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Limitation - From: 1960 To: 1969

This page lists 34 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Cottrell v Price [1960] 1 WLR 1097
1960

Buckley J
Insolvency, Limitation
The rights of a secured creditor against his security were held to be rights "outside the bankruptcy". As to the case of Benzon: "The importance of that case and of the way in which the doctrine is stated in the judgment of the Court is that it makes it clear that it is only "in the bankruptcy" that the statute ceases to operate. It does not have any effect on the operation of the statute on any rights or remedies which are unaffected by the bankruptcy."
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1 Citers


 
Watson v Fram Reinforced Concrete Co (Scotland) Ltd 1960 SC 92; 1960 SC (HL) 92
1960
HL
Lord Reid, Lord Keith of Avonholm, Lord Denning
Scotland, Negligence, Limitation
A workman had been injured through the breaking of a defective part in the machine with which he was working. He brought an action of damages against his employers, and later convened as second defenders the manufacturers of the machine, who had supplied it to his employers, on averments that the accident had been caused by the fault of the manufacturers in that they failed to supply his employers with a machine which was safe for use by their servants. The machine had been supplied on 7 July 1955 and the accident had happened on 9 August 1956, but the manufacturers were not convened in the action until 25 March 1959. Held: The three-year limitation period provided by section 6(1)(a) of the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions &c.) Act 1954 ran from the date when the workman suffered the injury and that, accordingly, the action against the manufacturers was not time-barred. "a cause of action accrues as soon as a wrongful act has caused personal injury beyond what can be regarded as negligible."
Lord Reid said: 'The ground of any action based on negligence is a concurrence of duty and damage and I cannot see how there can be that concurrence unless the duty still exists and is breached when the damage occurs.' and "It appears to me that default in the sense of breach of duty must persist after the act or neglect until the damage is suffered. The ground of any action based on negligence is the concurrence of breach of duty and damage, and I cannot see how there can be that concurrence unless the duty still exists and is breached when the damage occurs. Suppose that the damage occurred a year or two years after the manufacture and sale of the article: then undoubtedly the injured person can sue. But how could he sue if the manufacturer could say that his default had ceased a year before the injured person ever came near the dangerous article? Whatever be the true view with regard to the act or neglect, I think that the appellant is entitled to say that the respondents' 'default giving rise to the action' existed at the time when he suffered his injuries."
Lord Keith of Avonholm said: "Now this is a Donoghue v Stevenson type of case, and such a case undoubtedly introduces specialities into the law of negligence. But, on any view, I see difficulty in saying that there was negligence at the date of supply. At that date on the pursuer's pleadings there was no reason why the manufacturers should have known of the dangerous state of the strut. It can hardly be expected that they had a legal duty to take it to pieces and inspect it before sending it out. Undoubtedly there was an act of carelessness on the part of some workman when the pin was welded to the strut and the manufacturers would be vicariously responsible for that carelessness. But can it be said that at either date there was an act of negligence in the legal sense? The manufacturers owed a duty to anyone who should handle the machine to take reasonable steps to see that it was safe. They owed a duty not to injure, but until someone was injured there was no breach of duty. Only then could it be said that an act of negligence had been committed. That, I think, necessarily follows from the judgment of this House in Donoghue v Stevenson." and "Applying the ratio of these decisions there was, in my opinion, no act, neglect or default within the meaning of the statute affecting the pursuer until he was injured. A fortiori there was no act, neglect or default giving rise to his action before that date. It was then for the first time that there arose a breach of duty which made its impact on the pursuer. Time, in my opinion, commenced to run against the pursuer under the statute from that date."
Lord Denning said: "I think the true principle is contained simply in this: 'You must not injure your neighbour by your fault.' It is the doing of damage to him which, in my opinion, is the breach of duty giving rise to the action. It is no doubt correct to say, as Lord MacMillan did say (at p.71), that the manufacturer 'is under a duty to take care in the manufacture of these articles.' That is a duty which he owes to all those who may have occasion to use the article: and it is a duty which is broken at the time when he is negligent in making the article. But it is not a breach of duty to any particular individual. And it is not that breach of duty which gives rise to the action. There is another duty also to be considered: and that is the duty which Lord Atkin put in this wise (at p.44): 'You must not injure your neighbour': which I would expand so as to say that there is a duty on every man not to injure his neighbour by his want of reasonable care. This is a duty which he owes, not to the world at large, but to his neighbour. It is broken only when his neighbour is injured and not before. Then, and then only, is there a breach of duty giving rise to an action." and . . "The words 'act, neglect or default' are perhaps a little tautologous: for 'act' in legal terminology often includes an omission as well as an act of commission: and 'default' certainly includes 'neglect'. But tautologous as they may be, the words are apt to cover all breaches of legal duty, no matter whether it be by leaving undone those things which we ought to have done, or by doing those things which we ought not to have done."
Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act 1954 6(1)(a)
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Cotterill v Price [1960] 1 WLR 1907
1960


