challenge the validity of the instrument. Unless there is such challenge and, if there is, until it has been upheld by a judgment of the court, the validity of the statutory instrument and the legality of acts done pursuant to the law declared by it are presumed. It would, however, be inconsistent with the doctrine of ultra vires as it has been developed in English law as a means of controlling abuse of power by the executive arm of Government if the judgment of a court in proceedings properly constituted that a statutory instrument was ultra vires were to have any lesser consequence in law than to render the instrument incapable of ever having had any legal effect upon the rights or duties of the parties to the proceedings. Although such a decision is directly binding only as between the parties to the proceedings in which it was made, the application of the doctrine of precedent has the consequence of enabling the benefit of it to accrue to all other persons whose legal rights have been interfered with in reliance on the law which the statutory instrument purported to declare."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
EWP Ltd v Moore [1992] 1 QB 460
1992
CA
Bingham LJ
Litigation Practice
The construction favoured, despite the anomaly it produced, by all three members of the court was one which had been the subject of a longstanding decision at first instance and that "despite abundant opportunities Parliament has not acted to cure the anomaly, which cannot have escaped the attention of departmental lawyers and administrators" and "The inference must be either that this apparent anomaly is not regarded as such or that it is regarded as a desirable or tolerable anomaly". The anomaly was to be tolerated.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Fayed [1992] BCC 524
1992
CA
Neill LJ, Steyn LJ
Litigation Practice, Financial Services
This was a renewed application for leave to apply for judicial review of decisions of the Panel not to adjourn its disciplinary proceedings against Mr Fayed.
1 Citers


 
The Jay Bola [1992] 1 QB 907
1992

Hobhouse J
Limitation, Litigation Practice
A writ was issued against defendants "O" who had been owners of the Jay Bola, just prior to the expiry of the one year time bar under the Hague Rules. The judge laid emphasis on the fact that Article 6 III r.6 discharged from all liability unless suit was brought within a year. "O" had in fact sold the ship to "AS", and after the expiry of the time bar, the plaintiffs sought leave to correct the name under Ord.20 r.5(3). Held: Ord.20 r.5 had been in similar terms since 1964, and there were decisions showing that amendments granted under the rule did relate back, but those cases were concerned with "procedural time bars" under the Limitation Acts. Since the passing of the Limitation Act 1980, in particular by section 35, some power to relate back was derived from that section, but only in relation to time limits imposed by the Limitation Acts. The only relation back in respect of an amendment of proceedings to add another party after the limitation proceedings, that was available was that allowed by the rules made to give effect to section 35 of the 1980 Act.
Limitation Act 1980 30
1 Citers


 
Mouchell Superannuation Fund Trustees and another v Oxfordshire County Council [1992] 1 PLR 97
1992
CA

Planning, Litigation Practice
The court has jurisdiction to grant a declaration, in a private law action, that a planning condition is invalid.
1 Citers


 
Alliance and Leicester Building Society v Ghahremani and others [1992] 32 RVR 198
1992

Hoffmann J
Rating, Litigation Practice
The court rejected a submission that Mr Justice Vinelott's view as to the scope of the word "document" was restricted to questions of discovery under the rules of court. He applied the extended meaning of a document described to the question of whether the deliberate deletion of information stored on the disc of an office computer was a contemptuous breach of an order restraining a solicitor from destroying or altering any documents relating to a conveyancing transaction.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
ISC Technologies Limited v Guerin [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep 430
1992

