swarb.co.uk - law index
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Limitation - From: 1991 To: 1991
This page lists 9 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.
ÂHalford v Brooks [1991] 1 WLR 428
1991
CA
Russell LJ, Lord Donaldson MR, Nourse LJ
Limitation
The defendant had been tried for murder. The plaintiff now sought civil damages. The defendant replied that the case was brought out of time, and now appealed against the court's extension of the time limit on the basis that the plaintiff had not known of the possibility of civil action. Held: It was no reproach to a plaintiff that he has received the wrong legal advice.
Lord Donaldson MR discussed the meaning of 'knowledge' within section 33 as: "The word has to be construed in the context of the purpose of the section, which is to determine a period of time within which a plaintiff can be required to start any proceedings. In this context "knowledge" clearly does not mean "know for certain and beyond possibility of contradiction". It does, however, mean "know with sufficient confidence to justify embarking on the preliminaries to the issue of a writ, such as submitting a claim to the proposed defendant, taking legal and other advice, and collecting evidence". Suspicion, particularly if it is vague and unsupported, will indeed not be enough, but reasonable belief will normally suffice. It is probably only in an exceptional case such as Davis v Ministry of Defence that it will not, because there is some other countervailing factor."
Nourse LJ said that the court must carry out: "one composite exercise in which the material factors are identified and weighed and a balance is then struck"
Limitation Act 1980
1 Citers
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Rath v CS Lawrence and Partners (PJ Cook and Co) (a Firm) (Third Party) [1991] 1 WLR 399
1991
CA
Limitation, Contract
The plaintiff bought the property in 1982, relying on the defendant's survey, which later proved incorrect having failed to identify subsidence. The writ was issued in 1984. Delays before the expiry of the limitation period led the defendant to apply to dismiss the claim for inordinate and inexcusable delay. Held: The plaintiff's appeal against dismissal failed. Once the claim was issued, the plaintiff was under a duty to proceed with reasonable diligence, and delay after issue, and even within the limitation period could justify dismissal.
1 Cites
1 Citers
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The Sardinia Sulcis [1991] 1 Lloyd's R 201
1991
CA
Lloyd LJ
Limitation, Litigation Practice
The power to change a party after the expiry of a limitation period can be exercised where a party has been wrongly identified, but "it was possible to identify the intending claimant or intended defendant by reference to a description which was more or less specific to the particular case".
Civil Procedure Rules 19.5 - Limitation Act 1980 35
1 Citers
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 Mills and Another v Silver and others; CA 1991 - [1991] Ch 271; [1991] 2 WLR 324; [1991] 1 All ER 449; [1990] EWCA Civ 12
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Browne v Perry [1991] WLR 1297
1991
PC
Lord Templeman
Land, Limitation, Evidence
Any acknowledgement of title must be in writing. Lord Templeman explained the rule against relience upon oral acknowledgements in adverse possession cases: "If an oral acknowledgment were allowed to constitute an interruption litigation would be encouraged and litigants would dispute what was said, by whom and to whom . . Once an acknowledgment has been reduced to writing, there is certainty about the words used and the court need only decide whether the words which have been written amount to an acknowledgment. There is no room for fraud, mistake or failure of memory. The written word speaks for itself."
Limitation Act 1980 S1
1 Citers
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Bentley v Bristol and Western Hospital Authority [1991] 2 Med LR 359
1991
Professional Negligence, Limitation
1 Citers
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Halford v Brookes [1991] 1 WLR 428; [1991] 3 All ER 559
1991
CA
Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR
Limitation, Litigation Practice
The plaintiff, the mother and administratrix of the estate of a 16 year old girl, alleged that her daughter had been murdered by one or both of the Defendants. The claim was for damages for battery. Rougier J at first instance had decided that: "where the burden of proof is concerned it is my view that I should adopt the equivalent of the criminal standard . . I have proceeded, as indeed Mr Scrivener invited me to, on the basis that no-one, whether in a criminal or a civil court, should be declared guilty of murder, certainly not such a terrible murder as this, unless the Tribunal were sure that the evidence did not admit of any other sensible conclusion", and went on to hold that he was sure that both Defendants were party to the murder of the deceased. Strictly speaking therefore, his decision as to the standard of proof was not essential to the result, since the Claimant would have succeeded whatever the standard of proof; and indeed was reached on the basis of a concession by leading counsel for the plaintiff. Held: The court discussed the meaning of 'knowledge' for the purposes of the 1980 Act. Held: Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR said: "In this context ‘knowledge’ clearly does not mean ‘know for certain and beyond possibility of contradiction.’ It does, however, mean ‘know with sufficient confidence to justify embarking on the preliminaries to the issue of a writ, such as submitting a claim to the proposed defendant, taking legal and other advice and collecting evidence.’ and 'suspicion, particularly if it is vague and unsupported, will indeed not be enough, but reasonable belief will normally suffice."
Motives above and beyond obtaining damages - which a plaintiff may have in pursuing his claims in battery neither enhance nor damage his case for allowing those claims to proceed.
Limitation Act 1980
1 Citers
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Nash v Eli Lilly and Co [1991] 2 Med LR 182
1991
QBD
Hidden J
Limitation, Negligence
The court discussed the relevance of knowledge obtainable by the plaintiff's solicitor for limitation purposes. Held: Hidden J said "My conclusion is therefore that there is no binding authority on whether facts ascertainable by a plaintiff with the help of legal advice come within or without the terms of S14(3)(b). For my part I doubt whether in most ordinary circumstances they do".
Limitation Act 1989 14(3)(b)
1 Cites
1 Citers
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Andrews v Schooling [1991] 1 WLR 783
1991
CA
Balcombe LJ
Construction, Limitation
The plaintiff owned a 199 year lease of premises and sought compensation under the Act damp from the cellar. The defence said the development had not included work done on the cellar and therefore section 1 did not apply. Held: The defence failed. If the owner of a plot of land instructs a builder to erect a dwelling house but he fails to include a damp course, leaving the house, not fit for human habitation. Parliament could not have intended that the builder would be free from any duty under section 1(1). The exception (and the exception to the exception) under subsection (2) would serve no purpose. Subsection (4) was conclusive in favour of the construction that includes nonfeasance within the scope of the duty. If a developer who is professionally qualified, e.g. an architect or surveyor, instructs a builder to erect a dwelling house or to convert an existing house into a number of separate dwellings. His instructions are detailed, but make no provision for inclusion of a damp course, which is necessary if the dwelling is to be fit for habitation when completed. The builder will be exempt under subsection (2). But the developer, who will not have physically done any work, is to be treated under subsection (4) as a person who has taken on the work. There was no difference between acts of commission and of omission.
Defective Premises Act 1972 1
1 Citers
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