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Limitation - From: 1849 To: 1899

This page lists 44 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.


 
 Duke of Brunswick v Harmer; QBD 2-Nov-1849 - (1849) 14 QB 185; [1849] EngR 915; (1849) 117 ER 75
 
Randall v Stevens And Others [1853] EngR 767; (1853) 2 El & Bl 641; (1853) 118 ER 907
25 Jun 1853

Lord Campbell LC
Land, Limitation
A landlord evicted a tenant who had failed to pay any rent for twenty years. Statute provided that a house could not be repossessed simply by exercising a right of entry. Held: Lord Campbell LC, giving the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench on appeal from a judgment given at assizes, held that entry could be made "by stepping on any corner of the land in the night time and pronouncing a few words, without any intention or wish to take possession." However, where possession was taken with an intention to possess, then "whether possession was retained by the landlord an hour or a week must for this purpose [i.e. taking possession other than by mere entry] be immaterial."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
The Imperial Gas Light And Coke Company v The London Gas Light Company [1854] EngR 519; (1854) 10 Exch 39; (1854) 156 ER 346
11 May 1854


Limitation

[ Commonlii ]
 
Thomas v Thomas [1855] EngR 42; (1855) 2 K & J 79; (1855) 69 ER 701
1855


Children, Limitation
When a father has entered upon the estate of his infant children the presumption is that he entered as their guardian and bailiff, and therefore the Statute of Limitations does not begin to run against the children until they attain twenty-one, and from that time at least a child has twenty years within which he may recover possession. Semble, entry by a stranger might not have this effect.
If the father retain possession after the children attain twenty-one such possession will be considered to be continued in the character in which he entered, so that an account will be directed, not from the filing of the bill, but, if necessary, from the time of entry.
In an adverse suit, in the nature of an ejectment suit, against a person in no fiduciary relation to the plaintiff, this account is only directed from the time of filing the bill.
If a wife concurs with her husband in mortgaging property over which. she has a power, the husband is primarily liable, unless the wife received the money for her separate use; and the Court will direct an inquiry as to this fact.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Kingsmill v Millard (1855) 11 Exch 313; (1855) 19 JP 661; (1855) 3 CLR 1022; 156 ER 849
1855

Parke B
Land, Limitation, Landlord and Tenant
Parke B set out the doctrine that a tenant acquiring adjoining land by adverse possession acquires it on behalf of his landlord: "It is laid down in all the cases – whether the inclosed land is part of the waste, or belongs to the landlord or a third person – that the presumption is, that the tenant has inclosed it for the benefit of his landlord unless he has done some act disclaiming the landlord's title. …The encroachment must be considered as annexed to the holding, unless it clearly appears that the tenant made it for his own benefit."
1 Citers



 
 Whitehouse v Fellowes; 12-Feb-1861 - (1861) 10 CB (NS) 765; [1861] EngR 314; (1861) 10 CB NS 765; (1861) 142 ER 654
 
Allen v England [1862] EngR 1; (1862) 3 F & F 49; (1862) 176 ER 22
1862

Erle CJ
Land, Limitation
The court considered a claim for land by adverse possession against the owner on paper. Erle CJ said: "It may be taken that the plaintiff had the beneficial occupation for more than twenty years, and if that will give him a title, I will give him leave to move. But, in my judgment, every time Cox put his foot on the land it was so far in his possession that the statute would begin to run from the time when he was last upon it."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Hammond v Smith [1864] EngR 877; (1864) 33 Beav 452; (1864) 55 ER 443
21 Dec 1864


Limitation

[ Commonlii ]
 
Shah Mukhun Lall, Gungadeen And Boodhoo Jee, Appellants; Nawab Imtiazood Dowlah And Hajee Ali [1865] EngR 780; (1865) 10 Moo Ind App 362; (1865) 19 ER 1010
14 Dec 1865


Limitation

[ Commonlii ]
 
Edmunds v Waugh (1866) LR 1 Eq 418
1866


Limitation

1 Citers


 
Gee v Liddell [1866] EngR 66; (1866) 35 Beav 629; (1866) 55 ER 1041
23 Jan 1866


Contract, Wills and Probate, Limitation

[ Commonlii ]
 