Hoffman J
Litigation Practice
A fraud was alleged by the defendant against the arms manufacturer Ferranti.
Hoffman J said: "The question [on an application under Ord. 12 r. 8(1)(c) to discharge an order giving leave to serve a writ out of the jurisdiction] is . . whether that order was rightly made at the time it was made. Of course the Court can receive evidence which was not before the [Court when the order was made] and subsequent events may throw light upon what should have been relevant considerations at the time. But I do not think that leave which was rightly given should be discharged simply because circumstances have changed. That would mean that different answers could be given depending upon how long it took before the application came on to be heard." and
"Mr Crystal said I should look at the position today. An application under RSC, O12, r8 is a rehearing of the application to the Master and the exercise of a fresh discretion. It should therefore take into account whatever has since happened. I do not agree. The application is under RSC, O12, r8(1)(c) to discharge the Master's order giving leave to serve out. The question is therefore whether that order was rightly made at the time it was made. Of course the Court can receive evidence which was not before the Master and subsequent events may throw light upon what should have been relevant considerations at the time. But I do not think that leave which was rightly given should be discharged simply because circumstances have changed. That would mean that different answers could be given depending upon how long it took before the application came on to be heard. The position is quite different when the application is for a stay on the grounds of forum non conveniens. In such a case, the appropriate time to consider the matter is the date of the hearing."
1 Citers


 
TSB Private Bank International SA v Chabra [1992] 1 WLR 231
1992
ChD
Aikens J
Litigation Practice
Asset freezing orders may be made against persons in relation to whom the claimant asserts no cause of action and seeks no money judgment, but in relation to whom there is an arguable case that assets held in their name or under their control are in truth beneficially owned by the defendant against whom the claim is made.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Liverpool City Council ex parte Newman; 1992 - (1992) 5 Admin LR 669
 
Dubai Bank Ltd v Galadari (No 7) [1992] 1 WLR 106
1992
ChD
Morritt J
Litigation Practice
The court approved the proposition that the starting point for the court in addressing the selection of documents for discovery is that the court should accept a solicitor's affidavit claiming privilege as conclusive "unless it can be seen distinctly that the oath of the party cannot be relied on" and rejected a submission that the Lyell v. Kennedy principle could not apply to a selection made from own client documents: "At one stage the plaintiffs submitted that [the Lyell v. Kennedy principle] could not apply to copies made by a solicitor of his own client's pre-existing documents which were not themselves privileged, but it seems to me that, as the plaintiff's counsel ultimately accepted, there is no warrant for such a distinction. There is no authority to support it. As a matter of principle the selection of own client documents is just as likely to betray the trend of advice as a selection of third party documents, if not more so. And if I am right that the photocopies are discoverable there is every reason to uphold the application of the principle in respect of own client documents."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Republic of India and Others v India Steamship Co Ltd; The Indian Endurance and The Indian Grace [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep 124
1992
CA
Leggatt LJ
Litigation Practice, Estoppel
Munitions were consigned to Cochin on board the defendants' vessel. A fire occurred, and part was jettisoned, the remainder being damaged. The cargo owners first claimed damages in India for short delivery under the bills of lading for the jettisoned cargo. The Indian judge held that the defendants were liable for the value of the undelivered cargo, about £6,000. The plaintiffs then sued in rem in London for £2.6 million for the total loss of the cargo. The Indian claim pleaded short delivery of the cargo delivered at Cochin, viz. 51 shells (and a small item described as "charge green bag"). The claim was advanced under one of the two bills of lading under which the consignment was shipped. In the plaint, it was alleged that the ship-owners had been guilty of negligence while the cargo was in transit in the vessel, which was taken to refer to a breach of their duty as bailees (carriers for reward). It was either common ground (or found by the Indian judge) that the contract incorporated the Hague Rules. The claim in the English action was in the ordinary form for a damage to cargo claim, alleging against the ship-owners (1) breach of contract and/or duty as carrier by sea for reward to deliver the goods in like good order and condition as when shipped; (2) negligence, in breach of duty as carriers and/or as bailees for reward; and (3) breach of their obligations under article III(1) and (2) of the Hague-Visby Rules, which apply to the contracts contained in or evidenced by the two bills of lading under which the goods were shipped. One issue in the Court of Appeal was the relevance of Indian law to the question of cause of action estoppel. Leggatt LJ: "For my part, I see nothing in the suggestion that evidence of Indian law is required in order to establish that the cause of action sued on in India was the same as that relied on here. I accept Mr. Gruder's submission that it is a matter for English law to determine whether the causes of action were the same; there is no evidence or argument that they were not and, until the contrary is proved, Indian law must be presumed to be the same as English law. With the effect of the Indian judgment in India we are not concerned."
1 Citers


