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Litigation Practice - From: 1900 To: 1929

This page lists 119 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.


 
 Bullivant v Attorney-General for Victoria; PC 1900 - [1901] AC 196; [1900] 2 QB 163
 
Duke of Bedford v Ellis [1901] AC 1
1901
HL
Lord MacNaghten
Litigation Practice, Intellectual Property
Ellis and five others sued on behalf of themselves and all other growers of fruit, flowers, vegetables, roots or herbs to enforce rights conferred on them by the Covent Garden Act 1828 against the Duke of Bedford as the owner of the market. The Duke of Bedford obtained as trike out. The Court discharged that order on the undertaking of the plaintiffs to join the Attorney-General as a defendant. The Duke's appeal was dismissed.
Lord Macnaghten discussed whether the rule only applied to claims to some beneficial right of property and said "But it seems to me that there is no reason whatever for so restricting the rule, which was only meant to apply the practice of the Court of Chancery to all divisions of the High Court. The old rule in the Court of Chancery was very simple and perfectly well understood. Under the old practice the Court required the presence of all parties interested in the matter in suit, in order that a final end might be made of the controversy. But when the parties were so numerous that you could never "come at justice", to use an expression in one of the older cases, if everybody interested was made a party, the rule was not allowed to stand in the way. It was originally a rule of convenience: for the sake of convenience it was relaxed. Given a common interest and a common grievance, a representative suit was in order if the relief sought was in its nature beneficial to all whom the plaintiff proposed to represent. To limit the rule to persons having a beneficial proprietary interest would be opposed to precedent, and not, I think, in accordance with common sense."
1 Citers


 
Re Collyer-Bristow and Co [1901] 2 KB 839
1901


Arbitration, Litigation Practice
The issue was whether a bill of the solicitors employed to advise the Umpire was taxable and, if so, in which Division of the High Court
1 Citers


 
Parker v Schuller (1901) 17 TLR 299
1901
CA
A L Smith MR, Collins, Romer LJJ
Jurisdiction, Litigation Practice
The plaintiffs had obtained leave to serve a writ out of the jurisdiction under Order 11, r 1(e) of the RSC on the ground that the claim was for breach of a contract within the jurisdiction. The breach alleged was of a CIF contract, and the allegation was that the contract was broken by reason of a failure to deliver in Liverpool the goods that were the subject of the contract. Leave was given ex parte and upheld inter partes. The plaintiffs now conceded that the way that their claim had been advanced had been misconceived in that a CIF contract involves an obligation to deliver documents, not the goods to which the documents relate. The plaintiffs tried to persuade the Court to uphold the leave given to serve out on the basis of substituting for the original claim a claim for failure to deliver the relevant documents in Liverpool. Held: Permission was refused. A L Smith MR said: "It was not until the case came into this Court that the plaintiff set up another cause of action. That could not be allowed."
Collins LJ said: "an application for leave to issue a writ for service out of the jurisdiction ought to be made with great care and looked at strictly. If a material representation upon which the leave was obtained in the first instance turned out to be unfounded, the plaintiff ought not to be allowed . . to set up another and a distinct cause of action which was not before the Judge upon the original application. It was clear from the affidavit that the only case made on the original application was that the defendants were bound to deliver the goods in this country, and that there was a breach of that contract here, and upon that representation alone leave was originally granted to issue the writ and serve notice thereof abroad."
Romer LJ said: "an application for leave to issue a writ for service out of the jurisdiction ought to be made with great care and looked at strictly. If a material representation upon which the leave was obtained in the first instance turned out to be unfounded, the plaintiff ought not to be allowed, when an application was made by the defendant to discharge the order for the issue of the writ and the service, to set up another and a distinct cause of action which was not before the judge upon the original application."
1 Citers



 
 Stevens v General Steam Navigation Co Ltd; CA 1903 - [1903] 1 KB 890

 
 Bwllfa and Merthyr Dare Steam Collieries (1891) Ltd v Pontypridd Waterworks Co; HL 1903 - [1903] AC 426

 
 Bankes v Jarvis; 1903 - [1903] 1 KB 549

 
 Harper v Inspector of Rutherglen; 1903 - (1903) 6 F 23
 
Oliver v Nautilus Steam Shipping Co Ltd [1903] 2 KB 639
1903


Litigation Practice, Employment, Personal Injury
Where an employee was injured at work, but by an outside person, section 6 of the 1897 Act provides that the worker could "at his option, proceed, either at law against that person to recover damages, or against his employer for compensation under this Act, but not against both". If compensation under the Act was paid, the "employer [was] entitled to be indemnified" by that other person.
Receipts given "without prejudice" were accepted by the employers. Held: The workman had not exercised the option under the Act.
Workmen's Compensation Act 1897 6
1 Citers


 
Kent and Others (Liquidators of La Banque Ville-Marie) v La Communautu Des Soeurs De Charitu De La Providence and Others [1903] UKPC 17; [1903] AC 220
20 Mar 1903
PC

Commonwealth, Insolvency, Litigation Practice
(Quebec) The liquidators of a bank had sued on a cause of action vested in the bank. The Canadian courts had refused leave to amend to add the bank as a plaintiff on appeal. Held: The liquidators' appeal succeeded. There was power to amend to allow an amendment to add the bank as a party and that it should have been exercised.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
E M Bowden's Patents Syndicate Ltd v Herbert Smith and Co [1904] 2 Ch 86
1904

Warrington J
Litigation Practice, Intellectual Property
Where an equitable assignee sues a third party, the assignor must be joined as a defendant. The Plaintiff as the equitable owner of a patent was given liberty to amend its pleading by joining the legal owner, (failing which the Plaintiff’s case would have been dismissed), but on terms that the Plaintiff paid the Defendant’s costs of the two days of hearing up to that point.
1 Citers


 
Sneade v Wotherton Barytes and Lead Mining Co [1904] 1 KB 295
1904

Lord Collins MR
Litigation Practice
An amendment of a writ or a pleading relates back to the original date of the document amended.
1 Citers


