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Land - From: 1960 To: 1969

This page lists 97 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Jones v Challenger [1960] 1 All ER 785; [1961] 1 QB 176
1960
CA
Devlin LJ
Land, Trusts
The test under the section was whether it was inequitable to make the order for sale where one of the joint beneficiaries, who in that case were ex-husband and wife, wished to realise their investment in the property. Held: Referring to the statement of principle in in re Mayo, described as 'a simple uncomplicated case of a trust for sale of freehold property, where the beneficiaries were brother and sister, and where there was no suggestion that either of them were intended or even wished to occupy the property . . But this simple principle cannot prevail where the trust itself in the circumstances in which it was made show that there was a secondary or collateral object besides that of sale . . it is at any rate wrong and inequitable for one of the parties to the trust to invoke the letter of the trust in order to defeat one of its purposes, whether that purpose be written or unwritten, and the court will not permit it."
Law of Property Act 1925 30
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
D M'Ewing and Sons v Renfrewshire County Council [1960] SC 53
1960

Lord Clyde
Land

1 Citers


 
Ghana Commercial Bank v Chandiram [1960] AC 732
1960
PC
Lord Jenkins
Land, Equity
The bank made an advance to the owner of property in Accra which was used to pay off his indebtedness to Barclays (DC & O) Ltd, secured by an equitable mortgage. The owner executed a legal mortgage in favour of the Ghana Bank, but this was invalidated by a previous attachment of the property by a creditor. Held: The Ghana Bank was entitled to be subrogated to the equitable mortgage which had been paid off. "It is not open to doubt that where a third party pays off a mortgage he is presumed, unless the contrary appears, to intend that the mortgage shall be kept alive for his own benefit."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Beesly v Hallwood Estates Ltd [1960] 1 WLR 549
1960

Buckley J
Land
A lease contained an option to renew. Both the lease and the reversion were assigned for value. The assignee of the lease exercised the option and a new lease and counterpart were engrossed. The tenant executed the counterpart. The assignee of the reversion, a company, sealed the lease, but then sought to avoid granting the lease. Held: Buckley J said that where a deed is intended to be executed in duplicate to give effect to a transaction by which each of the two parties undertakes obligations to the other, prima facie a party executing the lease does so in escrow conditionally on the other party executing his part of the lease. J Buckley said that he was bound to treat an instrument complying with section 74(1) as "having been not only sealed but also delivered." When a party has delievered a document in escrow, he must await the event to see whether or not the condition is fulfilled.
Law of Property Act 1925 74(1)
1 Citers



 
 Ching Garage Ltd v Chingford Corporation; HL 1961 - [1961] 1 WLR 470
 
Sussex Caravan Parks Ltd v Richardson [1961] 1 WLR 561
1961
CA
Harman LJ
Land
Harman LJ described the Watcham case: "a case which has been long under suspicion of the gravest kind from real property lawyers."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Re Stirrup's Contract; 1961 - [1961] 1 WLR 449
 
Dunn v Blackdown Properties Ltd [1961] 1 Ch 433
1961

Cross J
Land
Application of the rule against perpetuities to expiration of rights of way.
1 Citers


 
Seekings v Clarke (1961) 59 LGR 268
1961

Lord Parker CJ
Land, Crime
Lord Parker CJ said: "It is perfectly clear that anything which substantially prevents the public from having free access over the whole of the highway which is not purely temporary in nature is an unlawful obstruction".
1 Citers



 
 Stokes v Cambridge Corporation; LT 1961 - (1961) 13 P & CR 77; (1961) 180 EG 839
 
Windsor Refrigerator Co Ltd v Branch Nominees [1961] Ch 88
1961

Cross J
Land
"A deed, whether executed by a corporation or by an individual, does not necessarily bind the grantor as soon as it is sealed. It only becomes binding when it has been 'delivered' by the grantor as his deed, i.e., when the grantor has indicated by words or conduct that he intends the deed which he has executed to be binding on him."
Law of Property Act 1925 74(1)
1 Citers


 
Westminster City Council v Quereshi [1991] CLY 461
1961


Land, Local Government

1 Citers


 
Marten v Flight Refuelling Limited [1962] Ch 115
1962

Wilberforce J
Land
The court denied the existence of a building scheme. Held: Where an owner of land, on selling part of it, sees fit to impose a restriction and expresses that restriction as being for the benefit of the land which he retains, the court will normally assume that it is capable of doing so. Wilberforce J: "Was the land capable of being benefited by the covenant? On this point . . the answer would appear to be simple. If an owner of land, on selling part of it, thinks fit to impose a restriction on user, and the restriction was imposed for the purpose of benefiting the land retained, the court would normally assume that it is capable of doing so. There might, of course, be exceptional cases where the covenant was on the face of it taken capriciously or not bona fide . . Why, indeed, should the court seek to substitute its own standard for those of the parties - and on what basis can it do so?"
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Simpsons Motor Sales (London) Ltd v Hendon Corporation (No 1) [1963] Ch 57; [1962] 3 WLR 666; [1962] 3 All ER 75; (1962) 126 JP 488; 60 LGR 393; 13 P&CR 372; [1962] RVR 583; (1962) 106 SJ 490
1962
CA

Land, Local Government
The use of land purchased under compulsory powers for a different purpose was ultra vires, but did not undermine the original notice to treat. There was no reason not to use a compendious description of the range of purposes for which land was to be acquired.
1 Citers


 
Wolverton Urban District Council v Willis [1962] 1 WLR 205; [1962] 1 All ER 243
1962


Land
Where a bridleway designation is not restricted, a gate erected over the line of the way is an unauthorised obstruction, though since every member of the public is entitled to pass and repass along a public road, the rights of each member of the public so to pass are subject to such obstacles, congestion and inconvenience as may be caused by the exercise by other members of the public of their rights to pass and repass along the road. As a matter of law members of the public are entitled to utilise the full width of any footpath over which they have rights of way, subject to a very narrow de minimis exception
1 Citers


 
Birmingham Citizens Permanent Building Society v Caunt [1962] 1 Ch 883
1962

Russell J
Litigation Practice, Land
The court considered whether there it had jurisdiction to refuse to order possession in favour of a legal mortgagee under an instalment mortgage under which, by reason of default, the whole money had become payable. Held: The court made an extensive review of the authorities. Russell J said: "where (as here) the legal mortgagee under an instalment mortgage under which by reason of default the whole money has become payable, is entitled to possession, the Court has no jurisdiction to decline the order or to adjourn the hearing whether on terms of keeping up payments or paying arrears if the mortgagee cannot be persuaded to agree to this course. To this the sole exception is that the application may be adjourned for a short time to afford to the mortgagor the chance of paying off the mortgage in full or otherwise satisfying him; but this should not be done if there is no reasonable prospect of this occurring. When I say the sole exception, I do not, of course, intend to exclude adjournments which in the ordinary course of procedure may be desirable in circumstances such as temporary inability of a party to attend, and so forth."
1 Citers


 
Glamorgan County Council v Carter [1963] 1 WLR 1; [1962] CLY 3002
1962
QBD
Salmon J
Land, Limitation
A caravan owner appealed against an enforcement notice on the basis that no planning permission was required because the parking of caravans was the purpose for which the land had been last used. Held: Factually that was correct. Prima facie it afforded a statutory defence. But the user amounted to a criminal or quasi criminal offence and, therefore, it could not be relied upon. It is plain on principle that a plaintiff could not acquire any legal right or easement by the illegal user to which she was putting the land. Salmon LJ said: "It seems to me plain on principle that Mrs James could not acquire any legal right by the illegal use to which she was putting the land."
Town and Country Planning Act 1947 12(5)(c)
1 Citers



