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Limitation - From: 2003 To: 2003

This page lists 39 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Mellors v Perry [2003] EWCA Civ 89
2003
CA

Limitation
The claimant had endured a childhood of renal problems with three kidney transplants but had no reason think that this was anything other than the consequence of her congenital disability.
Limitation Act 1980
1 Citers


 
Good Challenger Navegante S A v Metalexportimport S A [2003] EWHC 10 (Comm)
10 Jan 2003
ComC

Estoppel, Limitation

1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Matadeen v Caribbean Insurance Co Ltd Times, 20 January 2003; [2002] UKPC 69; [2003] 1 WLR 670
20 Jan 2003
PC
Bingham of Cornhill, Hobhouse of Woodborough, Millett, Svott of Foscoe, Rodge of Earslferry LL
Commonwealth, Insurance, Limitation
(Trinidad and Tobago) The claimant sought to claim damages. The respondent's insurers became insolvent, and he sought the damages in turn from the insurer's own insurer. They responded that the claim against them was out of time. Held: The limitation period in the claim against the insurer's insurers was the same as it would be as between the original insured and his insurer. The fact that the contract of insurance was entered into was a statutory requirement. That the contract was under seal did not operate to extend the limitation period.
[ Bailii ] - [ PC ]
 
Procter and Gamble (Health and Beauty Care) Ltd and others v Carrier Holdings Ltd and Another [2003] EWHC 83 (TCC)
24 Jan 2003
TCC

Negligence, Contract, Limitation

[ Bailii ]
 
Piggott v Aulton (Deceased) Times, 19 February 2003; [2003] EWCA Civ 24; [2003] RTR 540
29 Jan 2003
CA
Lord Justice Sedley, Lord Justice Simon Brown, Lady Justice Arden
Civil Procedure Rules, Wills and Probate, Limitation
The claimant had issued proceedings against the deceased after his death, but before a personal representative had been appointed. They later discontinued and re-issued against the person appointed by the court to defend the action. The defendant then said the proceedings were an abuse of process, and pleaded a limitation defence. Held: The deceased was not a person in law, and the first action had no proper defendant, and the two actions were not the same. The person appointed to defend was not a personal representative at law. There was an identity between him and the deceased, but only to the extent of the requirement to provide a defendant, and the appointment did not relate back to the death. The case fell within Shapland, not Walkley, and the judge could apply section 33 to allow the action.
Limitation Act 1980 33 - Civil Procedure Rules 19.8(2)(b)(ii)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Roland Brandwood and others v Bakewell Management Ltd Times, 05 February 2003; [2003] EWCA Civ 23; Gazette, 20 March 2003
30 Jan 2003
CA
Lord Justice Ward, Lady Justice Arden, Mr Justice Sullivan
Land, Limitation
House owners had used vehicular access across a common to get to their houses for many years. The commons owner required them to purchase the right, and they replied that they had acquired the right by lost modern grant and/or by prescription. Held: The use of a right of way over a common by vehicles (as opposed to use by foot) was specifically an offence under the 1925 Act. Unlawful acts could not be relied upon to found a claim to an easement based upon prescription. This court was bound by clear previous authority, with which it agreed. To apply the doctrine of lost modern grant it was necessary to identify who might have been the parties to such a transaction. None could be found in this case.
Law of Property Act 1925 193 - Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 68 - Vehicular Access Across Common and Other Land (England) Regulations 2002 11 - Prescription Act 1832 2
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Scottish Equitable Plc v Thompson and Another [2003] EWCA Civ 211; [2003] HLR 48
6 Feb 2003
CA