Insolvency, Limitation
A statute-barred debt cannot be proved in bankruptcy.
1 Citers


 
Davies v Elsby Brothers Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 170
1961
CA

Litigation Practice, Limitation
The writ was issued within the limitation period for the claim against "Elsby Brothers (a firm)". In fact, the firm's business had been taken over by Elsby Brothers Ltd before the proceedings had been issued. By the time the plaintiff applied for leave to amend the writ to change the name of the defendant, the limitation period had expired. Held: The amendment involved the addition of a new defendant, and was not merely the correction of a misnomer. Accordingly, following long established rule of practice the court held that the amendment should not be allowed.
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Marren v Dawson Bentley and Co Ltd [1961] 2 All ER 270; [1961] 2 QB 135
1961

Havers J
Limitation
Compensation was sought for injuries received in the course of employment. Held: The limitation period was to be calculated to have started on the day after the occurrence which founded the claim, the day itself being excluded from the calculation.
Limitation Act 1939 2(1)
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Glamorgan County Council v Carter [1963] 1 WLR 1; [1962] CLY 3002
1962
QBD
Salmon J
Land, Limitation
A caravan owner appealed against an enforcement notice on the basis that no planning permission was required because the parking of caravans was the purpose for which the land had been last used. Held: Factually that was correct. Prima facie it afforded a statutory defence. But the user amounted to a criminal or quasi criminal offence and, therefore, it could not be relied upon. It is plain on principle that a plaintiff could not acquire any legal right or easement by the illegal user to which she was putting the land. Salmon LJ said: "It seems to me plain on principle that Mrs James could not acquire any legal right by the illegal use to which she was putting the land."
Town and Country Planning Act 1947 12(5)(c)
1 Citers


 
Cartledge v E Jopling and Sons Ltd [1962] 1 QB 189
1962
CA
Pearson LJ
Personal Injury, Limitation
The court gave guidance on when an injury passes from being de minimis to being sufficiently significant to found a cause of action: "there is from the beginning some injury occurring from day to day, as each of the minute particles which enter the lung tissue causes some microscopic injury and permanent scarring, but a reasonable application of the de minimis rule postpones the first damage for legal purposes to the point at which the accumulated scarring is sufficient to diminish appreciably the elasticity of the lungs and deprive them of much of their reserve capacity; that point is not likely to be reached for several years, and may not be reached for many years, but when it is reached there is the damage completing the cause of action . . "
1 Citers


 
Cartledge v E Jopling and Sons Ltd [1963] AC 758; [1963] 1 All ER 341
1963
HL
Lord Reid, Lord Evershed MR, Lord Pearce
Limitation, Personal Injury
The plaintiffs were steel dressers who, in the course of their employment, had inhaled quantities of noxious dust which had caused them to suffer from pneumoconiosis. They issued proceedings on 1 October 1956 but were unable to show any breach of duty by their employers which contributed to their condition after 1 October 1950. The defendants pleaded that the claims were barred by the six year limitation period under section 2 of the 1939 Act. Held: Lord Reid made it clear that he would have wished to hold "that a cause of action ought not to be held to accrue until either the injured person has discovered the injury or it would be possible for him to discover it if he took such steps as were reasonable in the circumstances". But the House unanimously held that the 1939 Act and established authority precluded it from so holding. Where a defendant sought to rely upon some damage as setting the limitation clock running, the damage referred to must be ‘real’ as distinct from minimal. The common law ought never to produce a wholly unreasonable result.
Lord Pearce said: "It is for a judge or jury to decide whether a man has suffered any actionable harm and in borderline cases it is a question of degree.
It is a question of fact in each case whether a man has suffered material damage by any physical changes in his body. Evidence that those changes are not felt by him and may never be felt tells in favour of the damage coming within the principle of de minimis non curat lex. On the other hand evidence that in unusual exertion or at the onslaught of disease he may suffer from his hidden impairment tells in favour of the damage being substantial." and "The cause of action accrued when it reached a stage, whether known or unknown, at which a judge could properly give damages for the harm that had been done."
Lord Reid: "If this were a matter governed by the common law I would hold that a cause of action ought not to be held to accrue until either the injured person has discovered the injury or it would be possible for him to discover it if he took such steps as were reasonable in the circumstances. The common law ought never to produce a wholly unreasonable result … But the present question depends on statute, the Limitation Act, 1939, and section 26 of that Act appears to me to make it impossible to reach the result which I have indicated."
Limitation Act 1939 2
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Edgington v Clark [1963] 1 QB 367
1963