 
 Smith v Mansi; CA 1962 - [1963] 1 WLR 26; [1962] 3 All ER 857

 
 Blythe Corporation's Application; 1962 - (1962) 14 PLCR 56
 
Pennard Dock Engineering Co Ltd v Pounds [1963] 1 LI 359
1963


Land, Damages

1 Citers


 
Johnstone v Holdway [1963] 1 QB 601
1963


Land

1 Citers


 
Arrowsmith v Jenkins [1963] 2 QB 561
1963

Lord Parker CJ
Crime, Land
Lord Parker CJ said that "wilfully" in the context of an accusation of wilfully obstructing a highway means "intentionally as opposed to accidentally, that is, by an exercise of his or her free will"
1 Citers



 
 Selkirk v Romar Investments Ltd; PC 1963 - [1963] 1 WLR 1415

 
 Wyld v Silver; 1963 - [1963] Ch 243
 
Edgington v Clark [1963] 1 QB 367
1963

Upjohn LJ
Limitation, Land
All that is required to constitute an acknowledgement so as to defeat a claim under limitation, is that, as between himself and the paper title owner, the person in possession acknowledges that the paper title owner has the better title to the land. Whether or not a particular writing amounts to an acknowledgement depends on the true construction of the document in all the surrounding circumstances. It is not possible to lay down any more general rule than that. Upjohn LJ said: "Whether or not a particular writing amounts to an acknowledgment must depend on the true construction of the document in all the surrounding circumstances."
Limitation Act 1980 30
1 Citers



 
 Re Hewitt's Contract; 1963 - [1963] 1 WLR 1298
 
Venerable Vagisvaracharya Morontuduwe Sri Naneswara Dhammananda Nayaka Thero v Venerable Kalukondayawe Pannasekera Nayaka Thero and Others [1963] UKPC 17
27 Jun 1963
PC

Land
Ceylon
[ Bailii ]
 
Edginton v Clark [1964] 1 QB 367
1964
CA
Upjohn LJ
Land, Limitation
An offer to purchase the paper owner's interest, even if made "subject to contract", can be a sufficient acknowledgement of his title to defeat a claim for adverse possession. Upjohn LJ said: "If a man makes an offer to purchase freehold property, even though the offer be subject to contract, he is quite clearly saying that as between himself and the person to whom he makes the offer he realises that the latter has the better title, and that would seem to be the plainest possible form of acknowledgment." However, "it is not possible to lay down any general rule as to what constitutes an acknowledgment". Whether any particular form of words amounts to an acknowledgement depends on the true construction of the document in all the surrounding circumstances.
1 Citers


 
National Provincial Bank Ltd v Hastings Car Mart Ltd [1964] Ch 665
1964
CA
Lord Denning MR, Russell LJ
Registered Land, Land
The purpose and effect of section 70(1)(g) of the Land Registration Act 1925 was to make applicable to registered land the same rule as previously had been held to apply to unregistered land. (Russell LJ, Dissenting) "Nor should the mind be in any way distracted by the fact that the owner of the rights under section 70(1) (g) is identified as a person in actual occupation. It is the rights of such a person which constitute the overriding interest and must be examined, not his occupation."
Registered Land Act 1925 70(1)(g)
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Simpsons Motor Sales (London) Ltd v Hendon Corporation; HL 1964 - [1964] AC 1088
 
William Cory and Son Limited v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1964] 3 All ER 66
1964
CA
Lord Denning MR
Land, Contract, Stamp Duty
Lord Denning MR discussed what was meant by delivery of a document in escrow: "When an instrument is delivered in escrow, that only means that it is delivered on condition (which may be expressed or implied by conduct) that it is not to be operative until some condition is performed: see Norton on Deeds 2nd Edition page 18. A good instance is where, on a proposed sale of land, only part of the purchase price has been paid, but the vendor lets the purchaser into possession and delivers the deed to the purchaser's solicitor, and tells him to hold it until the balance is paid. The deed is clearly delivered on condition that it is not to be operative until the price is paid. Whilst the condition remains unperformed, the sale is not complete and the purchaser does not get the legal title (see Watkins v Nash in 1875 and Thompson v McCullough in 1947); but as soon as the money is paid, the sale is complete. The instrument there may precede any binding contract. But when the sale is complete it is clearly a conveyance on sale and is liable to stamp duty."
1 Citers


 
Davy v Leeds Corporation [1964] 3 All ER 390; [1964] 1 WLR 1218
1964
CA
Harman LJ
Land, Damages
Harman LJ described the section as 'monstrous legislative morass' and 'a Slough of Despond'.
Land Compensation Act 1961 6
1 Citers



 
 in Re White Rose Cottage; ChD 1964 - [1964] Ch 483
 
Edwards v Minister of Transport [1964] 2 QB 134
1964


Land, Damages
The landowner claimed for injurious affection of the remainder of his land after part was acquired by compulsory purchase. Held: The claim for injurious affection was confined to the effects of works and uses on the land taken.
Land Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 63
1 Citers



 
 Capital Investments Ltd v Wednesfield Urban District Council; ChD 12-Feb-1964 - [1965] Ch 774; (1964) 108 SJ 377; [1964] 2 WLR 932; [1964] 1 All ER 655; (1964) 128 JP 287; 62 LGR 566; 15 P & CR 435

 
 Commissioner for Railways v Quinlan; PC 9-Mar-1964 - [1964] 1 All ER 897; [1964] 2 WLR 817; [1964] AC 1054; [1964] UKPC 9

 
 Phipps v Pears and others; CA 10-Mar-1964 - [1964] 2 All ER 35; [1965] 1 QB 76; [1964] 2 WLR 996; [1964] EWCA Civ 3
 
Wong v Beaumont Property Trust Ltd [1965] 1 QB 173; [1964] 2 WLR 1325; [1964] 2 All ER 119; (1964) 108 SJ 237; [1964] EWCA Civ 4
12 Mar 1964
CA
Lord Denning MR, Pearson LJ, Salmon LJ
Land, Litigation Practice
A basement had been let to the plaintiff for use as a Chinese restaurant. The lease required the tenant to use the property as a restaurant, but also to control all smells. To do that it was necessary for the plaintiff to install a proper system for taking away the smells, which would have to go through the landlord's property. Held: The County Court had jurisdiction to hear such a claim on the basis assumed that the rateable value of each property was within the limits. An easement of necessity had been shown under the rule in Pwllbach.
Food Hygiene (General) Regulations 1960 (SI 1960 601) - County Court (Jurisdiction) Act 1963 1 - County Courts Act 1959 51
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]

 
 Hunter v Fox; HL 8-Apr-1964 - [1964] UKHL 8; 1964 SLT 20; 1964 190 EG 205; 1964 SC (HL) 95
 
Golden Lion Hotel v Carter [1965] 2 All ER 506
1965

Cross J
Land, Landlord and Tenant
A lease of a plot of land fronting a road contained a covenant by the lessor, who was also the owner of land with a hotel on the opposite side of the road, not to build on the hotel site except to a specified extent. Subsequently, the lessee acquired the freehold reversion. The successor to the hotel site brought an action for a declaration that, the lease having been extinguished by merger, the covenant was no longer enforceable. Held: On the facts there had been merger, and the covenant was accordingly unenforceable. The court rejected the defendant's argument that "though the leases no longer exist a corresponding right to enforce the covenants in equity against the plaintiff remains attached to the houses until the date when the leases would have expired." There need be "nothing unconscionable" in a party taking advantage of a conveyancer's mistake for a neighbour. As to the intention to merge the lease, Cross J said: "it is possible, though no doubt unlikely, that (the relevant parties) intended to give up any right to enforce the covenant in the respective leases against the plaintiff, and even if one assumes-which is much more likely-that they did not so intend and that the positive declarations that the lease should merge in the freeholds were inserted per incuriam, there is nothing unconscionable in the plaintiff, who was not concerned in the matter, taking advantage of the faulty conveyancing."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Jones v Price [1965] 2 QB 618
1965

