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Landlord and Tenant - From: 1960 To: 1969

This page lists 55 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.


 
 Smith v Grayton Estates Ltd; SCS 1960 - 1960 SC 249
 
Jacquin v Holland [1960] 1 WLR 528
1960


Landlord and Tenant
The relevant date for assessing damages for a tenant's failure to repair the premises in accordance with his covenant is the term date of the lease.
1 Citers


 
Chatham Empire Theatre (1955) Ltd v Ultrans [1961] 1 WLR 817
1961


Landlord and Tenant
When granting a new lease to a former sub-tenant after the head lease has been forfeited, the court may impose any conditions it thinks fit in the new tenancy.


 
 Green v Bowes-Lyon; CA 1961 - [1961] 1 WLR 503
 
Packaging Centre Ltd v Poland Street Estate Ltd (1961) 178 EG 189
1961


Landlord and Tenant
A landlord may act reasonably if he refuses consent where the assignment of a lease will necessarily result in a breach of a user covenant.
1 Citers


 
Boynton-Wood v Trueman (1961) 177 EG 191
1961


Landlord and Tenant
Where a tenant gave his landlord a key so that the landlord could enter to carry out repairs, no surrender could be implied.

 
Edmonton Corporation v Knowles (WM) and Son Ltd (1962) 60 LGR 124
1962

McNair J
Landlord and Tenant
The court was able to imply from a provision in a lease obliging the tenant to pay to the landlords 'the cost . . of painting in a workmanlike manner every third year of the term all outside wood and metal work and other external parts of the demised premises' a matching obligation on the landlords to do the repairs paid for.
1 Citers



 
 Rye v Rye; HL 1962 - [1962] AC 496; [1962] 1 All ER 146
 
Sunrose Ltd v Gould [1962] 1 WLR 20
1962


Landlord and Tenant
In construing a document "the principle is that that is certain which the context renders certain."
1 Citers


 
Gregson v Cyril Lord Ltd [1962] 3 All ER 907; [1963] 1 WLR 41
1962
CA
Upjohn LJ, Diplock LJ, Denning MR
Landlord and Tenant
A landlord opposing the grant of a new tenancy on the basis that he wished to conduct his own business from the premises, need not show that everything is in place to conduct the new business, but must be able to show that most obstacles to starting the business have been dealt with. There is a twofold test. The landlord must show a genuine desire to operate a business from the premises, and also a reasonable prospect of doing so: "The question whether the landlords intend to occupy the premises is primarily one of fact, but the authorities establish that to prove such intention, the landlords must prove two things. First, a genuine bona fide intention on the part of the landlords that they intend to occupy the premises for their own purposes. . . Secondly, the landlords must prove that in point of possibility they have a reasonable prospect of being able to bring about this occupation by their own act of volition . . it is essentially an objective test, that is to say, would a reasonable man, on the evidence before him, believe that he had a reasonable prospect of being able to bring about his occupation by his own act of volition?"
Upjohn LJ explained the requirements as to the objective evidence required from the landlord: "It is an objective test upon the evidence before the court: have the landlords established, not what the planning authority or the Minister would determine, but the different and practical question: would the reasonable man think he had a reasonable prospect of giving effect to his intention to occupy? On the facts of this case . . this amounts to an inquiry whether the landlords on the evidence have established a reasonable prospect either that planning permission is not required or, if it is, that they would obtain it. This does not necessitate the determination by the court of any of the questions which may one day be submitted to the planning authority or to the Minister; it is the practical appraisal upon the evidence before the court as to whether the landlords, upon whom, let me stress, the onus lies, have established a reasonable prospect of success."
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 30(1)(g)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Kenny v Preen [1963] 1 QB 499; [1962] EWCA Civ 2; [1962] 3 WLR 1233; [1962] 3 All ER 814
15 Oct 1962

Pearson, Donovan, Ormerod LJJ
Landlord and Tenant
A landlord's threats to evict the tenant, accompanied by repeated shouting and knocking on her door, was held to be a breach of his covenant for quiet enjoyment. The court explained that "the word 'enjoy' used in this connection is a translation of the Latin word 'fruor' and refers to the exercise and use of the right and having the full benefit of it, rather than to deriving pleasure from it."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Chapman v Honig [1963] 2 QB 502
1963
CA
Pearson LJ, Davies LJ
Contract, Landlord and Tenant
A landlord's notice to quit was held valid notwithstanding that the landlord seeking to uphold its validity had himself given it in contempt of court.
A contractual right may be exercised for any reason good, bad or indifferent and the motive with which it is exercised is irrelevant to its validity.
Pearson LJ: "There is a special difficulty in the present case. The act complained of, the service of the notice to quit, was on the face of it a lawful exercise of a contractual right, duly implemented in accordance with the provisions of the tenancy agreement and effective to terminate the tenant's estate and to convert the landlord's interest from an estate in reversion to an estate in possession. Common experience is that, when the validity of an act done in purported exercise of a right under a contract or other instrument is disputed, the inquiry is limited to ascertaining whether the act has been done in accordance with the provisions of the contract or other instrument. I cannot think of any case in which such an act might be invalidated by proof that it was prompted by some vindictive or other wrong motive. Motive is disregarded as irrelevant. A person who has a right under a contract or other instrument is entitled to exercise it and can effectively exercise it for a good reason or a bad reason or no reason at all. If the rule were different, if the exercise of such a right were liable to be overthrown, in an action brought at any time within the limitation period, by proof that the act was done with a wrong motive, there would be a great unsettlement of property titles and commercial transactions and relationships."
1 Citers