Upjohn LJ
Limitation, Land
All that is required to constitute an acknowledgement so as to defeat a claim under limitation, is that, as between himself and the paper title owner, the person in possession acknowledges that the paper title owner has the better title to the land. Whether or not a particular writing amounts to an acknowledgement depends on the true construction of the document in all the surrounding circumstances. It is not possible to lay down any more general rule than that. Upjohn LJ said: "Whether or not a particular writing amounts to an acknowledgment must depend on the true construction of the document in all the surrounding circumstances."
Limitation Act 1980 30
1 Citers


 
Good v Parry [1963] 2 QB 418
1963
CA
Lord Denning MR, Danckwerts LJ, Davies LJ
Limitation, Contract
A letter discussed first the writer's proposed purchase of the house (offering £1,350 subject to contract), and continued: "The question of outstanding rent can be settled as a separate agreement as soon as you present your account." Held: The letter did not to constitute an acknowledgment of the landlord's claim for rent.
Lord Denning MR said that the sentence meant "there may be some rent outstanding and it can be made the subject of an agreement as soon as you present your account" and concluded: "Such being the meaning of it, I am quite satisfied there is no acknowledgment, because there is no admission of any rent of a defined amount due, or of any amount that can be ascertained by calculation. The amount is uncertain altogether. Nor can I regard it as a promise to pay whatever amount may be found due on taking an account. The tenant clearly reserves the right to examine it and not to be bound except by separate agreement."
Davies LJ thought that "the letter did not acknowledge the claim; it only acknowledged that there might be a claim."
Danckwerts LJ regarded the letter as "merely . . . an admission that there may be some possible justified claim but no admission that there is such a debt in fact."
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 St Marylebone Property Co Ltd v Fairweather; HL 1963 - [1963] AC 510; [1962] UKHL 1; [1962] 2 WLR 1020; [1962] 2 All ER 288

 
 Central Electricity Generating Board v Halifax Corporation; HL 1963 - [1963] AC 785
 
Kruber v Grzesiak [1963] VR 621
1963

Adams J
Commonwealth, Limitation, Torts - Other
The plaintiff had issued a writ claiming damages for personal injuries caused by negligent driving more than three years after the accident, and now wanted to amend the writ by adding a claim for trespass to the person based on the same facts. The court asked whether the applicable limitation Act covered an allegation of unintentional trespass to the person. Held: Adams J said: "I would see no sufficient reason for excluding an action for trespass to the person] from the description of an action for damages for breach of duty, especially when it is provided that the duty may be one existing independently of any contract or any provision made by or under a statute. After all, do not all torts arise from breach of duty - the tort of trespass to the person arising from the breach of a general duty not to inflict direct and immediate injury to the person of another either intentionally or negligently in the absence of lawful excuse? The substance of the matter appears to be that section 5(6) is intended to provide a special limitation period of three years for actions in which damages for personal injuries are claimed. No doubt, as was pointed out in argument, this intention might have been achieved by the use of other and perhaps simpler and more direct language, but that does not seem to be a sufficient reason for not giving to the language chosen its full meaning."
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 Re Pauling's Settlement Trusts (No.1); CA 29-May-1963 - [1963] EWCA Civ 5; [1964] Ch 303; [1963] 3 All ER 1; [1963] 3 WLR 742
 
Edginton v Clark [1964] 1 QB 367
1964
CA
Upjohn LJ
Land, Limitation
An offer to purchase the paper owner's interest, even if made "subject to contract", can be a sufficient acknowledgement of his title to defeat a claim for adverse possession. Upjohn LJ said: "If a man makes an offer to purchase freehold property, even though the offer be subject to contract, he is quite clearly saying that as between himself and the person to whom he makes the offer he realises that the latter has the better title, and that would seem to be the plainest possible form of acknowledgment." However, "it is not possible to lay down any general rule as to what constitutes an acknowledgment". Whether any particular form of words amounts to an acknowledgement depends on the true construction of the document in all the surrounding circumstances.
1 Citers