Willmer LJ
Land
Willmer LJ said: "a covenant to perform positive acts . . is not one the burden of which runs with the land so as to bind the successors in title of the covenantor: see Austerberry v. Oldham Corporation."
1 Citers


 
Re Jeffkins Indentures [1965] 1 WLR 375
1965

Cross J
Costs, Land
"a plaintiff seeking a declaration that restrictive covenants do not affect his property is expected to pay his own costs. He is also expected to pay the costs of any defendants who enter an appearance down to the point in proceedings at which they have had a full opportunity of considering the matter and deciding whether or not to oppose the application. Any defendant who then decides to continue, and appears unsuccessfully before the judge, does so at his own risk as to his own costs at that stage. Such defendant should not however be ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs."
1 Citers


 
Qinn v Scott [1965] 1 WLR 1004
1965
QBD
Glyn-Jones J
Negligence, Land
A tree fell across the highway, injuring the plaintiff. Held: The claim succeeded. he decay of the tree (which was owned by the National Trust), was there to be seen and the tree should have been felled. Glyn-Jones J said: "The duty of the Trust is to take such care as a reasonable landowner - and that means a prudent landowner - would take to prevent unnecessary danger to users of the highway adjoining the Trust's land. There is not to be imputed in the ordinary landowner the knowledge possessed by the skilled expert in forestry . . But, in my opinion, there may be circumstances in which it is incumbent on a landowner to call in somebody skilled in forestry to advise him, and I have no doubt but that a landowner on whose land this belt of trees stood, adjoining a busy highway, was under a duty to provide himself with skilled advice about the safety of the trees"
1 Citers



 
 Davy v Leeds Corporation; HL 1965 - [1965] 1 WLR 445
 
Baxter v Four Oaks Properties Limited [1965] Ch 816
1965
ChD
Cross J
Land
The original owner of the estate alleged to be subject to a building scheme had not laid out the estate in lots before selling off plots on it. The court considered whether a building scheme had been established. Held: The failure did not mean that a building scheme was ineffective.
Cross J referred to the difficulty of annexing to a plot of land 'A' which had been earlier sold off, the benefit of a restrictive covenant imposed on the sale of plot 'B' which was the subject of a later sale, and said: "for well over 100 years past where the owner of land deals with it on the footing of imposing restrictive obligations on the use of various parts of it as and when he sells them off for the common benefit of himself (in so far as he retains any land) and of the various purchasers inter se a court of equity has been prepared to give effect to this common intention notwithstanding any technical difficulties involved."
He went on to explore the history of the law relating to building schemes: 'The view taken by the courts has been rather that the common vendor imposed a common law on a defined area of land and that whenever he sold a piece of it to a purchaser who knew of the common law, that piece of land automatically became entitled to the benefit of, and subject to the burden of, the common law. With the passage in time it became apparent that there was no particular virtue in the execution of a deed of mutual covenant — save as evidence of the intention of the parties — and what came to be called "building schemes" were enforced by the courts if satisfied that it was the intention of the parties that the various purchasers should have rights inter se, even though no attempt was made to bring them into direct contractual relations.'
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Keefe v Amor [1965] 1 QB 334
1965
CA
Russell LJ
Land
The Court declined to limit the extent of a right of way 20 feet wide by reference to the bottleneck at its entrance from the road of 4 feet 6 inches, consisting of a pair of gate pillars and a gate of that width. The grant was over the whole 20 feet width of the strip, not merely a 4 feet 6 inch passage down it. Russell LJ suggested that the day after the grant the grantee might compel the demolition of the gateway so as to permit the exercise of the right granted in clear terms the day before. The language of a grant may be such that the topographical circumstances cannot properly be regarded as restricting the scope of the grant according to the language of it.
Russell LJ explained the position: "I would remark that it is sometimes thought that the grant of a right of way in respect of every part of a defined area involves the proposition that the grantee can object to anything on any part of the area which would obstruct passage over that part. This is a wrong understanding of the law. Assuming a right of way of a particular quality over an area of land, it will extend to every part of that area, as a matter, at least, of theory. But a right of way is not a right absolutely to restrict user of the area by the owner thereof. The grantee of the right could only object to such activities of the owner of the land, including retention of obstruction, as substantially interfered with the use of the land in such exercise of the defined right as for the time being is reasonably required. (I am, of course, talking now about private rights of way.)"
1 Citers


 
Hill v Harris [1965] 2 QB 601; [1965] 1 All ER 338
1965
CA

Land, Landlord and Tenant
A lessor or vendor does not impliedly warrant that the premises are fit for any particular purpose. It is the contract which allocates the risk of the premises being unfit for such a purpose to the lessee. The lessee has duties to investigate the title, and to ensure that the permitted use under the tenancy was the permitted use in planning law.
1 Citers


 
British Railways Board v Glass [1965] 1 Ch 538
1965
CA
Harman LJ, Davies LJ
Land
An easement arising by prescription involves a fictional lost grant. The court considered the extent of user of an easement in relation to a prescriptive right of way for the benefit of land used as a caravan site: "A right to use a way for this purpose or that has never been to my knowledge limited to a right to use the way so many times a day or for such and such a number of vehicles so long as the dominant tenement does not change its identity. If there be a radical change in the character of the dominant tenement, then the prescriptive right will not extend to it in that condition. The obvious example is the change of a small dwelling house to a large hotel, but there has been no change of that character according to the facts found in this case."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Nagy v Weston [1965] 1 All ER 78; [1965] 1 WLR 280
1965
QBD
Lord Parker CJ
Crime, Land
The defendant was prosecuted after selling hot dogs from a van parked on a busy street in Oxford. The court was asked when such would become an illegal obstruction. Held: Such a use "could not . . be said to be incidental to the right to pass and repass along the street."
Lord Parker CJ said: "It is undoubtedly true - counsel for the appellant is quite right - that there must be proof that the user in question was an unreasonable use. Whether or not the user amounting to an obstruction is or is not an unreasonable use of the highway is a question of fact. It depends on all the circumstances, including the length of time the obstruction continues, the place where it occurs, the purpose for which it is done, and, of course, whether it does in fact cause an actual obstruction as opposed to a potential obstruction."
1 Citers


 
National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth [1965] UKHL 1; [1965] AC 1175; [1965] 3 WLR 1; [1965] 2 All ER 472
13 May 1965
HL
Lord Hodson, Lord Cohen, Lord Guest, Lord Upjohn, Lord Wilberforce
Land
The respondent stayed on in the family home owned by her husband after he had left, and resisted a possession order sought by the chargee. The husband had charged the house as security for his business debts.
Lord Wilberforce described the common law characteristics of property, saying: "Before a right or an interest can be admitted into the category of property, or of a right affecting property, it must be definable, identifiable by third parties, capable in its nature of assumption by third parties, and have some degree of permanence or stability."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
McCarthy v Wellington City [1966] NZLR 481
1966


Commonwealth, Land, Negligence
A person storing dangerous explosives on his premises owed a duty of care to keep them secure to all persons foreseeably likely to be injured as a result of a breach of that duty.
1 Citers