 
Watson v M'Ewan [1905] AC 480; [1905] UKHL 1; (1905) 13 SLT 340; (1905) 7 F (HL) 109
1905
HL
Earl of Halsbury LC, James, Robertson LL
Litigation Practice, Defamation, Scotland
A claim was brought against a medical witness in respect of statements made in preparation of a witness statement and similar statements subsequently made in court. The appellant was a doctor of medicine who had been retained by the respondent in respect of proposed proceedings against her husband for separation and aliment. He was later instructed by the husband in the same proceedings. In preparing his witness statement he included some very damaging allegations based on matters that he had learned when acting for the wife, which included allegations of taking morphine and planning to procure an abortion. He subsequently gave oral evidence of these matters in the court proceedings. The wife brought an action against him for breach of confidence and for slander, relying on both what was said to the husband's lawyers and what was said in court. Held: The appellant was immune. In respect of the indemnity given to witnesses, the phrase 'in office' can only refer to giving evidence. The only qualification to this is a prosecution for perjury or, possibly, an attempt to pervert the course of justice.
The public policy which renders the protection of witnesses necessary for the administration of justice must also and as a necessary consequence extend to the preliminary examination of witnesses to find out what they can prove. The privilege surrounding evidence actually given in a Court of Justice necessarily involves the same privilege in the case of making a statement to a solicitor and other persons who are engaged in the conduct of proceedings in Courts of Justice when what is intended to be stated in the court is narrated to them.
Earl of Halsbury LC said: "The broad proposition I entertain no doubt about, and it seems to me to be the only question that properly arises here; as to the immunity of a witness for evidence given in a court of justice, it is too late to argue that as if it were doubtful. By complete authority, including the authority of this House, it has been decided that the privilege of a witness, the immunity from responsibility in an action when evidence has been given by him in a court of justice, is too well established now to be shaken. Practically I may say that in my view it is absolutely unarguable - it is settled law and cannot be doubted. The remedy against a witness who has given evidence which is false and injurious to another is to indict him for perjury; but for very obvious reasons, the conduct of legal procedure by courts of justice, with the necessity of compelling witnesses to attend, involves as one of the necessities of the administration of justice the immunity of witnesses from actions brought against them in respect of evidence they have given. So far the matter, I think, is too plain for argument."
He continued: "It appears to me that the privilege which surrounds the evidence actually given in a Court of justice necessarily involves the same privilege in the case of making a statement to a solicitor and other persons who are engaged in the conduct of proceedings in Courts of justice when what is intended to be stated in a Court of justice is narrated to them - that is, to the solicitor or writer to the Signet. If it were otherwise, I think what one of the learned counsel has with great cogency pointed out would apply - that from time to time in these various efforts which have been made to make actual witnesses responsible in the shape of an action against them for the evidence they have given, the difficulty in the way of those who were bringing the action would have been removed at once by saying, 'I do not bring the action against you for what you said in the witness-box, but I bring the action against you for what you told the solicitor you were about to say in the witness-box.' If that could be done the object for which the privilege exists is gone, because then no witness could be called; no one would know whether what he was going to say was relevant to the question in debate between the parties. A witness would only have to say, 'I shall not tell you anything; I may have an action brought against me tomorrow if I do; therefore I shall not give you any information at all.' It is very obvious that the public policy which renders the protection of witnesses necessary for the administration of justice must as a necessary consequence involve that which is a step towards and is part of the administration of justice - namely, the preliminary examination of witnesses to find out what they can prove. It may be that to some extent it seems to impose a hardship, but after all the hardship is not to be compared with that which would arise if it were impossible to administer justice, because people would be afraid to give their testimony."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Kine v Jolly; CA 1905 - [1905] 1 Ch 480
 
In re Nisbet and Potts' Contract [1905] 1 Ch 391
1905

Farwell J
Litigation Practice, Contract, Land
Where a party asserted he was a purchaser in good faith without notice and for value, the burden of proving all the elements of the defence is upon the purchaser. A title acquired by adverse possession was not paramount to, and did not destroy the equitable right of persons entitled to the benefit of prior restrictive covenants to enforce them against the land.
Farwell J said: "Covenants restricting the enjoyment of land, except of course as between the contracting parties and those privy to the contract, are not enforceable by anything in the nature of action or suit founded on contract. Such actions and suits alike depend on privity of contract, and no possession of the land coupled with notice of the covenants can avail to create such privity: Cox v. Bishop (1857) 8 De G.M. & G. 815. But if the covenant be negative, so as to restrict the mode of use and enjoyment of the land, then there is called into existence an equity attached to the property of such a nature that it is annexed to and runs with it in equity: Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774. This equity, although created by covenant or contract, cannot be sued on as such, but stands on the same footing with and is completely analogous to an equitable charge on real estate created by some predecessor in title of the present owner of the land charged. . . . effect is given to the negative covenant by means of the land itself. But the land cannot spend money on improving itself, and there is no personal liability on the owner of the land for the time being, because there is no contract on which he can be sued in contract."
1 Citers


 
Meadows v Grand Junction Waterworks Company [1905] 21 TLR 538
1905


Litigation Practice

1 Citers


 
William Brandt's Sons and Co v Dunlop Rubber Co [1905] AC 454
1905
HL
Lord Lindley, Lord Macnaghten
Equity, Litigation Practice
The court was asked whether instructions given by the bank's customer to purchasers of rubber to make payment to its bank directly, amounted to an equitable assignment of debts, so that the bank could sue for their recovery. The bank sued the purchasers directly without joining its customer, the assignor. Held: Though the assignor was not a party, there had been an equitable assignment. An equitable assignment of a chose in action requires no more than an expression of intention to assign, coupled with notice to the debtor, to impose on the latter an obligation to pay the assignee.
Lord Macnaghten said that an equitable assignment need not take any particular form and continued: "It may be addressed to the debtor. It may be couched in the language of command. It may be a courteous request. It may assume the form of mere permission. The language is immaterial if the meaning is plain. All that is necessary is that the debtor should be given to understand that the debt has been made over by the creditor to some third person. If the debtor ignores such a notice, he does so at his peril. If the assignment be for valuable consideration and communicated to the third person, it cannot be revoked by the creditor or safely disregarded by the debtor."
No action should be dismissed for want of parties: "Strictly speaking, [the sellers], or their trustee in bankruptcy, should have been brought before the Court. But no action is now dismissed for want of parties, and the trustee in bankruptcy had really no interest in the matter. At your Lordships' bar the Dunlops disclaimed any wish to have him present, and in both Courts below they claimed to retain for their own use any balance that might remain after satisfying Brandts."
1 Citers