Land, Limitation
The mortgage deed, which was a second mortgage, did not contain any express covenant to repay the principal sum, but only for monthly interest instalments with no element of capital repayment, since the principal was to be paid from an insurance policy. The property was re-possessed and sold, leaving nothing for the second mortgagee after the first mortgage was repaid. At first instance ir was found that the relevant cause of action for the shortfall, which occurred on the sale by the mortgagee, was not an action on a specialty within s8, but a simple contract debt governed by section 5 of the 1980 Act and that the claim was statute barred after 6 years from the accrual of the cause of action. Held: Bartlett applied. s20(1) was of no relevance, as the property had been sold and the principal sum was no longer secured by a mortgage on property. With no express covenant to repay the whole of the principal sum on a particular date or in a specified event, no date for the actual repayment of the principal sum could be identified in the mortgage deed. The claim for the shortfall was a simple contract debt, which became statute barred after 6 years.
Limitation Act 1980 8 5
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
KR and others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd and Another Times, 17 February 2003; [2003] EWCA Civ 85; [2003] QB 1441; [2003] Fam Law 482; [2004] 2 All ER 716; [2003] 1 FLR 1203; [2003] Lloyd's Rep Med 175; [2003] 3 WLR 107; [2003] 1 FCR 385
12 Feb 2003
CA
Lord Justice Auld, Lord Justice Waller, Lord Justice Mantell
Limitation, Personal Injury
The respondent appealed decisions by the court to allow claims for personal injury out of time. The claims involved cases of sexual abuse inflicted by its employees going back over many years. Held: The judge had misapplied the test laid down in Stebbings. The court of appeal had not previously considered how to apply its section 33 discretion to cases involving continuing psychological damage. Each case had to be assessed individually, but the length of time allowed to pass before an application was made was a significant factor. Once the court had used its discretion to extend the time allowed before the limitation period, it should be more cautious about leniency in any following period. The question was whether the claims could still be tried fairly as against the defendant. Such allegations were easy to make and difficult to refute, and the judge must bear in mind the possibility of exaggeration for financial gain. "The overall question is one of equity, namely, whether it would be 'equitable' to disapply the limitation provisions having regard to the balance of potential prejudice weighed with regard to all the circumstances of the case, including those specifically mentioned in s 33(3)."
Limitation Act 1980 14 33
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Morris v Lokass and Motor Insurers' Bureau Unreported, 17 February 2003
17 Feb 2003
CC
Judge McKenna
Negligence, Limitation
(Birmingham County Court ) The court considered a request to exercise its discretion to allow a claim to proceed despite the writ having been issued outside the limitation period. Held: The court accepted the distinction proposed for the defendant that as between the claimant's solicitors' professional indemnity insurers and the MIB the loss should fall on the former, who had received a premium, and not on the MIB, who had not.
1 Citers


