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Legal Professions - From: 1800 To: 1849

This page lists 47 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Bunn, Executor of Bunn v Guy [1803] EngR 697; (1803) 4 East 190; (1803) 102 ER 803
7 Nov 1803


Legal Professions, Contract
A contract entered into by a practising attorney to relinquish his business and recommend his clients t0 two other attornies for a valuable consideration, and that he would not himself practise in such business within certain limits, and would permit them to make use of his name in their firm for a certain time, but without his interference, &c was holden to be valid in law.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Fountain, Administrator of Crump, v Young, [1807] EngR 419; (1807) 1 Taunt 60; (1807) 127 ER 753 (C)
28 Nov 1807


Legal Professions
If the client mistakenly thinks the person he is obtaining legal advice from is a lawyer but the person is not in fact a lawyer then no privilege attaches
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Cresswell v Byron [1807] EngR 465; (1807) 14 Ves Jun 272; (1807) 33 ER 525
24 Dec 1807


Legal Professions
A Solicitor, having declined to act for his client, has no lien for his costs upon a fund in Court. In this cause a petition was presented by a Solicitor; stating, that in 1789 he was employed as Solicitor for the Plaintiff ; and continued so to act until July 1792 ; when, the Plaintiff refusing to follow the advice of the petitioner and of Counsel, the petitioner ceased to act as his Solicitor.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Sterling, Ex Parte [1809] EngR 447; (1809) 16 Ves Jun 258; (1809) 33 ER 982
7 Aug 1809


Legal Professions, Insolvency
The court considered the status of a solicitor's lien over papers in his possession. Held: The lien was limited to the occasion on which they were delivered without a special agreement otherwise. One can infer from the client placing into the attorney's hands papers in the course of business, that he has to have a general lien.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Stevenson And Another, Assignees of Collis, A Bankrupt, v Blakelock [1813] EngR 362; (1813) 1 M & S 535; (1813) 105 ER 200
28 May 1813


Legal Professions

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Earl Cholmondeley And Ann Seymour Damer v Lord Clinton And Others [1815] EngR 448; (1815) G Coop 80; (1815) 35 ER 484
16 Jan 1815


Legal Professions
A solicitor for one of the parties in a suit cannot become the solicitor for the opposite party, though he is separated from the partnership which jointly were so employed on the other side, and the remaining partner still continues so employed, and the deed of dissolution stipulated that he should not act as solicitor for that party.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Earl Cholmondeley v Lord Clinton [1815] EngR 511; (1815) 19 Ves Jun 261; (1815) 34 ER 515
3 Feb 1815


Legal Professions, Intellectual Property
An Attorney or solicitor cannot give up his client, and act for the opposite party, in any suit between them.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Ex Parte Lane And Others In The Matter of Kingsbridge School [1819] EngR 781; (1819) 4 Madd 479; (1819) 56 ER 782 (B)
21 Dec 1819


Legal Professions

[ Commonlii ]
 
Candler v Candler [1821] EngR 419; (1821) 6 Madd 141; (1821) 56 ER 1045
7 Jun 1821


Legal Professions

[ Commonlii ]
 
Candler v Candler [1821] EngR 530; (1821) Jac 225; (1821) 37 ER 834
15 Aug 1821


Legal Professions
An agreement by an attorney to pay a share of the profits of his business to another person who is not an attorney, is not illegal. Semble. Receiver of the debts due to a business, appointed at the suit of persons to whom a share of the profits had been assigned against a subsequent assignee of the debts.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Ex Parte Murray [1822] EngR 639; (1822) Turn & R 56; (1822) 37 ER 1015
20 Dec 1822


Legal Professions

[ Commonlii ]
 
Studdy v Sanders and others [1823] 2 D and R 347
1823


Legal Professions
Legal professional privilege.
1 Citers


 
Barnardiston v Soames [1826] EngR 46; (1826) Freem KB 387; (1826) 89 ER 287 (C)
1826