 
Horner v Franklin [1905] 1 KB 479
1905


Litigation Practice

1 Citers



 
 Stretton v Stubbs Ltd; CA 28-Feb-1905 - Times, 28 February 1905
 
Martin v Nadel [1906] 2 KB 26
1906
CA
Stirling LJ, Vaughan Williams LJ
Banking, Jurisdiction, Litigation Practice
A garnishee order was sought in England against the London branch of a German bank to attach a balance owed to the judgment debtor by the Berlin branch of the bank. Held: A garnishee order is of the nature of an execution, and is governed by the lex fori; and by international law an execution which has been carried into effect in a foreign country under foreign law, and has taken away part of a man's property, is not recognised as binding. Under the rules of international law the Bank could not set up, in an action in Berlin, the execution levied in this country in respect to this debt. If we consider the converse case it is clear that we should take that view of a similar transaction occurring abroad. An absolute order was refused because the garnishee bank was at risk of having to pay twice and the making of an order in such circumstances was "inequitable" and "contrary to natural justice". "On the facts of this case the debt of the bank to Nadel would be properly recoverable in Germany. That being so, it must be taken that the order of this Court would not protect the bank from being called on to pay the debt a second time."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Coles v Ravenshear [1907] 1 KB 1
1907
CA
Lord Esher MR
Litigation Practice
If justice requires that the severity of a rule should be relaxed, then it is of extreme importance that the court should relax it. Lord Esher MR said: "a Court cannot conduct its business without a code of procedure, I think that the relation of rules of practice to the work of justice is intended to be that of handmaid rather than mistress, and the Court ought not to be so far bound and tied by rules, which are after all only intended as general rules of procedure, as to be compelled to do what will cause injustice in the particular case."

 
Swanson v Manson [1907] ScotCS CSIH_6; 1907 SC 42
16 Jan 1907
SCS
Lord Ardwall
Scotland, Litigation Practice
Lord Ardwall said that: "No person is entitled to subject another to the trouble and expense of a litigation unless he has some real interest to enforce or protect."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
British Cash and Parcel Conveyors Ltd v Lamson Store Service Co Ltd [1908] 1 KB 1006
1908

Fletcher-Moulton LJ
Costs, Litigation Practice
The court explained the law underlying the civil and criminal penalties for the maintenance of an action by third parties: "It is directed against wanton and officious intermeddling with the disputes of others in which the [maintainer] has no interest whatever, and where the assistance he renders to one or the other party is without justification or excuse."
1 Citers


 
Allan and Sons Bill Posting Limited v Edinburgh Magistrates 1909 SC 70
1909

Lord Low
Scotland, Litigation Practice
In asking whether an appeal was available, the presence or absence of a record of the decision at first instance is an indicator, since an appeal is more difficult without.
1 Citers


 
Leigh v Gladstone (1909) 26 TLR 139
1909


Litigation Practice, Prisons
Discovery was sought of medical reports prepared by the prison medical officer for the governor. Held: Such reports were not privileged from production.

 
Armour v Glasgow Royal Infirmary 1909 SC 916
1909


Scotland, Litigation Practice
Lord Ordinary, Lord Skerrington said that in the ordinary case the action could be brought only at the instance of the trustees. But the testamentary trustees had been called as defenders, and concurred with the Infirmary in maintaining that the money was properly paid. Consequently in those circumstances "the pursuers have a good and sufficient title to maintain this action to the effect of demanding that the money shall be repaid to the trustees."
1 Citers



 
 Brown v Dean; 1909 - [1910] AC 373; [1909] 2 KB 573

 
 Galbraith v Grimshaw and Baxter; CA 1910 - [1910] 1 KB 339
 
In re Aktiebolaget Robertsfors and La Societe Anonymes des Papeteries de l'AA [1910] 2 KB 727
1910
CA

Litigation Practice, Jurisdiction
The court was asked to construe O.XI r.8A made in 1909 to extend the power to serve out of the jurisdiction to summonses, orders or notices. Held. The power was only exercisable in situations where service out of a writ was permissible under O.XI r.8 and so did not cover a summons to set aside an arbitration award.
1 Citers



 
 Glasgow Navigation Co v Iron Ore Co; HL 1910 - [1910] AC 293

 
 Rex v Earl of Crewe, Ex parte Sekgome; CA 1910 - [1910] 2 KB 576

 
 Jones v Pacaya Rubber and Produce Co Ltd; CA 1911 - [1911] 1 KB 455
 
Pena Copper Mines Ltd v Rio Tinto Co Ltd (1911) 105 LT 846
1911


Litigation Practice
The court exercised its jurisdiction to make an order restraining the commencement of proceedings abroad.
1 Citers



 
 Dyson v Attorney General; CA 1911 - [1911] 1 KB 410; [1912] 1 Ch 158

 
 Maass v Gas Light and Coke Co; CA 1911 - [1911] 2 KB 543

 
 Hirachand Punamchand v Temple; CA 1911 - [1911] 2 KB 11; [1911] 2 KB 330
 
Standing v Eastwood and Co [1912] 5 BWCC 268
1912

Fletcher Moulton LJ
Jurisdiction, Litigation Practice
A court's jurisdiction cannot be created by the contract or consent of the parties.
1 Citers



 
 Russell v Stubbs Ltd; CA 1912 - [1913] 2 KB 200
 
Lord Advocate v Walker Trustees [1912] AC 95; 106 LT 194; 28 TLR 101
1912
HL
Lord Atkinson
Litigation Practice
The 1707 Act preserved the traditional offices in Scotland. The respondent held the position of Usher of the White Rod, and claimed his fees from those granted honours by the English parliament. Held: The Act was clear. The fact that had been paid for post Union titles for over 150 years was not admissible to explain the meaning of the article. Long established usage cannot prevail against clear words of a staute.
Treaty of Union 1707
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Metropolitan Water Board v Johnson and Co [1913] 3 KB 900
1913

Channel J
Litigation Practice

1 Citers



 
 Russell v Stubbs Limited; HL 1913 - 1913 SC (HL) 13

 
 Shackleton v Swift; CA 1913 - [1913] 2 KB 302

 
 In Re Hearn, De Bertodano v Hearn (No.1); ChD 1913 - (1913) 108 LT 452

 
 Barham v Lord Huntingfield; CA 1913 - [1913] 2 KB 193

 
 In Re Hearn; CA 2-Jan-1913 - (1913) 108 LT 737
 
Clarkson and Another v Wishart and Another [1913] UKPC 46; [1913] AC 828
7 Aug 1913
PC

Litigation Practice
(Ontario) The Board considered whether an interest in a mining claim was exigible under a writ of fieri facias against his lands or goods.
[ Bailii ]