Bryant v Foot (1867) LR 2 QB 161
1867

Cockburn CJ
Land, Limitation
It is to be presumed from a period of 20 years' user, and the lack of evidence inconsistent with there having been immemorial user or a lost modern grant, that a right which was within grant has been established. The apparent right should lie in grant, it should be capable of being created by an express grant made by deed. Cockburn CJ said that the fiction of lost modern grant, animus dedicandi and the like are "a bad and mischievous law, and one which is discreditable to us as a civilized and enlightened people."
1 Citers


 
Richardson v Younger (1871) 6 Ch App 478
1871


Land, Limitation
When there are two joint claimants to possessory title, and it is said that they had acknowledged the paper owner's title, the acknowledgment must be given by or on behalf of both of them.
1 Citers


 
In re River Steamer Company (1871) LR 6 Ch App 822
1871

Mellish LJ
Land, Limitation
A without prejudice letter was written by a person claiming adverse possession of land to the paper owner offering to purchase the land. The paper owner said this was an acknowledgment of his title. Held: The letter was written in the context of a dispute which had advanced to the point of an arbitrator having been appointed, and "a letter which is stated to be without prejudice cannot be relied on to take a case out of the Statute of Limitations, for it cannot do so unless it can be relied upon as a new contract." (Mellish LJ)
1 Citers


 
Oukur Pershad Bustooree,-Appellant; Mussamut Foolcoomaree Bebee,-Respondent [1871] EngR 25; (1871) 14 Moo Ind App 134; (1871) 20 ER 737
1 Jul 1871


Contract, Limitation
Action by a Firm against an Agent of the Firm, who received a puckah, or del credere commission, on the goods of the Principals sold by their Agent. The last item in the account between the Principals and Agent, in their dealings, accrued more than three years from the commencement of the suit. Held. On the construction of the Limitation of suis Act, No. XIV. of 1859, that as the action was for breach of contract, it fell within the words "for breach of contract" in cl. 9, sect, 1, and that, sect. 8 of that Act, which related to suits for balances of accounts current, did not apply.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Jane Day v Jane Day, And Others [1871] EngR 38; (1871) 8 Moo PC NS 152; (1871) 17 ER 270
17 Jul 1871
PC

Landlord and Tenant, Limitation
Tenant at will without interruption for more than twenty years, during which period he let and transferred portion of the land, with the knowledge, and without the interference of the Owner in fee: held to have acquired an indefeasible title against the Owner, whose right of entry after that period was barred by the Statute of Limitations.
[ Commonlii ]
 
In re General Rolling Stock Co: Joint Stock Discount Company's Claim (1872) LR 7 Ch App 646
1872
CA
James LJ, Mellish LJ
Insolvency, Limitation
Upon a winding up: "A duty and a trust are thus imposed upon the Court, to take care that the assets of the company shall be applied in discharge of its liabilities. What liabilities? All the liabilities of the company existing at the time when the winding up order was made." For limitation purposes, time ceased to run whilst a company was in voluntary liquidation.
1 Citers



 
 Knox v Gye; HL 1872 - (1872) LR 5 HL 656
 
Sham Chand Bysack v Kishen Prosaud Surma Alias Rajah Baboo [1872] EngR 23; (1872) 14 Moo Ind App 595; (1872) 20 ER 908
26 Mar 1872
PC

Land, Limitation, Commonwealth
Two riparian proprietors of land on opposite sides of a river, respectively claimed churs which had been diluviated for a great many years, and afterwards re-formed by a change of the course of the River, as belonging to their respective estates. After a police inquiry, the Magistrate, in 1836, put A in possession. B, the other riparian proprietor took no steps till the year 1847 to obtain posession of the churs. Held. (1), that the long delay in bringing a suit raised a presuption against B’s title, and (2), that he had failed to identify the churs as having been formerly part of his lands or an accretion thereto.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Des Barres and Another v Shey (1873) 29 LT (NS) 592
1873


