swarb.co.uk - law index
These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.
Limitation - From: 1992 To: 1992
This page lists 13 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.
Hancock Shipping Limited v Kowaski Heavy Industries; CA 1992 - [1992] 1 WLR 1025
Hendy v Milton Keynes Health Authority [1992] 3 Med LR 114
1992
Blofeld J
Limitation, Negligence
A potential plaintiff may have sufficient knowledge of the damage suffered to set the limitation period running, if she appreciates 'in general terms' that her problem was capable of being attributed to the operation, even where particular facts of what specifically went wrong or how or where precise error was made is not known to her.
1 Citers
Re Case of Taff Wells Ltd [1992] BCLC 11
1992
HH Judge Baker QC
Limitation, Insolvency
The court considered whether the liquidation of a company stopped time running for insolvency purposes: "One may conclude that the effect of an order to wind up is to convert the contractual rights of the creditors into proprietary rights under a trust. It may still be necessary and appropriate for a creditor to bring an action after the liquidation for the purpose of elucidating his original contractual rights, for which purpose he would have to get leave; but it is not necessary for the purpose of stopping time running against him in relation to his erstwhile contractual rights."
1 Citers
The Jay Bola [1992] 1 QB 907
1992
Hobhouse J
Limitation, Litigation Practice
A writ was issued against defendants "O" who had been owners of the Jay Bola, just prior to the expiry of the one year time bar under the Hague Rules. The judge laid emphasis on the fact that Article 6 III r.6 discharged from all liability unless suit was brought within a year. "O" had in fact sold the ship to "AS", and after the expiry of the time bar, the plaintiffs sought leave to correct the name under Ord.20 r.5(3). Held: Ord.20 r.5 had been in similar terms since 1964, and there were decisions showing that amendments granted under the rule did relate back, but those cases were concerned with "procedural time bars" under the Limitation Acts. Since the passing of the Limitation Act 1980, in particular by section 35, some power to relate back was derived from that section, but only in relation to time limits imposed by the Limitation Acts. The only relation back in respect of an amendment of proceedings to add another party after the limitation proceedings, that was available was that allowed by the rules made to give effect to section 35 of the 1980 Act.
Limitation Act 1980 30
1 Citers
Hartley v Birmingham City District Council; CA 1992 - [1992] 2 All ER 213; [1992] 1 WLR 968
Swansea City Council v Glass [1992] 1 QB 844; [1992] CLY 2828; [1992] 2 All ER 680; [1992] 3 WLR 123
1992
CA
Taylor LJ
Limitation, Housing, Local Government
The defendant had failed himself to reapir his property, and the Local Authority carried out the work itself under the 1957 Act. It sought to recover the associated costs from the defendant, but he said that their claim was time barred, being more than six years after the work had been concluded. The authority argued that it was not more than six years from when it had served the notices demanding payment. Held: The notices were not the cause of action, but only a condition precedent to bringing an action. Accordingly time ran from the conclusion of the works, and the claim was out of time.
Taylor LJ said: "Section 10(4) provides expressly that where the local authority opts to take summary proceedings to recover their expenses, the limitation period runs from the date of service of the demand or, if there is an appeal, the date when the demand becomes operative. Again, by implication, since no such provision is applied to proceedings in the High Court or County Court, time in those proceedings does not run from the date when the demand is served or becomes operative. It will run from the accrual of the cause of action which, ex hypothesi, is a different time.
The rationale of the distinction between summary and other proceedings probably lies in the respective limitation periods. In summary proceedings the period is six months. If time were to run from the accrual of the cause of action, i.e. when the expenses were incurred, summary proceedings might often be statute-barred before they could be brought, especially where there was an appeal against the demand. In other proceedings, however, the limitation period of six years gives, or should give, the local authority ample time to sue even after an appeal against their demand. In my judgment, the expression, special to section 10(4), that time runs from service of the demand or when it becomes operative, is intended to distinguish summary proceedings from other proceedings. Inclusio unius, exclusio alterius. In other proceedings, time runs from the accrual of the cause of action, i.e. when the four elements identified above are complete. Thus, I conclude that the requirement to serve a demand is a procedural condition precedent to bringing proceedings. It is not part of the cause of action.