 
Hildebrand v Hildebrand [1992] 1 FLR 244
1992

Waite J
Family, Litigation Practice
The parties in ancillary relief proceedings sought orders for discovery. H had been to the wife's flat surreptitiously on five occasions, and taken photocopies of so many documents obtained by him in the course of those visits (but returned after photocopying) that the photocopies themselves would now "fill a crate", as the judge was told. Held. Waite J summarised the legal background and procedures for discovery in the Family Division, referring to the Rules of the Supreme Court which governed civil proceedings in the High Court. He stated that they differ a little from that in other Divisions, in that the principal applicable rules were the 1977 Rules and that it had become standard practice to proceed to discovery by means of questionnaires. These partook of the character both of the request of discovery and of an interrogatory. In appropriate circumstances the court was exercising an inquisitorial jurisdiction: "underlying the whole basis of the exercise of the Court's discretion under the amended section 25 of the 1973 Act is the duty of both sides to provide the court with information about all the circumstances of the case, including amongst other things, the particular matters specified in section 25."
The first issue was: "what must the husband now disclose of the box file copies and the Wallace Court copies?" and the Judge held that the husband must disclose all of the documents in both categories.
Waite J held: "There is another important feature in the context of discovery which it is relevant to mention as applying in family cases. The jurisdiction is a paternal one, and, where financial proceedings are involved, the court is exercising not merely a paternal but also, in appropriate circumstances, an inquisitorial jurisdiction. Underlying the whole basis of the exercise of the court's discretion under the amended s. 25 of the 1973 Act is the duty of both sides to provide the court with information about all the circumstances of the case, including, among other things, the particular matters specified in s. 25. That was very clearly stated by the House of Lords in Livsey (formerly Jenkins) v Jenkins [1985] AC 424 . . (see the speech of Lord Brandon at p. 436)."
Matrimonial Causes Rules 1977 77(4)
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Hancock Shipping Limited v Kowaski Heavy Industries; CA 1992 - [1992] 1 WLR 1025
 
Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim and On (No.5) [1992] 2 All ER 911
1992

Hoffman J
Litigation Practice
The rule in Norwich Pharmacal does not provide a general right of discovery. Hoffman J cited Lord Reid in Norwich Pharmacal and said: "The reference to "full information" has sometimes led to an assumption that any person who has become mixed up in a tortious act can be required not merely to disclose the identity of the wrongdoer but to give general discovery and answer questions on all matters relevant to the course of action. In my view this is wrong. The principle upon which Lord Reid distinguished the "mere witness" rule was that unless the plaintiff discovered the identity of the wrongdoer, he could not commence proceedings. The reasoning of the other members of the House is the same. The Norwich Pharmacal case is no authority for imposing upon "mixed up" third parties a genera) obligation to give discovery or information when the identity of the defendant is already known."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Palmer v Durnford Ford [1992] QB 483; [1992] 2 WLR 407; [1992] 2 All ER 122;
1992
QBD
Mr. Simon Tuckey QC
Litigation Practice, Negligence
The plaintiff had consented to judgment for his opponent in a case against both the supplier and a repairer of a lorry tractor unit. They subsequently sued an engineering expert on the ground that his incompetent report had led them to advance claims on a basis that was invalid, and their solicitors for negligence in engaging an incompetent expert. The expert persuaded the district judge to strike out the claim against him on the ground that he was immune from suit. Held: Witnesses are immune from suit in relation to their conduct as witnesses. Mr. Simon Tuckey QC said: "Generally I do not think that liability for failure to give careful advice to his client should inhibit an expert from giving truthful and fair evidence in court. I can see no good reason why an expert should not be liable for the advice which he gives to his client as to the merits of the claim, particularly if proceedings have not been started, and a fortiori as to whether he is qualified to advise at all."
1 Citers