 
 Adam v Fisher; 1914 - [1914] 39 TLR 288
 
In re Woking Urban District Council (Basingstoke Canal) Act 1911 [1914] 1 Ch 300
1914
CA
Phillimore LJ
Litigation Practice
The court discussed why marginal notes are not to be used as an aid for stautory interpretation: "I am aware of the general rule of law as to marginal notes, at any rate in public general Acts of Parliament; but that rule is founded, as will be seen on reference to the cases, upon the principle that those notes are inserted not by Parliament nor under the authority of Parliament, but by irresponsible persons."
1 Citers



 
 Princess Thurn and Taxis v Moffitt; 1914 - (1914) 31 TLR 2
 
Von Hellfield v E Rechnitzer and Mayer Freres and Co [1914] 1 Ch 748
1914
CA
Buckley Phillimore LJJ
Company, Litigation Practice
A French partnership did not carry on business within the UK. It was sued in its firm name in respect of a contract signed in the name of the firm. The evidence of French law did not establish that the French partnership was a totally separate legal entity from the individual partners in it, although it was a legal person for the purpose of service of legal proceedings upon it. Held: The Court upheld the judge's order setting aside the writ which named the firm as the defendant on the ground that Ord 48A did not apply and that the writ was not properly issued naming the firm as a defendant.
Phillimore LJ: "According to our modern practice there are three classes who can sue, or appear to writs, - persons, corporations, and firms. The introduction of partnerships is comparatively modern and since the Judicature Act, but the fact is merely for convenience of nomenclature and of service; the results are in the end the same as if the individuals composing them sued or were sued by their individual names. It is clear from the case of Dobson v Festi, Rasini & Co (1) that some similar procedure now obtains in Italy, and it appears from this case that some similar procedure now exists in France. That may well be, but our law, being very careful how it interferes with the rights of foreigners, has not allowed service to be effected upon individuals who are engaged in a foreign partnership by serving the partnership as in England. The foreign partners cannot be sued by their firm name, and there is nothing to enable service upon some manager carrying on business for the partners or service on one as service on the rest."
and "They are not enough for this purpose; they are not enough to shew - which is necessary for this purpose - that a société en nom collectif is like a corporation in this respect, not merely that it has a separate persona, but that it has a separate ownership of property and separate liability from the ownership or liability by or of the persons composing the aggregation. I can conceive certain cases of bodies of which one might be doubtful whether they were corporations or not; and upon a writ properly framed alleging that the body sued was a separate entity, and making it clear that no relief was sought against any individual opposing that entity any more than it would be against shareholders in a corporation, I can conceive it being possible to suggest that such a body might be treated as a corporation and might be sued and served as a corporation. But this is on the face of it apparently a partnership, and the affidavit of service of the writ plainly and boldly describes it as a partnership. The rules of English law provide that our ancient process in respect of English people should remain in respect of foreigners."

 
Lambert v Home [1914] 3 KB 86
1914
CA
Cozens-Hardy MR, Buckley LJ, Chanell J
Litigation Practice, Intellectual Property
There was a transcript taken by a shorthand writer. Held: (Chanell J dissenting) Cozens-Hardy MR said as follows: "Now the proceedings in the county court were public. Any one present could listen and take a note of what the witnesses said. The transcript did not involve any such 'professional knowledge, research and skill' as Bowen LJ referred to in Lyell v Kennedy. There is no original composition in the document. It is a mere transcript of that which was publici juris. A defendant who has obtained at his own cost a copy of a document, not in his possession, which is not itself privileged, cannot decline to produce the copy, although he obtained it in anticipation of future litigation" A transcript of a case was "publici juris" (belonging to the public).

 
White v Barnes [1914] WN 74
1914


Litigation Practice

1 Cites


 
Reid v Cupper [1915] 2 KB 147
1915

Buckley J, Pickford LJ
Litigation Practice
A judge was entitled to make an order setting off one party's costs in an action against the other party's costs in a different action by reliance not on the language of Order LXV r 14, but on the old discretionary practice of the courts. The court described the courts 'equitable jurisdiction to do what was fair' when they were considering whether to allow one judgment to be set off against another.
1 Citers


 
Guarantee Trust Co of New York v Hannay and Co [1915] 2KB 536
1915

Pickford LJ
Litigation Practice
A negative declaration should be granted by the court only in exceptional circumstances: "I think that a declaration that a person is not liable in an existing or possible action is one that will hardly ever be made, but that in practically every case the person asking it will be left to set up his defence in the action when it is brought."
1 Citers


 
Porter v Freudenberg [1915] 1 KB 857
1915


Litigation Practice
A British citizen or neutral who is voluntarily resident in the enemy country is to be treated as an alien enemy when the question is asked as to his entitlement to bring proceedings in England.
1 Citers


 
In Re Boaler [1915] KB 21
1915
CA
Scrutton J
Litigation Practice, Constitutional
The court was asked whether the 1896 Act which permitted a court to make an order that a person could not institute proceedings without the leave of the court, applied to the institution of criminal proceedings. Held: It did not. Scrutton J said: "In the case of this statute the legislature clearly intends to interfere with some rights of persons, and uses words capable of extension to rights of litigation in criminal matters, but in my opinion more suitable to the subject-matter of rights of litigation in civil matters only. In my view, looking at the enacting part of the statute only, the presumption against the interference with the vital rights and liberties of the subject entitles, even compels, me to limit the words to the meaning which effects the least interference with those rights." but "The object of the court is, from the words used, construed in reference to the subject-matter in which they are used, to get at the intention of the legislature and give effect to it. When the legislature has used general words capable of a larger and a narrower meaning, those words may be restricted by innumerable presumptions all designed to give effect to the reasonable intent of the legislature."
"One of the valuable rights of every subject of the King is to appeal to the King in his Courts if he alleges that a civil wrong has been done to him, or if he alleges that a wrong punishable criminally has been done to him, or has been committed by another subject of the King. This right is sometimes abused and it is, of course, quite competent to Parliament to deprive any subject of the King of it either absolutely or in part. But the language of any such statute should be jealously watched by the Courts, and should not be extended beyond its least onerous meaning unless clear words are used to justify such extension."
Vexatious Actions Act 1896
1 Citers



