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Landlord and Tenant - From: 1930 To: 1959

This page lists 162 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Whitley v Stumbles [1930] AC 544
1930
HL
Viscount Hailsham
Landlord and Tenant
The case concerned whether, under the Act, an incorporeal right of fishing, demised as part of a lease of an hotel, was part of the "premises" for the purpose of the Act. Held: The standard conveyancing meaning of the word "premises" has long been established as meaning the subject matter of the habendum of the lease. In strict conveyancing language the word "premises" is used as meaning the subject-matter of the habendum in a lease. "Premises" in the vital part of the statute had its strict legal meaning of the subject matter of the habendum of a lease, which would include incorporeal rights. In certain sections "premises" was used in "a colloquial sense . . as meaning merely the physical buildings and land which are included in the lease."
There was no reason to suppose that the expression "any premises held under a lease" in section 17 of the 1927 Act did not include "not merely the actual buildings in which trade is carried on, but also the land surrounding them, the easements granted as appurtenant to them, and any other incorporeal hereditaments which may form part of the premises in the strict legal sense of the term which are the subject matter of the habendum." Any other construction would defeat the plain purpose of the Act, which was to provide in the circumstances defined in the Act the tenant should have the right to continue to carry on his trade or business in the premises in the legal sense in which he was carrying them on under the lease for which he seeks that renewal.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 17
1 Citers


 
Taylor v Twinberrow [1930] 2 KB 16
1930

Scrutton LJ
Landlord and Tenant, Limitation
It was a misunderstanding of the legal effect of 12 years adverse possession under the Limitation Acts to treat it as if it gave a title: "the operation of the statute in giving a title is merely negative; it extinguishes the right and title of the dispossessed owner, and leaves the occupant with a title gained by the fact of possession and resting on the infirmity of the right of others to eject him."
1 Citers


 
Simons v Associated Furnishers Ltd [1931] 1 Ch 379
1931

Clauson J
Landlord and Tenant
Buildings were let for a term of 17 years. The tenant had the right to terminate the lease after the first five or ten years of the term if it gave notice to that effect and if it "shall up to the time of determination . . perform and observe the covenants . . but without prejudice to the remedies of either party against the other in respect of any antecedent claim or breach of covenant". The tenant gave his notice to terminate, admitting some want of repair at the time he gave notice. Held: At the time the notice expired the covenants had been duly performed. The issues were whether compliance was required at the time the notice was given as well as at its expiry and whether the provision was a condition precedent notwithstanding the concluding words. As to the first, the answer was no, and as to the second, yes, and: "That clause is in an exceedingly familiar form. Such a form - or one so closely resembling it as to be practically indistinguishable - has been in common use for more than a century past. It has been before the Court many times, and it would be dangerous to depart a hair's breadth from decisions upon it in former cases."
1 Citers


 
Lynn v Nathanson [1931] 2 DLR 457
1931


Commonwealth, Taxes Management, Landlord and Tenant
(Nova Scotia Court of Appeal) A government theatre tax had to be paid by patrons who bought two tickets, one for the theatre and one for the tax. The tax was held to be outside the phrase in the lease which recovered rent on "gross receipts obtained in the theatre " which phrase was to be construed in context.
1 Citers


 
Stening v Abrahams [1931] 1 Ch 470
1931
ChD
Farwell J
Landlord and Tenant
The landlord complained that the tenant was in breach of his covenant not to part with possession of any part of the premises where the tenant had so organised things that he had effectively excluded himself from part of the demised premises. Held. The licence to erect an advertisement on the wall of the premises did not constitute parting with possession of the wall. A lessee who grants a licence to another to use the demised premises does not commit a breach of the covenant: "Unless his agreement with his licensee wholly ousts him from the legal possession . . nothing short of a complete exclusion of the grantor or licensor from the legal possession for all purposes amounts to a parting with possession."
1 Citers


 
Balls Brothers Ltd v Sinclair [1931] 2 Ch 325
1931


Landlord and Tenant
Whether an "improvement" really improves the property is considered from the point of view of the tenant alone, so that work may constitute an improvement although it does not increase the value of the property at all or even reduces it.
1 Citers


 
Peech v Best [1931] KB 1
1931
CA
Scrutton LJ
Landlord and Tenant, Land
The defendant owned a 700 acre farm. He granted to the plaintiff "the exclusive right of shooting and sporting in over and upon it" for a term of fourteen years. With still some four years of the term to run, he conveyed 12 acres of the farm for the erection of racing stables. The plaintiff objected. Held: The building substantially interfered with or limited the shooting rights, and was therefore a derogation from the defendant's grant of which the plaintiff could complain. Scrutton LJ said: "It appears to me that fundamentally changing the character of the land over which sporting rights are granted . . if it has the necessary effect of substantially injuring the rights of others is a derogation from grant, and is a substantial interference with the profit a prendre granted." The case of Farrar shows that both landlord and sporting tenant must use their land reasonably having regard to the interest of the other, and will be liable for damage caused to the other by extraordinary, non-natural, or unreasonable action.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 The Canadian Pacific Railway Company v The King; PC 19-Feb-1931 - [1931] UKPC 18; [1931] AC 414

 
 Barton v Reed; 1932 - [1932] 1 Ch 362
 
Farrow v Orttewell [1933] 1 CH 480
1933
CA

Landlord and Tenant
A purchaser of the freehold reversion on a lease who prior to registration of his title served a notice to quit on the tenant, on which the tenant acted, was estopped from denying that the notice was valid on the ground of his lack of title when it was given.
1 Citers


 
Premier Confectionery (London) Co Ltd v London Commercial Sale Rooms Ltd [1933] Ch 904
1933
ChD
Bennett J
Landlord and Tenant
There were two separate tenancies of a shop and a kiosk in the same office building, granted consecutively by the same landlord to the same tenant. Each contained a covenant by the tenant to use the demised premises as a tobacconist's shop only. The tenancies were assigned together to a company which went into creditor's voluntary liquidation. The liquidator applied for consent to assign the tenancy of the kiosk alone to an assignee who wished to carry on the trade of tobacconist in it. Held: The court upheld the refusal of consent. Even though the proposed use was permitted by the lease, the landlord's reasons for refusal were reasonable, and were sufficiently related to the relationship of landlord and tenant under the lease. The proposed assignment would prejudice the chances of finding anyone prepared to take an assignment of the tenancy of the shop.

 
Schalit v Joseph Nadler Ltd [1933] 2 KB 79
1933
CA
Goddard J
Landlord and Tenant
Mr Nadler was a lessee of property, part of which he sublet to the plaintiff. In 1931 he made a declaration of trust, under which he declared that the property was held in trust for his company, Joseph Nadler Ltd. Shortly after the company purported to distrain for arrears of rent under the subtenancy. The plaintiff issued proceedings for damages for illegal distress. The company argued that it was a person entitled to receive the rents, and therefore under section 141(2) it was able to enforce the covenants. Held: It did not qualify the ability of an absolute beneficial owner to recover rent. Section 141(2) did not by itself permit the beneficiary of a trust of the landlord's reversionary interest to distrain for rent. The company was not entitled to the rents as such, but only to an account of the "net proceeds" after meeting any liabilities of Mr Nadler under the headlease
Law of Property Act 1925 141
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Bishop v Consolidated London Properties Ltd [1933] All ER 963
1933

du Parcq LJ
Landlord and Tenant
Lord du Parq treated the landlord's duty of repair as including the removal of blockages from rainwater downpipes: 'to repair after all merely means to prepare or make fit again to perform its function: it means to put in order.'
1 Citers