 
Hatton v Messrs Chafes (A Firm) [2003] EWCA Civ 341; [2003] PNLR 24; [2007] Lloyd's Rep PN 15
13 Mar 2003
CA
Lord Justice Peter Gibson Lord Justice Clarke Sir Anthony Evans
Professional Negligence, Litigation Practice, Limitation
The defendant firm appealed against a refusal to strike out the claimant's claim for professional negligence, asserting that the judge should have considered the limitation issue in the light of Khan v Falvey. Held: By the time that the negligence arose, the first claim was worthless. The claimant knew of the negligence of his solicitors at that time, both as to the existence of any damage, and of the possibility of a claim. The court summarised the principles as follows: "(i) A cause of action in negligence does not arise until the claimant suffers damage as a result of the defendant's negligent act or omission. (ii) The damage must be 'real' as distinct from minimal: Cartledge v Jopling [1963] AC 758 per Lord Reid . . and Lord Evershed MR . . (iii) Actual damage is any detriment, liability or loss capable of assessment in money terms and includes liability which may arise on a contingency: Forsted v Outred [1982] 1 WLR 86 per Stephenson LJ at 94, approved by the House of Lords in Nykredit Mortgage Bank plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd No 2 [1995] 1 WLR 1627, per Lord Nicholls (with whom the other members of the appellate committee agreed) . . (iv) The loss must be relevant in the sense that it falls within the measure of damages applicable to the wrong in question: Nykredit at 1630F. (Propositions (i) to (iv) were confirmed by Sir Murray Stuart-Smith in Khan v Falvey [2002] EWCA Civ 400, [2002] PNLR 28, at paragraphs 11 and 12.)
(v) A claimant cannot defeat the statute of limitations by claiming only in respect of damage which occurs within the limitation period if he has suffered damage from the same wrongful act outside that period: Khan v Falvey . . following Knapp v Ecclesiastical Insurance Group Plc [1998] PNLR 172 per Hobhouse LJ . ." The claim now was time barred. Appeal allowed.
Clarke LJ said: "Khan v Falvey is authority for the proposition that it is not a condition precedent for any claim against defendant solicitors that the underlying action should have been struck out. That is because the claimant may have suffered relevant damage before an order is made striking the action out. The question remains by what criteria to judge when that moment arises. Although that question was discussed in the judgments in Khan v Falvey, as I read them it was not necessary to decide it for the purposes of the decision in that case. Nor is it to my mind necessary for it to be determined for the purposes of the decision in this appeal.
It seems to me that there are three possibilities as to when damage is caused by negligence in such a case so that the claimant's cause of action has accrued and time begins to run against him. The first is when the claimant has no arguable basis for avoiding the claim being struck out, the second is when it is more probable than not that the claim will be struck out and the third is when there is a real (as opposed to a minimal or fanciful) risk of the claim being struck out. The reason why it is not necessary to determine which of those possibilities is correct here is that, in my opinion, this is an example of the first class of case on the facts.
As I read it, Khan v Falvey was also an example of such a case. This can be seen with particular clarity in the judgment of Schiemann LJ. He noted in paragraphs 65 and 66 that in both Case 1 and Case 3 (which were the first two of the cases being considered) the claimant had pleaded that by a certain date his claim (or in one case counterclaim) was 'amenable to be struck out for want of prosecution'."
Sir Anthony Evans agreed that at the relevant time, the action was already doomed to fail, and added: "This is clear, in my judgment, because any attempt to proceed with the action against the accountants in October 1994 would have been met with an application to dismiss the claim for want of prosecution, and the application would certainly have succeeded. The action was, on any view, 'amenable to striking out.' The fact that the striking out order was not made until June 1999, after an even more belated attempt to revive the proceedings in January 1999, does not alter the circumstances as they were in 1994.
It is unnecessary, therefore, in the present case to define the precise nature of the evidential burden which rests upon the claimant in cases of this sort. Nevertheless, an issue does arise, which was argued before us. Is it sufficient to prove that there was some chance - a 'real' or 'substantial' chance - that the claim would have been struck out at the relevant date, if an application had been made? Or must the claimant prove something more - perhaps, that an application would probably have succeeded, if one had been made?
The former view receives some support from statements which are found in the authorities to the effect that the relevant kind of loss is the diminished value of the claim. Some diminution occurs when a striking out application would have some prospect of success, though falling short of 50 per cent. Yet in such a case it could not be said that the application would probably succeed or that the claim was probably worthless."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Anthony McCarroll v Statham Gill Davies (A Firm) [2003] EWCA Civ 425
1 Apr 2003
CA
Lord Justice Pill, Lord Justice Latham, Mr Justice Morland
Limitation, Professional Negligence
The claimant said his solicitors had failed to protect his interests in a partnership agreement into which he subsequently entered. The agreement contained less favourable terms than those which should have been agreed and he claimed damages accordingly. Alternatively he claimed damages on the basis that the solicitors' breach of duty had caused him to lose the chance of securing an agreement on more favourable terms. He contended that the loss was only suffered when he ceased to be a member of the partnership. Held: His cause of action accrued when he entered into the partnership agreement. That was the point in time when he suffered an actual loss.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Agnew v Scott Lithgow J G Kincaid Ltd Kvaerner Govan Limited [2003] ScotCS 94; 2003 SCLR 426
1 Apr 2003
SCS
Lord Abernethy and Lady Cosgrove and Lord Marnoch
Personal Injury, Limitation
Common law three of peursuer's former employers for the loss, injury and damage said to have been suffered as a result of his working with vibrating tools in the course of his employment with them.
[ Bailii ]
 
