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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  















Limitation - From: 2002 To: 2002

This page lists 30 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Clay v Chamberlain [2002] EWHC 2529
2002
QBD
Cox J
Limitation
The claimant sought the judge's discretion to disapply the rule in Walkley. The judge characterised the defendant's conduct as "though not improper, sufficiently blameworthy to result in a situation which was at any rate analogous to an estoppel and sufficient therefore to bring it within the category of 'most exceptional circumstances' which Lord Diplock had envisaged in the Walkley".
Limitation Act 1980 33(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Anglo-Manx Group Ltd v Aitken [2002] BPIR 215
2002

John Jarvis QC
Insolvency, Limitation
The court discussed the case of Cottrell v Price: "There was considerable argument before me as to what is meant by the words "in the bankruptcy" as distinct from the words "outside the bankruptcy". Mr Adair submitted that the question can be formulated in this way. Is the claim being directed at property within the statutory trust, or does it relate to property outside of the trust: for example, after-acquired property, or property which cannot form part of the estate. It seems to me that this is the correct formulation and is consistent with the analysis of Buckley J in Cottrell –v- Price."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Whitbread (Hotels) Ltd and Another v Walkmore (95) Ltd Times, 18 January 2002
4 Jan 2002
OHCS
Lord Eassie
Scotland, Company, Limitation
Where application was made to restore a company to the register, to face court action, the court should look at the issues of limitation, and at how any delays had arisen. Held: The court should be aware of the potential prejudice created by the use of the section. In this case there was no reason why the claimant should escape the normal consequences of that part of the delay which lay at his feet.
Companies Act 1985 653(3)
1 Cites


 
Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea v Khan and Another [2002] EWCA Civ 279
16 Jan 2002
CA
Judge, Latham, Arden LJJ
Limitation, Landlord and Tenant, Housing

Housing Act 1957 9(1A)
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]

 
 Calvelli And Ciglio v Italy; ECHR 17-Jan-2002 - 32967/96; [2002] ECHR 3
 
Sweet v Owners of Blyth Lifeboat; The Edward Duke of Windsor Times, 22 February 2002; Gazette, 06 March 2002
22 Jan 2002
QBD
Mr Justice Tomlinson
Limitation, Personal Injury, Transport
A claim which was covered by the Act for damages for psychiatric injury arose not at the date of the accident, but from when the claimant first developed a recognised psychiatric injury. The two year period of limitation under the Act ran accordingly from the later date. Had parliament wished another result, it could easily have been provided for. Instead it made a clear distinction between the date of the accident, and the date of the injury resulting from it.
Merchant Shipping Act 1995 190(3)(b)

 
Biggs and Another v Sotnicks (A Firm) and Others [2002] EWCA Civ 272
24 Jan 2002
CA

Limitation

[ Bailii ]
 
Chawda, Regina (on the Application Of) v University of Portsmouth [2002] EWCA Civ 72
25 Jan 2002
CA
Simon Brown LJ VP
Education, Limitation

[ Bailii ]
 