Land, Limitation
The defendants resisted a claim for possession asserting adverse possession from 1815 or 1832. This included possession during periods over which they had granted tenancies or licences but where the tenants or licensees had been in occupation thereunder and had paid rent to the defendant or his predecessors. Held: The defendants were taken to have acquired legal possession by way of possession; the licensee's or lessee's occupation was properly counted by the squatter as acts of possession as against the paper owner.
1 Citers



 
 Attorney-General v Tomline (No 3); ChD 1877 - (1877) 5 Ch D 750

 
 Leigh v Jack; CA 1879 - (1879) 5 Ex D 264 CA; (1879-80) LR 5 Ex D 264
 
Rains v Buxton [1880] 14 ChD 537
1880

Fry J
Land, Limitation
Fry J said: "The difference between dispossession and the discontinuance of possession might be expressed in this way: the one is where a person comes in and drives out the others from possession, the other case is where the person in possession goes out and is followed in by others." A defendant to a claim for adverse possession does not escape it by proving that he had not known of the acts relied upon against him nor by proving that that omission was not attributable to some negligence or default on his part.
1 Citers



 
 Heath v Pugh; CA 1881 - (1881) 6 QBD 345; [1881] 50 LJQB 473; [1881] 44 LT 327; [1881] 29 WR 904

 
 Rosenberg v Cook; 1881 - (1881) 8 QBD 162
 
Dalton v Henry Angus and Co (1881) 6 App Cas 740; [1881] UKHL 1
14 Jun 1881
HL
Lord Selborne LC, Lord Blackburn, Fry J (advising)
Land, Limitation
The court explained the doctrine of lost modern grant. Where there has been more than 20 years' uninterrupted enjoyment of an easement, and that enjoyment has the necessary qualities to fulfil the requirements of prescription, then unless, for some reason the existence of such a grant is impossible, the law will adopt a legal fiction that such a grant was made, in spite of any direct evidence that no such grant was in fact made. ". . the whole law of prescription and the whole law which governs the presumption or inference of a grant or covenant rest upon acquiescence. The courts and the judges have had recourse to various expedients for quieting the possession of persons in the exercise of rights which have not been resisted by the persons against whom they are exercised, but in all cases it appears to me that acquiescence and nothing else is the principle upon which these expedients rest."
Lord Blackburn, delivering the principal speech on this point, regarded the interposition of an independent contractor as irrelevant, because of the nature of the duty: "Ever since Quarman v Burnett (1840) 6 M & W 499, [1840] EngR 182, it has been considered settled law that one employing another is not liable for his collateral negligence unless the relation of master and servant existed between them. So that a person employing a contractor to do work is not liable for the negligence of that contractor or his servants. On the other hand, a person causing something to be done, the doing of which casts on him a duty, cannot escape from the responsibility attaching on him of seeing that duty performed by delegating it to a contractor. He may bargain with the contractor that he shall perform the duty and stipulate for an indemnity from him if it is not performed, but he cannot thereby relieve himself from liability to those injured by the failure to perform it: Hole v Sittingbourne Railway Co (1861) 6 H & N 488, [1861] EngR 170; Pickard v Smith 10 CB (NS) 470, [1861] EngR 71, Tarry v Ashton (1876) 1 QBD 314."
Fry J (asked to give his opinion to the house said: "But leaving such technical questions aside, I prefer to observe that, in my opinion, the whole law of prescription and the whole law which governs the presumption or inference of a grant or covenant rest upon acquiescence. The Courts and the Judges have had recourse to various expedients for quieting the possession of persons in the exercise of rights which have not been resisted by the persons against whom they are exercised, but in all cases it appears to me that acquiescence and nothing else is the principle upon which these expedients rest."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Fearnside v Flint; 1882 - (1882) 22 Ch D 57

