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Limitation - From: 1930 To: 1959

This page lists 33 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Taylor v Twinberrow [1930] 2 KB 16
1930

Scrutton LJ
Landlord and Tenant, Limitation
It was a misunderstanding of the legal effect of 12 years adverse possession under the Limitation Acts to treat it as if it gave a title: "the operation of the statute in giving a title is merely negative; it extinguishes the right and title of the dispossessed owner, and leaves the occupant with a title gained by the fact of possession and resting on the infirmity of the right of others to eject him."
1 Citers


 
Mabro v Eagle, Star and British Dominions Insurance Co Ltd [1932] 1 KB 485
1932
CA
Scrutton LJ
Litigation Practice, Limitation
Scrutton LJ said: "In my experience the Court has always refused to allow a party or a cause of action to be added where, if it were allowed, the defence of the Statute of Limitations would be defeated. The Court has never treated it as just to deprive a defendant of a legal defence."
1 Citers


 
Firm Bisham Chand, Through Lala Sri Ram v Seth Girdhari Lal and Another [1934] UKPC 28
14 May 1934
PC
Lord Blanesburgh, Lord Wright, Sie Lancelot Sanderson
Commonwealth, Limitation, Banking
Allahabad
[ Bailii ]
 
George Legge and Son Ltd v Wenlock Corporation [1938] AC 204
1938
HL
Lord Maugham, Lord Macmillan, Lord Atkin, Lord Roche
Land, Limitation
The question was whether the status of a natural stream could be changed to that of a sewer by the unlawful discharge for a long period of sewage into the stream. The claimant asserted that a right by way of an easement could be acquired despite the fact that that act involved continued polluting of a river. Held: There is no case in the books in which repeated violation of the express terms of a modern statute passed in the public interest has been held to confer rights on the wrongdoer. Such a contention would be quite untenable. "it is sought to prove that what was in law a protected stream has become in law an unprotected sewer simply by reason of infringements of the law designed for its protection. Now that is what your Lordships' House in effect held in the Airdrie case to be a legal impossibility."
Lord MacMillan said that a water channel may be a sewer though it may carry no sewage and its contents consist solely of innocuous surface drainage. Since any natural stream or watercourse which is still open will almost always contain some surface water, at any rate in or after wet weather, the fact that a flow of water does contain such surface water cannot show that it is a sewer, and cannot transform what was once a watercourse into a sewer.
River Pollution Prevention Act 1876
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Pratt v Cook, Son and Co (St Paul's) Ltd [1940] AC 437
1940
HL
Lord Atkin
Limitation

1 Citers


 
Leivers v Barber Walker and Co Ltd [1943] KB 385
1943
CA
Goddard LJ
Limitation
Goddard LJ (dissenting) said that section 2(1)(d) of the 1939 Act changed the former position altogether, leaving the provision for limitation as regards specialties to apply only to deeds and other documents under seal (or to claims other than for the recovery of money).
Limitation Act 1939 2(1)(d)
1 Citers


 
Ingall v Moran [1944] KB 160
1944
CA
Scott LJ
Limitation, Litigation Practice
The plaintiff had issued a writ in 1942 as administrator of his deceased son’s estate. However, he did not take out letters of administration until the November. It was said that proceedings instituted by an applicant who at the time had no standing to institute those proceedings were an incurable nullity. The limitation period had by then expired. Held. The grant did not date back to the date of death, and it was too late to issue fresh proceedings or to amend.
Scott LJ said: "The cause of action arose, and was vested in the deceased lad, at the moment when he was injured, and the measure of his damages included fair compensation for such loss of expectation of life as was caused to him by the defendant's tort. That chose in action was his. To it the common law maxim "Actio personalis moritur cum persona" would have applied on his death but for the Act of 1934 which caused it to survive. If he had left a will, it would at the moment of his death automatically have vested in his executor. As he died intestate, it vested in the President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, and remained in him until letters of administration were issued. Then - and not before - it would automatically pass from the President to the administrator. As the writ was issued on September 17, 1942, and there was no grant till November, it follows, necessarily, that at the time of writ issued the plaintiff had no shadow of title to his son's surviving chose in action, in respect of which he purported to issue a writ, falsely (although no doubt quite innocently) alleging that he issued it as administrator. It purported to launch a representative action under Or. III, r. 4 - an action in which he confessed, first, that he was not suing in his own right, and, secondly, that he had no right in that action to prosecute any claim except in his representative capacity. The defendant could have demanded production of the non-existent letters of administration, and on the plaintiff's failure to produce them the action would, on the defendant's application, automatically have been struck out. Such an action was, in my opinion, incapable of conversion by amendment into a valid action - just as much so as if he had issued a personal writ claiming to be lawfully possessed of the estate of the deceased and had subsequently asked leave to amend by substituting a representative claim. It is true that when he got his title by the grant of administration he prima facie became entitled to sue, and could then have issued a new writ, but that was all. An application by him to treat the original writ of September 17 as retrospectively valid from that date would have been refused by the court, not only because it might prejudice existing rights of defence, but because it would not be permissible under the Rules of the Supreme Court or the Judicature Acts. The old writ was, in truth, incurably a nullity. It was born dead and could not be revived. If that conclusion is right it follows equally that the statement of claim was not delivered in any action recognized by the Rules of the Supreme Court, and all subsequent proceedings in the supposed action, including the judgment of the learned county court judge, were likewise nugatory, for, if the action and the pleadings were bad, there was no valid action before the learned judge to try and it is our duty to say so."
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934
1 Citers