 
 Green v Bowes-Lyon; HL 1963 - [1963] AC 420
 
I and H Caplan Limited v Caplan No. 2 [1963] 1 WLR 124
1963
ChD
Cross J
Landlord and Tenant
For some months whilst the tenants' right to a new tenancy was being litigated they had ceased trading and had vacated the premises. They then succeeded before the Court of Appeal and started trading from the premises afresh. Their protection under the 1954 Act was again challenged because of the interruption. Held: Though it was "distinctly a border-line case", the "thread of continuity" was not broken. Cross J said: "I think it is quite clear that a tenant does not lose the protection of this Act simply by ceasing physically to occupy the premises. They may well continue to be occupied for the purposes of the business although they are de facto empty for some period of time. One rather obvious example would be if there was a need for urgent structural repairs and the tenant had to go out of physical occupation in order to enable them to be effected. Another example would be that which the Court of Appeal had to deal with in Teasdale v Walker [1958] 1 WLR 1076."
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Granada TV Network Ltd v Great Universal Stores Ltd (1963) 187 EG 391
1963


Landlord and Tenant
A landlord may reasonably refuse consent to an assignment of a lease where the result of the assignment would inevitably be a breach of a user covenant.
1 Citers


 
Segal Securities Limited v Thoseby [1963] 1 QB 887; [1963] 1 All ER 500
1963
QBD
Sachs J
Landlord and Tenant
To demand rent may waive a right to forfeiture. Sachs J said: "When one looks at the authorities, it is, however, clear that a demand can operate as a waiver in the same way as an acceptance." Also the landlord's own behaviour can be taken into account when deciding whether to grant relief against forfeiture.
A waiver occurs even where the demand or acceptance of rent was made without prejudice or under protest that it was not to be construed as a waiver.
Accepting rent can be a waiver of the right to terminate even if the landlord purports to accept the rent, "without prejudice". Sachs J said: "'As both demand and acceptance respectively are in law merely different forms of a notification by a landlord of election not to avoid or forfeit the Lease, to my mind no distinction can nowadays be drawn between them in relation to a question whether the label "Without Prejudice" affects their quality as an election.
There is no reason of principle why a right of forfeiture arising from a failure to pay rent, cannot be waived in exactly the same way as a right of forfeiture arising from a breach of any other covenant in the Lease. In London and County (A&D) Ltd v Wilfred Sportsman Ltd [1971] 1 Ch 764, at 786 Russell LJ (with whom Lord Donovan and Megaw LJ agreed) said:
'The other argument put forward was that there can never be waiver of forfeiture for non-payment of rent by recognition of the continued existence of the Lease because, as has often been said, a right of re-entry for non-payment of rent is a mere security for the payment. I am not aware of any authority for this proposition, and I see no justification in principle for making this distinction between a default in an obligation to pay rent and any other obligation. Of course, rent may be demanded after the forfeiture days are passed, and, indeed, part payment accepted on account without waiving the forfeiture; this does not recognise the continued existence of the Lease beyond the date when that rent was payable. I refer in this connection also to the passage in Shepherd v Berger [1892] 1 QB 597, 599, which appears to me inconsistent with the proposition advanced.'"
1 Citers


 
Interoven Stove Co Ltd v Hibbard and Painter and Shepherd [1936] 1 All ER 263
1963


Landlord and Tenant


 
Lovelock v Margo [1963] 2 QB 786
1963


Landlord and Tenant, Equity

County Courts Act 1959 191(3)
1 Citers


 
Bracey v Read [1963] Ch 88
1963

Cross J
Landlord and Tenant
A tenancy of land used for training horses was a business tenancy within the 1954 Act. The word “premises” is not defined in the Act. Its legal meaning is the subject matter of the habendum in a lease, and it would cover any sort of property of which a lease is granted. “... but no doubt the word is used sometimes in a popular sense which is considerably more restricted, in the sense of buildings, or buildings with land immediately adjoining them. In the popular sense it would not be said that some gallops on a downland with no buildings on or near them, could be described as “premises”. Sometimes in legislation “premises” has been construed in a popular rather than in a legal sense.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 Part II
1 Citers