Ezekiel v Lehrer [2002] EWCA Civ 16; [2002] Lloyd's Law Rep PN 260
30 Jan 2002
CA
Lord Justice Ward Lord Justice Jonathan Parker And Mr Justice Harrison
Legal Professions, Professional Negligence, Limitation
The applicant claimed that his solicitor had been negligent with regard to the execution of a mortgage. The solicitor said his claim was time barred. The claimant said the solicitor had hidden the true situation from him, and the solicitor replied that he had merely refused to answer a question put to him, but had instead advised him to take independent advice. The claimant appealed a finding against him. Held: The claimant asserted that he had learned of the facts, then forgotten them until five years later. He could not claim to have been unaware of them so as to extend the limitation period.
Limitation Act 1980 32(1)(b)
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Ace Insurance Sa-Nv v Surendranath Seechurn [2002] EWCA Civ 67; [2002] 2 Lloyds LR 390
6 Feb 2002
CA
Lord Justice Ward Lord Justice Thorpe And Lord Justice Keene
Limitation, Personal Injury, Insurance, Estoppel
The claimant sought payment under an insurance policy for his permanent disability. The judge had found that the defendant insurers had indicated a readiness to continue negotiations beyond the limitation period, and that they would apply for a stay if proceedings were issued whilst negotiations were under way. The insurers later claimed that his claim was out of time. He asserted that they were estopped from making that assertion. The insurance company appealed a finding against them. Held: An estoppel would require a clear promise with specific regard to the limitation period. It was unnecessary to explore the several different forms of estoppel. Hughes was to apply. There was to be shown a clear representation. It must be precise and unambiguous. The claimants interpretation of what was happening did not affect the objective view of the words used. The offer made was conditional upon the claimant submitting to further examination in any event, which he had not done. No estoppel was established.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Rowbottom v Royal Masonic Hospital [2002] EWCA Civ 87
12 Feb 2002
CA
Lord Justice Peter Gibson, Lord Justice Mantell, And, Mr. Justice Wall
Limitation, Personal Injury
The claimant sought damages for the negligent failure to administer antibiotics. Earlier proceedings had been discontinued, and the hospital resisted subsequent proceedings, claiming them to be time-barred. The claimant asserted that he knew of the negligence not when advised by counsel, but rather at a later date when he received a medical report. Held: Time runs from when the claimant knows that the personal injury can be attributed to the defendant whom he wishes to sue. Counsel's opinion did not suggest finally that the cause of the injury was the failure to provide antibiotics, since it was not then known whether they had been administered. (By a majority) The case should proceed.
Limitation Act 1980
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Khan v R M Falvey and Co (a Firm) Times, 12 April 2002; Gazette, 10 May 2002; [2002] EWCA Civ 400; [2002] Lloyd's Rep PN 369; [2002] PNLR 28
22 Mar 2002
CA
Lord Justice Schiemann, Lord Justice Chadwick and Sir Murray Stuart-Smith
Limitation, Professional Negligence
The claimant sought damages from his former solicitors for failing to act to avoid his case being struck out. The second action was itself delayed, and the defendants asserted that the cause of action occurred not when his claim was actually struck out, but at the time when it could have been struck out. Held: "where a tort is actionable only on proof of damage, the cause of action is not complete and time does not begin to run for the purposes of statutory limitation until actual damage occurs." The cause of action accrued on the occurrence of the first item of material loss. Damage in a claim for pure financial loss arose before the action was actually dismissed, and limitation ran accordingly.
Chadwick LJ said: "Typically, the effect of cumulative delay has been that it becomes increasingly difficult to resist an application to strike out based on the contention that it is no longer possible to have a fair trial. Although it may be possible to say in such cases that before a certain date the claim is not vulnerable to being struck out, and after another and later date it was so vulnerable, there would usually be a period of some months in respect of which there is room for a legitimate difference of view. But what can be said with some confidence is that during that period the value of the claim is diminishing as its vulnerability to strike out increases. It seems to me that once the action has entered that period it is impossible to say that damage has not occurred as a consequence of the previous delay. It is no answer that the damage may be difficult to quantify."
Schiemann LJ said: "By the phrase "amenable to be struck out" the pleader intended to convey that after 1990 there was no arguable defence to an application to strike out. This is common ground. On that basis the claimant had suffered damage from the defendant's negligence by, at the latest, January 1, 1991 and his cause of action had arisen then. What had been (let us assume) a right of action against the debtor which was worth something, had become a right of action which was worth nothing. All the alleged negligence by the solicitor had occurred by then. The present action was not started until more than six years later. In those circumstances it is time barred."
Sir Murray Stuart-Smith referred to the judgment of Hobhouse LJ in Hopkins v Mackenzie and said of it: "I share Hobhouse LJ's difficulties. A claimant cannot defeat the statute of limitations by claiming only in respect of damage which occurs within the limitation period, if he has suffered actual damage from the same wrongful acts outside that period."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Six Continents Retail Ltd (Formerly Bass Taverns Limited T/A Bass Leisure Retail) v Hughes; EAT 19-Apr-2002 - EAT/1312/00; [2002] UKEAT 1312_00_1904
 