 
Becker v Partridge [1966] 2 QB 155
1966
CA
Danckwerts LJ
Land
The contract for sale of an underlease provided that the vendor's title "has been accepted . . and the purchaser shall raise no requisition or objection thereto". there had been breaches of covenant in the superior lease giving grounds for forfeiture. Although the vendor did not have actual knowledge, he had "constructive notice", because his solicitor had neglected to inspect the superior lease, as he would have been entitled to do when taking the underlease. Held: The clause was ineffective. A purchaser of a leasehold title is concerned to ascertained that the lease (or any superior lease) is not liable for forfeiture for breach of covenant already committed. It is the duty of the vendor to deduce and then convey a good title and if he relies upon the terms of the contract to shift the risk of any defect in title to the purchaser, the language must clearly do so. General words which did not identify any specific defect in title were inadequate to protect the vendor against liability for a serious defect which he could easily have discovered.
1 Citers


 
Camrose v Basingstoke Corporation [1966] 1 WLR 1100
1966
CA
Lord Denning, Davies LJ, Russell LJ
Land, Damages
Basingstoke was to be expanded to receive overspill population from London and the corporation contracted to purchase about 550 acres from a landowner on terms that the price would be assessed as though the land had been compulsorily acquired under the 1952 Act. About 383 of the 550 acres were, in the town development plan, designated for residential development. The question was whether the increase in the value of the intended residential land brought about by the town development scheme should be reflected in the compensation. The relevant Act for assessment of compensation purposes was 1961 Act. The first question was whether the case fell within one of the new statutory disregards. Held: On a literal reading of the statutory provisions, any increase in value of the relevant land attributable to the development, or the prospect of development, of the rest of the land in the town development plan was to be excluded, but any increase in value of the relevant land due to its own inclusion in the town development plan was not excluded. This conclusion as "contrary to commonsense". And "The explanation of section 6(1) is, I think, this: The legislature was aware of the general principle that, in assessing compensation for compulsory acquisition of a defined parcel of land, you do not take into account an increase in value of that parcel of land if the increase is entirely due to the scheme involving the acquisition. . . . It is left untouched by section 6(1). But there might be some doubt as to its scope. So the legislature passed section 6(1) and the First Schedule in order to make it clear that you were not to take into account any increase due to the development of the other land, namely, land other than the claimed parcel. I think that the decision in the Pointe Gourde case covers one aspect: and section 6(1) covers the other: with the result that the tribunal is to ignore any increase in value due to the Town Development Act, both on the relevant land and on the other land."
Land Compensation Act 1961 5 6
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regent Oil Co Ltd v JA Gregory (Hatch End) Ltd [1966] Ch 402
1966
CA
Harman LJ, Salmon LJ, Willmer LJ
Land
No general distinction is to be drawn between the two types of mortgage and sub-mortgage. The court considered the practice for a mortgagor to attorn tenant to his mortgagee. The tenancy contained no covenants and was merely a device to give the mortgagee a right to obtain summary judgment for possession under the Small Tenements Recovery Act 1838. Held: It was effective to create the relationship of landlord and tenant:
Harman LJ said: "the new charge by way of legal mortgage created by section 87 was intended to be a substitute in all respects for a mortgage by demise, and anything which would be good in the one is good in the other. It would indeed be a trap if the rights of the mortgagee depended on whether his charge were created in one way or the other."
Salmon LJ said: "In my view it is plain that the policy of the legislature, as expressed in section 87, was to put a mortgagee in exactly the same legal position whether he entered into a mortgage in the form of a legal charge or in the form of a sub-demise. The legal effect was to be the same whichever form was chosen. In the one case the mortgagee is the tenant; in the other he is deemed to be so."
Law of Property Act 1925 87
1 Citers


 
Gee v National Trust [1966] 1 WLR 170
1966
CA
Lord Denning MR, Davies LJ, Salmon LJ
Land
Lord Denning MR considered the effect of section 8 of the 1937 Act which read: "Where any person is willing to agree with the National Trust that any land or any part thereof shall so far as his interest in the land enables him to bind it be made subject either permanently or for a specified period to conditions restricting the planning development or use thereof in any manner the National Trust may if it thinks fit enter into an agreement with him or accept a covenant from him to that effect and shall have power to enforce such agreement or covenant against persons deriving title under him in the like manner and to the like extent as if the National Trust were possessed of or entitled to or interested in adjacent land and as if the agreement or covenant had been and had been expressed to be entered into for the benefit of that adjacent land."
He said: "The Lands Tribunal held that the National Trust must be deemed to be the owner of adjacent land; but there is a difficulty about this. There is no land specified. We do not know the area or extent of that adjacent land, nor where it would be situated. In these circumstances I am inclined to think that we do not have to deem any particular land to be in the ownership of the National Trust. Section 8 is simply machinery to give the National Trust a standing to enforce the restriction where they would have no standing at common law. I am prepared to accept the view that the National Trust, when a covenant of this kind is made, are entitled to enforce it so as to protect the interests of which they are the custodians in this country. They are, under the statute, the custodians of the natural beauty of our land, the cliffs and downs, fields and woods, rivers and shores; and of the stately homes, historic buildings, cottages, and barns. In respect of any injury to their interest as custodians of our natural beauty, I think they would be qualified to insist on these covenants."
National Trust Act 1937 8
1 Citers


 
In re Jeffs' Transfer (No 2), Rogers v Astley [1966] 1 WLR 841
1966


Land
The conveyance expressly denied the existence of a building scheme. Held: Covenants which were made 'for the benefit of the remainder of the Chorleywood Estate (Loudwater) belonging to the vendor' were not annexed to each part later sold off.
1 Citers


 
Wheat v E Lacon and Co Ltd [1966] AC 552; [1966] UKHL 1; [1965] 3 WLR 142
1966
HL
Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Denning, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Pearce, Lord Pearson
Land, Negligence
The Appellant's husband, fell while going down the back stairs of a public house called "The Golfer's Arm" at Great Yarmouth. He was found lying on the floor of the vestibule at the bottom of the stairs and died later. She appealed against rejection of her claim and appeal. Held: The word "occupier" has a different meaning according to the subject matter in which it is employed. Lord Pearson used the phrase "control associated with and arising from presence in and use of activity in the premises. There can be more than one occupier of the same premises for the purpose of the 1957 Act.
Lord Denning defined an occupier for the purposes of the Act by examples the second of which was:- "Secondly, where an owner let floors or flats in a building to tenants, but did not demise the common staircase or roof or some other parts, he was regarded as having retained control of all parts not demised by him. Accordingly he was held to be under a duty in respect of those retained parts to all persons coming lawfully on to the premises... But the old cases still apply so as to show that the Landlord is responsible for all parts not demised by him, on the ground that he is regarded as being sufficiently in control of them to impose on him a duty of care to all persons coming lawfully on to the premises." and "the structure was reasonably safe including the handrail and that the system of lighting was efficient, but I doubt whether they were bound to see that the lights were properly switched on or the rugs laid safely on the floor."
Occupiers Liability Act 1957 - Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934
[ Bailii ]
 