Avril Alderson, Hilda Alderson v Beetham Organisation Limited [2003] EWCA Civ 408; Times, 19 April 2003; Gazette, 12 June 2003
2 Apr 2003
CA
Lord Justice Aldous Lord Justice Judge Lord Justice Longmore
Construction, Limitation
The claimants appealed rejection of their claim as out of time under the Act. The property was constructed in 1994, but came to suffer from damp. They were advised of the defect and possible action in 1995, but failed to begin proceedings until 2001. The claimant said the limitation period began when remedial works failed. Held: Section 1 imposes a duty of care upon builders of dwellings. 1(5) sets a limitation period of 6 years, but contains a proviso where work is done after completion "to rectify the work … already done". Parliament intended that there should be a fresh cause of action for breach of the duty to provide a dwelling fit for habitation when the further work did not rectify the original work as intended. The appeal was allowed.
Defective Premises Act 1972 1(5)
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Sage v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions and others [2003] UKHL 22; Times, 11 April 2003; [2003] NPC 51; [2003] 16 EGCS 102; [2003] 2 All ER 689; [2003] JPL 1299; [2003] 1 WLR 983; [2003] 2 P & CR 26
10 Apr 2003
HL
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry
Planning, Limitation
The appellant had challenged an enforcement notice requiring him to pull down a partially built house. The issue was when the four year limitation period had commenced. Did the four year limitation period commence when the works were complete, or when the building was complete? Held: The inspector had found the building to be a dwelling in the course of construction. Further works might not affect the exterior, but would not fall within section 55(2)(a) until the building works had been completed. The breach of planning control would not have been exhausted but would be continuing.
Town and Country Planning Act 1990 55(2)(a) 171(B)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ House of Lords ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd and others [2003] EWHC 687 (Comm); [2000] EuLR 232; [2003] 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 225
10 Apr 2003
ComC
Colman J
European, Commercial, Transport, Limitation
The Claimant sought damages for breach of the Rome Treaty Articles 82 and 81. His shipping company had faced organised anti-competitive attempts by the respondents to put him out of business. Held: A cause of action for breach of a statutory duty first arises when the breach causes damage to the claimant: "In this connection it is important to recognise that there are different ways in which such a breach may cause damage. Thus, an isolated event amounting to such a breach may cause a chain of damage development commencing when the effects of the breach first affect the claimant, and those [effects] may continue for a long period of time. If that period commences prior to the cut-off date for the purposes of the period of limitation, the claim will prima facie be time-barred notwithstanding that the effects of the breach may continue beyond that date. The position is similar to a claim in tort for negligence. By contrast, there may be a continuing or repeated breach of statutory duty, over an extended period, such as an unlawful emission of toxic fumes which continues to affect and injure those exposed to it over the whole period of that breach. In such a case, if the limitation cut-off date occurs during the period, the claimant's cause of action for the damage suffered after the date in question will not be time-barred." Colman J concluded that the case before him fell into the latter category.
Limitation Act 1980
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Hughes v Barratt Urban Construction (Scotland) Limited [2003] ScotCS 115
15 Apr 2003
SCS
Leonna Dorrian QC
Contract, Limitation
Action for damages after a flat purchased as new was shown to have defects.
[ Bailii ]
 
The Society of Lloyd's v Eric Nigel Laws and Others 2003/EWHC 873 (COMM)
17 Apr 2003
QBD
The Honourable Mr Justice Cooke
Torts - Other, Insurance, Limitation



 
 Adams v Bracknell Forest Borough Council; CA 6-May-2003 - Times, 14 May 2003; [2003] EWCA Civ 706; Gazette, 03 July 2003
 