Cave v Robinson Jarvis and Rolf (a Firm) Times, 07 May 2002; [2002] UKHL 18; [2003] 1 AC 384; [2002] 2 WLR 1107; [2002] 19 EGCS 146; (2002) 81 Con LR 25; [2002] 2 All ER 641; [2002] PNLR 25; [2003] 1 CLC 101; [2002] 19 EGCS 146; 81 Con LR 25; [2003] 1 CLC 101
25 Apr 2002
HL
Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough, Lord Millett and Lord Scott of Foscote
Limitation, Professional Negligence
An action for negligence against a solicitor was defended by saying that the claim was out of time. The claimant responded that the solicitor had not told him of the circumstances which would lead to the claim, and that deliberate concealment should extend the limitation period. Held: Brocklesby was wrongly decided. Section 32 should deprive a defendant of his limitation defence where either he took active steps to conceal his failure, or the failure itself was deliberate and the concealment might not be discovered for sometime. Where the failing was non-deliberate negligence, a failure to disclose was not concealment. Deliberate commission did not require unconscionable behaviour, but was still to be contrasted with behaviour which was accidental, or inadvertent.
Lord Millettt said: "As I have explained, in enacting the 1980 Act Parliament substituted "deliberate concealment" for "concealed fraud". This is a different and more appropriate concept. It cannot be assumed that the law remained the same. But reference to the old law explains why Parliament enacted section 32(2) and did not rely on section 32(1)(b) alone to cover the whole ground. With all reference to fraud or conscious impropriety omitted, there was an obvious risk that "deliberate concealment" might be construed in its natural sense as meaning "active concealment" and not as embracing mere non-disclosure. Section 32(2) was therefore enacted to cover cases where active concealment should not be required. But such cases were limited in two respects: first, the defendant must have been guilty of a deliberate commission of a breach of duty; and secondly, the circumstances must make it unlikely that the breach of duty will be discovered for some time.
Given that section 32(2) is (or at least may be) required to cover cases of non-disclosure rather than active concealment, the reason for limiting it to the deliberate commission of a breach of duty becomes clear. It is only where the defendant is aware of his own deliberate wrongdoing that it is appropriate to penalise him for failing to disclose it.
In my opinion, section 32 deprives a defendant of a limitation defence in two situations: (i) where he takes active steps to conceal his own breach of duty after he has become aware of it; and (ii) where he is guilty of deliberate wrongdoing and conceals or fails to disclose it in circumstances where it is unlikely to be discovered for some time. But it does not deprive a defendant of a limitation defence where he is charged with negligence if, being unaware of his error or that he has failed to take proper care, there has been nothing for him to disclose."
Lord Scott said: "If the claimant can show that the defendant knew he was committing a breach of duty, or intended to commit the breach of duty - I can discern no difference between the two formulations; each would constitute, in my opinion, a deliberate commission of the breach - then, if the circumstances are such that the claimant is unlikely to discover for some time that the breach of duty has been committed, the facts involved in the breach are taken to have been deliberately concealed for subsection (1)(b) purposes.
Morritt LJ said, in [Brocklesby v Armitage & Guest (Note) [2002] 1 WLR 598], that in general a person is assumed to know the legal consequences of his actions and that, therefore, if an act has been done intentionally, the actor's unawareness of its legal consequences would be immaterial and no defence. The premise is, in my opinion, much too wide to constitute a satisfactory approach to construction of a statutory provision such as section 32(2). A person may or may not know that an act of his or an omission to do or say something or other constitutes a breach of tortious or contractual duty. His knowledge or lack of it may well be immaterial to the question whether a cause of action for which he is liable has accrued to the person injured by the act or omission. But that is no reason at all why Parliament, in prescribing the circumstances in which the person injured by the act or omission can escape from a Limitation Act defence, should not distinguish between the case where the actor knows he is committing a breach of duty and the case where he does not. The clear words of section 32(2) - "deliberate commission of a breach of duty" - show that Parliament has made that distinction.
It follows that, in my opinion, the construction of section 32(2) adopted in the Brocklesby case was wrong."
Limitation Act 1980 32(2)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ House of Lords ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Felix Augustus Durity v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2002] UKPC 20; Appeal No 52 0f 2000
13 May 2002
PC
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead Lord Hutton Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough Lord Millett Lord Scott of Foscote
Crime, Commonwealth, Constitutional, Limitation, Human Rights
PC (Trinidad and Tobago) The applicant had been a magistrate, and challenged the application of a limitation period to his claim. He had been wrongfully suspended from his work, and the proceedings had been delayed and protracted. No effective progress having been made, he sought to challenge the original suspension. The court refused to hear the application as debarred by limitation. He said that the limitation period should have no application in a case involving a constitutional challenge and infringement of his human rights. Held: Where the state became liable in tort, it was appropriate that limitation defences available to tortfeasors should also be available to the state, but the considerations on constitutional proceedings are different, and the limitation period did not apply. As a magistrate, making a decision in good faith, even if incorrectly, to allow that mistake to be charged as misconduct was to impugn the independence of the judiciary. The failure to pursue the case over a long period of time, with the magistrate suspended amounted to an abuse of power.
[ Bailii ] - [ PC ]
 
Howard v Ministry of Defence [2002] EWCA Civ 766
15 May 2002
CA
Latham LJ
Limitation
Application for leave to appeal.
[ Bailii ]
 