 
 Hanson v Newman; 1934 - [1934] Ch 298

 
 Wilchick v Marks and Silverstone; KBD 1934 - [1934] 2 KB 56
 
Inland Revenue Commissioners v Raphael and Ezra [1935] AC 96
1935
HL
Lord Wright
Contract, Landlord and Tenant
Parties to a contract should be presumed to have intended what in fact they have said.
The function of the recitals in a lease is to narrate the history leading up to the making of the lease.
Lord Wright said: " . . the principle of the common law has been to adopt an objective standard of construction and to exclude general evidence of actual intention of the parties; the reason for this has been that otherwise all certainty would be taken from the words in which the parties have recorded their agreement or their dispositions of property. If in some cases hardship or injustice may be effected by this rule of law, such hardship or injustice can generally be obviated by the power in equity to reform the contract, in proper cases and on proper evidence that there has been a real intention and a real mistake in expressing that intention: these matters may be established, as they generally are, by extrinsic evidence. The Court will thus reform or re-write the clauses in order to give effect to the real intention. But that is not construction, but rectification."
1 Citers


 
Rugby School (Governors) v Tannahill [1935] 1 KB 87
1935
CA
Greer LJ, Maugham LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The tenant had been convicted of permitting the premises in Great Ormond Street to be used for habitual prostitution. The landlord served a notice under section 146 which did not provide for the possibility of the breach being remedied. The evidence showed that the tenant had been knowingly and actively permitting the house to be so used, and had probably been receiving profits from the business. Held: The breach was not capable of remedy. A breach of a covenant in a lease against illegal use, a negative covenant, is not one capable of remedy, and the court should be more ready to grant forfeiture.
Greer LJ said that the stigma attaching to the property and the resultant loss of value rendered the breach irremediable.
Maugham LJ said that such damage was remediable within a reasonable time.
Law of Property Act 1925 146
1 Citers


 
Matania v National Provincial Bank Ltd [1935] All ER Rep 923
1935
ChD
Charles J
Landlord and Tenant
The plaintiff, a professor of singing, took a lease of one second floor of a building to carrying on his profession on the demised premises. After taking possession he began giving singing lessons. The landlord then, knowing of his use of the premises, let the first floor of the building to a different tenant authorised that new tenant in the lease, to make structural alterations, the effect which was to make it impossible for the plaintiff to carry on his profession for a period of three months. Held: In consenting to the works on the first floor the landlord had breached the covenant for quiet enjoyment under the lease of the second floor. Charles J said: "The alterations in the present case continued from March to July, and during that time . . the premises were rendered uninhabitable and the physical enjoyment of those premises was completely destroyed. I find that under these circumstances the landlords have been guilty of a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment."
1 Citers



 
 Matania v National Provincial Bank Ltd; CA 1936 - [1936] 2 All ER 633
 
Lambert v FW Woolworth and Co Ltd [1938] Ch 883
1938
CA
Slesser LJ, McKinnon L.J
Landlord and Tenant
The court considered the reasonableness of the withholding of consent under the Act: "the landlords have unconditionally withheld their consent and made no condition as to payment of any compensation in respect of damage to or diminution in the value of the premises. Having so failed, they have abstained from claiming the benefit of sub-s. 2, which expressly preserves this right to them, nor in my view can they now be heard to say, as evidence of reasonableness, that the premises have suffered damage or any diminution in value and the tenant has not offered to compensate them. Prima facie, the proviso says that they shall not unreasonably withhold their licence or consent, but gives to them expressly a right to claim the payment of a reasonable sum in respect of damage or diminution in value. This they have not claimed; and I think therefore that they must seek for some other grounds of reasonableness for their refusal than those of damage or diminution in value to meet the case of the tenant against them."
Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 19(2)
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Sowler v Potter; 1939 - [1939] 4 All ER 478; [1940] 1 KB 271; 162 LT 12; 56 TLR 142; 84 Sol Jo 115
 
Egerton v Jones [1939] 2 KB 702
1939
CA
Sir Wilfred Greene MR, Mackinnon and Finlay LJJ
Landlord and Tenant, Costs
A mortgagee of a leasehold interest claimed that he should have been given notice of a section 146 notice served on the lessee. Held: A mortgagee by subdemise is always at the risk of a lessor obtaining re-entry for breach of covenant without the mortgagee knowing anything about it. He is completely shut out. Every mortgagee, therefore, knows that this is the risk he runs. If, after taking a covenant from his mortgagor to observe the covenants in the lease, he takes no steps whatsoever to satisfy himself from time to time that no breach of covenant is taking place, he is always exposed to the risk that, behind his back and without his knowledge, the lessor will succeed in re-entering, and so determining the lease, with the result that all possibility of relief from forfeiture is lost to the mortgagee. That is one of the risks of the game.
Sir Wilfred Greene MR required the mortgagees had to pay the landlord's costs on the solicitor and client basis, rather than the party and party basis, on the principle that the landlord should be indemnified against proper expenses reasonably incurred, which party and party costs would not give them.
Law of Property Act 1925 146
1 Citers


 
Moss Empires Ltd v Olympia (Liverpool) Ltd [1939] AC 544
1939

Lord Atkin, :or dPorter
Landlord and Tenant
Lord Atkin said: "if it does not apply in its ordinary and natural construction, I do not understand how there can be said to exist any principle of law which would avoid an agreement not in terms avoided by the statute sought to be applied."
1 Citers


 
Whitham v Bullock [1939] 2 KB 81
1939
CA

Landlord and Tenant
The assignee of part of the property comprised in the lease had paid the whole rent in order to stave off a threatened distress. He then sued the assignee of the other part for a contribution. Held: He succeeded.
Counsel for the defendant submitted that on the severance of the term occasioned by the assignment the landlord ceased to be in a position to sue for the whole rent and could only sue the tenants of the severed parts for a proportion of the rent. The Court (obiter) referred to authority which supported the proposition and then referred to the observation of Tindal CJ in Curtis v Spitty and "the unquestionable fact" that the assignment of part of the land does not affect the landlord's right to distrain on that part for the rent of the whole.
1 Citers



 
 Cockwell v Romford Sanitary Steam Laundry Ltd; CA 1939 - [1939] 4 All ER 370, CA
 
Webb v Frank Bevis Ltd [1940] 1 All ER 247
1940

Scott LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The tenant's large shed was fixed to the land. Held: It was a tenant's fixture which could be removed by the tenant at the end of his tenancy, even though it was annexed to the land and formed part of it.
1 Citers


 
Pembery v Lamdin [1940] 2 All ER 434
1940
CA
Slesser LJ
Landlord and Tenant
There was an obligation on the landlord to keep the premises in repair in the condition in which they were demised. The premises were ground floor and basement premises which were let for the purpose of providing accommodation for the public for drinking cocktails and wines. The covenant was that the landlord "would keep the external part of the demised premises other than the shop front in good and tenantable repair and condition". Held: "It is an old house, 100 years or more in age, and it was built at a time when modern devices for avoiding the consequences of damp were unknown. As the surveyor points out in his report, there was no provision for waterproofing it. When one comes to construe the repairing covenant, and looks (as directed by the authorities) to the nature of the premises demised, it is clear from the evidence, the judgment, and the surveyor's report that this was a house of the old type, with a cellar for the most part built into the ground, without any precautions against damp oozing through the porous bricks into the cellar. The house above fortunately may have remained dry, but that was the kind of house which was demised."
In this particular covenant: "The first question which arises in this case is what was the nature of the obligation to repair. In order to ascertain that, it is first necessary to consider the nature of the premises which had to be repaired under the covenant. I think that, for the purposes of this case, the principle which has never been doubted, is to be found stated in a short passage in a judgment of Lord Esher, MR, in Lister v Lane & Nesham. That is a case which has been subsequently followed and approved in Lurcott v Wakely & Wheeler. In Lister v Lane & Nesham, after reviewing the earlier authorities, Lord Esher, MR, who was speaking there of a tenant, says:
'Those cases seem to me to show that, if a tenant takes a house which is of such a kind that by its own inherent nature it will in course of time fall into a particular condition, the effects of that result are not within the tenant's covenant to repair. However large the words of the covenant may be, a covenant to repair a house is not a covenant to give a different thing from that which the tenant took when he entered into the covenant. He has to repair that thing which he took; he is not obliged to make a new and different thing ....'
Applying that to a landlord, in the same way as it is in that case applied to a tenant, if the counterclaim here made by Mrs Lamdin be correct, she is entitled to receive at the hands of this landlord 'a different thing' form that which she took when she entered into the covenant. She took this old house with a cellar without any waterproof protection, and she is asking the landlord so to repair that house as to give her a cellar which has a waterproof protection and is dry. That is not a right which she can possibly maintain, because the obligation of the landlord is to repair that which is demised, and not to give her something much drier in its nature than that which was demised." The installation of a damp course was not a repair.
1 Citers