E R Ives Investments Ltd v High [1967] 2 QB 379; [1966] EWCA Civ 1; [1967] 1 All ER 504; [1967] 2 WLR 789
14 Dec 1966
CA
Lord Denning MR, Danckwerts, Winn LJJ
Land
One exception to the requirement that an easement must be granted by a deed is that if permission to enjoy a right, capable of constituting an easement, is given by the landowner in terms likely to lead, and that do lead, the beneficiary of the permission to believe he is entitled on a permanent basis to enjoy the right and in that belief he sufficiently alters his position to his detriment, by expenditure of money or otherwise, he may become entitled in equity to the easement by proprietary estoppel. The landowner would not be able to withdraw the permission he had given. 20 years' enjoyment of the equitable right would enable the beneficiary of the permission to claim a legal easement under the 1832 Act. In such a case the enjoyment of the right pursuant to the original permission is enjoyment by a person "claiming right thereto". The original permission would be the foundation of the claim of right but the enjoyment would not have been precario. A purchaser taking with actual notice of the equity will be bound by it. An equity arising from a proprietary estoppel could not be registrable under the Land Charges Act as an equitable easement within class D(iii).
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Tophams Ltd v Earl of Sefton [1967] 1 AC 50
1967
HL
Lord Upjohn and Lord Wilberforce
Land
Section 79 of the Law of Property Act (relating to the burden of covenants) achieved no more than the introduction of statutory shorthand into the drafting of covenants. It does does not have the effect of causing covenants to run with the land
Law of Property Act 1925 79
1 Citers


 
Jolliffe v Exeter Corporation [1967] 1 WLR 993
1967
CA
Lord Denning, Davies LJ, Russell LJ
Land, Damages, Planning
Mr Joliffe owned a garage on a busy road. Adjoining land was involved in a widening scheme, the result of which was to leave his garage at the end of a cul de sac, though no land was taken from him. Held: Section 10 gave him no right to compensation. Where the execution of the works is facilitated by a stopping-up order made by a different compensating authority, under a different statutory scheme not incorporating the 1965 Act, the stopping up does not give rise to a claim under section 10.
Davies LJ noted that the stopping up of the street was done by the Minister under the Town and Country Planning Act, which made no provision for compensation.
Russell LJ said that: "the execution of the works authorised, that is to say, the construction of the highway" had no injurious effect on the plaintiff's property and "The damage was already done. Coombe Street, before a pick or spade had been laid on the works, had been turned into a cul-de-sac so far as the plaintiff was concerned."
Lord Denning said od a stopping up order that it: "authorised the stopping up of various streets in Exeter, including this part of Coombe Street. But it is important to observe that the Act of 1947 contains no provision for compensation. In this respect the Act is like the old Highways Act, 1835. The legislature provided for local inquiries and confirmation by quarter sessions, but no provisions for compensation. Under that Act the stopping up might ruin a man's trade, but he could recover no compensation. So here, the stopping up of Coombe Street may damage Mr Joliffe's trade in that street, but he can recover no compensation on that account."
1 Citers


 
Beckett (Alfred F) v Lyons [1967] CLY 3549; [1967] Ch 449
1967


Land
A claim was made that the inhabitants of the County Palatine of Durham had the right to take coal from the seashore. Held: Dedication of a public right must be to the public at large or a sufficiently large section of the public at large and not just to a fluctuating body of persons in a particular locality. The right claimed could not be claimed by the public at large, as public rights in the foreshore are well defined and do not include taking minerals.
1 Citers


 
Ough v King [1967] 1 WLR 1547
1967
CA
Lord Denning MR, Danckwerts LJ, Diplock LJ
Land, Nuisance, Litigation Practice
A claim was made for breach of a right to light. The defendant relied on Waldram diagrams to demonstrate that the new extensions did not reduce the amount of adequate light remaining available below the 50% threshold. The relevant room had a floor area of 156.5ft2; before the construction 100.25ft2 had been adequately lit; after the construction 80.25ft2 remained adequately lit. The adequately lit area had declined from 64.05% to 51.27%. The county court judge found that an actionable infringement had occurred. Held: The defenedant's appeal failed.
Danckwerts LJ referred to the "more demanding standards at the present time in the modern situation".
Diplock LJ referred to the 50:50 rule as "a convenient rule of thumb" in the 1920s "and perhaps later".
Lord Denning MR: "I think the judge was entitled to have regard to the higher standards expected for comfort as the years go by. . . . In these days I would not myself be prepared to regard the 50:50 rule of Mr. Waldram as a universal rule. In some cases a higher standard may reasonably be required."
1 Citers


 
West Bank Estates Ltd v Arthur [1967] AC 665
1967
PC
Lord Wilberforce
Land, Limitation
(From Federal Supreme Court of the West Indies) A claim was made for possessory title to a strip of land, based upon acts of cultivation, the cutting of timber, wood and grass, fishing and growing rice. The trial judge disallowed the claim to a possessory title. The Federal Supreme Court reversed him. They took the view that the respondents had made what was, for persons of their means and class, normal user of the land. Held: The precise nature of the acts and rights required to amount to possession varies with the nature of the land and all the circumstances. Lord Wilberforce said: "The learned judge . . applied his mind correctly to the question whether the respondents had proved ‘sole and undisturbed possession user and enjoyment’ of the disputed strip. As the Federal Supreme Court itself stated, these words convey the same meaning as possession to the exclusion of the true owner. The learned judge gave recognition to the fact that what constitutes possession, adequate to establish a prescriptive claim, may depend upon the physical characteristics of the land. On the other hand, he was, in their Lordships’ view, correct in regarding such acts as cutting timber and grass from time to time as not sufficient to prove the sole possession which is required . . The respondents had, in [the view of the Federal Supreme Court], proved that they had made what was for persons of their means and class normal user of the land . . This does not appear to be a correct approach to the evidence. Admitting the utility of the respondents’ operations, and that they did what was normal for small peasant farmers, this still does not establish a sufficient degree of sole possession and user to satisfy the Ordinance, or carry the matter beyond a user which remains consistent with the possession of the true owner."
1 Citers



 
 Owen v Cornell; 1967 - (1967) 203 EG 29

 
 Robson v Hallett; CA 1967 - [1967] 2 QB 939
 
Chalmers Property Investment Co Ltd v Robson Unreported, 20 June 1967
20 Jun 1967
HL
Lord Reid, Lord Guest
Land
A cottage on Mull had no public water supply. The owner had a right to draw water for domestic purposes from a "spring or well" on neighbouring land, but without any guarantee as to its sufficiency, purity or suitability; "and for the above purpose to lay and maintain at the expense of my said disponee and her foresaids adequate water pipes for the purpose of withdrawing water for the purposes aforesaid." The owner of the cottage employed a firm, carried on by the man behind the company that owned the land on which the source of water lay, to construct a piped water supply from the source to her cottage. The work was not done satisfactorily and the owner terminated her contract with the firm and employed other contractors to complete the necessary works, which included a dam and settling tank. The company threatened to remove the entire installation, on the ground that, due to a misdescription of the source of the water in the title, the owner of the cottage had no servitude whatever over its land. She brought proceedings to interdict the company from interfering with her water supply. The company contended that, even if the misdescription point were rejected - as it was - the settling tank should none the less be removed, on the ground that, in terms of the disposition, the dominant proprietor had no right to do anything more than lay water pipes on its land. Held: The company's appeal failed. It was not entitled to remove the settling tank. Although the right to construct and maintain a settling tank on the servient land was different from the right to lay pipes on the land, a servitude right to lay pipes could carry with it an implied right to construct a settling tank on the servient land, where the works "were essential to make the servitude effective" (Lord Reid) or were "essential to the carrying out of the purpose for which the original servitude was granted" or were a "means of obtaining an effective supply of water" (Lord Guest).
After noting that the company admitted that some kind of dam was necessary to provide a source from which water would flow into the pipe, Lord Reid said: "And if it is equally necessary for the enjoyment of the right to draw a domestic water supply from this point that there should be a settling tank, in my opinion the making of such a tank is equally authorised by the grant. The owner of the dominant tenement must not erect works of a size or character beyond what is necessary for the enjoyment of the right granted. But it must have been the intention of the granter of the servitude should have a right to construct on his land such works as were essential to make the servitude effective, and I find nothing in the wording of the grant to prevent that from being done."
Lord Guest pointed out that without the settling tank, the pipes became blocked, and said "If the respondent was entitled to draw water from the stream and she was entitled to collect the water by means of a dam and to take it by means of pipes for domestic purposes, my view is that the servitude comprehended that she would be given an effective water supply system. Ferguson on The Law of Water, page 264, states the matter thus: 'The principle appears to be that that may be done which is essential to the carrying out of the purpose for which the original servitude was granted….' Without a settling tank the water supply granted by the servitude would be rendered useless as the pipes would be at times blocked. Whether the settling tank be regarded as part of the system of water pipes or as a means of obtaining an effective supply of water, I am clearly of opinion that the appellants cannot object to the presence of the settling tank."
1 Citers