Skerratt v Linfax Ltd (T/A Go Karting for Fun) [2003] EWCA Civ 695
6 May 2003
CA

Personal Injury, Limitation

Limitation Act 1980 33(3)(a)
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Burke v Ashe Construction Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 717
23 May 2003
CA
Lord Justice Mummery Lord Justice Potter Lady Justice Arden
Limitation

Limitation Act 1980 833
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
KR and others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd and Another [2003] EWCA Civ 783; [2003] QB 1441
10 Jun 2003
CA
Auld LJ
Limitation, Insurance
The court considered an extension of the time for claiming damages for personal injuries after the claimants said they had been sexually abused as children in the care of the defendants. Held: The test to be applied under section 14(2) was "partly subjective"and "section 14(2) was designed principally to provide for cases of late diagnosis of physical diseases, such asbestosis or byssinosis, the deadly development of which may be unknown until their symptoms eventually appear." The section "does not fit so readily the circumstances of abused children who, because of their immaturity and vulnerable position might never consider and seek advice about suing their abusers". In such a case, the trial judge, when considering the applicability of section 14(2), must take into account the claimant's "individual history and circumstances, the nature severity and duration of the abuse, the period of time when it occurred and its physical and/or mental effects evident to the claimant". The judge would then have "to relate them all to the question whether the claimant, given those and any other relevant circumstances, would have considered the injury… sufficiently serious to institute proceedings against a solvent compliant defendant".
Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 1930 1 - Limitation Act 1980
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
BP Oil UK Ltd v Kent County Council [2003] EWCA Civ 798; Ghazette, 04 September 2003
13 Jun 2003
CA
Lord Justice Kennedy, Lord Justice Mummery And Lord Justice Carnwath
Land, Damages, Limitation
BP sought compensation after its land had been acquired compulsorily. The council said its claim was time barred. BP appealed from the Lands Tribunal, saying an agreement with the Authority had kept its claim alive. Held: The fact of entry did not prevent purchase by agreement, which was usual. The agreement gave rise to a claim for consideration, and it was under that agreement that the authority had taken possession. Appeal allowed.
Limitation Act 1980 9 - Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 11
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Purbrick v Hackney London Borough Council Gazette, 10 July 2003; [2004] 1 P & CR 553
26 Jun 2003
ChD
Mr Justice Neuberger
Land, Limitation
The property fell into disrepair. The claimant began to use it for storage, carrying out some refurbishment. He now claimed to own the property by adverse possession. Held: Littledale was not to be followed unless the facts were strictly on all fours. He had done all that was possible to occupy and retain possession of the premises. He was not required to demonstrate that he had intended to claim ownership of the building but only that he intended to exclude the world. That he had done. “…. it is to some extent implicit in the present law of adverse possession that an owner of property who makes no use of it whatever should be expected to keep an eye on the property to ensure that adverse possession rights are not being clocked up. A period of 12 years is a long period during which to neglect a property completely.”
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Northern and Shell Plc v John Laing Construction Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1035
16 Jul 2003
CA

Construction, Limitation

[ Bailii ]
 
Barry Young (Deceased) v Western Power Distribution (South West) Plc [2003] EWCA Civ 1034; Times, 18 July 2003; [2003] 1 WLR 2868
18 Jul 2003
CA
Lord Justice Laws Lord Justice Mummery Lord Justice Simon Brown
Limitation, Litigation Practice
The deceased had begun an action on becoming ill after exposure to asbestos by the defendant. He withdrew his action after receiving expert evidence that his illness was unrelated. A post-mortem examination showed this evidence to be mistaken. His widow sought to pursue an action, but it was claimed that this was out of time. Held: The first action was timeous. Section 33 was not available to the widow to provide a discretion for the judge to allow her action. Time began running for her on receipt of the post mortem report. There were no exceptional circumstances to justify the availability of any discretion in the judge. As to Walkley: "The rationale of the Walkley principle is, as already explained, that it is not the time limit in section 11 which prejudices the claimant in such circumstances but rather the fact that he had previously commenced timeous proceedings which, for whatever reason, were not then successfully pursued."
Limitation Act 1980 11 12 33
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
VAI Industries (UK) Ltd v Bostock and Bramley and others [2003] EWCA Civ 1069
23 Jul 2003
CA
Lord Justice Ward Mr Justice Newman Lord Justice Carnwath
Contract, Limitation