 
Kapeller v Rondalia Versekeringskorporasie van Suid-Afrika Bpk 1964 (4) SA 722 (T)
1964


Litigation Practice, Commonwealth, Limitation
(South Africa) A clear admission by an insurer of liability in the course of without prejudice negotiations about quantum was sufficient to restart the limitation period.
1 Citers


 
Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232; [1964] EWCA Civ 5; [1964] 2 Lloyd's Rep 339; [1964] 2 All ER 929; [1964] 3 WLR 573
15 Jun 1964
CA
Diplock LJ, Lord Denning MR, Danckwerts LJ
Torts - Other, Limitation
The plaintiff, injured in an accident, pleaded trespass to the person, which was not a breach of duty within the proviso to the section, in order to achieve the advantages of a six-year limitation period. Held: Trespass is strictly speaking not a cause of action but a form of action. It was the form anciently used for a variety of different kinds of claim which had as their common element the fact that the damage was caused directly rather than indirectly; if the damage was indirect, the appropriate form of action was the action on the case. A negligent trespass to the person could only be pursued in negligence and not in trespass. A cause of action was defined: "a cause of action is simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person." (Diplock LJ)
Lord Denning MR said that the cause of action of trespass to the person was limited to intended acts, and that when the act was not intended the plaintiff's cause of action lay in negligence. He referred to the Tucker report which parliament had not adopted: "In this very case, Parliament did not reduce the period to two years. It made it three years. It did not make any exception of 'trespass to the person' or the rest. It used words of general import; and it is those words we have to construe, without reference to the words of the Committee." "Breach of duty" in the section meant any breach of duty: "Our whole law of tort today proceeds on the footing that there is a duty owed by every man not to injure his neighbour in a way forbidden by law. Negligence is a breach of such a duty. So is nuisance. So is trespass to the person. So is false imprisonment, malicious prosecution or defamation of character."
Diplock LJ said that the cause of action in trespass included both intended and unintended acts. The expression "breach of duty" in section 2 of the 1939 Act, as amended, included both intended and unintended trespass. "A cause of action is simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person."
Personal Injuries (Emergency Provisions) Act 19392
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[ Hamlyn ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Dungate v Dungate [1965] 1 WLR 1477
1965
CA
Diplock LJ
Limitation, Contract
A claim was made against the widow and administratrix of the deceased's estate by his surviving brother. The widow wrote to the creditor: "Keep a check on totals and amounts I owe you and we will have account now and then….Sorry I cannot do you a cheque yet. Terribly short at the moment" The court was asked whether this operated as an admission to extend the limitation period. Held: An acknowledgment will be sufficient if the amount for which the debtor accepts legal liability can be ascertained by extrinsic evidence.
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Harkness v Bell's Asbestos and Engineering Limited [1967] 2 QB 729; [1966] 3 All ER 843
1966
CA
Lord Denning MR, Diplock LJ, Russell LJ
Litigation Practice, Limitation
The plaintiff's solicitors had applied to a district registrar for leave of the court for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1963 when they ought to have made the application to a judge in chambers. The district registrar ordered that Section 2(1) of the Limitation Act 1939 should not afford a defence to the proposed action for damages, and a writ was duly issued. A judge in chambers held that this order was a nullity, and made no order. A different judge in chambers dismissed an application to rectify the order and have it treated as valid. Held: The appeal succeeded. The court considered the different ways in which objection could be taken to proceedings according to whether the source of the objection was that it was a nullity or an irregularity.
Diplock LJ said: "Thomas William Harkness, retired boiler-lagger, if he had followed, as I have no doubt he has, the intricacies of the interlocutory proceedings in the case, must have thought that `the law is an ass'. I am not sure that this judgment will change his opinion, but at any rate he will not feel it is such an unjust ass as he must have felt before. It was to remedy just this kind of injustice that the new RSC Ord 2 r 1 was made."
Lord Denning MR said that the new rule should be construed widely and generously to give effect to its manifest intentions: "This new rule does away with the old distinction between nullities and irregularities. Every omission or mistake in practice or procedure is henceforward to be regarded as an irregularity which the court can and should rectify so long as it can do so without injustice. It can at last be asserted that 'it is not possible for an honest litigant in Her Majesty's Supreme Court to be defeated by any mere technicality, any slip, any mistaken step in his litigation.'"
and "I think that any application to the court, however informal, is a 'proceeding'. There were 'proceedings' in being at the very moment that the plaintiff made his affidavit and his solicitor lodged it with the court."
Rules of the Supreme Court Ord2 R2 - Limitation Act 1963 2(1)
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Hodgson v Armstrong [1967] 1 All ER 307; [1967] 2 QB 299
1967
CA
Sellers, Davies LJJ
Limitation, Landlord and Tenant
Sellers LJ considered the application of court rules requiring notices to be given within a certain number of days: "Does the court need in each statute requiring notices to be given to a court - of which there are so many - an express stipulation about days when a court to which an application or notice is to be made or given is closed, or can it not be be said that the courts are able and are intended to administer the provisions strictly but with regard to te functioning and avaiability of the court?' and "It is said that the application could have been meade some days before. That is true, but that would have deprived te tenant of some part of the time which the statute has prescribed. I cannot find any such differentiation between one tenant and another or between one lease and another depending on te hdifferentces of their date in relation to te time of th efnctioning of the appropriate court. In my view th eproper construction of the statute requires that all tenants and all leases should be placed on the same basis as to time.
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West Bank Estates Ltd v Arthur [1967] AC 665
1967
PC
Lord Wilberforce
Land, Limitation
(From Federal Supreme Court of the West Indies) A claim was made for possessory title to a strip of land, based upon acts of cultivation, the cutting of timber, wood and grass, fishing and growing rice. The trial judge disallowed the claim to a possessory title. The Federal Supreme Court reversed him. They took the view that the respondents had made what was, for persons of their means and class, normal user of the land. Held: The precise nature of the acts and rights required to amount to possession varies with the nature of the land and all the circumstances. Lord Wilberforce said: "The learned judge . . applied his mind correctly to the question whether the respondents had proved ‘sole and undisturbed possession user and enjoyment’ of the disputed strip. As the Federal Supreme Court itself stated, these words convey the same meaning as possession to the exclusion of the true owner. The learned judge gave recognition to the fact that what constitutes possession, adequate to establish a prescriptive claim, may depend upon the physical characteristics of the land. On the other hand, he was, in their Lordships’ view, correct in regarding such acts as cutting timber and grass from time to time as not sufficient to prove the sole possession which is required . . The respondents had, in [the view of the Federal Supreme Court], proved that they had made what was for persons of their means and class normal user of the land . . This does not appear to be a correct approach to the evidence. Admitting the utility of the respondents’ operations, and that they did what was normal for small peasant farmers, this still does not establish a sufficient degree of sole possession and user to satisfy the Ordinance, or carry the matter beyond a user which remains consistent with the possession of the true owner."
1 Citers