 
 Mackay v Campbell; HL 29-Jun-1967 - [1967] UKHL 8; 1967 SC (HL) 5; 1967 SLT 337
 
Jelbert v Davies [1968] 1 WLR 589
1968
CA
Lord Denning MR
Land
Lord Denning MR explained that even a right granted in wide terms like "at all times and for all purposes" is not a sole right, if it is used in common with others, and it does not authorise unlimited use.
1 Citers


 
Re Wembley Park Estate Co Ltd's Transfer [1968] Ch 491
1968

Goff J
Costs, Land
The court confirmed the rule in Jeffkins and added that "the costs payable to the defendant should be paid on the common fund basis "since the obtaining of the order is something in the nature of a luxury to the plaintiff for which he ought to pay."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Fowley Marine (Emsworth) Ltd v Gafford [1968] 2 QB 618
1968


Land, Limitation
A paper title owner of land is deemed to be in possession of the fee simple unless and until someone else acquires possession of it
1 Citers


 
Kaye v Basingstoke Corporation (1968) 20 P & CR 417
1968
LT
Sir Michael Rowe QC
Land, Damages
The Tribunal discussed compensation on compulsory purchase, and how the extent of the underlying scheme was to be identified: 'Before the 1939 war it is broadly, perhaps entirely, true to say that the application of the common law rule was comparatively simple in so far as discovering what "the scheme underlying the acquisition" was. There was usually an Act, public but more often private, or an Order which defined the scheme and the area wherein it was to operate. But in the post-war years a new conception of planning led to a series of measures which gave to local authorities, of one kind or another, planning powers of a much less detailed although more far-reaching character.'
1 Citers


 
Taylor v Taylor [1968] 1 WLR 378
1968
CA
Russell LJ
Land
Mrs T, by summons under section 17 sought a declaration that she and her husband were beneficial owners in equal shares of the matrimonial home and that the premises should be sold and the proceeds divided equally between them. She registered a lis pendens under the Land Charges Act. The house was in the husband's name. Held: Her interest was, at best, a share in the proceeds of sale of the house and was not an interest in land (which under the Act, was defined not to include "an undivided share in land,") and it vacated the registration in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The court has both statutory and inherent jurisdiction to order vacation of an entry on the register on ‘other good cause', and the inherent jurisdiction of the court is co-extensive with that of the High Court.
Russell LJ said: "The lis (the dispute) is not about any land, but about what is the entitlement to the beneficial interest in the land, and therefore the proceeds of sale. The purpose of registration of a lis pendens is to prevent effective disposition of the land pendente lite. How can a suit which demands that the land be disposed of be properly registrable? . . how could it be said . . that a purchaser with notice of a lis, in which there was no reference to the land except a demand that it should be sold by the defendant, could get a defective title?. . If the wife's claim . . had been made in a writ and statement of claim, the lis could not possibly have been properly registrable."
Married Women's Property Act 1882 17 - Land Charges Act 1925
1 Citers


 
VT Engineering Limited v Richard Barland and Co Limited [1968] 19 P&CR 890
1968
ChD
Megarry J
Land
The court was asked whether a right of way "at all times and for all purposes" over a roadway included an ancillary right to lateral and vertical "swing space" in the course of loading and unloading in the exercise of the principal right. Held: The submission failed. In descriptions of rights of way there was to be implied "some degree of tolerance". Under the ordinary law of easements, the grant of an easement implies also the grant of “swing space”
Megarry J said: "Mr Mottershead went further; he claimed the right to the use of a sufficiency of space in which to swing or otherwise manoeuvre the goods that are being loaded and unloaded. During the argument I ventured to call this right by the convenient but inelegant name of a right to "swing space," though I readily acknowledge that this has nothing save brevity to commend it. Mr. Mottershead could cite no authority to support him in this claim, but rested it on implication.
This is a far-reaching contention. It seems to me that the alleged right ought to be analysed into the two sub-heads of lateral swing space and vertical swing space, the latter embracing only what is vertically above any part of the way, and the former extending horizontally beyond the vertical lines bounding the way. Let me take lateral swing space first, and assume as an example the grant of a right of way over a roadway eight feet wide. Let me further assume that there is no wall or hedge on either side. If there is an implied right of lateral swing space, the servient owner can never erect any wall or building abutting on the roadway lest it interfere with the dominant owner's rights. The dominant owner is, on this view, entitled not only to ingress and egress over the eight feet road, and to occupy it with stationary vehicles being loaded or unloaded, but also to have a strip on either side of the roadway, of indefinite dimensions which depend on the size and *895 manoeuvrability of the goods which he or some successor in title of his may later choose to receive on the dominant tenement or despatch from it, kept free from any obstruction which might hinder the loading or unloading.
I can well see that on the grant of a right of way the grantor must accept that over the way granted he cannot thereafter exercise rights which materially interfere with the enjoyment of the easement. It may perhaps be that he must allow some degree of tolerance for wide loads, so that he cannot fence or build up to the very edge of the way granted, but must leave a freeboard of a foot or two, particularly if there are bends in the way. But that is very different from saying that the grant of a way may in effect sterilise a strip of land of indefinite depth on each side of the way, depending on the loads and methods of loading from time to time adopted. This seems to me to go far beyond any necessary or reasonable expectation or implication; and quite apart from the absence of authority on the point, it seems to me that such a right would or might subject the grantor to a quite unjustifiable burden. I accordingly reject such a claim."
1 Citers



 
 Paradise Beach and Transportation Co Ltd v Price-Robinson; PC 1968 - [1968] AC 1072; [1968] UKPC 1; [1968] 2 WLR 873; [1968] 1 All ER 530
 
Bilkus v London Borough of Redbridge [1968] 207 EG 803
1968


Land
The court was asked to construe the terms of a covenant given by the council to the claimant.
1 Citers


 
Bligh v Martin [1968] 1 All ER 1157; [1968] 1 WLR 804
1968
ChD
Pennycuick J
Land, Limitation
The paper owner of the disputed land had grazed cattle on it in winter, and denied that the defendant claiming adverse possession had been in continuous occupation. Held: Even though the adverse possessor had received rent from the real owner, who had been then unaware of his ownership and became the tenant of the land, the adverse possessor could still successfully claim the land: "Both counsel pointed out that where land is subject to a tenancy, the landlord and the tenant have each, in correct legal parlance, possession of the land, though in different senses . . It seems to me that for the purpose of adverse possession of freehold land under the Limitation Act, 1939, the land should be regarded as in the possession of one or other of the two parties concerned, i.e. the landlord or the tenant; and it seems to me that subsection (3) designates the landlord as the relevant party for this purpose. On that footing, it follows that the plaintiff, having been in receipt of rent during this summer period, remained throughout the period in adverse possession of the land".
With an intention to control the land, the adverse possessor actually believing himself or herself to be the true owner, is quite sufficient. Pennycuick J said: "It would, I think, be quite wrong to regard the owner of arable farmland as having been dispossessed of that land because during certain winter months he personally makes no use of it and some other person puts cattle upon it."
1 Citers