 
In re Metropolis Estates Co Ltd [1940] 3 All ER 522
1940
CA

Landlord and Tenant, Insolvency

1 Citers


 
A Lewis and Co (Westminster) Ltd v Bell [1940] 1 Ch 345
1940

Simons J
Landlord and Tenant
Simons J said: "In my view, what is done at these premises is the carrying on of the business of a tea-shop, and that involves, among other things, the sale of cigarettes. It is common-indeed, I was told that it was almost universal - that in tea - shops of this character cigarettes should be sold. Accordingly, it appears to me that it is no more right to predicate of this shop that there is carried on there the business of the sale of tobacco, cigars and cigarettes than to say of it that there is carried on the business of the sale of milk, or the business of the sale of confectionery. There is there carried on the usual business of a tea-shop, which involves the sale of a number of articles therein usually sold."
1 Citers


 
Butler Estates Company Ltd v Bean [1941] 1 All ER 355
1941
KBD

Landlord and Tenant

1 Citers


 
Potts v Hickman [1941] AC 212
1941
HL
Viscount Simon LC
Landlord and Tenant, Insolvency
The Plaintiff was the landlord of certain premises and had as at 29 September 1938, a right to distrain for unpaid rent in the sum of £15 11s. However, on 20 September, the defendant, as bailiff for Wolverhampton Corporation, had levied on the tenant under a warrant for distress for rates granted by a justice of the peace for the borough on 11 August pursuant to Distress for Rates Act 1849. Held: The levying of a distress for poor rates under a justice's warrant was not an "execution" within section 1 Landlord and Tenant Act 1709 (called in this case "the Act of Anne"). The issue was whether the distress was an execution within section 1 of the 1709 Act. The section referred to "the party at whose suit the execution is sued out" and to a process to be executed by "the sheriff or other officer" resulting in payment "to the plaintiff'. The wording led to the conclusion that, in this context, "execution" referred to the process of enforcing a judgment obtained inter partes. Although the distress warrant was stated to be "in the nature of an execution" it was not a process to enforce payment of a debt ascertained by a previous judgment. As to the possibility of a wider meaning of "execution": "The House has been much assisted by the learning and research of counsel on both sides, and we further have the advantage of the full and carefully reasoned judgment of Goddard L.J. delivered on behalf of the Court of Appeal. [see at [1940] 1 KB 38.D] If the test which would determine the present controversy were completely stated by asking whether the lawyers of 1709 would have regarded the levying of a distress of rates as an execution, there would indeed be a great deal to be said for the learned Lord Justice's conclusion. Ten years before the Act of Anne was passed, Holt C.J. in the deer-stealing case Rex v. Speed had said that "when a statute says money 'shall be levied by distress,' that is an execution." In Hutchins v. Chambers, where the question was whether beasts of the plough were privileged from distress for poor rates and it was decided that they were not, Lord Mansfield quotes with approval the following passage from 3 Salkeld, p. 136: "This common-law exemption of utensils, tools, instruments of husbandry etc. from distress holds only in distress for rent arrear, amerciaments etc., but doth not extend to cases where a distress is given in the nature of an execution by any particular statute; as for poor rates." "Therefore", adds Lord Mansfield, "it is more analogous to an execution than to a distress at common law, and there (in cases of execution) averia carucae may be distrained; although there be other sufficient distress."
Landlord and Tenant Act 1709 1
1 Citers


 
Mackeson v Boyd 1942 SC 56; 1942 SLT 106; [1941] ScotCS CSIH_4
7 Nov 1941
SCS
Lord Patrick
Scotland, Landlord and Tenant
The pursuer had taken a lease of a furnished country residence but came to be able to occupy a small part of the property, after the main residence was requisitioned for the war effort. Held: Speedie's casedid apply, and: " the tests to be applied in deciding whether there has been total or partial eviction from subjects leased are the same in the case of eviction by the action of the executive as in the case of eviction resulting from rei interitus."
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Kiddle v City Business Properties Ltd [1942] 1 KB 269
1942
CA
Goddard LJ
Landlord and Tenant
Goddard LJ said: "[The plaintiff] takes the property as he finds it and must put up with the consequences. It is not to be supposed that the landlord is going to alter the construction, unless he consents to do so. He would say to his intending tenant: 'You must take it as it is or not at all.'"
1 Citers



 
 Gemmell v Goldsworthy; 1942 - [1942] SASR 55,57

 
 Price v Mann; CA 1942 - [1942] 1 All ER 453
 
Hankey v Clavering [1942] 2 KB 326
1942
CA
Lord Greene MR,Clauson LJ
Landlord and Tenant
A lease term ran for 21 years from 25 December 1934. A break clause gave either party the right to determine the lease at the expiration of the first seven years, by six calendar months' notice. The landlord gave notice to the tenant's solicitors in the following terms: "As I may have to be away for some time in the near future, I will be obliged if you would accept the six months' notice to terminate your client's lease which I am allowed to give on June 21, 1941. This would mean that he would have to give up the cottage on December 21, 1941." The notice should have expired on 25, not 21, December. At first instance, Asquith J. had held that the notice could be saved on the basis that it had been accepted as a good notice by the tenant's solicitors. Held: The notice was ineffective. Break notices "must on their face and on a fair and reasonable construction do what the lease provides that they are to do."
Clauson LJ said: "I should have thought that, as a matter of construction, an argument other than that which leads to the result the Master of the Rolls has announced was quite untenable."
and (Greene MR) "This appeal raises a short point in connection with a break clause in a lease wherein the plaintiff was the lessor and the defendant was the lessee. By his letter of January 15, 1940, the plaintiff, on the face of it, was purporting to determine the lease by notice on December 21, 1941. The whole thing was obviously a slip on his part, and there is a natural temptation to put a strained construction on language in aid of people who have been unfortunate enough to make slips. That, however, is a temptation which must be resisted, because documents are not to be strained and principles of construction are not to be outraged in order to do what may appear to be fair in an individual case." and "Notices of this kind are documents of a technical nature, technical because they are not consensual documents, but, if they are in proper form, they have of their own force without any assent by the recipient the effect of bringing the demise to an end. They must on their face and on a fair and reasonable construction do what the lease provides that they are to do. It is perfectly true that in construing such a document, as in construing all documents, the court in a case of ambiguity will lean in favour of reading the document in such a way as to give it validity, but I dissent entirely from the proposition that, where a document is clear and specific, but inaccurate on some matter, such as that of date, it is possible to ignore the inaccuracy and substitute the correct date or other particular because it appears that the error was inserted by a slip. By the clear wording of this notice the plaintiff purported to bring the lease to an end on December 21, 1941. In so doing he was attempting to do something which he had no power to do, and, however much the recipient might guess, or however certain he might be, that it was a mere slip, that would not cure the defect because the document was never capable on its face of producing the necessary legal consequence."
1 Citers