 
 Haynes v Davis; 1915 - [1915] 1 KB 332
 
Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Hannay and Co [1915] 2 KB 536
1915
CA
Pickford LJ, Bankes LJ
Jurisdiction, Litigation Practice
A claimant does not need to have a subsisting cause of action against a defendant before the court will grant a claimant a declaration. The court considered the ambiguity in the meaning of the word 'jurisdiction': "The first and, in my opinion, the only really correct sense of the expression that the Court has no jurisdiction is that it has no power to deal with and decide the dispute as to the subject matter before it, no matter in what form or by whom it is raised. But there is another sense in which it is often used, i.e., that, although the Court has power to decide the question it will not according to its settled practice do so except in a certain way and under certain circumstances." An unsuccessful attack was mounted on the vires of Ord 25 r 5.
Pickford LJ said: "I think therefore that the effect of the rule is to give a general power to make a declaration whether there be a cause of action or not, and at the instance of any party who is interested in the subject matter of the declaration." and "The first and, in my opinion, the only really correct sense of the expression that the Court has no jurisdiction is that it has no power to deal with and decide the dispute as to the subject-matter before it, no matter in what form or by whom it is raised. But there is another sense in which it is often used, i.e., that, although the Court has power to decide the question it will not according to its settled practice do so except in a certain way and under certain circumstances."
Bankes LJ: "It is essential, however, that a person who seeks to take advantage of the rule must be claiming relief. What is meant by this word relief? When once it is established, as I think it is established, that relief is not confined to relief in respect of a cause of action it seems to follow that the word itself must be given its fullest meaning. There is, however, one limitation which must always be attached to it, that is to say, the relief claimed must be something which it would not be unlawful or unconstitutional or inequitable for the court to grant or contrary to the accepted principles upon which the court exercises its jurisdiction. Subject to this limitation I see nothing to fetter the discretion of the court in exercising a jurisdiction under the rule to grant relief, and having regard to general business convenience and the importance of adapting the machinery of the courts to the needs of suitors I think the rule should receive as liberal a construction as possible."
1 Citers



 
 Norman v Mathews; 1916 - (1916) 85 LJ KB 857
 
Ex parte Stott [1916] 1 KB 7
1916


Administrative, Litigation Practice
An order of certiorari should be made only at the request of somebody with a sufficient interest in the mater.

 
Webster v Bakewell Rural District Council (No 2) (1916) 115 LT 678; (1916) LJ Ch 89; (1916) 80 JP 437; (1916) 14 LGR 1109
1916


Land, Litigation Practice
The plaintiff was life tenant of a cottage adjoining the highway. Over a period of time, scrapings from the road had accumulated to form a bank which suited the plaintiff. The defendant, wanting to repair the roadway, removed the bank, and the plaintiff sued. Held: The plaintiff's claim had no prospect of success, and was to be struck out as an abuse of process. The authority had acted within its rights and no actionable damage had arisen.
1 Citers



 
 Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd v Anglo-Persian Oil Co Ltd; CA 1916 - [1916] 1 KB 822

 
 Bradford Corporation v Myers; HL 1916 - [1916] 1 AC 242
 
Blair v Haycock Cattle Co (1917) 34 TLR 39
1917

Lord Finlay LC
Litigation Practice

1 Citers



 
 Schetky v Cochrane and the Union Funding Co; 1918 - [1918] 1 WWR 821

 
 Jones v S E and Chatham Railway; 1918 - (1918) 87 LJ KB 775

 
 Arkadelphia Milling v St Louis Southwestern Railway; 1918 - (1918) 249 US 134

 
 Hip Foong Hong v H. Neotia and Co; PC 1918 - [1918] AC 888

 
 Aberconway v- Whetnall; 1918 - (1918) 87 LJ Ch 524
 
Bourne v Keane [1919] AC 815
1919
HL
Lord Buckmaster
Litigation Practice
Lord Buckmaster said: "The construction of a statute of doubtful meaning, once laid down and accepted for a long time, ought not to be altered unless your Lordships could say positively that it was wrong and productive of inconvenience."
1 Citers


 
Raja Setrucherla Ramabhadraraju v Maharajah of Jeypore All India Reports 1919 PC 150
1919
PC

Litigation Practice

1 Citers


 
Re Boks and Co v Peters, Rushton and Co Ltd [1919] 1 KB 491
1919
CA
Scrutton LJ
Arbitration, Litigation Practice
The alternative procedure for seeking enforcement of an arbitrator's award is by an action upon the award. The procedure is to be used only in "reasonably clear cases".
1 Citers



 
 Clarke v Edinburgh and District Tramways Co; HL 1919 - 1919 SC (HL) 35
 
Rodriguez v Speyer Brothers [1919] AC 59
1919

Viscount Haldane
Company, Litigation Practice
The courts will not give assistance to proceedings which, if successful would lead to the enrichment of an alien enemy, and therefore would tend to provide his country with the sinews of war. An enemy alien has no standing to commence proceedings here. However, because the rule is one of public policy, it does not apply if the case discloses no mischief against which the rule was intended to guard.
Lord Finlay LC said: "When a debt due to the firm is got in no partner has any share or definite interest in that debt; his right is merely to have the money so received applied, together with the other assets, in discharging the liabilities of the firm, and to receive his share of any surplus there may be when the liquidation has been completed."
1 Citers


 
In re Clay; Clay and Booth [1919] 1 Ch 66
1919
CA

Litigation Practice
A plaintiff is not entitled to a declaration of non-liability where the defendant has neither asserted a contrary right nor made nor formulated an adverse claim. It is oppressive and unjust to subject a defendant to legal proceedings where he has given no reason to believe that he will assert a claim which is sufficiently formulated to be adjudicated upon: there has to be more than a belief on the part of the claimant that the defendant will probably make a claim in the future.
1 Citers



 
 Taylor v Davies; PC 19-Dec-1919 - [1920] AC 636; [1857] EngR 521; (1857) 11 Moo PC 151; (1857) 14 ER 652; [1919] UKPC 136; [1857] UKPC 15
 
French v Champkin [1920] 1 KB 76
1920


Litigation Practice
The word adapt means to "alter so as to make apt".