 
Ray v Fairway Motors (Barnstaple) Limited (1968) 20 P&CR 261
1968
CA
Willmer LJ, Russell LJ, Fenton-Atkinson LJ
Land
It was argued that an easement of support, obtained by prescription, could no longer be enjoyed where the owner of the dominant land had extended his building so as to increase, indeed virtually to double, the weight thrown onto a wall on the building owned by the defendants. Held: "I do not think that there is any room for doubt as to the law. The difficulty, as is not uncommon, is to apply a perfectly well established principle of law to the facts of the particular case. As I understand it, the principle dating back at least to Lutrell's case, is that an easement is extinguished when its mode of user is so altered as to cause prejudice to the servient tenement. Whilst an easement of support in relation to a building may be extinguished if the building is so altered or reconstructed as to throw a substantially increased burden on the servient tenement to the prejudice of the owner thereof." and "It seems to me that there is all the difference in the world between an easement of light and an easement of support". 'Substantial prejudice' in this context meant "A substantial additional restriction upon the use to which the servient tenement could be put or upon legitimate activities thereon. In my judgment, it is for the servient owner to establish this."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Burnside and Another v Emerson and Others; CA 1968 - [1968] 1 WLR 1490; [1968] 1 All ER 74
 
Zarraga v Newcastle upon Tyne Corporation [1968] 19 P&CR 609
1968


Land, Damages
'in assessing the business profits, no deduction should be made in respect of "wages" of the claimant's wife, notwithstanding a figure in respect thereof had been allowed for income tax purposes, since the wife could not fairly be classed as a "paid employee"'.
1 Citers


 
Meeruppe Sumanatissa Terunnanse v Warakapitiye Pangnananda Terunnanse [1968] UKPC 3; [1968] AC 1086
23 Jan 1968
PC
Lord Devlin
Commonwealth, Land
Ceylon - A bare licence terminates on the transfer of the licensor's own title.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Protheroe v Protheroe [1968] EWCA Civ 7; [1968] 1 All ER 1111; [1968] 1 WLR 519; (1968) 19 P & CR 396
1 Feb 1968
CA
Lord Denning MR, Danckwerts, Widgery LJJ
Land, Trusts
If a trustee who owns the leasehold gets in the freehold, the freehold belongs to the trust and the trustee cannot take the property for himself.
[ Bailii ]
 
Oak Co-Operative Building Society v Blackburn [1968] EWCA Civ 6; [1968] 2 All ER 117; [1968] 2 WLR 1053; (1968) 19 P and CR 375; [1968] Ch 730
14 Feb 1968
CA
Harman, Russell, Sachs LJJ
Land

[ Bailii ]
 
Darstone Ltd v Cleveland Petroleum Co Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1807
1969


Land

Land Charges Act 1925
1 Citers


 
The Rawlplug Co Ltd v Kamvale Properties Ltd (1969) 20 P&CR 32
1969
ChD
Megarry J
Land
Megarry J said: "to effect registration of a . . caution is an easy matter, and . . to do so will usually effectually inhibit any disposition of the land so long as the registration remains effective. Registration may, therefore, become a weapon of considerable nuisance value"
1 Citers


 
Sargaison v Roberts [1969] 3 All ER 1072; [1969] 1 WLR 951
1969
ChD
Megarry J
Income Tax, Land
The court was asked as to a taxpayer's entitlement to tax allowances under section 314 of the 1952 Act, and whether, for the purposes of the legislation, a transfer by the taxpayer into trust of a farm and the simultaneous grant by the trustees to him of a lease resulted in the whole of the taxpayer's interest in the land being transferred to another person (which would have disentitled him to his tax allowance) or operated to reduce his interest from ownership of a freehold to ownership of a lease. Held: Megarry J took the latter view. He said that the taxpayer's interest had uno ictu merely been reduced from ownership of the freehold to ownership of a lease. The effect of the transaction was that the taxpayer's interest had been reduced from ownership of the freehold to ownership of a lease.
Income Tax Act 1952 314
1 Citers


 
Ocean Estates Ltd v Pinder [1969] 2 AC 19
1969
HL
Lord Diplock
Land, Limitation
The court asked whether the sufficiency of adverse possession might be qualified either by the intentions of the paper owner or the squatter's willingness to pay for their occupation if asked. Lord Diplock: "Where questions of title to land arise in litigation the court is concerned only with the relative strengths of the titles proved by the rival claimants. If party A can prove a better title than party B he is entitled to succeed notwithstanding that C may have a better title than A, if C is neither a party to the action nor a person by whose authority B is in possession or occupation of the land."
1 Citers



 
 Neilson v Poole; ChD 1969 - [1969] 20 P & CR 909
 
Birmingham Corporation v West Midlands Baptist (Trust) Association Inc [1970] AC 874; [1969] 3 All ER 172
1969
HL
Lord Reid, Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest, Lord Upjohn, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Donovan
Damages, Land
There had been a substantial delay of many years after the order for compulsory purchase was made, with a substantial increase in value after the service of the notice to treat. Held: The physical condition of the reference land and its surroundings is to taken as at the valuation date.
Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest said: "The word 'compensation' would be a mockery if what was paid was something that did not compensate." and
"Apart from severance and injurious affection there is only one subject for compensation – the value of the Land (see Inland Revenue Comrs v. Glasgow & South Western Ry. Co (1887) 12 App. Cas. 315). But it was convenient and it became customary to value separately the market value of the land and the other elements comprised in its value to the owner and then to add these together to obtain the total value to the owner. And it further became customary to add 10 per cent. in respect of the expropriation being compulsory. Rule (1) abolished this addition of 10 per cent."
Lord Reid said: "These provisions do show that Parliament (or the draftsman) must have thought that the law was that compensation was assessable on the basis of value as at the date of notice to treat. But the mere fact that an enactment shows that Parliament must have thought that the law was one thing does not preclude the courts from deciding that the law was in fact something different. This has been stated in a number of cases including Inland Revenue Commissioners v Dowdall, O’Mahoney & Co Ltd [1952] AC 401. No doubt the position would be different if the provisions of the enactment were such that they would only be workable if the law was as Parliament supposed it to be. But, in my view, all that can be said here is that these enactments would have a narrower scope if the law was found to be that compensation must be assessed at a date later than that of the notice to treat." and
"No stage can be singled out as the date of expropriation in every case. Sometimes possession is taken before compensation is assessed. Then it would seem logical to fix the market value of the land as at that date and to take actual consequential losses as they occurred then or thereafter, provided that the dispossessed owner had acted reasonably. But if compensation is assessed before possession is taken, taking the date of possession can I think be justified because then either party can sue for specific performance and the promoters obtain a right to the land, as if there had been a contract of sale at that date."
Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act 1919
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
In re Draper's Conveyance [1969] 1 Ch 486
1969

Plowman J
Land
A severance of the joint tenancy had been effected by the service of a summons under section 17 of the 1882 Act and an affidavit in support, asking for an order that the former matrimonial home be sold and the proceeds of sale distributed in accordance with the parties' respective interests therein.
Married Women's Property Act 1882 17


 
 Capital Finance v Stokes; 1969 - [1969] 1 Ch 261
 
H E Dibble v Moore [1969] CLY 3040
1969
CA
Megaw LJ
Land
A greenhouse was not an "erection" within section 62(1). Megaw LJ noted that it was customary to move the greenhouse every few years,
Law of Property Act 1925 62(1)
1 Citers