 
Dobson v Hastings [1992] Ch 394
1992

Sir Donald Nicholls VC
Litigation Practice, Company
The Rules of the Supreme Court indicate that save when permitted under the rules, documents on the court file are not intended to be inspected or copied. There is no common law right to obtain access to a document filed in proceedings and held as part of a court record.
The Rules of the Supreme Court, including Order 62 relating to costs, apply to applications under the Act of 1986. Sir Donald Nicholls VC said that: "a court file is not a publicly available register. It is a file maintained by the court for the proper conduct of the proceedings. Access to that file is restricted. Non-parties have a right of access to the extent, but only to the extent, provided in the rules."
Dealing with the transcripts of evidence without the control of the court is "knowingly setting at nought one of the court's procedures devised to strike a balance between the various factors which pull in different directions in all court processes" and "The essential vice lies in knowingly interfering with the court's documents. This is as much an interference with the administration of justice as knowingly interfering with the court's officers. The boundary line is to be drawn at the point where there has been a taking of information from documents in the custody of the court knowing that leave was needed and that it had not been obtained. In such cases there is an act of interference with the judicial process; there is also an intention to interfere, because the act was done with knowledge that it was a contravention of the prescribed judicial process."
Companies Act 1986
1 Citers


 
Horizon Technologies International Ltd v Lucky Wealth Consultants Ltd Hong Kong Gazette, 15 January 1992; [1992] 1 WLR 24
15 Jan 1992
PC

Litigation Practice
(Hong Kong) The fact that some but not all of the terms of an agreement were also contained in a Tomlin order did not prevent the party referring to the deed for protection, in an action to enforce the Tomlin Order.


 
 A T and T Istel Ltd and Another v Tully and Others; CA 15-Jan-1992 - Gazette, 15 January 1992; [1992] 2 WLR 112; [1992] 2 All ER 28; [1992] 1 QB 315
 
Practice Direction No 47 Qbd Gazette, 15 January 1992
15 Jan 1992
QBD

Litigation Practice
Procedure for collecting costs of earlier unsuccessful enforcement proceedings.

 
Halls and An v O'Dell and Others Gazette, 15 January 1992
15 Jan 1992
CA

Litigation Practice
No special striking out considerations applied and the discretion given within Order 28 proceedings are to be applied as elsewhere. Here there was no limitation period expired or other substantial prejudice, and the striking out was incorrect.

 
Application for Appointment Before A Queens Bench Master Gazette, 05 February 1992
5 Feb 1992
QBD

Litigation Practice
Procedure and form for postal application for QB private room appointments.

 
Dubai Bank Ltd and Another v Galadari and Others Gazette, 19 February 1992
19 Feb 1992
ChD

Litigation Practice
Photocopies of documents are discoverable even if they may not be themselves good evidence of the documents of which they are copies.
1 Cites


 
Claims From Motor Accident At Auxerrre, France On A6 On 3 June 1991 Gazette, 26 February 1992
26 Feb 1992
QBD

Litigation Practice
All claims to be transferred to High Court central office for Master Hodgson

 
Claims From Use of Copper 7 or Gravigard Intra-Uterine Device Gazette, 26 February 1992
26 Feb 1992
QBD

Litigation Practice
All claims in this litigation are to be transferred to the High Court Central Office for management by Master Miller.

 
Europa Property and Financial Services Ltd v Stubbert Gazette, 18 March 1992; Times, 25 November 1991
18 Mar 1992
CA

Litigation Practice
Court has power to overturn Judge's exercise of discretion to refuse summary judgment. If a defendant appealed against an Order 14 judgment, then on the question as to what order it was appropriate to make under Order 14, the judge in chambers had a completely free discretion and in those circumstances ought not to have declined to order summary judgment simply because there was no cross-appeal.
1 Citers


 
Ocean Software Ltd v Kay and Others Gazette, 18 March 1992
18 Mar 1992
CA

Litigation Practice
An application to dismiss a Mareva injunction must be made to the judge, who had made the order, before any appeal against it is to be allowed.