 
The Ansonia (1920) 2 Ll L Rep 123
1920


Litigation Practice
A judge in a shipping case is not bound to accept the advice he receives from the assessors.
1 Citers


 
Hohler v Aston [1920] 2 Ch 420
1920

Sargant J
Wills and probate, Litigation Practice, Contract
A Mrs. Aston agreed with her nephew Mr. Hohler to make provision for her niece and her husband, Mr. and Mrs. Rollo. Mrs. Aston died before doing so. Mr. Hohler and Mr. And Mrs. Rollo sued the executors of Mrs. Aston for specific performance Held: The action succeeded. Sargant J: "the third parties, of course, cannot themselves enforce a contract made for their benefit but the person with whom the contract is made is entitled to enforce the contract." Mr. Hohler took no benefit under the contract but was allowed to recover.
1 Citers


 
Tetlow v Orela Ltd [1920] 2 Ch 24; [1920] All ER 419
1920

Russell J
Litigation Practice
Ord 16, rr. 2 and 11 Ord 16, r 2, provided that, where an action had been commenced in the name of a wrong plaintiff, the court might, if satisfied that it had been so commenced through bona fide mistake and that it was necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted. Ord. 16, r. 11, provided that no cause or matter should be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties and that the court might in any cause or matter deal with the matter in controversy so far as regarded the rights and interests of the parties actually before it, and also that the court might at any stage of the proceedings order that the names of any persons improperly joined as plaintiffs or defendants be struck out, and that the names of any parties, whether plaintiffs or defendants, who ought to have been joined be added. Held: A non-existent person cannot sue.
Russell J said that rule 2 meant that, where an action had been commenced between two living parties by a living plaintiff and that plaintiff turned out afterwards to be the wrong person, the court could substitute another for him. 'But it does not justify the court, in creating a plaintiff in an action for the first time' and the 'parties' referred to in rule 11 were living persons, and that that rule did not carry the plaintiff any further. The Rules of 1883 had made no change in the position, which was still as it had been under the Act of 1852.
Common Law Procedure Act 1852
1 Citers



 
 O'Rourke v Darbishire; HL 1920 - [1920] AC 581; [1920] All ER 1
 
Barton v Fincham [1921] 2 KB 291
1921
CA
Bankes LJ, Atkin LJ
Litigation Practice
Where the court lacks jurisdiction, jurisdiction cannot be conferred merely by the consent of the parties. Atkin LJ said: "but apart from such an admission the Court cannot give effect to an agreement, whether by way of compromise or otherwise, inconsistent with the provisions of the Act."
1 Citers


 
Cape Brandy Syndicate v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1921] 1 KB 64
1921
CA
Rowlatt J, Lord Sterndale MR, Lord Atkinson
Income Tax, Litigation Practice
Rowlatt J said: "In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied" and "subsequent legislation, if it proceeded on an erroneous construction of previous legislation, cannot alter the previous legislation".
Lord Sterndale MR said: "I quite agree that subsequent legislation, if it proceed upon an erroneous construction of previous legislation, cannot alter that previous legislation; but if there be any ambiguity in the earlier legislation, then the subsequent legislation may fix the proper interpretation which is to be put upon the earlier."
Lord Atkinson: "Where the interpretation of a statute is obscure or ambiguous, or readily capable of more than one interpretation, light may be thrown on the true view to be taken of it by the aim and provisions of a subsequent statute."
1 Citers


 
In re Prior [1921] 3 KB 333
1921
CA

Litigation Practice
The court considered its equitable powers over funds it held as security. The court ordered equitable execution.
1 Citers


 
Atlantic Shipping and Trading Co v Louis Dreyfus and Co [1921] 2 AC 250; [1922] 10 Ll Rep 703
1921
HL
Lord Dunedin
Litigation Practice, Damages
Lord Dunedin said: "My Lords in these commercial cases it is I think of the highest importance that authorities should not be disturbed and if your lordships find that a certain doctrine has been laid down in former cases and presumably acted upon you will not be disposed to alter that doctrine unless you think it clearly wrong."
1 Citers


 
In re Mahmoud and Ispahami [1921] 2 KB 716
1921


Litigation Practice
A failure to plead an allegation in a later appeal where the facts at issue had been covered in the trial need not be fatal to that ground being added.
1 Citers



 
 Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v British Bank of Foreign Trade; HL 1921 - [1921] 2 AC 438
 
Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation [1921] 3 KB 110; [1921] 37 TLR 534
1921
CA
Atkin LJ
Litigation Practice, Banking
The service of the order nisi binds the debt in the hands of the garnishee - that is, it creates a charge in favour of the judgment creditor. No cause of action for non payment arises in respect of money standing on a current account until the customer demands payment by the bank. The court set out the legal characteristics of a bank account.
1 Citers



 
 Ellis v Deheer; 1922 - [1922] 2 KB 113
 
Viscountess Rhondda's Claim [1922] 2 AC 339
1922
HL
Viscount Haldane, Lord Birkenhead LC
Litigation Practice, Constitutional, Discrimination
(Committee of Privileges of the House of Lords) Viscountess Rhondda asserted a right to sit in the House of Lords as a member, relying on the 1919 Act. Held: It is incorrect for a court to draw conclusions from such elements of the Parliamentary history of the legislation as the proposal and rejection of amendments. It is the sole right of the Committee to decide who was entitled to receive the Writ of Summons and Lord Lyndhurst said that if a person is entitled to a writ, but the Crown does not issue one, then his remedy is to petition the House.
Lord Birkenhead LC said: "The rule that the words of an instrument shall be taken most strictly against the party employing them - verba chartarum fortius accipiuntur contra proferentem - does not apply to the Crown such a grant is construed most strictly against the grantee and most beneficially for the Crown, so that nothing will pass to the grantee but by clear and express words." It was the duty of the Committee for Privileges to consider whether she was entitled to receive a Writ of Summons: "The writ is not to be issued capriciously or withheld capriciously at the pleasure of the Sovereign or of this House. It is to be issued, or withheld, according to the law relating to the matter, and if, under that law, it appears that there is a debt of justice to the petitioner in that matter, the writ will issue and, if not, it cannot issue."
Lord Lyndhurst said: "If a Writ of Summons is improperly withheld, your Lordships can insist upon its being issued. You may address the Crown for that purpose if you think proper. If that address to the Crown is unavailing, there is a remedy that in a remarkable case has been resorted to and which was effectual to attain its object. The Peers in Parliament, in that case, refused to proceed to business until the Writ of Summons was issued and until the House was properly constituted, and the historian who records this fact says that the means adopted were so effectual that the King was induced to issue the Writ of Summons and that the abuse of which they complained never occurred again. That is a remedy when the Writ of Summons is withheld. On the other hand, when a party has obtruded himself upon the House in which he has no right to sit, the remedy is equally plain. It is your duty to direct your Officers to refuse to administer the oaths, or allow the party to take his seat."
Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Fairman v Perpetual Investment Building Society [1923] AC 74; 92 LJKB 50
1923
HL
Lord Wrenbury, Lord Sumner, Lord Atkinson
Litigation Practice, Negligence, Landlord and Tenant
The defendants owned a block of flats that were tenanted. The plaintiff lived as a lodger with her sister in one of the flats. She was injured when walking down the steps from her flat; the steps were part of the common property under the control of the landlord. The plaintiff argued that she was an invitee of the landlord and thus was owed a higher standard of care than would have been owed to a licensee. Held: An invitee of a tenant was only a licensee of the landlord when using the stairway. In fact, the plaintiff would have lost on the facts, whether she was an invitee or a licensee, because the defect in the step on which she had slipped was perfectly obvious.
Lord Wrenbury stated: "There are some things which a reasonable person is entitled to assume, and as to which he is not blameworthy if he does not see them when if he had been on the alert and had looked he could have seen them." His Lordship then instanced the case of a staircase with a missing stair, or a ladder in which a rung has been removed, and went on to say that no reasonable person would expect that a step or a rung had been removed and added pungently: "he has nevertheless suffered from what has generally been called "a trap" although if had stopped and looked he would have seen that the step or rung had been removed. He was not guilty of negligence, he was not bound to look out for such an unexpected danger as that, although if he had proceeded cautiously and looked out it would have been obvious to him."
1 Citers