Legal Professions, Elections
Case lies against the sheriff at common law for making a double return to a Parliamentary writ falsely, maliciously, and with intent to put the pIaintiff to expense. Disseni, Rainsford J
1 Cites

[ Commonlii ]
 
Sir William Soames v Sir Sam Barnardiston [1826] EngR 556; (1826) Freem KB 430; (1826) 89 ER 321
1826


Legal Professions, Elections
Action on the case lies not against a sheriff for making a double return to a Parliamentary writ.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Sir Samuel, Barnardiston v Sir Will Soames [1826] EngR 551; (1826) Freem KB 380; (1826) 89 ER 283 (B)
1826


Legal Professions, Elections
Whether an action on the case lies at common law against the sheriff for maliciously making a double return upon a writ to elect a member of Parliament.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Sir Samuel Barnardiston v Soames [1826] EngR 550; (1826) Freem KB 390; (1826) 89 ER 290 (A)
1826


Legal Professions, Elections
Case lies against the sheriff at common law for making a double return to a Parliamentary writ falsely, maliciously, and with intent to put the pIaintiff to expense. Disseni, Rainsford J
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Harrington v Hoggart (1830) 1 B & Ad 577
1830


Legal Professions
A solicitor receiving a deposit as stakeholder is entitled to keep the interest earned as payment for him carrying out that task.

 
Hill v Featherstonhaugh (1831) 7 Bing. 569
1831

Tindal CJ
Legal Professions, Contract
Tindal CJ said: 'If an attorney, through inadvertence or inexperience, - for I impute no improper motive to the plaintiff - incurs trouble which is useless to his client, he cannot make it a subject of remuneration . . Could a bricklayer, who had placed a wall in such a position as to be liable to fall, charge his employer for such an erection?' Clearly not."
1 Citers


 
Bolton v The Corporation Of Liverpool [1831] EngR 974; (1831) 3 Sim 467; (1831) 57 ER 1073 (B)
22 Dec 1831


Legal Professions, Litigation Practice
The Defendants had brought an action against the Plaintiffs to recover a sum alleged to be due for town dues. The Plaintiff's filed their bill, alleging that the Defendants had in their cusbody cases for the opinion of counsel, by which it would appear that the Defendants had no right to levy the dues, and also various charters, deeds, &c., by which the truth of the attachments in the bill would appear. The Defendants admitted in their answer that they had, in their custody, several cases, two of which were prepared many years ago, and without reference to the existing proceedings, but which contained mistaken representations as to the nature of their title to the dues, and the rest of which were prepared pending, or in contemplation of the existing proceedings, and that they also had, in their custody, charters, deeds and copies of accounts from public offices, which evidenced their title to the dues. A motion, by the Plaintiffs, for a production of all the documents, was granted as to the two old cases only.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Vansandau and Brown v Browne [1832] EngR 869; (1832) 9 Bing 403; (1832) 131 ER 667
24 Nov 1832