I am fortified in this view by consideration of what could result if the local authority were right. Upon their argument, the local authority could delay service of a demand indefinitely. Then, having served their demand long after the works were complete, they would have a further six years in which to take proceedings in the High Court or the county court."
Taylor LJ also nted that: ""Although not on all fours with the present case, these decisions show that a cause of action may well accrue before, for procedural reasons, the plaintiff can bring proceedings. Where the cause of action arises from statute, the question as to what is merely procedural and what is an "inherent element" in the cause of action is one of construction." It is a question of construction of the relevant instrument, whether statute, regulations, rules or contract, in each case as to whether there is such a difference.
Housing Act 1957 10(4) - Limitation Act 1980
1 Cites
1 Citers
Stubbings v Webb [1992] QB 197
1992
CA
Personal Injury, Limitation
The claimant sought damages for having been raped. The defendant said the claim was out of time.
Limitation Act 1980 2
1 Citers
Nitrigin Eirann Teoranta v Inco Alloys Ltd Gazette, 22 January 1992; [1992] 1 All ER 854
22 Jan 1992
QBD
Limitation, Damages
Cracking in a pipe which was repaired, was a purely economic loss, and therefore not recoverable. When it subsequently failed causing damage by an explosion from leakage, that was the first recoverable damage and time began to run from that date, and not on the discovery of the original cracks.
Banks v CBS Songs Ltd and Others Gazette, 18 March 1992
18 Mar 1992
CA
Limitation
A plaintiff was not allowed to add a further cause of action which was now time-barred but had not been not at the time of the writ.
Payabi and Another v Armstel Shipping Corporation and Another Gazette, 01 April 1992; [1992] 1 QB 907
1 Apr 1992
QBD
Hobhouse J
Judicial Review, Limitation
A party had been wrongly added in breach of limitation under Hague Convention. There should have been no relation back. Hobhouse J considered the effect of the 1980 Act: "But it is clear that Ord. 20, r. 5 must now be read with the [1980] Act and is implicitly (but inelegantly) giving effect to the first alternative, (a), in section 35(6). The result is that the rule relevant to the present case, Ord 20. r. 5, must be construed as being made under the general power to regulate procedure and under the more specific power given for the purposes of that Act by section 35 of the Act of 1980."
Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Comercial Matters 1965 Cmd 3986 - Limitation Act 1980 35(6)
1 Cites
1 Citers
Re Workvale Ltd (In Liquidation) Gazette, 08 April 1992; [1992] 1 WLR 416
8 Apr 1992
CA
Insolvency, Limitation, Personal Injury
A limited company was correctly restored to the register from dissolution so that its insurers could face an arguable claim. Where a first writ issued within the primary limitation period was ineffective (although not a nullity) through having been issued against a company which had been struck off the register, the Walkley principle does not defeat a second action in limine, despite the defect being curable, by having the company restored to the register.
Limitation Act 1980
1 Cites
1 Citers
Turner v W H Malcolm and Another Gazette, 16 September 1992
16 Sep 1992
CA
Limitation
Action by plaintiff under disability not to be struck out - may be restarted.
Limitation Act 1980 28-1
KM v HM (1992) 96 DLR (4th) 289; [1992] 3 SCR 6; 14 CCLT (2d) 1; AZ-92111111; EYB 1992-67549; JE 92-1644; [1992] SCJ No 85 (QL); 36 ACWS (3d) 466; 57 OAC 321
29 Oct 1992
La Forest, L'Heureux-Dube, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin and Iacobucci JJ
Commonwealth, Limitation, Equity, Trusts
Supreme Court of Canada - Limitation of actions - Torts - Assault and battery - Incest - Woman bringing action against father for damages for incest - Whether or not action limited by Limitations Act - Application of the reasonable discoverability principle - Whether or not incest a separate and distinct tort - Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 240, s. 45(1)(j), 47.
Limitation of actions - Equity - Fiduciary relationship - Parent/child - Woman bringing action against father for incest - Whether incest constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty by a parent - Whether limitation period applicable and whether the defence of laches applies.
Limitation of actions - Fraudulent concealment - Incest - Whether a limitation period in an incest action is postponed by defendant's fraudulent concealment.
1 Citers
[ Canlii ]