 
 Sutton v Sutton; 1882 - (1882) 22 Ch D 511
 
Great Eastern Railway v Goldsmid (1884) 9 App Cas 927
1884

Lord Selborne
Land, Limitation
The City of London Corporation had implicitly given up a franchise consisting of an exclusive right to markets within London that had apparently been conferred on it by an Act or charter of Edward III in circumstances in which it had acquiesced for centuries in the holding of other markets. Lord Selborne discussed the reasoning behind te law of prescription: "In the first place, if there be a valuable principle in our law, the observation of which within its proper limits is of cardinal importance, it is this, that all reasonable presumptions shall be made in support and not in destruction of long enjoyment and usage….It is, as I have said, a principle of vital importance to the maintenance of public and private rights in this country, where no law can be repealed by mere desuetude, that reasonable presumptions shall be made of all things which are reasonably possible in support of such long enjoyment."
1 Citers


 
In Re Williams (1886) 34 ChD 558
1886


Wills and Probate, Limitation, Land
The purpose of the section is to allow time to run against an administrator as from the intestate's death, irrespective of whether a grant of administration has been obtained or not.
Real Property Limitation Acts of 1833 6
1 Citers


 
Lord Advocate v Young (1887) 12 App Cas 544
1887

Lord Watson, Lord Halsbury, Lord MacNaghten, Lord Fitzgerald (dubitante)
Land, Limitation
Lord Watson said: "It is, in my opinion, practically impossible to lay down any precise rule in regard to the character and amount of possession necessary in order to give a riparian proprietor a prescriptive right to foreshore. Each case must depend on its own circumstances. The beneficial enjoyment of which the foreshore admits, consistently with the rights of navigators and of the general public, is an exceedingly variable quantity….. In estimating the character and extent of his possession it must always be kept in view that possession of the foreshore, in its natural state, can never be, in the strictest sense of the term, exclusive. The proprietor cannot exclude the public from it at any time; and it is practically impossible to prevent occasional encroachments on his right, because the cost of preventive measures would be altogether disproportionate to the value of the subject."
1 Citers


 
Weldon v Neal (1887) 19 QBD 394
1887
CA
Lord Esher MR
Limitation, Litigation Practice
An amendment to pleadings should not be allowed so as to allow a plaintiff to set up a cause of action which would otherwise be barred by the Statutes of Limitation.
1 Citers