 
Phillips v Rogers [1945] 2 WWR 53
1945


Commonwealth, Limitation, Contract
The creditor argued that the limitation period was extended anew when the debtor wrote: "Re your correspondence re Mr C H Phillips claim $1300 which he is prepared to settle November 1st for $700. Please thank Mr Phillips for the kind offer. I have no idea where I am going to get $700 and meet your demands by November 1st unless I rob a bank and I really don't think a case of this kind warrants such drastic action on my part. If Mr Phillips or yourself have any ideas how I can get that amount of money, honestly I shall be pleased to consider them."
1 Citers



 
 Poole Corporation v Moody; CA 1945 - [1945] KB 350
 
Billings v Reed [1945] KB 11
1945
CA
Lord Greene MR, Mackinnon and Lawrence LJJ
Limitation, Negligence
The plaintiff's wife had been killed by a negligently piloted RAF aeroplane. It was argued that, although this was a war injury, the language of section 3(1) did not exclude a claim based on trespass to the person. Held: Lord Greene MR said: "It seems to me that in this context the phrase "breach of duty" is comprehensive enough to cover the case of trespass to the person which is certainly a breach of duty as used in a wide sense."
Personal Injuries (Emergency Provisions) Act 1939
1 Citers


 
Hilton v Sutton Steam Laundry [1946] KB 65
1946
CA

Limitation

1 Citers


 
Srimati Bibhabati Devi v Kumar Ramendra Narayan Roy and Others [1946] AC 508; [1946] UKPC 1
30 Jul 1946
PC
Lord Thankerton, Lord du Parcq, Sir Madhavan Nair
Constitutional, Wills and Probate, Limitation, Commonwealth
(Bengal) The appellant sought to claim a substantial inheritance. From many years before it had been thought that he had been buried after dying of syphilis. He claimed he had been resuscitated, taken away and brought up by sanyasi. His identity appeared to be subsequently accepted. The committee could not reverse a finding of fact save in the case of a manifest blunder by the lower court, or where there were concurrent and contradictory findings of separate lower courts, or in exceptional cases. The court should be careful to respect the traditions and systems of the countries from which appeal was made. The appellant had been in possession of the estate for many years. However in Hindu law, her possession could not be adverse to that of her husband even though he might be presumed to be dead. Held: The Board will only in exceptional circumstances review evidence for a third time. Exceptional circumstances might include a miscarriage of justice or violation of a principle of law or procedure: "That miscarriage of justice means such a departure from the rules which permeate all judicial procedure as to make that which happened not in the proper sense judicial procedure at all. That the violation of some principle of law or procedure must be such an erroneous proposition of law that if that proposition be corrected the finding cannot stand; or it may be the neglect of some principle of law or procedure, whose application will have the same effect. The question whether there is evidence on which the courts could arrive at their finding is such a question of law."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ PC ]
 
Tintin Exploration Syndicate Ltd v Sandys (1947) 111 LT 412
1947

Roxburgh J
Company, Limitation
The court considered the ability of a de facto director to rely on the 1939 Act as a defence to an action by the company to recover "trust property". Held: The defence failed. The court considered the circumstances in which fiduciary duties might arise, and said that the de facto directors exercised command and control over the company's property and were consequently trustees for the purposes of the Limitation Act.
Limitation Act 1939
1 Citers