Legal Professions
An attorney is not compelled to proceed to the end of a suit in order to be entitled to his costs, but may, upon reasonable cause and reasonable notice, abandon the conduct of the suit, and in such case may recover his costs for the period during which he was employed.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Greenhough v Gaskell (1833) 1 My & K 98; [1833] EngR 105; (1833) Coop T Br 96; (1833) 47 ER 35
1833
CA
Lord Brougham LC
Legal Professions
The question arose whether the defendant solicitor, sued for fraudulently concealing that his client was insolvent and thereby inducing the plaintiff to issue a promissory note on the client’s behalf, could claim privilege in respect of communications which he had received from his client. The Lord Chancellor held that the defendant could claim privilege, that it made no difference whether it was the client or the solicitor who was the defendant and that it did not matter that, at the time, there were no existing or contemplated proceedings. In relation to lawyers: "Here the question relates to the solicitor, who is called upon to produce the entries he had made in accounts, and letters received by him, and those written (chiefly to his town agent) by him, or by his direction, in his character or situation of confidential solicitor to the party; and I am of opinion that he cannot be compelled to disclose papers delivered, or communications made to him, or letters, or entries made by him in that capacity. To compel a party himself to answer upon oath, even as to his belief or his thoughts, is one thing; nay, to compel him to disclose what he has written or spoken to others, not being his professional advisers, is competent to the party seeking the discovery; for such communications are not necessary to the conduct of judicial business, and the defence or prosecution of men's rights by the aid of skilful persons. To force from the party himself the production of communications made by him to professional men seems inconsistent with the possibility of an ignorant man safely resorting to professional advice, and can only be justified if the authority of decided cases warrants it. But no authority sanctions the much wider violation of professional confidence, and in circumstances wholly different, which would be involved in compelling counsel or attorneys or solicitors to disclose matters committed to them in their professional capacity, and which, but for their employment as professional men, they would not have become possessed of. As regards them, it does not appear that the protection is qualified by any reference to proceedings pending or in contemplation. If touching matters that come within the ordinary scope of professional employment, they receive a communication in their professional capacity, either from a client, or on his account, and for his benefit in the transaction of his business, or, which amounts to the same thing, if they commit to paper, in the course of their employment on his behalf, matters which they know only through their professional relation to the client, they are not only justified in withholding such matters, but bound to withhold them, and will not be compelled to disclose the information or produce the papers in any Court of law or equity, either as party or as witness. If this protection were confined to cases where proceedings had commenced, the rule would exclude the most confidential, and it may be the most important of all communications - those made with a view of being prepared either for instituting or defending a suit, up to the instant that the process of the Court issued."
If it were confined to proceedings begun or in contemplation, then every communication would be unprotected which a party makes with a view to his general defence against attacks which he apprehends, although at the time no one may have resolved to assail him. But were it allowed to extend over such communications, the protection would be insufficient, if it only included communications more or less connected with judicial proceedings; for a person oftentimes requires the aid of professional advice upon the subject of his rights and his liabilities, with no references to any particular litigation, and without any other reference to litigation generally than all human affairs have, in so far as every transaction may, by possibility, become the subject of judicial inquiry. 'It would be most mischievous,' said the learned Judges in the Common Pleas, 'if it could be doubted whether or not an attorney, consulted upon a man's title to an estate, was at liberty to divulge a flaw' (2 Brod. & Bingh. 6). . . The foundation of this rule is not difficult to discover. It is not (as has sometimes been said) on account of any particular importance which the law attributes to the business of legal professors, or any particular disposition to afford them protection, though certainly it may not be very easy to discover why a like privilege has been refused to others, and especially to medical advisers. . . . But it is out of regard to the interests of justice, which cannot be upholden, and to the administration of justice, which cannot go on, without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, in the practice of the Courts, and in those matters affecting rights and obligations which form the subject of all judicial proceedings. If the privilege did not exist at all, every one would be thrown upon his own legal resources; deprived of all professional assistance, a man would not venture to consult any skilful person, or would only dare to tell his counsellor half his case. If the privilege were confined to communications connected with suits begun, or intended, or expected, or apprehended, no one could safely adopt such precautions as might eventually render any proceedings successful, or all proceedings superfluous."
However: "for a person at times requires the aid of professional advice upon the subject of his rights and liabilities, with no references to any particular litigation, and without any other reference to litigation generally than all human affairs have, in so far as every transaction may, by possibility, become the subject of judicial inquiry….The foundation of this rule is not difficult to discover. It is not (as has sometimes been said) on account of any particular importance which the law attaches to the business of legal professors, or any particular disposition to afford them protection, though certainly it may not be very easy to discover why a like privilege has been refused to others, and especially medical advisers. But it is out of regard to the interests of justice, which cannot go on, without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, in the practice of the courts, and in those matters affecting rights and obligations which form the subject of all judicial proceedings. If the privilege did not exist at all, every one would be thrown upon his own legal resources"
and "the interests of justice, which cannot be upholden, and the administration of justice, which cannot go on without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, in the practice of the courts, and in those matters affecting rights and obligations which form the subject of all judicial proceedings."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Bolton v Liverpool Corporation; HL 1833 - (1833) 1 My & K 88; [1833] EngR 409; (1833) 39 ER 614
 