 
Hannays v Baldeosingh Gazette, 01 April 1992
1 Apr 1992
PC

Litigation Practice, Commonwealth
There was no jurisdiction for appellate court to strike out a reply once a defence had been admitted.

 
Regina v Betting Licensing Committee Cardiff Petty Sessions, ex parte Les Croupiers Casino Limited Unreported, 13 April 1992
13 Apr 1992

Cluny J
Litigation Practice
The court considered what would constitute frivolous proceedings on a request to magistrates to state a case. Held: The expression meant that there was no possible prospect of a case succeeding because there was no substance in the request that a case should be stated.
1 Citers



 
 Ashmore and Others v Corporation of Lloyds; HL 13-May-1992 - Gazette, 13 May 1992; [1992] 2 All ER 486; [1992] 1 WLR 446; [1992] 2 Lloyds Rep 1
 
Towers v Morley Gazette, 20 May 1992
20 May 1992
CA

Litigation Practice
The provision of a writ for information purposes was not service despite a payment in being made. The action was struck out.

 
Jeyaretnam v Mahmood Times, 21 May 1992
21 May 1992

Brooke J
Litigation Practice
For the purpose of an application to discharge an order for service on a defendant outside the jurisdiction, the court declined to evaluate allegations of lack of independence or impartiality in the defendant's home country of Singapore on the grounds that such allegations were not justiciable.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Practice Statement (Court of Appeal: Civil Division Short Warned List) Number 2 Gazette, 27 May 1992
27 May 1992
CA

Litigation Practice
Amends original statement to clarify duty of counsel to ensure that he has received proper instructions.


 
 Antcliffe v Gloucester Health Authority; CA 10-Jun-1992 - Gazette, 10 June 1992

 
 Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco and Another (No2); HL 17-Jun-1992 - Gazette, 17 June 1992; [1992] 2 WLR 621; [1992] 2 AC 443
 
Strathmore Group Ltd v Fraser and Others (New Zealand) Gazette, 24 June 1992
24 Jun 1992
PC

Litigation Practice, Commonwealth
The division of a trial into two parts or stages did not, of itself, remove the right of appeal to the Privy Council.