 
Firma E Kampffmeyer and others v Commission of the EEC (Judgment) C-5/66
14 Jul 1967
ECJ

European, Limitation
Europa 1. Procedure - proceedings in matters arising from non-contractual liability - period for bringing proceedings - limitation (statute of the court of justice of the EEC, article 43) 2. Procedure - proceedings in matters arising from non-contractual liability for reparation for the same damage brought both against the EEC and a member state - necessity for a decision of the national court before a decision by the court of justice 3. Non-contractual liability - damage resulting from an act illegal under community law and the law of a member state - existence of a right to reparation against the EEC dependent upon proof of the prior exhaustion of all methods of recourse under national law (EEC treaty, article 215) 4. Non-contractual liability - injury suffered owing to the reliance of a person subject to the jurisdiction of the EEC on the apparent legality of an administrative act held to be illegal - compensation (EEC treaty, article 215) 5. Non-contractual liability - injury resulting from loss of profit - necessity for the performance of the transaction envisaged to have been at least commenced (EEC treaty, article 215) 6. Agriculture - common organization of the markets - cereals - protective measures taken by member states - examination by the commission (regulation no 19, article 22) 7. Agriculture - common organization of the markets - cereals - regulation no 19 - sphere of application - general interests concerned - possibility of protection of individual interests 1. It follows from the actual wording of the second and third sentences of article 43 of the statute of the court of justice of the EEC that these provisions are not intended to shorten the period of limitation of five years but that they are intended to protect those concerned by preventing certain periods from being taken into account in the calculation of the said period. Consequently the aim of the third sentence of article 43 is merely to postpone the expiration of the period of five years when proceedings instituted or a prior application made within this period start time to run in respect of the periods provided for in articles 173 or 175. 2. If, for the purposes of obtaining compensation for the same damage, two actions are brought, one against a member state before a national court and one against the EEC before the court of justice, it is necessary to avoid the applicant's being insufficiently or excessively compensated because of the different assessment of two different courts applying different rules of law. For that reason the final judgment of the court cannot be given before the decision of the national court on the matter. 3. When there is damage resulting from an act illegal according to community law and the law of a member state, it is appropriate to ask the applicant to prove that he has exhausted all methods of recourse, both administrative and judicial, under the national law applicable for obtaining repayment of sums improperly paid. Only after production of such proof is it appropriate to consider whether any damage exists which the community should make good. 4. Damage suffered by a person subject to the jurisdiction of the EEC by reason of the fact that he has relied on the legality of an unlawful administrative act must be made good. 5. Compensation for loss of profit following a wrongful act or omission presupposes that the performance of the commercial transaction in question has at least been commenced. 6. In exercising the powers conferred upon it by article 22 of regulation no 19, the commission is required in respect of each protective measure notified to it to conduct as exhaustive an examination as that required to be made by the member states and bears independent responsibility for the retention of protective measures. 7. Even though in essence they refer to interests of a general nature, the provisions of regulation no 19 may also ensure the protection of individual interests such as those of the producers of member states and of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the EEC participating in intra-community trade.