 
Gregoire v GP Putnam's Sons (1948) 81 NE2d 45
1948


International, Defamation, Limitation
(New York Court of Appeals) A book had been placed on sale in 1941, but was still being reprinted and sold in 1946. Held. The rule in Duke of Brunswick v Harmer was formulated "in an era which long antedated the modern process of mass publication" and was therefore not suited to modern conditions. The limitation period started to run in 1941, when the book was first put on sale. The court pointed out that "Under [the rule in Duke of Brunswick v Harmer] the Statute of Limitation would never expire so long as a copy of such book remained in stock and is made by the publisher the subject of a sale or inspection by the public. Such a rule would thwart the purpose of the legislature."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
WT Lamb and Sons v Rider [1948] 2 KB 331; [1948] 2 All ER 402
1948
CA
Scott LJ and Romer J
Arbitration, Limitation
An interlocutory order is generally not regarded as final in the sense of barring a further application on the ground of res judicata: "Execution is essentially a matter of procedure - machinery which the Court can, subject to the rules from time to time in force, operate for the purpose of enforcing its judgments or orders." The right to sue on a judgment is a matter quite distinct from the right to issue execution under it.
Limitation Act 1939
1 Citers


 
W T Lamb and Sons v Rider [1948] 2 KB 331
1948
CA
Scott L
Insolvency, Limitation
The judge at first instance had rescinded the master's order giving leave to the judgment creditor to proceed to levy execution although six years had passed since the judgment. On appeal the judgment creditor challenged the validity of the rule of court dating from 1883 requiring leave to proceed to levy execution. It was contended that the rule was in conflict with s2(4). It subjected the right of execution, if not exercised within 6 years, to the discretion of the court. The judgment creditor argued that it was entitled by statute to bring an action upon the judgment and to issue execution, which was "a proceeding in a court of law" and therefore an "action upon a judgment." Such an action could be brought, without obtaining the leave of the court, within 12 years from the date on which the judgment became enforceable. Held: The expression "an action upon any judgment" in s 2(4) of the 1939 Act was interpreted to apply only to suing for a judgment upon a judgment. It did not apply to execution of a judgment. The Court rejected the contention that the provision in the Rules of the Supreme Court (O 42 r23(a)), requiring a judgment creditor, after the elapse of 6 years from the date of the judgment, to obtain the leave of the court to levy execution, was rendered invalid by s2(4) of the 1939 Act, which allowed 12 years for bringing an action upon any judgment as of right. Scott LJ: The 12 year limitation period set in the 1939 Act dealt only with the "substantive right to sue for and obtain a judgment, and with that alone;" the period did not apply to the "procedural machinery for enforcing a judgment when obtained." The broad definition of "action " in the 1939 Act did not have the effect of merging what had formerly been the two "quite independent and distinct" subjects of (a) the substantive right to sue for and obtain a judgment and (b) the procedural machinery for enforcing a judgment when obtained. It did not cover an application to the court for leave to levy execution on the judgment after the expiration of 6 years.
Limitation Act 1939 2(4)
1 Citers


 
In re Diplock [1948] Ch 465
1948
CA

Limitation
S 26 of the Act of 1939 would operate to postpone the running of time in the case of an action at common law to recover money paid under a mistake of fact, and would likewise apply to an analogous claim in equity to recover money paid under a mistake of law.
Limitation Act 1939 26
1 Citers


 
In re Diplock's estate [1948] Ch 465
1948
CA
Lord Greene MR
Equity, Limitation
After considering a situation in which trust money had been applied in making alterations to the property of an innocent third party but had not added to the value of the property, Held: The origin of the equitable rules of tracing were described: "the metaphysical approach of equity coupled with and encouraged by the far-reaching remedy of a declaration of charge that enabled equity to identify money in a mixed fund." and
"In the absence of authority to the contrary, our conclusion is that as regards the Diplock money used in these cases it cannot be traced in any true sense; and, further, that even if this were not so, the only remedy available to equity, viz., that of a declaration of charge, would not produce an equitable result and is inapplicable accordingly"
and "In the case of adaptation of property of the volunteer by means of trust money, it by no means necessarily follows that the money can be said to be present in the adapted property. The beneficial owner of the trust money seeks to follow and recover that money and claims to use the machinery of a charge on the adapted property in order to enable him to do so. But in the first place the money may not be capable of being followed. In every true sense the money may have disappeared. .... The result may add not one penny to the value of the house. Indeed the alteration may well lower the value of the house. .... Can it be said that in such cases the trust money can be traced and extracted from the altered asset? Clearly not for the money will have disappeared leaving no monetary trace behind. ...."
As regards limitation, the 12 year period for enforcing a will trust runs from the date of the death, even though a personal representative is not bound to distribute within a year from death.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 RB Policies at Lloyd's v Butler; 1949 - [1950] 1 KB 76; [1949] 2 All ER 226
 
Jones v Bellgrove Properties Limited [1949] 2 KB 700
1949


Limitation, Insolvency
The court allowed the plaintiff to establish by evidence that his particular debt was included in the total sum acknowledged to be due to a number of creditors.
1 Citers