 
 Cumming v Danson; CA 1942 - [1942] 2 All ER 653; [1942] 112 LJKB 145; [1942] 59 TLR 70; [1942] 87 Sol Jo 21
 
Butler Estates Company Ltd v Bean [1942] 1 KB 1; [1941] 2 All ER 793
1942
CA

Landlord and Tenant

1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Smith v Cox [1942] 2 KB 558
1942

Humphreys J
Contract, Landlord and Tenant
The tenant, Mr Smith, refused to pay rent to the elderly landlady, Ms Rolf, because she had not repaired the property. The defendant agent paid the rent from his own pocket, expecting to recover it when the rent was eventually paid. When he failed to obtain the rent, he distrained and recovered £180, which was the rent due, less deductions for repairs. The plaintiff sued for damages, contending that the distraint was unlawful because the rent had been paid by the defendant. He admitted that the rent was paid without his knowledge and not at his request. Held: The judge found for the defendant. There was no evidence that: "the defendant acted or purported to act or regarded himself as acting as the agent of the plaintiff. The view which I take of this transaction is that the defendant did no more than advance out of his own pocket to an elderly impecunious landlord money which he did not wish her to be without for any length of time and so he took the risk of recouping himself later on. That being so, this action must fail because it is based on the allegation that there was an illegal distress, on the ground that the plaintiff had paid his rent or that somebody had paid it for him." As between a tenant and a landlord, if a stranger or third person purported to make a discharge of rent, the landlord was entitled to reject the payment.
1 Cites


 
Francis Jackson Developments Ltd v Stemp [1943] 2 All ER 601
1943
CA
Lord Greene MR
Landlord and Tenant
The landlord had served a notice determining a tenancy at will before commencing proceedings for possession. Held: The provisions of the Rent Acts applied to premises let on a tenancy at will. Lord Greene: "In my opinion this tenancy was a tenancy at a rent, and the result is that the Acts apply. I do not take up time by referring to the authorities which were cited to us, which at any rate settle, so far as this court is concerned, that the Acts do apply to a tenant at will."
1 Citers


 
Chamberlain v Farr [1943] 112 LJKB 206
1943
CA
Lord Greene MR
Landlord and Tenant
A prospective purchaser of a house (No 1 Falling Lane) under construction had agreed that, if he were allowed into occupation before completion, he would occupy, pending completion, as tenant at will, paying a weekly sum. In the event, the house not being ready, he was allowed into possession of another house (No 7 Falling Lane) in the same road, paying a lesser sum. The landlord later sought determination of a standard rent of No 7 Falling Lane under section 11 of the 1928 Act. The question for decision was whether standard rent was to be determined by reference to the actual rent payable in respect of No 7 Falling Lane on 1 September 1939, or was to have regard to standard rents of similar houses in the neighbourhood – section 6 of the 1933 Act, as amended by section 3 of the 1939 Act. That turned on whether No 7 Falling Lane was "let" on 1 September 1939. Held: It was. It was immaterial, in that context, whether the tenancy was a tenancy at will or a weekly tenancy. Lord Greene: "Once it was pointed out that it was a tenancy and that this was a rent, the necessary result . . . follows that that was the figure at which the standard rent ought to have been determined."
Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act 1928 11 - Rent and Mortgage Restrictions (Amendment) Act 1933 6
1 Citers


 
Summers v Salford Corporation [1943] AC 283
1943
HL
Lord Atkin, Lord Thankerton, Lord Russell of Killowen, Lord Wright, Lord Romer
Landlord and Tenant, Housing
The tenant had given notice to the landlord's agent that a sash-cord in the only window of a bedroom had broken. No repair was effected and about two months later the second sash-cord broke injuring the tenant. The House was asked whether there was a breach by the landlords of the implied undertaking in the Act, that the house would be kept by the landlord during the tenancy in all respects fit for human habitation. Held: Lord Atkin said: "In the present case the point on which the Court of Appeal in Morgans case decided for the defendant does not arise, namely, that notice of the lack of repair complained of must be given to the landlord before his statutory obligation arises. I can see that different considerations may arise in the case of an obligation to repair imposed in the public interest, and I think that this question must be left open, and I reserve to myself the right to reconsider my former decision if the necessity arises."
Housing Act 1936 2(1)
1 Citers



 
 Green v Palmer; 1944 - [1944] 1 Ch 328
 
Minister of Health v Bellotti [1944] 1 KB 298; [1944] 1 All ER 238
1944
CA
Lord Greene MR, Mackinnon LJ
Housing, Landlord and Tenant
298 blocks of flats had been requisitioned to provide accommodation for persons evacuated from Gibraltar during the war. The evacuees occupied the various flats as licensees. They were given only one week's notice terminating their licences. Held: Where the relevant period has not been specified by the licence itself, a licensee is entitled, following revocation of the licence, to whatever in all the circumstances is a reasonable time to remove himself and his possessions. It was an unreasonably short period, although possession proceedings were not in fact begun until after the lapse of a reasonable time.
Had the licences been validly terminated? A licensor can terminate a licence at any time as long as reasonable time is given within which the determination is to take effect. However, the question of what the licensee is entitled to expect and the matter of determination of his licence is one that is impossible to answer by reference to other cases in different circumstances.
Mackinnon LJ said: "I think the rule of law is that the licensor can revoke his licence at any time, but the licensee has thereafter a reasonable time, having regard to all the circumstances, to comply with the revocation."
Lord Greene rejected the proposition that the only notice to terminate a licence which the law required was a period sufficient to enable the licensee to remove himself and his property from the premises comprised in the licence: "I refer to that because it appears to me that where a question arises as to the lawful method of terminating a licence, the circumstances in which the licence came to be granted are most relevant to consider. Where a licence is granted under a contract, it may very well be that the contract will make express provision for those matters which must be observed, but what is to happen where the contract is silent in that regard? I cannot take the view that there is some cast-iron principle of law which lays down for every type of contract, whatever the circumstances and whatever the purposes for which it was entered into, some rule which is always to operate. In my opinion, the true rule is that the implications of the contract are to be determined by regard to all the relevant circumstances of the case. Thus, in the judgment of the Privy Council in Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. The King, the following paragraph appears: "Whether any and what restrictions exist on the power of a licensor to determine a revocable licence must, their Lordships think, depend upon the circumstances of each case." That is the only proposition of general application which I find it possible to extract from that authority; and although the case is not binding on this court, the law there is, in my opinion, laid down with complete accuracy.
The notice given by each letter operates as a clear determination of the licence at the expiration of one week. It conveys to the mind of the recipient as clearly as anything can notice that the licence is determined. It goes on, however, to indicate that the recipient of the letter, together with his possessions, is to be removed from the premises within one week. So far as the letter gives that instruction, it was, in my opinion, quite inoperative. The true view is that where a licence is revoked, the licensee has, in spite of the revocation, whatever in the circumstances is a reasonable time to enable him to remove himself and his possessions from the scene of the licence. I have already said that in the circumstances of this case such a reasonable time must extend to whatever is a reasonable time to find alternative accommodation, and, if the day after this notice expired, proceedings had been taken by the minister to eject the defendants, those proceedings would have failed because the defendants were entitled to a reasonable time, and a week was not a reasonable time, to enable them to find alternative accommodation. The circumstance that the threat to remove them before the expiration of what would have been a reasonable time was inserted in the letter does not prevent the letter from being a good notice to determine the licence. That being the position, the county court judge decided that the interval which elapsed between the expiration of the week mentioned in that document and the commencement of these proceedings was a sufficient time to enable alternative accommodation to be found. In view of that finding of fact, the defendants could not complain at the time these proceedings were instituted that they had not been allowed sufficient time in the circumstances to remove themselves and their possessions and find alternative accommodation."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Brown v Draper [1944] KB 309
1944
CA
Lord Greene MR
Landlord and Tenant
The husband tenant had left the matrimonial home after a quarrel leaving behind some of his furniture. Held: The husband/tenant cannot put an end to the tenancy, even by such acts as delivering the keys to the landlord, so long as his wife remains on the premises: he remains there by her, and so long as he does so, whatever else he does or says, the tenancy remains. The only ways in which a tenant may lose the protection of the Rent Acts are (a) by giving up possession (in which case no order for recovery of possession against him was required) or (b) by having an order of possession made against him. In the case of a licensee of a tenant, the licensee cannot in her own right claim the protection of the Acts, and "That proposition is equally true of our Rent Restriction Act and what is stated about a licensee is applicable equally to a sub-tenant. But a sub-tenant car shelter behind the protection afforded to the tenant (his immediate landlord) is that protection has not ceased to exist."
1 Citers