 
Hornsey Local Board v Monarch Investment Building Society [1889] 24 QBD 1
1889
CA
Lord Esher MR, Lopes LJ, Lindley LJ
Limitation, Local Government
The local authority had incurred expense in paving a street. They were entitled to apportion those expenses amongst the owners of the properties fronting onto that street and summarily to recover from the respective owners the amounts so apportioned. In addition statute provided that such expenses should be charged on the premises in respect of which they were incurred with interest thereon at the rate of 5% until payment. It was not necessary for the amount due to be ascertained on the sale of a house before the Society had a right to receive it. The charge was imposed when the paving works were completed in 1875. The expenses were not apportioned until 1885. In 1887 a demand for payment was made on the defendant and in 1888 the local board sought to enforce the statutory charge against the defendant. The county court judge granted the order, but the Queen's Bench Division reversed him. Held: The appeal failed. The limitation period for a local authority to recover paving expenses ran from the time of imposition even though the charge had not yet been apportioned between the frontagers. The right to receive payment had arisen even though it could not yet enforce payment.
Lord Esher MR "It was strongly argued that the words "present right to receive the same" in this section are equivalent to "present right to enforce payment of the same". If there were some overwhelming reason why that construction should be given to the words; if that were the only construction that would render the procedure sensible, I think possibly the words might receive that construction, but I do not think it would be their ordinary meaning in the English language. A present right to receive is not in ordinary English the same as a present right to enforce payment. Then is there any overwhelming reason why we should read the words otherwise than in their natural sense? So far from that, I think that in the present case to read the words in the way suggested for the plaintiffs would raise insuperable difficulties, whereas to read them in their natural sense makes the whole legislation sensible and easier application. The difficulty that arises on the plaintiffs' construction has been pointed out, viz., that the Board, who have to receive the money, and also to apportion the amount, would have the power to delay the application of the Statute of Limitation for any time they please. When that difficulty was presented, the plaintiffs' Counsel endeavoured to meet it by the ingenious suggestion that, if the apportionment were not made within a reasonable time, the making of it might be enforced by mandamus; and other modes were suggested of meeting the difficulty. But why should we embark on such questions and invent means of overcoming this difficulty, when by reading the words in their ordinary sense no such difficulty arises? . . .
"The charge exists, though the exact amount charged may not be ascertained. It is suggested that a person in whose favour a charge is imposed cannot be entitled to receive an amount which is not ascertained. I do not see why this should be so. A sum may be offered to him, which the person offering it thinks to be the right sum, and which he may also think to be the right sum, although the actual calculation of the exact amount has not been made. What is there in law, or reason, or business, to shew that he is not entitled to receive the sum when so offered to him? I cannot see any difficulty in saying that there is a present right to receive the expenses. In the case where a person has only a reversionary right to receive money, or for some other reason the time when he is entitled to receive the money has not yet arrived, it would be different, and there would be no present right to receive the money. . .
So, reading the words of the section in their ordinary sense, it seems to me that in the present case the Local Board were a body of persons in whose favour a charge existed for a sum of money, who were entitled to receive it, and who were capable of giving a receipt or discharge for it . . . It seems to me therefore that the case comes within the words of the section read in their ordinary sense and that there is no reason for giving them any other construction. Consequently the claim of the plaintiffs is barred by the Statute of Limitations."
Lindley LJ said that expression, a "present right to receive" was "a little ambiguous", but agreed with Lord Esher: ". . . and as distinguishable, as apparently it is meant to be, from "present right to sue", everything works out harmoniously; the moment the time of the coming into existence of the charge is ascertained, the period of limitation will begin to run: whereas, if the opposite construction is adopted, we are at once landed in the curious anomaly that the creditor, that is to say, the person who is entitled to the charge, can by his own act postpone his right to sue indefinitely . . .
The section is dealing with charges on land, and it must be borne in mind that such charges are present charges and future charges, reversionary charges, charges in remainder, and such like. One general form of expression is used to include the whole, and that expression is "present right to receive." It seems to me clear that the meaning is that in each case the moment to be looked to is the moment when the charge comes into present operation; for instance, when reversionary charges are being dealt with, the moment to be looked to is the moment when the reversion falls in and the charge takes effect in possession."
Lopes LJ said that the right to receive what was secured by a charge arose concurrently with the charge: "When, then, does the right accrue to the person or persons in whose favour the charge is imposed to receive the amount secured by the charge? It appears to me that it accrues the moment the charge is imposed on the premises by the statute, that is when the expenses have been incurred and the works completed. It may be that certain things have to be done before the right can be enforced, but the right to receive what is secured by the charge arises concurrently with the charge. The words are 'present right to receive' not 'present right to recover'. The right to receive may exist though the definite sum to be received has not yet been ascertained. There are cases where the legislature requires a notice to be given before an action can be maintained. The right of action however exists as soon as an actionable wrong has been committed, though it cannot be successfully enforced until the statutory requirements are complied with."
Real Property Limitation Act 1874 8
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Reeves v Butcher [1891] 2 QB 509
1891
CA
Fry LJ, Lindley LJ, Lopes LJ
Limitation
A five-year loan was granted by the plaintiff to the defendant under a written agreement, providing for a "power to call in the same at an earlier period in the events hereinafter mentioned". The plaintiff agreed not to call in the money for the five years, if the defendant should regularly pay the interest. But it was also provided that the repayment of the loan could be accelerated in two circumstances. One arose if the borrower died before the expiration of the term, in which case it would be lawful "to call in the said principal sum upon giving to the executors or administrators six calendar months' notice in writing" of the intention to call in the loan. And the second was that if the borrower: "should make default in payment of any quarterly payment of interest as aforesaid for the period of twenty-one days next after the same should become payable, it should be lawful for [the creditor] immediately upon the expiration of such twenty-one days to call in and demand payment of the said principal sum and all interest then owing or accruing in respect thereof." The action to recover the loan was commenced more than six years after 21 days had run following the defaulting payment of a quarterly instalment of interest, but there was no demand prior to the service of the writ separate from the issue and service of that writ. So the issue before the court was whether in those circumstances the claim was time-barred, or whether it was saved from being time-barred by the absence of any formal demand prior to the issue of the writ. Held: No such demnd was necessary, and the claim was time barred.
Lindley LJ said: "The agreement is one reasonably easy to be understood. It provides for a loan for five years, subject to a provision that if default is made in punctual payment of interest, the principal shall be recoverable at once. Now, the Statute of Limitation (21 Jac. I, c. 16) enacts that such actions as therein mentioned including "all actions of debt grounded upon any lending or contract without specialty" shall be brought "within six years next after the cause of such action or suit, and not after." This expression "cause of action" has been repeatedly the subject of decision, and it has been held particularly in Hemp v. Garland 4 QB 519, decided in 1843, that the cause of action arises at the time when the debt could first have been recovered by action. The right to bring an action may arise on various events, but it has always been held that the statute runs from the earliest time at which an action could be brought."
Fry LJ said: "The agreement contains a stipulation that the lender shall not call in the principal sum for a period of five years, if the borrower should so long live, and should duly and regularly pay the interest. This implies a contract by the borrower that the principal debt should be paid at once on the death of the borrower, or on default in payment of interest. The subsequent provisions imply a contract by the lender not to enforce payment after the death of the borrower until the expiration of a six months' notice, and a contract not to enforce payment of the capital for default in payment of interest until twenty-one days after such default, thus giving the borrower further time. Subject to the stipulations, the implied contract to pay the principal remained in force. The principal, therefore, became payable twenty days after the first quarterly instalment of interest became due, and from that time the statute of limitations began to run. If authority is wanted, Hemp v. Garland 4 QB 519 is in point."
Lopes LJ said: "Now, when first had the plaintiff a cause of action? When default was made for twenty-one days in payment of an instalment of interest. Hemp v. Garland (1842) 62 R.R. 423, is in point."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Radcliffe v Bartholomew; 1892 - [1892] 1 QB 161; [1891-94] All ER Rep 829