Greenough v Gaskell [1833] EngR 333; (1833) 1 My & K 98; (1833) 39 ER 618
17 Jan 1833

Lord Brougham LC
Legal Professions
On a bill which sought to charge a solicitor with a fraud practised on the Plaintiffs in the course of proceedings on his client’s behalf, the Court refused to order the production of entries and memorandums contained in the Defendant’s books, or of written communications, made or received by him, relating to those proceedings, and admitted by the answer to he in the Defendant’s custody.
And, generally, it seems that a solicitor cannot be compelled, at the instance of a third party, to clisclose matters which have come to his knowledge in the conduct of professional business for a client, even though such business had no reference to legal proceedings, either existing or in contemplation.
Lord Brougham LC said: "The foundation of this rule is not difficult to discover. It is not (as has sometimes been said) on account of any particular importance which the law attributes to the business of legal professors, or any particular disposition to afford them protection, though certainly it may not be very easy to discover why a like privilege has been refused to others, and especially to medical advisers. But it is out of regard to the interests of justice, which cannot be upholden, and to the administration of justice, which cannot go on, without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, in the practice of the Courts, and in those matters affecting rights and obligations which form the subject of all judicial proceedings. If the privilege did not exist at all, every one would be thrown upon his own legal resources; deprived of all professional assistance, a man would not venture to consult any skilful person, or would only dare to tell his counsellor half his case. If the privilege were confined to communications connected with suits begun, or intended, or expected, or apprehended, no one could safely adopt such precautions as might eventually render any proceedings successful, or all proceedings superfluous."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Sadler v Palfreyman, Chambers, And Ward, And Chambers And Ward v Sadler [1834] EngR 826; (1834) 1 Ad & E 717; (1834) 110 ER 1381
5 Jun 1834


Legal Professions

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Fenton [1835] EngR 741; (1835) 3 Ad & E 404; (1835) 111 ER 467 (A)
27 May 1835


Legal Professions
Thie Court will not, in a summary way compel an attorney of the Court to pay over money to a party entitled to it, though the attorney has received it from a client to be paid to such party, if the application is not made on behalf of the client.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Becke, Gent One, &Amp;C v Penn And Another [1835] EngR 1060; (1835) 7 Car & P 397; (1835) 173 ER 177
9 Dec 1835


Legal Professions
If an attorney deliver a bill to his client duly signed, for business in Court, and another separate bill for conveyancing, not signed ; in an action for the amount of the conveyancing bill, its not being signed is no objection at the trial, but a Judge would, on application, order both bills to be taxed. If A, having employed as attorney to defend an action, assign his property to trustees for the benefit of his creditors, and the trustees direct the attorney to go on with the defence- they are liable to pay the attorney for what he does after they directed him to go on, but are not liable for the bygone business, unless there be an agreement in writing to make them so.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Heslop v Metcalfe [1837] 3 My & Cr 183
1837

Lord Cottenham LC
Legal Professions
The court referred to the practice that where a solicitor removed himself from a case, an order should be made for the transfer of his file of papers: "Undoubtedly, that doctrine may expose a solicitor to a very great inconvenience and hardship, if, after embarking in a cause, he finds that he cannot get the necessary funds wherewith to carry it on. But, on the other hand, extreme hardship might arise to the client if - to take the case which is not uncommon in the smaller practice in the country - a solictor, who finds a poor man having a good claim, and having but a small sum of money at his command, may go until that fund is exhausted, and then, refusing to proceed further, may hang up the cause by withholding the papers in his hands. That would be great grievance and means of oppression to a poor client, who in the clearest right in th eworld, might still be without the means of employing another solicitor. The rule of the Court must be adapted in every case that may occur, and be calculated to protect suitors against such conduct." and "I then take the law as laid down by Lord Eldon, and, adapting that law, must holdthat Mr Blunt is not to be permitted to impose upon the Plaintiff the necessity of carrying on his cause in an expensive, inconvenient, and disadvantageous manner. I think the principle should be, that the solicitor claiming the lien, should have every security not inconsistent with the progress of the cause.”
1 Citers