 
Thompson v Park [1944] KB 408
1944

Goddard LJ
Contract, Landlord and Tenant
Goddard LJ rejected a submission regarding recovery of pssession after a forced entry, saying: "Having got back into the house, . . with strong hand and with multitude of people, he has established himself in the house, and he then says : "I ought not to have an injunction given against me to make me go out because I got back here . . and therefore, I want the status quo preserved." The status quo that could be preserved was the status quo that existed before these illegal and criminal acts on the part of the defendants. It is a strange argument to address to a court of law that we ought to help the defendant who has trespassed and got himself into these premises in the way in which he has done and to say that that would be preserving the status quo and a good reason for not granting an injunction."
1 Citers


 
Dickson v St Aubyn [1944] 1 All ER 470
1944


Landlord and Tenant
An ambiguity in a lease should be construed in favour of the tenant.

 
Cunningham-Reid v Public Trustee [1944] KB 602; [1944] 2 All ER 6
1944
CA
Luxmoore LJ, Lord Greene MR and MacKinnon J
Landlord and Tenant
At common law, upon the death of a joint tenant, the tenancy is vested in the survivor, or jointly in the survivors if there is more than one.
Luxmoore LJ said: "In the present case there is no evidence of what the bargain between the plaintiff and Sir Ernest Sanger was, and, in the absence of any evidence which would establish a tenancy in common in equity between them, it seems plain that the joint tenancy which is created in law is also a joint tenancy in equity. Sir Ernest Sanger has died, and the plaintiff has succeeded, not only to the legal interest in this lease, but also to the full beneficial interest. As I have said, had the covenant stood alone and had the legal position only to be considered, and if neither of the parties had any beneficial interest in the lease, there could be no question on a covenant in this form but that whichever of them was called on to fulfill it would be entitled to contribution from the other. The substantial point in this case, however, on which the plaintiff is bound to fail, is that he has acquired, by reason of the death of Sir Ernest Sanger, the full beneficial interest in the lease. In those circumstances, it could hardly be suggested that he, having the full benefit of the lease, could be equitably entitled to call on the executors of his co-covenantor, whose estate has no beneficial interest in it, to pay half the rent. It seems to me that in equity the claim to contribution in these circumstances must, of necessity, fail."
1 Citers


 
Lace v Chantler [1944] 1 All ER 305; 113 LJKB 282; 170 LT 185; 60 TLR 244; 88 Sol Jo 135; [1944] 1 KB 368
1944
CA
Lord Green MR
Landlord and Tenant
The freeholder purported to let the house to the tenant 'for the duration of the war' Held: The term was uncertain, and therefore no lease was created.
Lord Green MR said: "The intention was to create a tenancy and nothing else. The law says that it is bad as a tenancy. The court is not then justified in treating the contract as something different from what the parties intended, and regarding it merely as a contract for the granting of a licence. That would be setting up a new bargain which neither of the parties ever intended to enter into. The relationship between the parties must be ascertained on the footing that the tenant was in occupation and was paying a weekly rent. Accordingly, it must be the relationship of weekly tenant and landlord and nothing else."
1 Citers


 
Cricklewood Property and Investment Trust Ltd v Leighton's Investment Trust Ltd [1945] AC 221; [1945] 1 All ER 525
1945
HL
Viscount Simon, Lord Russell, Lord Goddard
Landlord and Tenant
Wartime regulations were implemented which prohibited the building on land which was already subject to a building lease which required the lessees to erect several shops. Held: Even if the doctrine of frustration could apply to a lease, the circumstances did not justify such application; the lease had not been determined by frustration, and the liability for rent continued. The regulations were temporary, and the lease was therefore not frustrated. A lease will rarely be frustrated; it might require a 'vast convulsion of nature.' Frustration is ‘apt to vindicate justice wherever owing to relevant supervening circumstances the enforcement of any contractual arrangement in its literal terms would produce injustice’
Lord Russell said: "The contractual obligations [under a lease] of each party are merely obligations which are incidental to the relationship of landlord and tenant created by the demise, and which necessarily vary with the character and duration of the particular lease. It may well be that circumstances may arise during the currency of the term which render it difficult, or even impossible, for one party or the other to carry out some of its obligations as landlord or tenant, circumstances which might afford a defence to a claim for damages for their breach, but the lease would remain."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Cole v Harris; 1945 - [1945] KB 474

 
 Neale v Del Soto; CA 1945 - [1945] KB 144; [1945] 1 All ER 191
 
Moss v Brown [1946] 2 All ER 557
1946
CA
Asquith LJ, Somervell LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The parties to the disputed arrangements were friends at the time when the letting arrangement was entered into. The putative landlord said there was no intention by the parties to create the relationship of landlord and tenant, the issue being whether the persons in exclusive occupation of residential property were tenants or licensees. Held: (majority) There was evidence to support the finding of the county court judge that the occupation of the flat in question was under a licence.
1 Citers


 
MacMillan and Co Ltd v Rees [1946] 1 All ER 675
1946
CA
Evershed J
Landlord and Tenant
The lease of premises as an office allowed the tenant or her business partner were authorised to sleep when required. Held: The Court drew a distinction between an authorised user of merely sleeping or eating on premises and use as a dwelling house. Authorised acts, which were residential in character, did not make the business premises a dwelling house
1 Citers


 
Milmo v Carreras [1946] KB 306
1946
CA
Lord Greene MR
Landlord and Tenant
Privity of estate between the assignee and the lessor creates liability in the lessor only in respect of covenants which run with the land.
What was plainly stated and understood by the parties to be an underlease operated as an assignment of the lease as a matter of law, because the duration of the purported underlease equalled or exceeded that of the lease. Whatever the form of the transaction, if a tenant purports to grant a sublease for a term equal to or larger than the term vested in the tenant, it necessarily results in an assignment because the tenant is left without a reversion.
Lord Greene MR said: "In accordance with a very old and established rule, where a lessee, by a document in the form of a sub-lease, divests himself of everything that he has got (which he must necessarily do if he is transferring to his so-called sub-lessee an estate as great as, or purporting to be greater than, his own) he from that moment is a stranger to the land, in the sense that the relationship of landlord and tenant, in respect of tenure, cannot any longer exist between him and the so called sub-lessee."
1 Citers


 
Freeman v Hambrook [1947] LR 70
1947


Landlord and Tenant

1 Citers


 
Buck v Howarth (1947) 1 ABR 344
1947


Landlord and Tenant
A man, for no consideration, gave another permission to stay in a cottage until he died. Held: It was not a lease but only a tenancy at will.
1 Citers


 
Crate v Miller [1947] 1 KB 946
1947
CA

Landlord and Tenant
A weekly tenancy which begins on Saturday may be determined validly by notice to quit either on Friday or Saturday. Both are equally intimations that tenant is to quit when the current period ends.