Firth v State of New York (2002) NY int 88
2 Jul 2002


International, Defamation, Limitation
(New York Court of Appeals) A report published at a press conference on 16 December 1996 was placed on the internet the same day. A claim was filed over a year later. Held. The limitation period started when the report was first uploaded onto the website and did not begin anew each time the website version of the report was accessed by a user: "The policies impelling the original adoption of the single publication rule support its application to the posting of . . the report . . on the website . . These policies are even more cogent when considered in connection with the exponential growth of the instantaneous, worldwide ability to communicate through the Internet . . Thus a multiple publication rule would implicate an even greater potential for endless retriggering of the statute of limitations, multiplicity of suits and harassment of defendants. Inevitably, there would be a serious inhibitory effect on the open, pervasive dissemination of information and ideas over the Internet which is, of course, its greatest beneficial promise."
1 Citers

[ Cornell ]

 
 J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and Another; HL 4-Jul-2002 - Times, 05 July 2002; [2002] UKHL 30; [2002] 3 All ER 865; [2002] 3 WLR 221; [2003] 1 AC 419; [2002] NPC 92; [2002] HRLR 34; [2003] 1 P & CR 10; [2002] 28 EGCS 129; [2002] 2 P & CR DG22
 
Marks and Spencer plc v Commissioners of Customs and Excise Times, 20 July 2002; C-62/00; [2002] STC ECJ 1036; [2002] EUECJ C-62/00; [2002] BVC 622; [2003] 2 WLR 665; [2002] STI 1009; [2002] ECR I-6325; [2002] STC 1036; [2002] BTC 5477; [2003] QB 866; [2002] 3 CMLR 9; [2002] CEC 572
11 Jul 2002
ECJ
P Jann, President of Chamber and Judges D. A. O. Edward and A. La Pergola Advocate General L. A. Geelhoed
VAT, Limitation
The claimant challenged the reduction of the limitation period from six years to three for the reclaiming of overpaid VAT with immediate effect, depriving it of the opportunity to recover sums paid in excess. The company sold vouchers. It paid VAT as directed by the Commissioners after challenge, but would have sought to reclaim sums overpaid after a decision of the European Court. Held: Such a withdrawal was contrary to Community law. Limitation laws must be reasonable, and appropriate transitional provisions were needed. It would not be correct for individuals to be able rely on a Directive where it had been implemented incorrectly but not to be able to do so where the national authorities applied national measures correctly implementing the Directive in a manner incompatible with it.
Finance Act 1997 47(1) 47(2)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Gold v Mincoff Science and Gold (A Firm) [2002] EWCA Civ 1157
19 Jul 2002
CA

Professional Negligence, Limitation

1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Robinson v St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council Gazette, 10 October 2002; [2003] PIQR P128; [2002] EWCA Civ 1099
25 Jul 2002
CA
Lords Justice Peter Gibson and Brooke and Sir Murray Stuart-Smith
Limitation, Personal Injury
The claimant sought an extension of the limitation period to allow him to pursue an action. He sought damages for negligence against his former school which had failed to diagnose and treat his dyslexia. Held: His appeal was denied. The claim was one for personal injury, but the question of whether to extend the time period is one for a judge's discretion. The prejudice to the claimant in being denied the right to bring an action must not be over-emphasised. Here, the long delay meant also that the defendant would have great difficulty in unearthing its records to defend its action. There were no grounds for interfering with the judge's discretion. As to whether a failue to ameliorate dyslexia could constitute a personal injury: "Dyslexia…may itself be an 'impairment of a person's mental condition'. It is not of course caused by the defendant; but negligent failure to ameliorate the consequences of dyslexia by appropriate teaching may be said to continue the injury, in the same way that the negligent failure to cure or ameliorate a congenital physical condition so that it continues, could give rise to an action for personal injuries. Although as I understand it dyslexia cannot be cured, a dyslexic person can be trained to overcome the difficulties in reading and writing which he experiences."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Hawkes v Howe [2002] EWCA Civ 1136
29 Jul 2002
CA
Mr Justice Sumner, Lord Justice Keene
Land, Limitation
The parties were neighbours. One asserted that the other had trespassed in a building by 2.5 inches. The defendant appealed an award of damages. A garage had been built over the boundary by a previous occupier but by agreement. The new owner replaced the garage. He claimed to have acquired the land by prescription. Held: The judge had failed to make an essential finding on an issue as to the adverse possession, and the matter ought to have been reheard. However the overriding objective required a proportional approach, and a rehearing would prejudice the parties. An order was made reducing the damages, in the hope that this would conclude the matter.
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]