 
Jones v Christy (1963) 107 Sol Jo 374
1963
CA
Lord Denning MR
Landlord and Tenant
Lord Denning MR doubted whether the mere letting of an incorporeal hereditament could be occupation so as to be the subject of a new tenancy within the 1954 Act. However, since the fishing rights had been used for the purposes of a business in connection with a room that was also let by the same lease, the letting of the fishing rights could in fact be the subject of a new tenancy within the 1954 Act.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954
1 Citers


 
Finbow v Air Ministry [1963] 1 WLR 697
1963

McNair J
Landlord and Tenant, Administrative
The minister had mistakenly exercised a formal power to approve a licence to occupy land under a repealed section instead of its re-enacted successor. The claimant said that this was not an effective approval. The court also considered the authorities on how to distringuish between a lease and a licence. Held: The misdescription of his powers rendered the document a nullity would defeat the plain intention of the Minister. McNair J said "It is, in my judgment, a plain case for the application of the maxim falsa demonstratio non nocet and of the principle embodied in the maxim magis valeat quam valeat. There is a total inconsistency and repugnancy between the minister's manifest intention and the literal effect of the document, and, in my judgment, the former should prevail."
As to the nature of the agreement: "1) that the agreement must be construed as a whole and that the relationship is determined by law and not by the lable which the parties put on it, though the label is a factor to be taken into account in determining the true relationship; . . . 2) that the grant of exclusive possession, if not conclusive against the view that there is a mere licence as distinct from a tenancy, is at any rate a consideration of the first importance;' and in all the cases where a licence was found, that was because of the presence of factors such as those set out in Facchini.
As to the effect of reliance upon the mistake, McNair J said: "The document was in the circumstances in which it was executed plainly intended by the Minister to be an approval in the exercise of his statutory powers. These powers at the date of the instrument were to be found only in section 2 of the Act of 1948. To hold that the mis- description of his powers rendered the document a nullity, would, in my judgment, defeat the plain intention of the Minister to be deduced from the circumstances and the date of its execution. It is, in my judgment, a plain case for the application of the maxim falsa demonstratio non nocet and of the principle embodied in the maxim magis valeat quam pereat. There is a total inconsistency and repugnancy between the Minister's manifest intention and the literal effect of the document, and, in my judgment, the former should prevail. In this connection, reference may be made to In re Lockwood, Atherton v Brooke, where Harman J was confronted with a rather similar problem arising out of mistake in a statute and approved a citation from Maxwell on Statutes (now 11th ed. (1962) p 243) to the following effect: 'The authorities do .... establish that the judicial interpreter may deal with careless and inaccurate words and phrases in the same spirit as a critic deals with an obscure or corrupt test, when satisfied, on solid grounds, from the context or history of the enactment or from the injustice, inconvenience, or absurdity of the consequences to which it would lead, that the language thus treated does not really express the intention and that this amendment probably does.'"
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
William Hill (Football) Limited v Willen Key and Hardware Limited [1964] 190 EG 867
1964


Landlord and Tenant
The tenant surrendered the lease, but the date of surrender fell between two rent days. He sought credit for the rent due for the remainder of that rent period. Held: In the absence of an explicit incorporation of it in the lease, the 1870 Act did not apply, and the rent payment due at the start of the quarter remained due in full and unapportioned.
Apportionment Act 1870

 
Pimms Ltd v Tallow Chandlers Company [1964] 2 QB 547
1964
CA
Danckwerts LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The landlord had refused its consent to an assignment of the remaining term of a lease to a development company, which desired to acquire the lease because of its nuisance value, and to use its interest as a basis for inducing the landlord to enter into a joint venture for the redevelopment of the property. Held: The refusal was reasonable. Danckwerts LJ said: "it is not necessary for the landlords to prove that the conclusions which led them to refuse consent were justified, if they were conclusions which might be reached by a reasonable man in the circumstances."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Appah v Parncliffe Investments Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 1064; [1964] 1 All ER 838
1964
CA
Davies LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The test of whether a person is a lodger, as opposed to a sub-tenant, must be determined by the degree of control retained by the householder over the rooms which the lodger occupies.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Grangeside Properties v Collingwood Securities; 1964 - [1964] 1 WLR 139
 
Kirkby v Robinson [1965] EGD 236
1965


Arbitration, Landlord and Tenant
It is fundamental for an arbitrator asked to settle a rent to adjudicate on the extent of a land holding in order to decide the amount of that rent. If the Parties could not agree it, then the arbitrator would have to do so. Such preliminary issues fall within his jursdiction even if the terms of the appointment restrict his duties to determination of the rent.
1 Citers


 
Hill v Harris [1965] 2 QB 601; [1965] 1 All ER 338
1965
CA

Land, Landlord and Tenant
A lessor or vendor does not impliedly warrant that the premises are fit for any particular purpose. It is the contract which allocates the risk of the premises being unfit for such a purpose to the lessee. The lessee has duties to investigate the title, and to ensure that the permitted use under the tenancy was the permitted use in planning law.
1 Citers