 
White v Taylor (No 2) [1969] 1 Ch 160
1969
ChD
Buckley J
Land
The alienation of grazing rights for a fixed number of beasts cannot prejudice the residual interest of the owner of the servient common. Whoever the grazing right belongs to, the number of beasts that can be grazed upon the common pursuant to the right will remain constant.
Buckley J said: "To make good a prescriptive claim in this case it is not necessary for the claimant to establish that he and his predecessors have exercised the right claimed continuously. This is a profit of a kind that, of its nature, would only be used intermittently. Flocks would not, for instance, be on the down at lambing time, or for 24 hours of the day, or very possibly on every day of the week or all round the year. But the user must be shown to have been of such a character, degree and frequency as to indicate an assertion by the claimant of a continuous right, and of a right of the measure of the right claimed."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Hampstead and Suburban Properties Ltd v Diomedous [1969] 1 Ch 248
1969
ChD
Megarry J
Land, Litigation Practice
A covenant against causing nuisance or annoyance is to be read to refer to wider nuisance than is referred to by the tort of nuisance. It is to be applied "according to robust and common sense standards" Megarry J granted an interlocutory injunction to restrain the playing of musical instruments in breach of covenant, saying: "Thirdly, there is Doherty v Allman. I accept, of course, that Lord Cairns' words were uttered in a case where what was in issue was a perpetual injunction and not an interlocutory injunction. Indeed, the words seem to be obiter, for no negative covenant was present in that case. But these considerations do not preclude the words from having any weight or cogency in relation to an interlocutory injunction. Where there is a plain and uncontested breach of a clear covenant not do a particular thing, and the convenantor promptly begins to do what he has promised not to do, then in the absence of special circumstances it seems to me that the sooner he is compelled to keep his promise the better. In such a case I do not think that the enforceability of the defendant's obligation falls into two stages, so that between the issue of the writ and the trial the defendant will be enjoined only if that is dictated by the balance of convenience and so on, and not until the trial will Lord Cairns' statement come into its own. Indeed, Lord Cairns' express reference to "the balance of convenience or inconvenience" suggests that he had not forgotten interlocutory injunctions. I see no reason for allowing a covenantor who stands in clear breach of an express prohibition to have a holiday from the enforcement of his obligations until the trial. It may be that there is no direct authority on this point; certainly none has been cited. If so, it is high time that there was such authority; and now there is."
1 Citers


 
Jelson v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1970] 1 QB 243; [1969] 3 All ER 147
1969
CA
Lord Denning MR, Sachs LJ, Phillimore LJ
Land, Planning
A proposed ring road had been cancelled. The landowners applied for certificates of appropriate alternative development. The Minister confirmed the negative certificates which had been issued by the local planning authority. It was contended that the question whether planning permission might reasonably have been expected to be granted should be considered not as at the date of the section 22(2)(a) notice but as at a date before there had been any proposal for the strip of land to be used for a ring road. Held: The owners' appeals failed. The local planning authority must determine the question of planning permission as at the date of the notice, and in the circumstances then existing, and not by looking at events in the past. It was a question of construction after examining the meaning of the words used in section 17(4).
Lord Denning MR: "After the discussion we have had, I think the decision depends on this one short point under section 17 (4): what is the date at which it must be decided whether planning permission "might reasonably have been expected to be granted"? The Minister says it must be decided as at the date of the deemed notice to treat, that is, on September 19, 1965. At that date there was this long, narrow strip of land bordered by great housing estates on either side. At that date planning permission would not be granted for any beneficial purpose. So there should be a "nil certificate." But Wimpeys and Jelsons say that that is not that date at all. They say that the date should be some time in the distant past before there was any proposal for a ring road. At that time they might reasonably have expected planning permission to be granted, not only for the housing estates, but also for this long, narrow strip for residential development.
That issue was to be determined simply as a matter of statutory construction:
The crucial word . . . is the word "proposed," which is defined in section 22 (2): "For the purposes of sections 17 and 18 of this Act, an interest in land shall be taken to be an interest proposed to be acquired by an authority possessing compulsory purchase powers in the following (but no other) circumstances, that is to say-"
(a) (put shortly) where there is an actual notice to treat; (b) (put shortly) where there is a deemed notice to treat; (c) (put shortly) where there is an offer to negotiate to purchase.
That definition shows that the word "proposed" refers to the proposal contained in an actual or deemed notice to treat or in an offer to purchase. That gives a good clue to the date of the proposal. It is the date of the actual or deemed notice to treat or of the offer to purchase, as the case may be.
In the light of that definition, section 17 (4) means that the planning authority must form an opinion as to what planning permission might reasonably have been expected to be granted at the date of the actual notice to treat, or the deemed notice to treat, or the offer to purchase, as the case may be. In the present case, therefore, which is a case of a deemed notice to treat, subsection 17 (4) must be read:"...that might have been expected to be granted [at the date of the service of the deemed notice to treat] in respect of the land in question, if it were not proposed [at that date] to be acquired..." The planning authority must form an opinion as to what planning permission might reasonably be expected at that date, namely, September 28, 1965. It must look at the position as at that date, and see, in the circumstances then existing, whether planning permission might reasonably be expected to be granted. "
Phillimore LJ: "An important factor is that, apart from the question of construction, once you start looking back, the whole exercise becomes hopelessly uncertain. Did it all result from the designation of this strip as required for the ring road? How far was the state of the land due to the appellants' own action in building right up to the strip? Could they have avoided loss by serving notice to purchase in 1959 when the provisions of the Act of 1961 were first [enacted]? Have they really suffered any loss, or did they pay for the strip on the basis that it was blighted land? At any rate, when they acquired it they knew this to be the case. It seems to me that to look back beyond the date of the deemed notice to treat would open up a considerable filed of guesswork which would often make it impossible to give firm advice to any member of the public as to his rights. Accordingly, both as a matter of construction and on wider grounds, I would dismiss these appeals."
1 Citers


 
Manchester Diocesan Council for Education v Commercial and General Investments Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 241; [1969] 3 All ER 1593
1969

Buckley J
Education, Land
The school governors were required to obtain consent before selling land formerly used as a school. Held: The court rejected a submission that that consent was a necessary pre-requisite for a contract could be made at all: "Reliance is placed on Milner v Staffordshire Congregational Union (Inc) [1956] Ch 275 where it was held that it was unlawful for charity trustees to enter into a contract of sale under the Charity Trusts Amendment Act 1855, section 29, without the prior approval of the Charity Commissioners. In my judgment, that case is clearly distinguishable from the present case. Section 29 of the 1855 Act expressly makes any sale by charity trustees--that is, any contract for sale--unlawful unless it is made with the approval of the commissioners. The power to contract is conditional upon prior approval. The requirement of clause 4 of the 1962 scheme in the present case is quite different. By that clause the governing body is authorised to sell property comprised in the scheme but any sale - ie, any contract for sale - is required to be conditional upon ministerial approval of the price being obtained. The power to complete a sale is conditional upon prior approval, but not the power to contract. The fact that ministerial approval was not obtained until 18 November 1964, does not, in my judgment, invalidate the contract, if any, made on 15 September."
Endowed Schools Acts 1869
1 Citers


 
Hughes v Griffin and Another [1969) 1 WLR 23
1969
CA
Harman LJ, Russell LJ
Land, Limitation
Possession of land is never adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title.
1 Citers


 
Costagliola v English (1969) 210 EG 1425
1969


Land


 
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