 
Butlin v Barry [1837] EngR 984; (1837) 1 Curt 614; (1837) 163 ER 215
5 Sep 1837


Wills and Probate, Legal Professions
(Prerogative Court) A will being drawn by a solicitor, in which a considerable legacy was given to himself and to the medical man and butler of the deceased, excluding an only son, the presumption of law is strong against the act, and the Court requires strong evidence to satisfy it that the act is the real and voluntary act of the testator. Under the circumstances sufficient evidence being given of the capacity of the deceased and of his knowledge of the contents of the instrument, the Court pronounced for the will and condemned the son in costs from the time of giving in his allegatian.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Neale v Postlethwaite [1841] EngR 62; (1841) 1 QB 243; (1841) 113 ER 1122
1841


Legal Professions

[ Commonlii ]
 
Brydges v Branfill (1842) 12 Sim 369
1842

Sir Lancelot Shadwell VC
Equity, Vicarious Liability, Legal Professions
A tenant for life of settled land set out on an elaborate fraud aiming for the capital. It required first a private Act of Parliament to enable the estate to be sold under the direction of the court and the proceeds paid into court and invested in other land; a fictitious sale of the tenant for life's own lands to an associate of his; the application of the money in court in the purchase of the land from the associate at an excessive price; and the deliberate deception of the court to obtain an order under which part of the money in court was paid out to the tenant for life. He employed a firm of solicitors to act for him in obtaining the Act and the orders of the court and in every other proceeding under the Act. Brooks, the partner who acted in the transactions knew the circumstances of the transactions, but neither of his partners was aware that there was any fraud or irregularity in them. Held: Though the partners were blameless, they were jointly and severally liable with Brooks to make good the loss to the trust estate. The court allowed a claim in Chancery for the vicarious liability of partners for his equitable wrongdoing.
1 Citers


 
Herring v Clobery (1842) 1 Ph 91
1842

Lord Lyndhurst LC
Legal Professions
The court considered whether legal advice privilege should be confined to litigation: "But further, I think that restriction of the rule is not consistent with, and not founded on, any sound principle; for it may, and in a great variety of cases would, be of as much importance to parties that the communications made between a client and a solicitor with respect to the state of the client's property, with respect to his liabilities, with respect to his title, should be protected, as that protection should be afforded to communications made in the progress of a cause; and it appears to me that, as individuals must from time to time resort to their legal advisers for guidance in their ordinary transactions, public policy requires that communications of that kind should be privileged and protected, in order that they may be free and unfettered."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Carter, Esq v Sir William Henry Palmer, Bart [1842] EngR 397; (1841,1842) 8 Cl & Fin 657; (1842) 8 ER 256
17 Mar 1842


Legal Professions, Agency
The employment of counsel as confidential legal adviser disables him from purchasing for his own benefit charges on his client's etates, without his permission ; and although the confidential employment ceases, the disability continues as long as the reasons on which it is founded continue to operate.
C, a barrister, who had been for several years confidential and advising couunsel to P, and had, by reason of that relation, acquired an intimate knowledge of his property and liabilities, and was particularly consulted as to a compromise of securities given by P for a debt which C considered not to be recoverable for the full amount, purchased these securities for less than their nominal amount, without notice to P after ceasing to be his counsel. Held: that C's purchase, while the compromise proposed by P was feasible, was in trust for P ; and that C was entitled only to the sum he had paid, with interest according to the course of the Court.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re John Whytehead [1842] EngR 757 (A); (1842) 4 Man & G 768
11 Jun 1842