 
Long v Hepworth [1968] 1 WLR 1299
1968

Cooke J
Limitation

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 Paradise Beach and Transportation Co Ltd v Price-Robinson; PC 1968 - [1968] AC 1072; [1968] UKPC 1; [1968] 2 WLR 873; [1968] 1 All ER 530
 
Fowley Marine (Emsworth) Ltd v Gafford [1968] 2 QB 618
1968


Land, Limitation
A paper title owner of land is deemed to be in possession of the fee simple unless and until someone else acquires possession of it
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Brown v North British Steel Foundry Ltd 1968 SC 51
1968
OHCS
Lord President Clyde
Scotland, Personal Injury, Limitation
The 1954 Act passed on 4 June 1954 but was not to affect any action or proceeding if the cause of action arose before that date. The Lord Ordinary found that the pursuer who sought damages for pneumoconiosis did not begin to suffer from until 1955. But the pursuer contended that the injury had been done to his lungs by 1949 because he had been inhaling dangerous dust for some years before that and, as subsequent events showed, he was susceptible to pneumoconiosis in 1949. So the cause of action had arisen at that date. The First Division of the Court of Session rejected that argument. Held: Lord President Clyde said that there was no cause of action in 1949 and added: "To create a cause of action, injuria and damnum are essential ingredients. In the present case there is no evidence of any injuries to the workman's lungs in 1949. He had then merely a deposit of dust in his lungs, which might or might not subsequently create an injury. But, in addition, he had then sustained no damnum. He could not then have been awarded damages for any loss, because at that stage he had sustained no loss of wages and had suffered none of the discomforts and disabilities which, he avers, followed upon the onset of pneumoconiosis and which in fact flowed from the outbreak of that disease in 1955."
Law Reform (Limitation of Actions etc) Act 1954
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Hayward v Chaloner [1968] 1 QB 107
1968
CA
Russell LJ
Landlord and Tenant, Limitation
The alleged tenant (the rector of a parish) knew that rent should have been paid but had not paid it. "Only one of the previous rectors gave evidence. He was the Rev. Richard Phillips (dates) He knew the rectory cottages and said that the land behind the cottages was used by the occupants, including the land in dispute. He added that the land was sadly neglected and an old couple lived there. He never paid any rent for it. Mr and Mrs Hayward were prominent supporters of the church. He said that he would not expect them to ask him for the 10s. per annum rent." Held: A corporation sole may acquire land by adverse possession. Russell LJ said "Nor do I doubt the applicability of section 9 (2) to the present case," and
"just because the freeholders were content that the rector should not pay his rent and did not bother to ask for it for all those years. In Moses v Lovegrove in this court it was assumed on all hands that when section 9 apparently operates, adverse possession starts: see especially Lord Evershed, and Romer LJ. The principle clearly accepted was that once the period covered by the last payment of rent expired, the tenant ceased to be regarded by the Limitation Acts as the tenant. This case was not cited to the county court judge. A similar assumption was made in Nicholson v England, under the then existing principles which section 10 (1) was designed to embody. Textbooks to the same effect include Cheshire's Modern Law of Real property, 9th ed. (1962), pp. 797, 798: Megarry & Wade's Textbook of the Law of Real Property, 3rd ed. (1966), p. 1010: and Preston & Newsom on Limitation of Actions, 3rd ed. (1953), p.89. I am not aware that the contrary view has been anywhere expressed."
Limitation Act 1939
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Bligh v Martin [1968] 1 All ER 1157; [1968] 1 WLR 804
1968
ChD
Pennycuick J
Land, Limitation
The paper owner of the disputed land had grazed cattle on it in winter, and denied that the defendant claiming adverse possession had been in continuous occupation. Held: Even though the adverse possessor had received rent from the real owner, who had been then unaware of his ownership and became the tenant of the land, the adverse possessor could still successfully claim the land: "Both counsel pointed out that where land is subject to a tenancy, the landlord and the tenant have each, in correct legal parlance, possession of the land, though in different senses . . It seems to me that for the purpose of adverse possession of freehold land under the Limitation Act, 1939, the land should be regarded as in the possession of one or other of the two parties concerned, i.e. the landlord or the tenant; and it seems to me that subsection (3) designates the landlord as the relevant party for this purpose. On that footing, it follows that the plaintiff, having been in receipt of rent during this summer period, remained throughout the period in adverse possession of the land".
With an intention to control the land, the adverse possessor actually believing himself or herself to be the true owner, is quite sufficient. Pennycuick J said: "It would, I think, be quite wrong to regard the owner of arable farmland as having been dispossessed of that land because during certain winter months he personally makes no use of it and some other person puts cattle upon it."
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Hughes v Griffin and Another [1969) 1 WLR 23
1969
CA
Harman LJ, Russell LJ
Land, Limitation
Possession of land is never adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title.
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Chatsworth Investments Ltd v Cussins (Contractors) Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1
1969
CA
Lord Denning MR
Limitation, Litigation Practice