[ Bailii ]
 
Martin Knight v Rochdale Healthcare NHS Trust, the National Health Service Litigation Authority, the Secretary of State for Health [2003] EWHC 1831 (QB); [2004] 1 WLR 371
23 Jul 2003
QBD
Mr Justice Crane
Health Professions, Professional Negligence, Limitation
A contribution to a damages award was sought. The two year period under section 10 had expired between the anniversary of the date on which an agreement to settle the victim's claim had been made and the anniversary of the consent order which had given effect to the agreement. The court had to decide whether the period for limitation purposes was fixed by subsection 10(3) or 10(4). Held: A consent order amounted to a "judgment". Subsection 10(4) applied and the contribution claim was time barred: "My principal reason for doing so is if a firm agreement is made, as here, time undoubtedly starts to run at that moment. It would be different if the agreement required the making of a consent order before it took effect. Neither party so contends here. Although Parliament could have decided that a consent order should restart the clock, there are insufficiently clear words to indicate that. Indeed the words in subsection (1) "Where…any person becomes entitled" and the words in subsection (4) "the earliest date on which the amount…is agreed" suggest that the crucial moment is the first moment when liability arises. It is tidy to conclude that subsections (3) and (4) deal separately with cases decided by a court (or arbitrator) and cases of agreement."
Limitation Act 1980 10(3) 10(4)
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Rowe v Kingston-Upon-Hull City Council and Another [2003] EWCA Civ 1281; [2003] ELR 771
24 Jul 2003
CA

Limitation, Negligence, Human Rights
The claimant sought damages for a breach of duty by his teachers which had happened before 1991. He argued that 3(1) of the HRA should affect the construction of section 14(1) of the 1980 Act.
Limitation Act 1980 14 33 - Human Rights Act 1980 14(1)
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 DEG-Deutsche Investitions und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH v Koshy and Other (No 3); Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd (in receivership) v Same (No 3); CA 28-Jul-2003 - [2003] EWCA Civ 1048; Times, 09 September 2003; [2004] 1 BCLC 131
 
Edward James Mason v First Leisure Corporation Plc [2003] EWHC 1814 (QB)
30 Jul 2003
QBD
The Honourable Mr Justice Tugendhat
Personal Injury, Limitation

[ Bailii ]
 
London Borough Lewisham v Mr Ltd [2003] EWHC 2114 (TCC)
31 Jul 2003
TCC

Construction, Limitation

[ Bailii ]
 
Graham v Entec Europe Ltd (T/A Exploration Associates) [2003] EWCA Civ 1177; Times, 10 September 2003
6 Aug 2003
CA
Lord Justice Potter Lord Justice Chadwick And Mr Justice Cresswell
Insurance, Limitation
The claimant's bungalow suffered subsidence. Repair works were undertaken as advised by the defendants, but unsuccessfully. The claimant's insurers instructed experts negotiators to investigate with a view to a claim. The defendants now claimed the action was out of time, since the knowledge of the defects acquired by the loss adjusters was to be imputed to the claimants. Held: "The knowledge of a loss adjuster investigating and advising on a claim on behalf of insurers for the purpose of pursuing a subrogated claim by those insurers, is to be treated as the knowledge of the insurers for the purposes of s.14A(5)."
Limitation Act 1980 14A
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Hemmingway and Another v Smith Roddam (A Firm) and others [2003] EWCA Civ 1342
18 Sep 2003
CA