Legal Professions
A rule to prohibit an attorney from practising in this court was granted on reading a rule of the court of Queen’s Bench to the like effect. Channell Serjt. moved for a rule to prohibit Mr Whytehead, as attorney of this court, from practising in, upon reading a rule of the Queen’s Bench prohibiting him from practising in that court. The learned serjeant cited ex parte Fates (9 Bingh, 455, 2 Moo. & Sc. 618), where an attorney was struck off the roll of this court in accordance with a rule of the court of King’s Bench for striking him off the roll of that court, and he was afterwards readmitted in this court, without any inquiry as to the circumstances upon his being readmitted in (the court of King’s Bench. Per curiam. You may take your rule. Rule absolute
[ Commonlii ]
 
Allen v Aldridge (1844) 5 Beav 401
1844

Lord Langdale MR
Legal Professions
The case concerned the recovery of costs by a solicitor for acting as steward of a manor. The claim to tax such costs failed: “The statute does not authorise the taxation of every pecuniary demand or bill which may be made or delivered by a person who is a solicitor, for every species of employment in which he may happen to be engaged. The business contained in a taxable bill may be business of which no part was transacted in any Court of law or Equity; but I am of opinion that it must be business connected with the profession of an attorney or solicitor – business in which the attorney or solicitor was employed, because he was an attorney or solicitor, or in which he would not have been employed, if he had not been an attorney or solicitor, or if the relation of attorney or solicitor and client had not subsisted between him and his employer. It may perhaps, on some occasions, be questionable, whether the business contained in a solicitor’s bill be or be not such as to make the bill taxable under the Act; but in the present case I do not see any reason to doubt. The relation of solicitor and client did not subsist between Mr Ward and the Petitioners, or any of them, or between Mr Ward and any other person in relation to this matter. He was not employed by the Petitioners because he was a solicitor, but because he was steward of the manor, and he might have been steward of the manor, without being a solicitor. His bill is not as to any part of it a solicitor’s bill; it is a bill of charges claimed to be payable to the steward of the manor, and nothing else; and I am of opinion that the statute gives me no jurisdiction over it.”
Solicitors Act 1843 37
1 Citers



 
 Holmes v Baddeley; HL 1844 - (1844) 1 Ph 476
 
Ward v The Society Of Attornies [1844] EngR 816; (1844) 1 Coll 370; (1844) 63 ER 459
26 Jul 1844


Legal Professions, Company, Litigation Practice
On a motion made on behalf of the minority for an injunction to restrain the majority of the members of a corporation from surrendering their charter, with a view to obtain a new charter for an object different from that for which the original charter was granted, the Court granted the injunction until the hearing.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Lloyd v Mason [1845] EngR 328; (1844-45) 4 Hare 132; (1845) 67 ER 590
11 Jan 1845


Legal Professions

[ Commonlii ]
 
Carpmael v Powis (1846) 1 Ph 687
1846

Lord Lyndhurst LC
Legal Professions, Evidence
The court discussed the extent and scope of legal professional privilege: "I am of the opinion that the privilege extends to all communications between a solicitor, as such, and his client, relating to matters within the ordinary scope of a solicitor's duty." and "Now, it cannot be denied that it is an ordinary part of a solicitor's business to treat for the sale or purchase of estates for his clients. For some purposes his intervention is indispensable in such transactions: he is to draw the agreements, to investigate the title, to prepare the conveyance. All these things are in the common course of his business. But it is said that the fixing of a reserved bidding and other matters connected with the sale are not of that character, inasmuch as they might be entrusted equally well to anyone else. It is impossible, however, to split the duties in that manner without getting into inextricable confusion. I consider them all parts of one transaction – the sale of an estate : and that a transaction in which solicitors are ordinarily employed by their client. That being the case, I consider that all communications which may have taken place between the witness and his client in reference to that transaction are privileged."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Jardine v Sheridan [1846] EngR 99 (B); (1846) 2 Car & K 24
1846


Legal Professions
Where the clerk of plaintiff’s attorney went to defendant’s attorney for the object of effecting a compromise, and what he said was said with the wish of effecting it. Held: All that passed was privileged, as being a negotiation to bring about a compromise.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Pearse v Pearse (1846) 1 De G & Sm 12
2 Jan 1846