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Newton v Cammell Laird and Co (Shipbuilders and Engineers) Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 415
1969
CA
Lord Denning MR, Widgery LJ
Personal Injury, Limitation
The court considered when the limitation period in a personal injury claim would start to run, where the plaintiff might be unaware of the damage: "You have to ask yourself: At what date was it reasonable for him - for the sick man himself - to have taken advice and found out that his illness was due to his employer's negligence or breach of duty. You do not ask: At what date would a reasonable person have taken advice. You ask: At what date was it reasonable for this man to take it? In other words, at what date ought he to have taken advice and found out that he had a worthwhile action?" Widgery LJ: "When one has to consider constructive notice under section 7(5)(c) it is necessary to look at all the circumstances of the particular individual concerned to see whether, when all those circumstances are looked at in the round, it can be said that his failure to take advice was reasonable."
Limitation Act 1963 7(5)(c)
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Braniff v Holland and Hannen and Cubitts (Southern) Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1533
1969
CA
Widgery LJ
Limitation, Litigation Practice
Widgery LJ said: "Again, I think that it would only complicate matters if I attempted to deal with the facts, but one thing is perfectly clear, namely, that in the view of Megaw J. the fact that in certain cases under Order 20 rule 5, amendments were to be permitted although the statutory period had run did not mean that in general there was any relaxation of the principle formerly applying under Weldon v. Neal(4); I respectfully agree with that approach. I find it very difficult to think that, when specific exemption is made in paragraphs (3),(4) and (5) of Order 20 rule 5 in cases where the statute has run, it is then legitimate to interpret the rule as making similar provision available and similar excuses available in cases which are not within the precise terms of those three paragraphs."
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Ocean Estates Ltd v Pinder [1969] 2 AC 19
1969
HL
Lord Diplock
Land, Limitation
The court asked whether the sufficiency of adverse possession might be qualified either by the intentions of the paper owner or the squatter's willingness to pay for their occupation if asked. Lord Diplock: "Where questions of title to land arise in litigation the court is concerned only with the relative strengths of the titles proved by the rival claimants. If party A can prove a better title than party B he is entitled to succeed notwithstanding that C may have a better title than A, if C is neither a party to the action nor a person by whose authority B is in possession or occupation of the land."
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Re Flynn (no 2) [1969] 1 Ch 403
1969


Limitation
An acknowledgement of title to restart a limitation period must be precisely focused on a disputed right.
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