 
Crane v Morris [1965] 1 WLR 1104; [1965] 3 All ER 77
1965


Landlord and Tenant
A tenancy at will can be determined by either party on his expressly or impliedly intimating to the other his wish that the tenancy should be at an end. The issuing of a writ claiming possession is a sufficient demand for possession to bring the tenancy to an end. The statutory minimum period of four weeks' notice to quit in respect of premises let as a dwelling does not apply to a tenancy at will.
Protection from Eviction Act 1977 5
1 Citers



 
 East Coast Amusement v British Transport Board; Re "Wonderland" Cleethorps; HL 1965 - [1965] AC 58
 
Harvey v Pratt [1965] 1 WLR 1025; [1965] 2 All ER 786
1965
CA
Lord Denning MR
Landlord and Tenant
The parties had entered into an agreement for a lease, but had not specified a date for its commencement. Held: In the case of a lease or agreement to lease, the essential terms will usually be the parties, the premises, the term and the rent. In the case of an agreement for a lease, unless the length of the term and the commencement of the term are defined, the general position is that the agreement is uncertain and therefore not binding on the parties
Lord Denning MR said: "it has been settled for all my time, that in order to have a valid agreement for a lease, it is essential that it should appear, either in express terms or by reference to some writing which would make it certain, or by reasonable inference from the language used, on what day the term is to commence."
1 Cites


 
Willis v Association of Universities of the British Commonwealth [1965] 1 QB 140; [1965] 2 All ER 393
1965
CA
Denning MR, Pearson, Salmon LJJ
Landlord and Tenant, Company
The landlord resisted renewal of the business tenancy saying that he intended to occupy the premises himself. The Court was asked whether the landlord could show the necessary intention under section 30(1)(g) where it intended to occupy the premises for the purposes of its business, but had passed a resolution to enter liquidation for the purposes of reconstruction and to transfer its assets to a successor company in order to convert from a limited company into a chartered company.
Lord Denning MR said: "The answer to [the point that the landlord did not intend to occupy the premises itself] is, I think, that the landlords did in fact intend to occupy the premises themselves even if only for the short time that should ensue before the transfer. Section 30(1)(g) of the Act of 1954 does not say for how long the landlord must intend to occupy himself, and the courts must fill the gap. It seems to me that in some cases even a short time may suffice. Take the case where the landlord intends to occupy the premises and to carry on business himself there for six months, and then transfer the business to his son as a family arrangement. I should have thought that the father would have sufficient intention to satisfy section 30(1)(g). But suppose the intention was after six months to transfer to a purchaser for cash, I should not expect that intention to suffice. Just as a purchaser within the previous five years cannot defeat the tenant (see section 30(2)), so also a purchaser shortly afterwards should not be able to defeat him. The matters that influence me are these. It is open to the landlord to complete the transfer before the day of hearing, in which case it is the successor's intention which counts - see section 30(1)(g) - save only that if that successor falls foul of section 30 (2) his intention does not count. Hence I would say that if the landlord intends to occupy the premises and carry on business himself there for a time, and then to transfer to a successor, his intention is sufficient to satisfy section 30(1)(g), unless the intended transfer is one which, if it had been made before the hearing, would have fallen within section 30(2) so as to render section 30(1)(g) unavailable.
Applying those principles to this case it seems to me that the intent of the landlords is sufficient to satisfy section 30(1)(g). They intend to occupy the premises and to carry on their activities therein (by providing the detailed administration for the Universities Central Council on Admissions) and then to transfer their activities to their successors, the chartered company, without any payment in money or anything in the nature of sale or purchase.
The landlords have established, therefore, the statutory ground of opposition. The tenants are not entitled to a new lease."
Pearson LJ said that the landlord and its successor company were in practice and substance the same: an intention to carry out a sale after taking possession would mean that the landlord had not shown the necessary intention: "This case falls within the literal meaning of section 30(1)(g) as the landlords do intend to occupy the premises for the purposes of a business to be carried on by them therein, though only for a short time until transfer of the occupation and the business to the chartered corporation. The transfer will not be by way of sale. and there will be only a formal change of identity. In form the landlords are a limited company which is being wound up, and a new chartered corporation has been created. In substance, however, there is continuity. The phrase alter ego undoubtedly lacks precision for most purposes, but for the present purpose it is a fair description of the landlords in their new guise of the chartered corporation as successors of the landlords in their old guise of the limited company.
There must, however, be some qualification of the literal meaning of section 30(1)(g) of the Act of 1954. A landlord should not be allowed to succeed under section 30(1)(g) in a case where his intention is only to start a business at the premises and carry it on for a few weeks and then sell his interest in the premises and the business. If the sale took place before the hearing the purchaser would be precluded by section 30 (2) from relying on section 30 (1) (g). It should not be possible to evade section 30 (2) by postponing the intended sale until after the hearing. There is, therefore, an implied limitation on the operation of section 30 (1) (g); it is not applicable if the landlord's intention is to occupy for only a short time and then make a sale. The implied limitation should not be any greater than is necessary to secure consistency between section 30 (1) (g) and section 30 (2). Probably section 30 (1) (g) can be allowed to apply according to its terms without implied limitation in any case where no sale is intended. Certainly it should be allowed to apply according to its terms in a case such as the present where there is no intended transaction even resembling a sale and there is to be complete continuity of operation, and the only transfer is to be a formal transfer to an alter ego of the transferor."
Salmon LJ said that: "The argument runs that, at best, the period during which the landlords will carry on business there before the transfer is so short that the landlords' real purpose in occupying the premises is to effect the transfer. It is pointed out that in the ordinary case a landlord could not defeat the tenant's right to a new lease if he intended to occupy the premises and carry on business there for only a few days or weeks before selling them. In such circumstances his real purpose would be to sell the premises, not to carry on business there. No doubt that is so.
If, however, a landlord not being a company, intended to occupy the premises and carry on business there as long as he lived or was physically capable of doing so, his rights under the Act of 1954 could not, in my judgment, be defeated by showing that his expectation of life or of retaining his strength happened to be very short. The tenant could not successfully argue that the landlord's real intention was merely to transfer the premises to his heirs. If the landlord died before the termination of the tenancy, or indeed at any time before the hearing, his heirs would stand in his shoes and succeed to his rights. They could not be defeated because they had inherited only recently; Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954, ss. 30 (2) and 41 (2). So, too, if a landlord transferred otherwise than for money or money's worth at any time, his transferee would succeed to his rights against the tenant; H. L. Bolton Engineering Co. Ltd. v. T. J. Graham & Co. Ltd.
Here the circumstances are somewhat analogous. The landlord association will be dissolved, for all practical purposes, as soon as the transfer to the new chartered association is complete. It intends to carry on its activities, inter alia, in the three rooms on the top floor of No. 29, Tavistock Square, virtually for the rest of its life, short as that may be. Moreover (and this is of crucial importance), it is quite plain that the transfer to the new chartered association will be by way of gift, and not for any financial consideration. In these circumstances there seems to me to be no reason on principle or authority why the probable brevity of the landlords' occupation of the three top rooms should confer any benefit upon the tenants, and in my view it does not do so. If the transfer to the chartered association had been completed before the county court hearing, the tenants would clearly have had no right to a new lease. I am glad to think that the law does not make the rights of the parties depend upon the fortuitous circumstance as to whether the transfer is executed sooner rather than later."
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 30(1)(g)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Golden Lion Hotel v Carter [1965] 2 All ER 506
1965