 
Independent Research Services Ltd v Catterall [1992] UKEAT 279_92_2606; [1993] ICR 1
26 Jun 1992
EAT
Knox J
Employment, Litigation Practice
The claimant was a director of the employer's company. He claimed that the relationship of trust and confidence with the company had been undermined so far as to be a repudiatory breach of the contract. Before his complaint of unfair dismissal, he wrote without prejudice to the employers offering to stay a full time employee with a payment for ceasing to act as a director. At an interlocutory hearing the Chairman refused to admit the letter in evidence. The employers appealed saying that the "without prejudice" letter was inconsistent with the his assertion that the relationship of trust and confidence had been undermined and that it should be admitted as an exception to the general principle of exclusion. Held: The employee's appeal failed. The principles for excluding "without prejudice" correspondence in a Court applied equally to proceedings in Industrial Tribunals. The letter would only be admissible if it came within a recognised exception to the general principle, namely that there would be an abuse of the rule if it was applied to exclude the "without prejudice" correspondence. The appropriate test was whether, if the "without prejudice" material were suppressed, something amounting to a dishonest case would be prosecuted, and that since there was no such dishonesty in the present case, the privilege should remain.
Knox J said: "As often happens in difficult cases two well established and valuable legal principles collide. One is that it is desirable that courts and tribunals should have all the available material before them with which to arrive at a just conclusion in accordance with law. The other is that it is desirable that parties should be in a position freely to negotiate a compromise of their disputes without having what they say in the course of those negotiations revealed subsequently and used against them in litigation or proceedings before a tribunal. There is inevitably going to be a contradiction or conflict where an admission, or a statement of present intention, is made which conflicts with the parties' pleaded case and we quite see that in the present circumstances there is going to be a difficult conflict between the proposition that the applicant's trust and confidence was destroyed in late April 1991 and remained destroyed to 13 May and on the other hand his willingness to continue as an employee if certain financial inducements were forthcoming. But the existence of the conflict is not of itself, in our view, sufficient to warrant our giving priority to the first of the two principles, namely, that the courts should have all available material before them, over the other, namely, protection for "without prejudice" correspondence. It seems to us, particularly having regard to the authorities that are collected in Mr. Foskett's book, that the yardstick that should be applied in this category of cases is whether the "without prejudice" material involves, if it is suppressed, something amounting to a dishonest case being prosecuted if the pleaded case continues. The nearest example amongst the quoted cases in Mr. Foskett's book, to which we were referred, is a decision of Mr. Anthony May Q.C., Hawick Jersey international Ltd. v. Caplan, The Times, 11 March 1988, and the account given of it is this:
"P claimed a repayment of a loan to D of £10,000 made by means of a cheque. D denied the transaction was a loan because he had supplied £10,000 cash. D secretly tape recorded a "without prejudice" meeting at which (a) P did not dispute and indeed accepted D's repeated assertions that the transaction was not a loan but one involving an exchange for £10,000 in cash and (b) P expressly or impliedly said that the proceedings were brought to persuade D to reach a fairer settlement or to settle other differences."
and Mr. May, sitting as a deputy judge of the Queen's Bench Division, held that P was threatening to persist with dishonest proceedings and accordingly that "without prejudice" privilege did not apply to the discussion. Other more extreme examples are given of threats in the nature of blackmail and other wholly undesirable and, indeed, criminal activities which cannot be indulged in cloaked under the privilege of "without prejudice".
We have therefore looked to see whether we are of the view that the exclusion of the "without prejudice" material and persistence in the applicant's case as pleaded in his originating application involves something in the nature of dishonest conduct on his part. Tested by that test we conclude that the material should remain hidden from the industrial tribunal because we do not think that there is dishonesty involved in such an attitude."
Industrial Tribunals (Rules of Procedure) Regulations 1985 (SI 1985 NO 16)
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Practice Direction 29 Jun 92 Commercial Lists: Manchester and Liverpool Gazette, 14 October 1992
29 Jun 1992
QBD

Litigation Practice
Renaming of courts as 'mercantile courts' to distinguish from London.

 
Arab Monetary Fund v Nahiralulloom and Others Gazette, 08 July 1992
8 Jul 1992
ChD

Litigation Practice
A 'Pending' action for consolidation purposes includes a writ not yet served.
1 Citers



 
 Universal Thermosensors Ltd v Hibben and Others; ChD 8-Jul-1992 - Gazette, 08 July 1992; [1992] 1 WLR 840
 
Cheddar Valley Engineering Ltd v Chaddlewood Homes Ltd Gazette, 15 July 1992; [1992] 1 WLR 820
15 Jul 1992
ChD
Jules Sher QC
Litigation Practice
Without Prejudice negotiations continue on that basis till clearly altered.
1 Citers


 
Family Division - President's Direction Gazette, 15 July 1992
15 Jul 1992
FD

Litigation Practice, Family
Directions on choice of High or County Court for various Family proceedings.

 
Lubrizol Corporation and Another v Esso Petroleum Ltd and Others Gazette, 22 July 1992
22 Jul 1992
ChD

Litigation Practice
A Plaintiff may be given leave to inspect copies of privileged documents where this would not be adverse to the defendant's rights or interests.