 
Smith v Poulter [1947] KB 339
1947


Landlord and Tenant
The court has a duty to see whether a tenant is entitled to statutory protection, even if the point is not pleaded or raised by the tenant.
1 Citers



 
 Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd; KBD 1947 - [1947] 1 KB 130; [1956] 1 All ER 256; [1947] LJR 77; [1947] 175 LT 332; [1947] 62 TLR 557
 
Eccles v Bryant and Pollock [1948] Ch 93; [1947] 2 All ER 865
1947
CA
Lord Greene MR, Cohen and Asquith LJJ
Landlord and Tenant, Contract, Legal Professions, Agency
The Plaintiff contended that a letter written by the purchaser's solicitor which effectively set out the terms of the agreement, enclosed the part of the contract signed by the purchaser, and asked in exchange for the counter-part signed by the vendor, created a binding contract between the parties. Held: Negotiations 'subject to contract' for the grant of a lease remain in a state of negotiation until exchange of lease and counter-part.
Letters written by solicitors, acting as solicitors relating to a proposed grant of a lease, or related to a proposed acquisition of property by sale, are letters written by agents of the parties who have no authority to conclude a contract; they are not written by agents within whose ostensible authority there lies the function of making a contract. Once the documents had been exchanged however, the parties would be bound.
Lord Greene MR said: "One thing is quite clear on the facts of this case to my mind, that both firms of solicitors, one of whom - that is the vendors' solicitors - practised in East Grinstead and the other of whom, the purchaser's solicitors, practised in London, when they were instructed to carry this matter through by their respective clients, contemplated and intended from beginning to end to do so in the customary way which is familiar to every firm of solicitors in the country, namely, by preparing the engrossment of the draft contract when agreed in duplicate, the intention being to do what I have no doubt at this very moment is happening in dozens of solicitors' offices all over the country, namely, to exchange the two parts when signed by their respective clients." and
"When parties are proposing to enter into a contract, the manner in which the contract is to be created so as to bind them must be gathered from the intentions of the parties express or implied. In such a contract as this, there is a well-known, common and customary method of dealing; namely, by exchange, and anyone who contemplates that method of dealing cannot contemplate the coming into existence of a binding contract before the exchange takes place.
Lord Greene MR continued: "It was argued that exchange is a mere matter of machinery, having in itself no particular importance and no particular significance. So far as significance is concerned, it appears to me that not only is it not right to say of exchange that it has no significance, but it is the crucial and vital fact which brings the contract into existence. As for importance, it is of the greatest importance, and that is why in past ages this procedure came to be recognised by everybody to be the proper procedure and was adopted. When you are dealing with contracts for the sale of land, it is of the greatest importance to the vendor that he should have a document signed by the purchaser, and to the purchaser that he should have a document signed by the vendor. It is of the greatest importance that there should be no dispute whether a contract had or had not been made and that there should be no dispute as to the terms of it. This particular procedure of exchange ensures that none of those difficulties will arise. Each party has got what is a document of title, because directly a contract in writing relating to land is entered into, it is a document of title. That can be illustrated, of course, by remembering the simple case where a purchaser makes a sub-sale. The contract is a vital document for the purpose of the sub-sale. If he had not got the vendor's part, signed by the vendor, to show to the sub-purchaser, he would not be able to make a good title. "If the argument for the purchaser is right and the contract comes into existence before exchange takes place, it would mean that neither party could call upon the other to hand over his part. The non-exchanged part would remain the property of the party who signed it, because exchange would be no element in the contract at all and therefore you could get this position, that the purchaser might wish to resell and would have no right to obtain from the vendor the vendor's signed part."
1 Citers



 
 McCarrick v Liverpool Corporation; HL 1947 - [1947] AC 219
 
Rich v Basterfield [1847] EngR 693
3 Jul 1947


Landlord and Tenant, Nuisance
Although the owner of property may, as occupier, be responsible for injuries arising from acts done upon that property by persons who are there by his permission, though not strictly his agents or servants, such liability attaches only upon parties in actual possession. - Where, therefore, an action was brought against A., the owner of premises, for a nuisance arising from smoke issuing out of a chimney, to the prejudice of the plaintiff in his occupation of an adjoining messuage, on the ground that A, having erected the chimney, and let the premises with the chimney so erected, had impliedly authorised the lighting to a fire therein. Held that the action would not lie. Held, also, that, inasmuch as the premises were in the occupation of B a tenarit, at the time the fires were lighted, A. was entitled to a verdict on a pIea of "not possessed," the allegation as to possession, having reference to the time when the nuisance complained of was committed, and not to the time at which the chimney was erected.
1 Cites

[ Commonlii ]
 
Bonham-Carter v Hyde Park Hotel (1948) 64 TLR 177
1948

Goddard LCJ
Landlord and Tenant
A party claiming damage for breach of a covenant to repair in a lease must prove that damage.
1 Citers


 
Pender v Reid 1948 SC 381
1948


Landlord and Tenant, Scotland
When a court is asked whether a dwelling-house is let with other land, it must determine whether the land is the adjunct of the dwelling-house, or the dwelling-house the adjunct of the land.


 
 Addis vBurrows; CA 1948 - [1948] 1 All ER 177; [1948] 1 KB 144
 
EH Lewis and Son Ltd v Morelli [1948] 2 All ER 1021
1948


Landlord and Tenant, Estoppel
Where somebody with no legal estate purports to grant a tenancy, he can only create a tenancy by estoppel which continues until the true land-owner asserts his interest. Such a tenancy can be created even if only by word of mouth.


 
 Property Holding Co Ltd v Clark; CA 1948 - [1948] 1 KB 630
 
McIntyre v ANR and Hardcastle [1948] 2 QB 82
1948


Landlord and Tenant

1 Citers


 
Bannister v Bannister [1948] 2 ALL ER 137
1948


Landlord and Tenant, Trusts
A claim that the owner had agreed to let the occupier live in a cottage rent free for as long as she wished was treated as a claim based on constructive trust, on the basis that the purchaser fraudulently set up "the absolute character of the conveyance . . for the purpose of defeating the beneficial interest"
Settled Land Act 1925
1 Citers


 
Breams Property Investment Co Ltd v Stroulger [1948] 2 KB 1
1948
CA
Scott LJ
Landlord and Tenant
An agreement by a landlord in a periodic tenancy not to serve notice to quit for three years unless it required the premises for its own use was valid.
Scott LJ said: “The phrase ‘subject-matter of the lease’ was, as we know, substituted for the ancient expression ‘touching and concerning the land’. Professor Cheshire’s elucidation of its meaning on pp.214-5 of the 5th ed. of his book on ‘Modern Real Property’, in my respectful opinion, supplies the true test. ‘If a simple test’, he says, ‘is desired for ascertaining into which category a covenant falls, it is suggested that the proper inquiry should be whether the covenant affects either the landlord qua landlord or the tenant qua tenant. A covenant may very well have reference to the land, but, unless it is reasonably incidental to the relation of landlord and tenant, it cannot be said to touch and concern the land so as to be capable of running therewith or with the reversion. Tested by this principle the following covenants have been held to touch and concern the land’. Of the covenants by the tenant running with the land that ‘to pay rent or taxes’ and ‘not to assign or underlet’, and by the landlord running with the reversion, ‘to renew the lease’ are the most apposite of the instances which he quotes from decided cases.”
1 Citers


 
Hoffman v Fineberg [1949] 1 Ch 245
1949


Landlord and Tenant
The court rejected an argument in the context of an application for the forfeiture of a lease, that a painting in the sixth year of a lease could not remedy a failure to repaint in the fifth year.
1 Citers



 
 Morgan and Son Ltd v S Martin Johnson and Co Ltd; CA 1949 - [1949] 1 KB 107

 
 Wolfe v Hogan; CA 1949 - [1949] 2 KB 194

 
 Lewisham Borough Council v Roberts; CA 1949 - [1949] 2 KB 608
 
Macley v Nutting [1949] 2 KB 55
1949


Landlord and Tenant, Equity, Estoppel
Where the grant of a lease has been equitable only, because of an absence of title of the landlord, a later acquisition of the title 'feeds the estoppel' creating a lease in law.