Cross J
Land, Landlord and Tenant
A lease of a plot of land fronting a road contained a covenant by the lessor, who was also the owner of land with a hotel on the opposite side of the road, not to build on the hotel site except to a specified extent. Subsequently, the lessee acquired the freehold reversion. The successor to the hotel site brought an action for a declaration that, the lease having been extinguished by merger, the covenant was no longer enforceable. Held: On the facts there had been merger, and the covenant was accordingly unenforceable. The court rejected the defendant's argument that "though the leases no longer exist a corresponding right to enforce the covenants in equity against the plaintiff remains attached to the houses until the date when the leases would have expired." There need be "nothing unconscionable" in a party taking advantage of a conveyancer's mistake for a neighbour. As to the intention to merge the lease, Cross J said: "it is possible, though no doubt unlikely, that (the relevant parties) intended to give up any right to enforce the covenant in the respective leases against the plaintiff, and even if one assumes-which is much more likely-that they did not so intend and that the positive declarations that the lease should merge in the freeholds were inserted per incuriam, there is nothing unconscionable in the plaintiff, who was not concerned in the matter, taking advantage of the faulty conveyancing."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Strand Securities Ltd v Caswell [1965] Ch 958; [1965] EWCA Civ 1
2 Feb 1965
CA
Lord Denning MR, Russell LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The leaving of furniture in a flat or having a key to the flat or making occasional use of it was not enough to constitute actual occupation. Where A permits B to occupy land on B's own behalf by way of gratuitous licence, A's capacity as licensor will not by itself entitle him to claim to be in actual occupation of the land, though the position will be different if B occupies as the representative of A.
Lord Denning MR said that object of section 70(1)(g) was "to protect a person in actual occupation of land from having his rights lost in the welter of registration . . No one can buy the land over his head and thereby take away or diminish his rights"
Land Registration Act 1925 70(1)(g)
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Verrall v Farnes [1966] 1 WLR 1254
1966

Cross J
Landlord and Tenant, Agriculture
Consideration for an agreement need not take a monetary form. As to section 2, Cross J said: "After all, one of the objects of the Act of 1948, as I understand the matter, was to give security of tenure to those actually farming that land, so that they should not be tempted to take the last halfpenny of profit out of it during the period for which they had a contractual right to remain in occupation, without regard to its future welfare after the date when they were liable to be turned out."
Agricultural Holdings Act 1948 2