Knight Bruce V-C
Legal Professions
Legal privilege was claimed for communications related to transactions concerning the client's lands and unconnected with any existing or anticipated litigation. Held: The work done was all part of one transaction of the nature in which solicitors are ordinarily employed, and it was privileged. "The discovery and vindication and establishment of truth are main purposes certainly of the existence of Courts of Justice; still, for the obtaining of these objects, which, however valuable and important, cannot be usefully pursued without moderation, cannot be either usefully or creditably pursued unfairly or gained by unfair means, not every channel is or ought to be open to them. The practical inefficacy of torture is not, I suppose, the most weighty objection to that mode of examination. . . Truth, like all other good things, may be loved unwisely - may be pursued too keenly - may cost too much. And surely the meanness and the mischief of prying into a man's confidential communications with his legal adviser, the general evil of infusing reserve and dissimulation, uneasiness, and suspicion and fear, into those communications which must take place, and which, unless in a condition of perfect security, must take place uselessly or worse, are too great a price to pay for truth itself."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Ivimey v Marks [1847] 16 M & W 843
1847


Legal Professions
A solicitor's charge for an item in an action, without specifying in what court the action is brought, rendered the bill bad, the reason being that the client ought to be enabled by the bill to obtain advice as to taxation without the need of further question.
1 Citers


 
In Re Harrison [1847] EngR 175; (1846-1847) 10 Beav 57; (1847) 50 ER 503
28 Jan 1847


Legal Professions
Effect of payment of a bill of costs 'under protest'.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Penruddock v Hammond [1847] EngR 955 (A); (1847) 11 Beav 59
1 Dec 1847


Legal Professions, Litigation Practice
Privilege as to cases and opinions anterior to any litigation. A Defendant by his answer, stated, that he was advised that the cases and opinions stated in the schedule, were privileged. Held, that the privilege was not sufficiently shewn by the answer; but liberty was given to supply the omission by affidavit.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Keene v Ward (1849) 13 QB 513
1849


Legal Professions

1 Citers


 
Pelly v Wathen [1849] EngR 398; (1849) 7 Hare 351; (1849) 68 ER 144
15 Mar 1849


Legal Professions
The lien of a solicitor on the deeds of his client is a legal right which cannot be greater in extent than the interest of the client in the deeds, and does not enable the solicitor to retain the deeds against third parties, where the client could not against such third parties give the solicitor a lien upon the property to which the deeds relate. In determining the extent of such lien equity follows the law; and although the deeds might have come to the possession of the solicitor without notice of a prior equitable claim, the Court gives effect as against the solicitor to such prior equitable right.
A solicitor does not, as solicitor, acquire a lien for his costs upon the documents of his client which came into the possession of the solicitor, not in that character but as mortgagee of the client’s estate.
A solicitor does not acquire a lien for costs due to himself solely upon documents which came into the joint possession of himself and his partner or partners; but he does not lose his lien for such costs upon documents which, having come into his own possession, are afterwards continued in the possession of himself and his partner or partners.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Tate v Hitchins And Others [1849] EngR 639; (1849) 7 CB 875; (1849) 137 ER 347
22 May 1849


Legal Professions
Assumpsit against several defendants for work and labour by the plaintiff as an attorney, with counts for money paid, &e. Plea,-by one of the defendants,-to the whole declaration, that the action was commenced, after the 6 & 7 Vict. e. 73, for the recovery of fees, charges, and disbursements due to the plaintiff as an attorney, as in the first count mentioned, and that no signed bill had been delivered to the defendant, or sent by the post to, or left for him at, his counting-house, office of business, dwelling-house, or last known place of abode :-Held, on special demurrer, that the word "disbursements" applied to the count for money paid; and that the plea sufficiently negatived the delivery of a bill of costs within the terms of the statute
[ Commonlii ]

 
 In Re The Duke of Brunswick, And The Sureties Of Crowl And Another; 22-Nov-1849 - [1849] EngR 1058 (B); (1849) 4 Exch 492
 
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