 
Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v Proctor [1923] AC 253
1923
HL
Viscount Cave LC
Litigation Practice
Viscount Cave LC said: "In such a case . . it is the duty of the Court of Appeal to make up its own mind not disregarding the judgment appealed from and giving special weight to that judgment in cases where the credibility of witnesses comes into question, but with full liability to draw its own inferences from the facts proved or admitted and to decide accordingly."
1 Citers


 
Secretary of State for Home Affairs v O'Brien [1923] AC 603
1923
HL
Lord Birkenhead, Lord Atkinson
Litigation Practice, Constitutional
The Home Secrtary appealed against the issue of a writ of habeas corpus against him in respect of a prisoner held in Mountjoy prison in the Irish Free State. He had been arrested in London and interned in Ireland, but the appellant had given assurances to the House of Commons that he could request and cahieve his return. Held: The appeal was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.
A writ of Habeas Corpus is perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement. It is of immemorial antiquity, an instance of its use occurring in the thirty third year of Edward I. It has through the ages been jealously maintained by the courts of law as a check upon the illegal usurpation of power by the executive at the cost of liege.
Lord Atkinson said that a writ of habeas corpus: "operates with coercive force upon the Home Secretary to compel him to produce in Court the body of the respondent. If the Executive of the Free State adhere to the arrangement made with him he can with its aid discharge the obligation thus placed upon him. If the Irish Executive should fail to help him he would be placed in a very serious position. Unless this Executive breaks what has been styled its bargain with the Home Secretary he had, in effect, the respondent under his power and control. It would be rather unfair to this Executive to assume gratuitously beforehand that it would not keep the bargain made with it, simply because that bargain was not enforceable at law."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Secretary of State for Home Affairs v O'Brien [1923] AC 603
1923


Litigation Practice
The Crown has no right of appeal against the grant of a discharge of a prisoner on a writ of habeas corpus.
1 Citers


 
George Hudson Ltd v Australian Timber Workers' Union (1923) 32 CLR 413
1923

Isaacs J
Litigation Practice
When considering the intentions behind an Act of Parliament to enquire as to its retrospective effect, the court must look to all the circumstances, "that is to say, the whole of the circumstances which the legislature may be assumed to have had before it. What may seem unjust when regarded from the standpoint of one person affected may be absolutely just when a broad view is taken of all who are affected. There is no remedial Act which does not affect some vested right, but, when contemplated in its total effect, justice may be overwhelmingly on the other side."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Ex parte O'Brien [1923] 2 KB 361
1923
CA
Bankes, Scrutton, Atkin LJJ
International, Litigation Practice
Mr O'Brien had been arrested in London under regulation 14B of the Restoration of Order in Ireland Regulations 1920 and deported to Ireland there to be interned until further order. A writ of habeas corpus was sought as against the governor of Mountjoy prison. Held: The court accepted the affidavit evidence of the Home Secretary to the effect that Mr O'Brien was under the control of the governor that the governor was an official of the Irish Free State and not subject to the orders or directions of the Home Secretary or the British government. However, the writ of habeas corpus should issue. This was because the arrangements which existed between the Irish Free State and the United Kingdom provided grounds for believing that the Home Secretary could obtain the return of Mr O'Brien.
A statement had been made in the House of Commons on 19 March 1923 that the Irish Free State had given the British government a number of undertakings, one of which was to the effect that if it was decided that any person should not have been deported he would be released. There was therefore a reasonable prospect that the Home Secretary could exert sufficient control over the custody of Mr O'Brien to justify the issue of the writ.
Scrutton LJ said that if the court is satisfied that the body whose production is asked is not in the custody, power or control of the person to whom it is sought to address the writ, a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy.
1 Citers


 
Pinnock Bros v Lewis and Peat Ltd [1923] 1 KB 690
1923

Roche J
Litigation Practice
Roche J said as to Ayscough: "In that case the arbitrator decided - whether rightly or wrongly is immaterial for present purposes - that by reason of a clause as to time contained in the contract, the plaintiffs had no claim, and therefore he dismissed it. In the present case, the arbitrator merely decided that he had no jurisdictio, and that being in the award does not and cannot determine the substance of the plaintiff's claim."
Later he said: "The mere presence of an arbitration clause is no defence to an action on the contract.An award following on the arbitration clause mnay be an answer to the claim, and it will be an answer where it deal with the claim


 
 Swiss Bank Corporation v Boehmische Industrial Bank; CA 1923 - [1923] 1 KB 673
 
Everett v Islington Guardians [1923] 1 KB 45 T
1923

Avery J
Litigation Practice
The court was asked whether a jury trial was appropriate under the 1920 Act. Held. Avery J said: "It cannot be sufficient to bring a case within those words of the proviso that a plaintiff should merely allege in his particulars that the defendant has acted fraudulently. Suppose an action is brought for the price of goods sold and delivered. The only issue is whether the goods have been paid for or not. It cannot be sufficient for the plaintiff in such an action to allege that the defendant is a fraudulent person to entitle him to obtain trial by jury under this proviso. The words in question in the proviso refer to a case where a relevant issue of fraud is raised. No such relevant issue is raised in this action."
Administration of Justice Act 1920 2(1)
1 Citers