 
 Soar v Ashwell; CA 1893 - [1893] 2 QB 390
 
Wolmershausen v Gullick [1893] 2 Ch 514
1893

Wright J
Limitation, Damages, Contract
Claim for contribution between co-securities. Wright J reviewed the development of the entitlement to contribution from Justinian's statement of it, through its application by the custom of the City of London in the time of Queen Elizabeth to the time of his judgment.
1 Citers


 
Re Lands Allotment Company [1894] 1 Ch 616
1894
CA
Lindley LJ and Kay L JJ
Company, Limitation, Equity
A limited company is not a trustee of its funds, but their beneficial owner. However, the fiduciary character of the duties of its directors mean that they are treated as if they were trustees of those funds of the company which are in their hands or under their control, and if they misapply them they commit a breach of trust.
The court contrasted the conduct of two directors (one of whom, Mr Brock, was also chairman) in determining their responsibility for an ultra vires investment made by the company. Neither was present at the meeting at which the investment had been approved. Attendance at a later meeting at which the minutes of that meeting were confirmed was held to be insufficient to make either director liable. On the other hand statements made by Mr Brock showing he had taken an active part in the decision to make the investment were sufficient to hold him responsible for it. However the other director had been "away on the sea" and "had nothing to do with the transaction at all" which was "past praying for" on his return. In a case of a company director being treated as a trustee within the limitation provisions of ss1(3) and 8(1) of the Trustee Act 1888 in respect of a claim that unauthorised investments had caused loss to the company. The court recognised the trustee-like nature of a director’s duties as very relevant to the statutory limitation periods for actions by beneficiaries against express trustees for breach of trust and for the recovery of trust property, whether those periods are applied directly or by analogy. In consequence of the fiduciary character of their duties the directors of a limited company are treated as if they were trustees of those funds of the company which are in their hands or under their control, and if they misapply them they commit a breach of trust.
Directors are not regarded as trustees merely by virtue of their office; but they are treated as trustees "of money which comes to their hands or which is actually under their control" (per Lindley LJ); or "they are only trustees qua the particular property which is put into their hands or under their control" (per Kay LJ).
Trustee Act 1888 1(3) 8(1)
1 Citers