Professional Negligence, Limitation

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Fletcher v Containerbase (Manchester) Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1635
31 Oct 2003
CA

Personal Injury, Limitation

[ Bailii ]

 
 Lambie v Toffolo Jackson Limited (In Liq) and Another; OHCS 11-Nov-2003 - [2003] ScotCS 282; 2003 SLT 1415

 
 Regina v City of Sunderland ex parte Beresford; HL 13-Nov-2003 - [2003] UKHL 60; Times, 14 November 2003; [2003] 3 WLR 1306; [2004] 1 AC 889; [2004] 1 All ER 160; [2004] 2 P & CR 23; [2004] JPL 1106; [2003] NPC 139; [2003] 47 EGCS 155; [2004] 1 EGLR 94
 
Good Challenger Navegante S A v Metalexportimport SA [2003] EWCA Civ 1668; Times, 27 November 2003; Gazette, 15 January 2004; [2004] 1 Lloyd's Law Reports 67
24 Nov 2003
CA
Lord Justice Clarke Lord Justice Mantell Mr Justice Rimer
Arbitration, Limitation
The claimant sought to enforce an arbitration award made in 1983. Time might otherwise have expired, but the claimants relied on a fax which they said was an acknowledgement of the debt, and also upon a finding in a Romanian court which created an issue estoppel. Held: A typed signature on a fax was capable of being an acknowledgement since section 30 derived from the 1677 Act which would have accepted such. "The crucial point here is that Navlomar’s typed signature appeared on the telex in circumstances in which it is evident that it was put on with Navlomar’s authority" and "to establish an issue estoppel four conditions must be satisfied (1) the judgment must be given by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the judgment must be final and conclusive and on the merits; (3) there must be identity of parties; and (4) there must be identity of subject matter, which means that the issue decided by the foreign court must be the same as that arising in the English proceedings." The issue had not been a necessary part of the Romanian decision (under 2 above), and therefore no issue estoppel arose.
When an ex parte application for leave was made under s.26, that was an action brought for the purposes of s.7 of the Limitation Act 1980; that was because such an application was an alternative to proceeding by way of writ or originating summons.
Limitation Act 1980 30
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Aldi Stores Ltd v Holmes Buildings Plc [2003] EWCA Civ 1882
1 Dec 2003
CA
Auld, Hale and Dyson LJJ
Construction, Limitation, Litigation Practice
What makes a claim a "new claim" as defined in section 35(2) of the Limitation Act 1980 is not the newness of the case according to the type or quantum of the remedy claimed, but the newness of the cause of action that it involves. A cause of action is a set of facts that enable one person to obtain a remedy from another; as opposed to a form of action used as a convenient and succinct description of a particular category of factual situation.
Limitation Act 1980 35(2)
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
McDonnell v Congregation of Christian Brothers Trustees (Formerly Irish Christian Brothers) and others [2003] UKHL 63; Times, 05 December 2003; [2004] 1 AC 1101
4 Dec 2003
HL
Lord Bingham of Cornhill Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead Lord Steyn Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough Lord Rodger of Earlsferry
Limitation, Personal Injury
In 2000, the claimant sought damages for sexual abuse from before 1951. The issue was as to whether the limitation law which applied was that as at the date of the incidents, or that which applied as at the date when he would be deemed uner the modern law to have acquired knowledge of the possibility of claiming. Held: Though the 1963 Act, consolidated in the 1980 Act, was framed to remedy the injustice of Cartledge, it did not extend the law to override an accrued statutory time bar to pre-1954 six-year claims: "an accrued right to plead a time bar, which is acquired after the lapse of the statutory period, is in every sense a right, even though it arises under an Act which is procedural. It is a right which is not to be taken away by conferring on the statute a retrospective operation, unless such a construction is unavoidable." The decision in Arnold was not so wrong as to allow the House to depart from it. The claim failed.
Limitation Act 1939 2(1) 22
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ House of Lords ] - [ Bailii ]
 
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