 
 Performing Right Society Limited v London Theatre of Varieties Limited; HL 1924 - [1924] AC 1; [1923] All ER Rep Ext 794

 
 Slack v Leeds Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd; CA 1924 - [1924] 2 Ch 475
 
Knight v Knight [1925] Ch 835
1925


Litigation Practice

1 Citers


 
Neki and Others v Chhajju Ram and Another [1925] UKPC 10
19 Feb 1925
PC

Litigation Practice
(Punjab)
[ Bailii ]

 
 Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation; PC 1926 - [1926] AC 155; [1925] All ER 56; (1926) 42 TLR 207; 67 ER 313
 
Lord Strathcona Steamship Co Ltd v Dominion Coal Co Ltd [1926] AC 108
1926
HL

Litigation Practice

1 Citers


 
Scott Paper Co v Drayton Paper Works Ltd [1927] 44 RPC 151
1927

Clauson J
Evidence, Litigation Practice
Parties to litigation should 'be encouraged fully and frankly to put their cards on the table.'
1 Citers


 
Nicholson v Southern Star Fire Insurance Co Ltd (1927) 28 SR (NSW) 124
1927


Commonwealth, Litigation Practice
(New South Wales)


 
 Re The Hontestroom; HL 1927 - [1927] AC 37
 
Friern Barnet UDC v Adams [1927] 2 Ch 25
1927
CA
Lord Hanworth MR
Litigation Practice
The plaintiff sought the cost of certain streetworks from the relevant frontagers. They did not know their names and issued a writ against "the owners of" certain land clearly identified by name. It was pointed out that only owners of that land at the date of the completion of the works could be liable. In order to cover that point the plaintiff sought to amend the description by adding "at the time of the completion of the works. Held: Leave to amend was properly refused. A writ cannot be issued in the terms proposed referring to the parties sought to be summoned in this vague way. The procedure established by the Act necessarily implies even if it does not expressly state that it is necessary to an action that the defendants should be named. The writ, in not naming the defendants, but merely describing them as the owners of adjoining property, is bad. The plaintiffs do not know, and the writ does not state, whether any one of the defendants is a lunatic, or an infant, or is residing abroad, or is under any kind of disability, in each of which cases some special directions or some special procedure might be required
Judicature Act 1873
1 Citers


 
Richardson v Richardson [1927] P 228,
1927
KBD
Hill J
Jurisdiction, Litigation Practice
A bank owed debts to a judgment debtor customer on accounts held both in London and in Africa. It was accepted that the former were subject to a garnishee order. The dispute concerned the latter. Held: The bank is no doubt indebted to the judgment debtor and the bank is within the jurisdiction. The Order deals with the case where 'any other person is indebted to the judgment debtor and is within the jurisdiction". But both in principle and upon authority, that means 'is indebted within the jurisdiction and is within the jurisdiction'. The debt must be properly recoverable within the jurisdiction. In principle, attachment of debts is a form of execution, and the general power of execution extends only to property within the jurisdiction of the Court which orders it. A debt is not [properly] within the jurisdiction if it cannot be recovered here. The court was accordingly of opinion that moneys held by the bank to the credit of the judgment debtor at the African branches cannot be made the subject of a garnishee order, for they are not a debt recoverable within the jurisdiction." The court went on to hold that, if he was wrong in that conclusion, he would exercise his discretion against the making of an order.
1 Citers


 
Owners of Steamship Hontestroom v Owners of Steamship Sagaporack [1927] AC 37
1927
HL
Lord Sumner
Litigation Practice
The court discussed the weight to be given by an appellate court to findings of fact made by the court of first instance.
Viscount Sumner said: "What then is the real effect on the hearing in a Court of Appeal of the fact that the trial judge saw and heard the witnesses? I think it has been somewhat lost sight of. Of course, there is jurisdiction to retry the case on the shorthand note, including in such retrial the appreciation of the relative values of the witnesses, for the appeal is made a rehearing by rules which have the force of statute: Order LXVIII, r. 1. It is not, however, a mere matter of discretion to remember and take account of this fact; it is a matter of justice and of judicial obligation. None the less not to have seen the witnesses puts appellate Judges in a permanent position of disadvantage as against the trial Judge and unless it can be shown that he has failed to use or has palpably misused his advantage, the higher Court ought not to take the responsibility of reversing conclusions so arrived at merely on the results of their own comparisons and criticisms of the witnesses and of their own view of the probabilities of the case."
. . and "If his estimate of the man forms any substantial part of his reasons for his judgment the trial judge's conclusions of fact should . . be let alone."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Practice Note [1927] WN 290
2 Jan 1927

Tomlin J
Litigation Practice
Tomlin J set out the appropriate practice on attaching a private schedule to an order made by consent. The schedule records the terms of the settlement agreed between the parties but which terms are not ordered by the court and are not enforceable as a judgment.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Dashwood v Dashwood; 1-Nov-1927 - (1927) 71 SJ 911; [1927] WN 276; (1927) 64 LJNC 431

 
 Conquer v Boot; CA 1928 - [1928] 2 KB 336; [1928] All ER 120

 
 Coleshill v Manchester Corporation; 1928 - [1928] 1 KB 776

 
 Graigola Merthyr Co Ltd v Swansea Corporation; 1928 - [1928] 1 Ch 31
 
Ormond Investment Co Ltd v Betts [1928] AC 143
1928
HL
Lord Buckmaster
Land, Litigation Practice
The House considered the interpretation of a statute dealing with public rights of navigation. Held: ‘Where the interpretation of a statute is obscure or ambiguous, or readily capable of more than one interpretation, light may be thrown on the true view to be taken of it by the aim and provisions of a subsequent statute’
Lord Buckmaster said of the statement by Lord Sterndale in Cape Brandy: ‘That is, in my opinion, an accurate expression of the law, if by ‘any ambiguity’ is meant a phrase fairly and equally open to divers meanings’.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Macleay v Macdonald 1928 SC 776
1928
IHCS
Lord Anderson
Scotland, Litigation Practice
When an interlocutor is reclaimed against, the effect from the time the reclaiming motion is marked is to sist, or stay, all execution on the decree which has been pronounced in the Outer House until the reclaiming motion has been determined: rule 38.8.
1 Citers


 
In re British Reinforced Concrete Engineering Co Ltd [1929] 45 TLR 186
1929

McKinnon J
Litigation Practice
Practice on incapacity of the judge during a trial.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
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