 
In re McHenry (1894) 3 Ch 290
1894
CA
Lord Herschell LC, Lindley LJ
Land, Limitation
The court considered the effect of the Limitation Acts on the rights of a secured creditor where there was an express shortfall provision in a mortgage deed. There was an express promise by a mortgagor to pay the difference on realisation of the security on personal property (a scrip certificate of bonds) between the proceeds of the realisation and the amount of the advance. The issue was whether the limitation period ran from the date of realisation of the security, which was within the limitation period, or from the earlier date when the principal sum became repayable. Held: The court rejected the contention that the time only began to run when the security was sold and the actual amount payable was ascertained and that there was a separate claim on the express promise to pay the difference. The cause of action arose when the original mortgage debt became due and that the promise to pay the difference did not create a new debt. Lord Herschell LC: "I cannot say that the right of realisation gave a new, separate and independent cause of action, so that the statute did not begin to run until from that date. The truth is that the debt is one debt only. The second clause of the document did not create a new debt, but only prescribed what should be done in the event of realisation and what should be made of the money realised. The words gave the creditor no right which would not equally have existed without them." Lindley LJ: " The promise to pay the deficiency does not create a new obligation to pay: it only applies the old obligation to a reduced sum. The realisation of the security does not add to the cause of action; the cause of action accrued long before." .
1 Citers


 
Musurus Bey v Gadban [1894] 2 QB 352
1894
CA
AL Smith and Davey LJJ
Contract, Limitation
Musurus Bey had been the accredited Ambassador of the Sultan of Turkey in London for some thirty years prior to his recall in December 1885. He wound up his official and personal business and in February 1886 he returned to Turkey where he lived until his death in 1890. In 1892 his executors brought proceedings against the defendants who sought to counterclaim in debt for money lent by them to Musurus Bey in 1873 while he was Ambassador in London and which, it was alleged, had never been repaid. Held: The counterclaim was not statute barred. The wrongdoer may be entitled to diplomatic immunity at the time of the tort. No cause of action could accrue against a debtor during such period as he enjoyed diplomatic immunity, though an envoy's immunity from suit and legal process in respect of acts done in his private capacity endures only so long as he is 'en poste' and for a sufficient time thereafter to enable him to wind up his affairs

 
Re Owen [1894] 3 Ch 220
1894


Trusts, Limitation
Legacies were charged on land after the death of the life tenant. The life tenant died in 1880. It was not suggested that time ran from the death of the testator in 1854.
1 Citers


 
Ex Parte Caucasian Trading Corporation: Bankruptcy Petition [1896] 1 QB 368
1896
CA

Limitation, Insolvency
A proceeding in bankruptcy was based upon an order to enforce an ordinary civil arbitration award. Under the 1889 Act it was possible to obtain an order in the High Court of England for the enforcement of such an order and all that was held was that that was a civil proceeding in the High Court. For the enforcement of the order it was necessary to issue an originating summons in the High Court based upon the award and to obtain an order. Held. It was a proceeding in the High Court.
Arbitration Act 1889 12
1 Citers


 
Coburn v Colledge [1897] 1 QB 702
1897
CA

Limitation, Legal Professions
A solicitor commenced an action on June 12th, 1896 for his fees for work which had been completed on May 30th 1889. Held: A period of limitation runs from the date on which the ingredients of the cause of action are complete. The statute of limitations began to run from the time the work was completed, not from the expiration of a month from the delivery of the bill of costs. The court accepted this definition of "cause of action": "Every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court."
1 Citers


 
Barnes v Glenton [1899] 1 QB 885
1899

ALSmith LJ
Limitation
A contract debt had been then secured on land. The defendant pleaded limitation. Held: The section, in not enlarging the period of recovery of a simple contract debt from 6 years to 12 years, was prohibitory and was enacted to limit existing limitation periods relating to the recovery of debts charged on land. The addition of the charge did not extend the period for recovery of the debt itself.
Limitation Act 1874 8
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