 
 Beaman v ARTS Ltd; CA 1949 - [1949] 1 KB 550; [1949] 1 All ER 465; 65 TLR 389; 93 Sol Jo 236
 
Burns v Campbell [1952] 1 KB 15
1952


Limitation

1 Citers


 
Moses v Lovegrove [1952] 2 QB 533; [1952] 1 The Times LR 1324
29 Apr 1952
CA
Sir Raymind Evershed MR, Birkett and Romer LJJ
Landlord and Tenant, Limitation
The tenant had gone into possession under an oral agreement with a rent book. He ceased to pay rent or acknowledge the landlord's right in 1938. In 1952 the landlord sought to recover possession, and now appealed a finding that the tenant had acquired the title to the property by adverse possession. Held: A rent book did not constitute a tenancy agreement, or lease in writing. Evershed MR said: 'The alleged lease in writing consisted of the rent book, which was put in evidence. The judge rejected the view that the rent book was such a lease in writing within the meaning of the Act, and I think he was entirely right in that conclusion.
The rent book is, I think, what it purports to be, and what it is called, a rent book, that is, a book containing acknowledgements for payment of weekly sums of rent, and containing also, in pursuance of the terms of the legislation, a reference to the conditions on which the tenant was holding his tenancy. I think that on the face of it, it was not intended to be, and is not, a contract for granting a tenancy, still less a lease creating an estate.' and 'The notion of adverse possession, which is enshrined now in section 10, is not new; the section is a statutory enactment of the law in regard to the matter as it had been laid down by the courts in interpreting the earlier Limitation Statutes.'
Romer LJ said: "The tenancy was quite obviously an oral weekly tenancy, with the result that time started to run by virtue of section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1939, from one week after the last payment of rent, which was on May 28, 1938." and
"As no notice to quit was given, the tenant could not thereafter be said to be in immediate adverse possession in the ordinary sense, for he remained on under his contractual tenancy. Nevertheless, for the purposes of the Limitation Act, 1939, his tenancy ceased to exist, and therefore he is deemed to have remained on in adverse possession. Accordingly, the fact that for some purposes his contractual right remained in the absence of a notice to quit a writ for possession is irrelevant, as also is the precise date on which the lessor could properly have started proceedings in ejectment. The point is that after the expiration of one week from the date of the last payment of rent, the defendant is deemed to have had no contractual right to possession, and therefore to have been a trespasser or a squatter.
Why should he be regarded as being in possession by virtue of permission or grant of the owner merely because of the passing of the Rent Act of 1939?" and
"It seems to me that one can, in addition to looking at position and rights of the owner, legitimately look also at the position of the occupier for the purpose of seeing whether his occupation is adverse. In my opinion, if one looks to the position of the occupier and finds that his occupation, his right to occupation, is derived from the owner in the form of permission or agreement or grant, it is not adverse, but if it is not so derived, then it is adverse, even if the owner is, by legislation, prevented from bringing ejectment proceedings."
Limitation Act 1939 9(2) 10
1 Cites

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 The Firestone Tire and Rubber Company (SS) Limited v Singapore Harbour Board; PC 10-Jun-1952 - [1952] UKPC 17; 50 LGR 619; [1952] 1 TLR 1625; [1952] 2 Lloyd's Rep 1; [1952] AC 452; [1952] 2 All ER 219
 
Littlewood and George Wimpey and Co Ltd v British Overseas Airways Corporation [1953] 2 QB 501; [1953] 2 All ER 915; [1953] 3 WLR 553
1953
CA
Singleton LJ
Limitation, Damages
The words "liable to pay" in s 3 carried their usual meaning as "responsible in law".
1 Citers