 
Brown v Wilson [1950] EG 45; (1949) 208 LT 144
1949

Hilbery J
Landlord and Tenant, Agriculture
A subtenant's lease is not protected under the Agricultural Holdings Act where the head lease is terminated by the landlord, but if the head tenant determines his own tenancy the sub-tenancy is protected and will be promoted in his stead: "the law will not allow a man, by an act done between him and another, to impair or destroy the rights which he has granted to a third party."
Agricultural Holdings Act 1948 - Law of Property Act 1925 139
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Dudley and District Benefit Building Society v Emerson; 1949 - [1949] 2 All ER 252

 
 Marche v Christodoulakis; 1949 - (1948) 64 TLR 466

 
 Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries v Matthews; 1950 - [1950] 1 KB 148

 
 Jones v Herxheimer; CA 1950 - [1950] 2 QB 106

 
 Foster v Robinson; CA 1950 - [1950] 2 All ER 342; [1951] KB 149

 
 Borthwick-Norton v Romney Warwick Estates Ltd; 1950 - [1950] 1 All ER 798
 
Smiley v Townshend [1950] 2 KB 311
1950
CA
Denning LJ
Landlord and Tenant
At the end of the lease, the tenant had not complied with his covenant to repair. The court considered the damages which might be awarded. Held: The court may take into account events which had not yet occurred but which threw a light on the condition of the property at the end of the lease.
Denning LJ said: "In cases where it is plain that the repairs are not going to be done by the landlord, the cost of them is little or no guide to the diminution in value of the reversion, which may be nominal: see Espir v Basil Street Hotel, and James v Hatton. B ut in cases where the repairs have been, or are going to be, done by the landlord, the cost may be a very real guide. That is shown by the recent case of Jones v Herxheimer to which we were referred. In cases where it is open to question whether the repairs will be done by the landlord, as in the present case, then the costs may afford a starting figure; but it should be scaled down according to the circumstances, remembering that the real question is : What is the injury to the reversion? That is what the Judge did here, as I read his judgment: he used the cost merely as an aid in assessing the diminution in value of the reversion. I do not think that I should myself have given so much weight to the cost of repairs; or, at any rate, having regard to the requisition I should have scaled down the figure considerably just as damages for breach of covenant to keep in repair during the term are scaled down according to the length of time unexpired: see Conquest v Ebbetts."
1 Citers


 
Edler v Auerbach [1950] 1 KB 359
1950

Devlin J
Landlord and Tenant, Contract
Devlin J said: "It is the business of the tenant, if he does not protect himself by an express warranty, to satisfy himself that the premises are fit for the purpose for which he wants to use them, whether that fitness depends upon the state of their structure, the state of the law, or any other relevant circumstances."
Where an allegation of illegality emerges only at the time of the trial, the court should take particular care to ensure that the party taken by surprise has opportunity adduce additional evidence for the purpose of rebutting an inference of illegality which the court might be entitled to draw. The court should not act on unpleaded facts "unless it is satisfied that the whole of the relevant circumstances are before it".
1 Citers



 
 Parkus v Greenwood; ChD 1950 - [1950] Ch 33

 
 Cunliffe v Goodman; CA 1950 - [1950] 2 KB 237; [1950] 1 All ER 720
 
Clarke v Grant [1950] 1 KB 104
1950
CA
Lord Goddard CJ
Housing, Landlord and Tenant
Lord Goddard CJ said: "if a notice to quit has been given in respect of a periodic tenancy such as a yearly tenancy, the result is to bring the tenancy to an end just as effectually as if there had been a term which had expired."
1 Citers



 
 Goldsack v Shore; CA 1950 - [1950] 1 KB 708
 
Shreeve v Hallam [1950] WN 140
1950
CA
Sir Raymond Evershed MR
Housing, Landlord and Tenant
Sir Raymond Evershed MR considered what a judge had to look at when making a possession order: 'In such matters the judge was not to consider whether it was reasonable for the landlord to claim possession, but whether it was reasonable to make an order.'
1 Citers



 
 Edler v Auerbach; ChD 1950 - [1950] 1 KB 359; [1949] 2 All ER 692

 
 Parkus v Greenwood; CA 2-Jan-1950 - [1950] Ch 644
 
Marcroft Wagons Ltd v Smith [1951] 2 KB 496
1951
CA
Denning LJ
Landlord and Tenant
Denning LJ discussed the situation of a tenant holding over after his lease had expired: "If the acceptance of rent can be explained on some other footing than that a contractual tenancy existed, as, for instance, by reason of an existing or possible statutory right to remain, then a new tenancy should not be inferred."
1 Citers


 
Howkins v Jardine [1951] 1 KB 614
1951
CA
Somervell LJ, Jenkins LJ, Hodson J
Landlord and Tenant, Agriculture
There was a tenancy from year to year of 7 acres which had on them three cottages, which the tenant in fact sub-let to persons not engaged in agriculture. The tenancy itself contained provisions usual in agricultural tenancies, and the tenant used the land for agriculture. The judge held that the protection afforded to the tenant by the Act in invalidating a notice to quit was limited to land used for agriculture and did not extend to the cottages. Held: Either the whole of the property demised was subject to the protection of the Act or no part. It took as the test of whether or not the Act applied, whether or not the tenancy was in substance an agricultural tenancy
Agricultural Holdings Act 1948 1
1 Citers


 
Cresswell v Hodgson [1951] 1 All ER 710; [1951] 2 KB 92
1951
CA
Somervell LJ, Denning LJ, and Singleton LJ
Housing, Landlord and Tenant
The landlord sought possession. The tenant had a controlled tenancy. L offered the tenant another house (one he had built) as alternative accommodation. The rent was higher. The landlord was under pressure from his bank and wanted capital to pay off his overdraft. He wanted to sell the tenanted house with vacant possession at an unrestricted price, whereas the maximum price at which he could sell the house he had built was restricted. Held: The landlord's appeal was dismissed, the court holding that the judge had taken into account the factors he should have done. The judge had properly considered both sides – the positions of both the landlord and the tenant, and found the offered alternative accommodation suitable but that it would not be reasonable to make the order: its making would represent nothing but loss to the tenant and nothing but very substantial gain to the landlord. As to the reasonableness of making an order for possession, Parliament had given the judge in the county court a very wide discretion, and that the Court of Appeal should not say anything that restricted the circumstances he should take into consideration. Denning LJ thought that the word "reasonable" meant "reasonable having regard to the interests of the parties concerned and also reasonable having regard to the interests of the public".
Somervell LJ said: 'I think the words of the section themselves indicate that the county court judge must look at the effect of the order on each party to it. I do not see how it is possible to consider whether it is reasonable to make an order unless you consider its effect on landlord and tenant, firstly, if you make it, and secondly, if you do not. I do not think we should say anything which restricts the circumstances which the county court judge should take into consideration. I think he is entitled to take into consideration that this is a case where the landlord is making a pecuniary gain. That might in other cases be a fact in the landlord's favour, and it might be thought reasonable that he should be given the chance of making pecuniary gain.'
Singleton LJ said: "It seems to me that if a county court judge, in a case of this kind, found that the landlord was in dire financial straits – and landlords sometimes are – whereas the tenant was well-to-do, that would be a matter which the county court judge could consider. Equally, if he found that the tenant would be put into grave difficulty by the making of the order whereas the landlord would not be in any difficulty, because he had more means, again I think that is a matter for consideration." Because the tenant's employment gave him a rent allowance that would cover the increased rent at the alternative accommodation, he was in a much better position than most tenants and that 'it may well be that many persons might not have come to the conclusion at which the county court judge arrived.' But as the question of fact was for the judge, and he had not erred in principle or made a mistake in law, his decision must be upheld.
1 Citers