 
 Brazil v Brazil; CA 31-Jul-2002 - Times, 18 October 2002; [2002] EWCA Civ 1135; [2003] CP Rep 7

 
 Bristol and West plc v Bartlett and Another; Paragon Finance plc v Banks; Halifax plc v Grant; CA 31-Jul-2002 - Times, 09 September 2002; Gazette, 03 October 2002; [2002] EWCA Civ 1181; [2003] 1 WLR 284
 
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij (LVM) and others vCommission (Judgment) C-238/99; [2002] EUECJ C-238/99P
15 Oct 2002
ECJ

European, Commercial, Limitation
Europa Appeal - Competition - Polyvinylchloride (PVC) - Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty (now Article 81(1) EC) - Annulment of a Commission decision - New decision - Documents predating the first decision - Res judicata - Principle of non bis in idem - Limitation - Reasonable period - Statement of reasons - Access to the file - Fair hearing - Professional secrecy - Self-incrimination - Private life - Fines.
[ Bailii ]
 
Massey and Another v Boulden and Another Times, 27 November 2002; Gazette, 23 January 2003; [2002] EWCA Civ 1634; [2003] 2 All ER 87; [2003] 1 WLR 1792; [2003] P & CR 355
14 Nov 2002
CA
Simon Brown, Mantell, Sedley LJJ
Land, Limitation
The claimants said they had acquired a right of way by vehicle over land, a village green, having driven over it for more than forty years. It was responded that the act of driving over the land other than on a track had been an unlawful act, and as such could not be the basis for acquiring a right by prescription. Held: Under the 1988 Act, such driving was a criminal offence, even though as a penal statute it must be interpreted restrictively. The common land fell within the statute. However the 2000 Act and 2002 Regulations would now create the right to purchase such a right of way.
Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 68 - Road Traffic Act 1988 34(1) - Vehicular Access Across Common and Other Land (England) Regulations 2002 (2002 No 1711)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Lorna Morrice v Martin Retail Group Limited [2002] ScotCS 298; 2003 SCLR 289
22 Nov 2002
OHCS
Lord Clarke
Scotland, Limitation
An accident occurred on 16 April 1997 and the action was raised on 21 November 2000. The pursuer averred that it would be equitable in the circumstances to allow her to bring the action out of time. The action had not been raised within the triennium because the firm of claim handlers acting on behalf of the pursuer had mistakenly noted on their file that the date of the accident was 16 April 1998. Held: In refusing the claim: "It appears to me that, in a case like the present, where there is an admitted culpable act of negligence by the pursuer's representatives in not raising the action timeously, it is simply insufficient to aver the fact of that negligent act. Frequently where the power conferred by section 19A is prayed in aid by a pursuer, there has been an oversight or omission by those acting for him to raise the action timeously. The court's discretionary power, conferred by section 19A, is to be exercised when it seems to the court that it is equitable to do so. Before the pursuer can succeed in persuading the court to exercise the power he must, in my judgment, set out appropriate facts and circumstances which point to it being equitable, notwithstanding the oversight or omission by those acting on his behalf, that the action should be allowed to proceed. Those facts and circumstances will include, no doubt among other things, the reason for the oversight or omission, how excusable the oversight or omission was, and the prejudice to the pursuer (including the extent of any such prejudice) if the action were not to proceed. It is clear from the authorities, cited by counsel for the defenders, that these factors have to be averred with some degree of specification (and if necessary proved). The section 19A power cannot, in my judgment, be regarded as simply providing an automatic release from the consequences of a pursuer's representative's negligence. In the present case, even after amendment, the pursuer's pleadings, in my opinion, provide no basis which would justify the court being persuaded that, notwithstanding the oversight or omission in this case, it would be equitable for the pursuer to be allowed to bring her action. This is particularly so where it is accepted, as it was, that a refusal to exercise the section 19A power would involve no real prejudice to the pursuer."
1 Citers

[ ScotC ] - [ Bailii ]
 
James and Another v Opanubi [2002] EWCA Civ 1898
29 Nov 2002
CA

Land, Limitation
adverse possession
[ Bailii ]
 
Burke v Ashe Construction Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1913
16 Dec 2002
CA

Limitation
Renewed application for leave to appeal - granted.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Slaven v Greenwood Nursery (A Firm) [2002] EWCA Civ 1970
19 Dec 2002
CA

Personal Injury, Limitation

Limitation Act 1980 33(3)
[ Bailii ]
 
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