 
Wimpey (George) Co Ltd v British Overseas Airways Corporation [1955] AC 169; [1954] 3 WLR 932; [1954] 3 All ER 661
1954
HL
Lord Reid, Lord Keith of Avonholm, Viscount Simonds, Lord Porter
Litigation Practice, Torts - Other, Damages, Limitation
A joint tortfeasor could escape liability in contribution proceedings if it had been unsuccessfully sued by the injured person in an action brought outside the relevant limitation period. Where a court has to decide between two competing cases, if the arguments are fairly evenly balanced that interpretation should be chosen which involves the least alteration of the existing law.
An employee of BOAC, had been injured in a collision between a vehicle owned by BOAC and another owned by Wimpey. He sued Wimpey, who now claimed a contribution against BOAC. The claimant later joined BOAC, but outside a special one year limitation period under the 1939 Act. The judge had found BOAC one third liable, but that they then escaped liability, the claim against them being time barred. At the Court of Appeal LLJ Denning and Singleton compared the situation with that of co-sureties, and that a six year period applied. Held: The decision and discussion was limited firmly to the point of statutory construction under section 6(1)(c) of the 1935 Act.
Viscount Simonds: "My Lords, at the hearing of the action and of the appeal two questions were raised, upon which there was no argument before your Lordships, the first as to the date upon which Wimpeys' right to contribution arose and the second as to the period of limitation in respect of a claim for contribution against a public authority under section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1939. I am content to assume that the right to contribution arose at any rate not earlier than the date when the existence and amount of Wimpeys' liability to Littlewood was ascertained by judgment and that the relevant period of limitation was six years." The concept of being "held liable" by a judgment for the purpose of setting time running in a claim for contribution involved the ascertainment of the quantum of the liability.
Lord Porter: "The quantum having been determined, the only question is: can the party against whom judgment has been given recover contribution from the other who was in part the cause of the injury?" and "Substantially, their view was that Wimpeys were under no liability until judgment was given against them, that their cause of action arose then and not until then, and accordingly their cause of action against B.O.A.C. arose at that date. I need not, I think, set out the authorities and reasoning upon which these opinions are founded except to refer to such cases as Wolmershausen v. Gullick and Robinson v. Harkin, both of which were claims to contribution between co-sureties, and M'Gillivray v. Hope, which was a claim involving the right of present and former employers to contribution inter se in respect of damages awarded to a workman employed by them consecutively.
If this view be true, Wimpeys' liability did not come into existence until judgment had been given against them, and therefore they had whatever was the appropriate period of limitation from that date. What that appropriate period may be – whether it is a year because B.O.A.C. is a public authority and the action is brought in respect of any act, neglect or default or whether it is six years, because the claim is not in respect of any act, neglect or default, but for contribution – is immaterial in the present case inasmuch as Wimpeys made their claim to contribution in the original action before judgment was given."
Lord Keith of Avonholm: "My Lords, your Lordships are not now concerned with a question which was considered in the courts below, namely, when the cause of action in the claim for contribution accrued. It is conceded, in conformity with the view taken by the Court of Appeal, that the cause of action accrued at earliest at the date when judgment was given in favour of Littlewood against the appellants."
Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935 - Limitation Act 1939 21
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Phillips-Higgins v Harper [1954] 1 QB 411; [1954] 2 All ER 51
1954
QBD
Pearson J
Limitation
A claim was made to recover monies due under a contract where the plaintiff had failed to realise that the balance was due to her, and by that mistake the action was concealed from her. Held: Pearson J said: "But that is not sufficient. Probably provision (c) applies only where the mistake is an essential ingredient of the cause of action, so that the statement of claim sets out, or should set out, the mistake and its consequences and pray for relief from those consequences. In this case the statement of claim sets out that sums became due and that only a smaller amount of X pounds has been paid, and the prayer is for an account to ascertain the sums still due and for payment of them when so ascertained. This action is not for relief from the consequences of mistake within the meaning of section 26."
When asking when a cause of action began under the section, the essential question was whether the action was for relief from the consequences of a mistake, an example of which was an action for the recovery of money paid in consequence of a mistake. The section was intended to be a narrow one, because any wider provision would have opened too wide a door of escape from the general principle of limitation.
Limitation Act 1939 26
1 Citers



 
 Semtex Ltd v Gladstone; 1954 - [1954] 2 All ER 206
 
In re Ingleton Charity [1956 ] Ch 585
1956


Land, Limitation
The effect of section 2 of the 1841 Act is that if a reverter occurred but the trustees of the school remain in possession for 12 years, the title by reverter will usually become statute-barred.
School Sites Act 1841 2
1 Citers


 
Williams Brothers Direct Supply Ltd v Raftery [1958] 1 QB 159; [1957] 3 All ER 593
1957
CA

Land, Limitation
In a claim for the adverse possession of land, the court is to determine whether the acts of user do or do not amount to dispossession of the owner, the character of the land, the nature of the acts done on it and the intention of the squatter must be considered.
1 Citers


 
West Riding of Yorkshire County Council v Huddersfield Corporation [1957] 1 QB 540
1957


Limitation
Where a statute enables the court to give relief in monetary or non-monetary form the court should look to see what is actually claimed.
1 Citers


 
Harvey v R.G.O'Dell Ltd [1958] 2 QB 78
1958


Limitation, Damages

1 Citers



 
 GL Baker Ltd v Medway Building and Supplies Ltd; CA 11-Jan-1958 - [1958] 1 WLR 1216; [1958] 3 All ER 540
 
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