 
Hare v Nicoll [1966] 2 QB 130; [1966] 1 All ER 285
1966
CA
Danckwerts LJ
Landlord and Tenant, Contract
In an option for the renewal of a lease, or for the purchase or re-purchase of property, the contractual right must be exercised strictly within the time limited for the purpose, otherwise it will lapse. Danckwerts LJ said: "The authority cited for that proposition is a very striking case, Dibbins v. Dibbins, a decision of Chitty J. In that case an option for a surviving partner to purchase a deceased partner's share had to be exercised within three months of his death. A notice within the three months was given by solicitors on behalf of the surviving partner, but he was of unsound mind, and therefore the notice was not effective. Under an order in lunacy, a fresh notice was given, but it was too late in time, and equally ineffective. The rule really is long established, as Ranelagh (Lord) v. Melton (a decision of Kindersley V-C) and other cases show."
1 Citers


 
Glass v Kencakes [1966] 1 QB 611
1966

Paull J
Landlord and Tenant
The court considered the ability of a tenant to obtain relief from forfeiture for illegal or immoral use where the tenant was not aware of the breach by his sub-tenant until he received the section 146 notice. Where the tenant took prompt action to limit or prevent damage to the landlord's reputation, relief from forfeiture might be given. The section 146 notice did not allow for the breach to be remedied. Paull J reviewed the case law on whether a breach such as that alleged in the case before him was capable of remedy, and said: "Having considered these authorities to which I have referred, I think the following propositions may be stated: (1) The mere fact that the breach complained of is a breach of user by a subtenant contrary to a covenant in the lease does not render the breach incapable of remedy. If one of the tenants of these flats in Queensway had, unknown to the defendants, carried on a small business of dressmaking in the flats, I would hold without hesitation that the breach was capable of remedy so far as the defendants are concerned, but it may be that the remedy would have to consist not only of stopping the tenant from carrying on that business but of bringing an action for forfeiture, it being then left to the court to decide whether the particular tenant should be granted relief. (2) The fact that the business user involves immorality does not in itself render the breach incapable of remedy, provided that the lessees neither knew of nor had any reason to know of the fact that the flat was being so used. The remedy in such a case, however, must involve not only that immediate steps are taken to stop such a user so soon as the user is known, but that an action for forfeiture of the sub-tenant's lease must be started within a reasonable time. If therefore the lessee has known of such a breach for a reasonable time before the notice is served, the breach is incapable of remedy unless such steps have been taken. (3) It does not follow that such a breach is always capable of remedy. All the circumstances must be taken into consideration. For example, if the notice is not the first notice which has had to be served, or if there are particularly revolting circumstances attaching to the user, or great publicity, then it might well be that the slate could not be wiped clean, or, to use another phrase, the damage to the property might be so great as to render the breach incapable of remedy."
The breach of the lease was capable of remedy, and had been remedied within a reasonable time: "It is true that the user for prostitution took place either during two periods or for one lengthy period, but there was no fault on the part of the tenant and no general publicity - only publicity to those who chose to follow up the advertisements which did not give the address. Again, had the prostitutes refused to leave, the length of time before the defendants issued their writ against Dean would have been unreasonably long, but the premises were empty and were seen to be empty by anyone coming to the premises, not only by their appearance but also by reason of a "Notice of Sale" exhibited on the premises."
Law of Property Act 1925 146
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
West Country Cleaners (Falmouth) Limited v Saly [1966] 3 All ER 210; [1966] 1 WLR 1485
1966
CA
Dankwerts LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The landlord lived next door to the premises and frequently visited the premises. The tenant failed to paint the ceiling and did no painting in the last year of the term. The landlord objected to the exercise of an option in the lease. The tenant said that the breaches had been waived by the landlord's failure to object to the breaches. Held: A covenant to renew so long as lessee’s obligations were duly performed is strictly interpreted against the lessee. Such an option required both notice and observance of the covenants in the lease if the tenant was to be able to exercise it. This applied even though the breaches might be trivial.
Dankwerts LJ said: "An option of this character [to extend the terms of a lease] is a privilege - a right which has always been treated by the law as requiring compliance with the terms and conditions upon which the option is to be exercised."
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Sidnell v Wilson [1966] EWCA Civ 2; [1966] 2 QB 67; [1966] 1 All ER 681; [1966] 2 WLR 560
14 Jan 1966
CA
Lord Denning MR, Harman, Diplock LJJ
Landlord and Tenant

[ Bailii ]
 
Scholl Manufacturing Co Ltd v Clifton (Slim-Line) Ltd [1967] Ch 41
1967
CA
Diplock LJ, Harman LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The question was whether a landlord could exercise a right to break a lease by serving a notice under section 25 of the Act, which provides for termination of a tenancy by the landlord.
Harman LJ said: 'the question is whether, having regard to section 25 of the Act, the landlords may determine a lease having a break clause such as the present one under that section provided only that the termination date is not earlier than the date on which the break clause could operate. The judge held that the landlords could do this without first going through the formality of serving a notice to bring the break clause into operation. In my opinion the judge was right and, in fact, I think that section 25 so provides in express terms.'
Diplock LJ: 'As regards a tenancy which would, apart from the Act, come to an end by notice to quit given by the landlord in accordance with the terms of the lease or tenancy agreement, the provision substituted by the Act is that such tenancies may be terminated by the landlord by giving notice to quit in the prescribed form. The statutory provisions to which I have referred are not in addition to but in substitution for those terms contained in the lease or tenancy agreement which relate to tenancies coming to an end by effluxion of time or by notice to quit given by the landlord to the tenant.'
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 25
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 Joseph v Joseph; CA 1967 - [1967] Ch 78
 