 
 Halliday v Shoesmith and Another; CA 29-Jul-1992 - Gazette, 29 July 1992
 
Re T Gazette, 29 July 1992
29 Jul 1992
CA

Litigation Practice
The High Court can order the disclosure of assets in support of proceedings for purposes of drug Trafficking control.
Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1985 8

 
Grand Metropolitan Nominee (No 2) Co Ltd v Evans Gazette, 29 July 1992
29 Jul 1992
CA

Litigation Practice
Disobeyance of 'unless order' to be judged on whether intentional & contumelious.


 
 Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim and Others (No 4); CA 9-Sep-1992 - Gazette, 09 September 1992; [1992] 1 WLR 1176

 
 Appeals From Decisions of District Judges In Insolvency Matters; ChD 16-Sep-1992 - Gazette, 16 September 1992
 
Bank of Crete Sa v Koskotas and Others Gazette, 16 September 1992
16 Sep 1992
ChD

Litigation Practice
A court would not stop a plaintiff using discovered documents in way they were obliged to do under foreign law.

 
Forms of Notices of Motion and Judge's Summons Practice Direction Gazette, 16 September 1992
16 Sep 1992
ChD

Litigation Practice
Notices needn't state Judge's name - only 'the Chancery Motion's Judge' etc.

 
Balli Trading Ltd v Afalona Gazette, 23 September 1992
23 Sep 1992
CA

Litigation Practice
The Order 14 procedure was restricted to short arguments disposing of the case. The court had some small latitude only.

 
Practice Direction 20 Jul 1992: Form of Notices of Motion and Judge's Summons Gazette, 14 October 1992
14 Oct 1992
ChD

Litigation Practice
No need to name judge in chancery motions/ companies court summonses.

 
Newsgroup Newspapers Ltd v Sogat 82 and Others Gazette, 28 October 1992
28 Oct 1992
QBD

Litigation Practice
Time for filing bill runs from date party's part in action is complete.

 
Broxton v McClelland Unreported, 6 November 1992
6 Nov 1992


Litigation Practice

1 Citers


 
Forster v Friedland Unreported, 10 November 1992; Ttranscript No 1052 of 1992
10 Nov 1992
CA
Hoffmann LJ
Litigation Practice
The defendant admitted that he considered himself honour bound by an agreement, but said that if it came to litigation he would deny any legal obligation. On the facts, this was held to be "very far from blackmail". As an exception to the rule that without prejudice revelations are not admissible, there is the situation where a statement can be admitted because of an 'unambiguous impropriety' - "the value of the without prejudice rule would be seriously impaired if its protection could be removed from anything less than unambiguous impropriety."
1 Citers



 
 Linotype-Hell Finance Ltd v Baker; CA 25-Nov-1992 - Gazette, 25 November 1992; [1992] 4 All ER 887
 
Regina v Tottenham Magistrates Court ex parte Gleaves CO/2253/90; Unreported 18 December 1992
18 Dec 1992
Admn
Evans LJ and Otton J
Litigation Practice, Judicial Review
An application for permission to bring judicial review and the judicial review proceedings themselves (whether in a civil or criminal cause or matter) are all civil proceedings and are caught by a civil proceedings order against the applicant.
Evans LJ concluded that all proceedings under RSC Order 53 were civil proceedings: "The matter can be tested in this way. So far as these proceedings are concerned, that is to say, Mr Gleaves' application for judicial review . . there is no prosecutor and there is no defendant. Indeed . . the intended defendant in the Magistrates Court is not necessarily a party to these proceedings. This is an application by Mr Gleaves and the respondent is the Tottenham Magistrates Court. These are civil proceedings. Mr Gleaves seeks to invoke the powers of the civil courts admittedly for the purposes, as he sees them, of the criminal proceedings which he seeks to institute in the magistrates court but does not alter the fact in my view that he is invoking the powers of the civil court and that an application under O 53 at all its stages, even when the application relates to a criminal cause or matter, is nevertheless properly to be regarded as a civil proceeding."
1 Citers


 
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