Hodgson v Armstrong [1967] 1 All ER 307; [1967] 2 QB 299
1967
CA
Sellers, Davies LJJ
Limitation, Landlord and Tenant
Sellers LJ considered the application of court rules requiring notices to be given within a certain number of days: "Does the court need in each statute requiring notices to be given to a court - of which there are so many - an express stipulation about days when a court to which an application or notice is to be made or given is closed, or can it not be be said that the courts are able and are intended to administer the provisions strictly but with regard to te functioning and avaiability of the court?' and "It is said that the application could have been meade some days before. That is true, but that would have deprived te tenant of some part of the time which the statute has prescribed. I cannot find any such differentiation between one tenant and another or between one lease and another depending on te hdifferentces of their date in relation to te time of th efnctioning of the appropriate court. In my view th eproper construction of the statute requires that all tenants and all leases should be placed on the same basis as to time.
1 Citers


 
Commercial Properties Ltd v Wood [1968] 1 QB 15; [1967] 2 All ER 916; [1967] 3 WLR 185; 111 Sol Jo 275
1967
CA

Landlord and Tenant
A lease of commercial premises continued automatically under the Act. It became a monthly tenancy with rent payable in advance at the beginning of each mointh. The landlord served a notice under s25 on 4 October 1965 to terminate the tenancy on April 11 1966. Held: The notice being in appropriate form was effective to terminate the tenancy on the date given.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 26
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Owendale Pty Ltd v Anthony [1967] HCA 52; (1967) 117 CLR 539
24 Aug 1967

Windeyer J, Barwick CJ, McTiernan, Kitto, Taylor, Owen JJ
Commonwealth, Landlord and Tenant
Austlii High Court of Australia - Landlord and Tenant - Lease - Determination - Forfeiture - Covenant to commence erection of building within specified time - Clearing operations commenced - Whether breach - Acceptance of rent after notice of breach - Conduct of lessor and lessee - Waiver - Crown lease - Statutory procedure for determination upon breach of covenant - Effect of conduct upon statutory right to determine - Notice - Requirement that conditions for failure to comply with &which lease may be determined be fully set out - Reference to terms of lease - Whether sufficient - Signature on notice - Delegation of function by Minister - Delegate designated by office held - City Area Leases Ordinance 1936-1964 (A.C.T.), ss. 6,22.*
Windeyer J set out the principles behind the waiver of a right to forfeit a lease: "A waiver in this sense is more properly understood as an election. The essence of the doctrine, in cases between landlord and tenant, is that where a Lease contains a provision for forfeiture and a right of re-entry upon breach of a covenant by the lessee, then, upon a breach occurring, the lessor can either take advantage of his right of forfeiture and re-entry or waive this and treat the Lease as still subsisting. If, with knowledge of a breach, giving him a right of re-entry, he does an act inconsistent with his avoiding the Lease, he is deemed to have elected not to avoid it. Anything which a landlord does or says which is an unequivocal recognition of the continued existence of the Lease when he is aware of facts which would have given him a right of re-entry will amount to a waiver of that right. One act which, by the common law, is always regarded as unequivocal, and therefore necessarily a waiver of a right of re-entry on account of a breach of covenant by the lessee, is the lessor's acceptance, with knowledge of the fact of the breach, of rent accrued due after the breach. Apart from any special term in the Lease . . or any statutory modification of the common law, acceptance of rent due in respect of a current period is an obvious recognition of a tenancy then subsisting."
[ Austlii ]
 
Dutch Oven Ltd v Egham Estate and Investment Co Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 1483
1968
ChD
Megarry J
Landlord and Tenant
Megarry J was asked which was the relevant hearing when a court considered the condition of a landlord's intention to redevelop premises to support a refusal of a new tenancy. He approved an application that the landlord's ground of opposition be tried as a preliminary issue. Only if the landlord failed to establish his ground would the court then need to go on to address matters relating to the terms of any new tenancy. He held that the relevant hearing for the purpose of establishing the landlord's intention was the hearing to determine the preliminary issue and that if he failed on that occasion, so that a further hearing became necessary to determine the terms of a new tenancy, the landlord could not have a second bite of the cherry and seek to establish that his intention had been made good by the date of the later hearing.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954
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Hayward v Chaloner [1968] 1 QB 107
1968
CA
Russell LJ
Landlord and Tenant, Limitation
The alleged tenant (the rector of a parish) knew that rent should have been paid but had not paid it. "Only one of the previous rectors gave evidence. He was the Rev. Richard Phillips (dates) He knew the rectory cottages and said that the land behind the cottages was used by the occupants, including the land in dispute. He added that the land was sadly neglected and an old couple lived there. He never paid any rent for it. Mr and Mrs Hayward were prominent supporters of the church. He said that he would not expect them to ask him for the 10s. per annum rent." Held: A corporation sole may acquire land by adverse possession. Russell LJ said "Nor do I doubt the applicability of section 9 (2) to the present case," and
"just because the freeholders were content that the rector should not pay his rent and did not bother to ask for it for all those years. In Moses v Lovegrove in this court it was assumed on all hands that when section 9 apparently operates, adverse possession starts: see especially Lord Evershed, and Romer LJ. The principle clearly accepted was that once the period covered by the last payment of rent expired, the tenant ceased to be regarded by the Limitation Acts as the tenant. This case was not cited to the county court judge. A similar assumption was made in Nicholson v England, under the then existing principles which section 10 (1) was designed to embody. Textbooks to the same effect include Cheshire's Modern Law of Real property, 9th ed. (1962), pp. 797, 798: Megarry & Wade's Textbook of the Law of Real Property, 3rd ed. (1966), p. 1010: and Preston & Newsom on Limitation of Actions, 3rd ed. (1953), p.89. I am not aware that the contrary view has been anywhere expressed."
Limitation Act 1939
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Wakeham v Mackenzie [1968] 1 WLR 1175
1968


Equity, Landlord and Tenant
The plaintiff sought performance of an oral agreement to grant a tenancy having given up her own home to move into her employer's home. Held: There had been sufficient part performance.

 
Lucass Executors v Demarco 1968 SLT 89
1968


Scotland, Landlord and Tenant
The tenant argued as to the unreasonableness of the exercise of an irritancy.

 
Harmond Properties Ltd v Gajdzis [1968] 1 WLR 1858
1968
CA

Landlord and Tenant, Agency
The County Court decided that a notice to quit given to a tenant by a director of the landlord company in his own name was valid. Held: The decision was correct. The director had carried out the letting and acted as if he were the landlord in every way. He was held to have been the general agent of the landlord.
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 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd; HL 1968 - [1968] AC 269; [1967] UKHL 1; [1967] 1 All ER 699

 
 Thatcher v CH Pearce and Sons (Contractors) Ltd; 1968 - [1968] 1 WLR 748
 
Marsh v Cooper [1969] 1 WLR 803
1969


Landlord and Tenant
The landlord said his tenant was not a protected tenant since he shared use of the kitchen. Held: The use was restricted so that the tenant could not be said to be occupying the kitchen, and that use was not shared so as to prevent the letting being of a separate dwelling.

 
Central Estates (Belgravia) Ltd v Webster [1969] 209 EG 1319
1969


Landlord and Tenant
A notice under the Act which specified the penultimate date of the tenant's term as the date on which possession was required was invalid. The Act required the date to be not before the tenant's term expired by effluxion.
Lanldord and Tenant Act 1954 27


 
 Vincent v Premo Enterprises (Voucher Sales) Ltd; CA 1969 - [1969] 2 QB 609
 
Byrnlea Property Investments Ltd v Ramsay [1969] 2 QB 253
1969
CA
Lord Denning MR, Edmund Davies LJ
Landlord and Tenant
It was a requirement under the 1967 Act for the notice of a lessee, seeking to extend his interest under that Act, to indicate whether he was seeking the freehold or an extended lease. The tenant failed to do so. Held: This failure was fatal. Under the statutory scheme, the notice was designed to lead to a "statutory contract" binding on both parties. If the notice had been held to be valid: "The remarkable result would be that there would instantly spring into being at the moment of its service two statutory contracts, both binding on the parties and each differing in important respects from the other." The notices were inconsistent: as soon as the written notice is given, there is a binding contract, I cannot see any room for a notice in the alternative. If a tenant gives a notice that he desires `the freehold or an extended lease', without saying which, there can be no binding contract. The statute simply cannot begin to operate. If I may put it into the form of offer and acceptance, it stands in this way: the landlord, under the compulsion of the statute, whether he likes it or not, makes an offer to the tenant to let him either buy the freehold at a fair price or to take an extended lease of 50 years at a fair rent. In order to accept that offer, so as make a binding contract, the tenant must accept one of these alternatives. If he replies: `I desire to have either the freehold or an extended lease,' then there is no contract because no one knows which it is. It is too uncertain to be a contract. " (Lord Denning)
Leasehold Reform Act 1967
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Custins v Hearts of Oak Benefit Society (1969) 209 EG 239
1969
LT

Landlord and Tenant
The tribunal was asked to value a freehold on the tenant seeking to acquire the reversion under the 1967 Act. Held: The actual tenant could be treated as being in the market as a potential purchaser of the freehold when assessing a price payable under section 9(1).
Leasehold Reform Act 1967 9
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