 
 RMR Housing Society Ltd v Combs; 1951 - [1951] 1 KB 486

 
 Mint v Good; CA 1951 - [1951] 1 KB 517
 
Egerton v Rutter [1951] 1 KB 472
1951
CA
Lord Goddard CJ
Landlord and Tenant
A tenant of an agricultural holding died intestate leaving her son and daughter in actual possession. Almost two months after the tenant's death and before any Grant of Letters of Administration the landlord served a notice to quit addressed to the executors of the late tenant. The son and daughter received the notice. They claimed to be in possession as tenant and had paid the rent. Held: The notice could properly have been served on the President of Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division as the temporary tenant under the Administration of Estates Act 1925 but that on the facts the son and daughter could be regarded as agents for that President. There was thus service on an agent of the tenant within section 92(3). Even a wrongly addressed notice, so long as it came to the attention of the person most likely, in practical terms, to be most affected by it, was to be considered valid. Alternatively, the fact that notice had been addressed to the executors of the late tenant was mere "falsa demonstratio"; the position was obvious and no-one was misled into thinking that it could have been addressed to anyone but "those really interested, namely, the defendants who were in possession".
1 Citers



 
 Universal Permanent Building Society v Cooke; CA 1951 - [1952] Ch 95; [1951] 2 All ER 893; [1951] 2 TLR 962
 
Regina v Fulham, Hammersmith and Kensington Rent Tribunal, ex parte Zerek [1951] 2 KB 1
1951

Devlin J
Administrative, Landlord and Tenant
A rent tribunal could not give itself jurisdiction over an unfurnished letting. Devlin J said: "While they will not allow every empty threat to their jurisdiction to deter them from their proper business of fixing reasonable rents, they will likewise appreciate that they are not by their nature equipped for the trial of matters which in the ordinary civil court would be determined after pleading and discovery had been given and evidence on oath tested by cross-examination, and possibly, also after trial by jury. The tribunal cannot be required to determine summarily such an issue if it involves a point of substance and if one or other of the parties is willing to have it determined in the ordinary civil courts."
1 Citers



 
 Errington v Errington and Woods; CA 19-Dec-1951 - [1952] 1 KB 290; [1951] EWCA Civ 2; [1952] 1 TLR 231; [1952] 1 All ER 149
 
Norwich Union Life Insurance Society v Low Profile Fashions Ltd [1952] 21 EG 104
1952
CA
Beldam LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The landlord claimed for arrears of rent. The tenancy had been assigned quickly three times. The tenant argued that the landlord should be restrained from pursuing a remedy against the original tenant when, with the new alternative remedies against the second assignee and the surety, it was wholly unreasonable to pursue the original tenant. Held: The tenant's defence confused remedies available in cumulative and alternative fashions.
1 Citers



 
 Leek and Moorlands Building Society v Clark; CA 1952 - [1952] 2 QB 788
 
Cobb v Lane (1952) 1 TLR 1037
1952
CA

Landlord and Tenant
An occupier of premises may not be deemed to be present under a tenancy where his presence can be explained by some family arrangement. Here the owner had allowed her brother to occupy the premises rent free. There had been no intention to create legal relations.

 
Kushner v Law Society [1952] 1 KB 264
1952

Lord Goddard CJ
Landlord and Tenant

1 Citers



 
 Facchini v Bryson; 1952 - [1952] 1 TLR 1386

 
 Sidney Trading Co Ltd v Finsbury Borough Council; 1952 - [1952] 1 ALL ER 460

 
 Baron Sherwood v Moody; 1952 - [1952] 1 All ER 389
 
Factors (Sundries) Ltd v Miller [1952] 2 All ER 630
1952
CA
Somervell LJ
Landlord and Tenant, Costs
The tenant seeking and being granted forfeiture was legally aided and the court was precluded by statute from making an order for costs against him. Held: There was nonetheless jurisdiction to require him to pay the landlord's costs as a condition of being granted relief from forfeiture. A In a case where relief against forfeiture is granted, where appropriate it may be ordered that the tenant pay the landlord's costs, even on a solicitor/client basis as a condition of relief.
Somervell LJ explained that the liability under such a condition was "not an order to pay costs in the ordinary sense", but "a payment of a sum equal to the costs as a condition of relief".
1 Citers


 
Wilbraham v Colclough and others [1952] 1 All ER 979
1952


Landlord and Tenant

1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Haviland v Long [1952] 2 QB 80
1952
CA
Denning LJ, Somervell LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The landlord had a right to recover damages from a tenant for breach of an obligation to keep and leave the premises in repair. The landlord entered into a fresh lease with a new tenant who paid the full economic rent and agreed to carry out the repairs in return for the landlord undertaking to reimburse the new tenant from the damages recovered from the old tenant. Held: The fact that repairs to demised premises were necessary after the end of a lease was a fact from which damage to the reversion can be inferred. The Court of Appeal rejected the submission that the landlord could not recover damages from the old tenant because, as a result of the agreement with the new tenant, he had suffered no loss. Bargaining between the parties to resolve a dispute did not cause the associated right to be lost because the agreement is properly regarded as res inter alios acta.
1 Citers


 
Moses v Lovegrove [1952] 2 QB 533; [1952] 1 The Times LR 1324
29 Apr 1952
CA
Sir Raymind Evershed MR, Birkett and Romer LJJ
Landlord and Tenant, Limitation
The tenant had gone into possession under an oral agreement with a rent book. He ceased to pay rent or acknowledge the landlord's right in 1938. In 1952 the landlord sought to recover possession, and now appealed a finding that the tenant had acquired the title to the property by adverse possession. Held: A rent book did not constitute a tenancy agreement, or lease in writing. Evershed MR said: 'The alleged lease in writing consisted of the rent book, which was put in evidence. The judge rejected the view that the rent book was such a lease in writing within the meaning of the Act, and I think he was entirely right in that conclusion.
The rent book is, I think, what it purports to be, and what it is called, a rent book, that is, a book containing acknowledgements for payment of weekly sums of rent, and containing also, in pursuance of the terms of the legislation, a reference to the conditions on which the tenant was holding his tenancy. I think that on the face of it, it was not intended to be, and is not, a contract for granting a tenancy, still less a lease creating an estate.' and 'The notion of adverse possession, which is enshrined now in section 10, is not new; the section is a statutory enactment of the law in regard to the matter as it had been laid down by the courts in interpreting the earlier Limitation Statutes.'
Romer LJ said: "The tenancy was quite obviously an oral weekly tenancy, with the result that time started to run by virtue of section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1939, from one week after the last payment of rent, which was on May 28, 1938." and
"As no notice to quit was given, the tenant could not thereafter be said to be in immediate adverse possession in the ordinary sense, for he remained on under his contractual tenancy. Nevertheless, for the purposes of the Limitation Act, 1939, his tenancy ceased to exist, and therefore he is deemed to have remained on in adverse possession. Accordingly, the fact that for some purposes his contractual right remained in the absence of a notice to quit a writ for possession is irrelevant, as also is the precise date on which the lessor could properly have started proceedings in ejectment. The point is that after the expiration of one week from the date of the last payment of rent, the defendant is deemed to have had no contractual right to possession, and therefore to have been a trespasser or a squatter.
Why should he be regarded as being in possession by virtue of permission or grant of the owner merely because of the passing of the Rent Act of 1939?" and
"It seems to me that one can, in addition to looking at position and rights of the owner, legitimately look also at the position of the occupier for the purpose of seeing whether his occupation is adverse. In my opinion, if one looks to the position of the occupier and finds that his occupation, his right to occupation, is derived from the owner in the form of permission or agreement or grant, it is not adverse, but if it is not so derived, then it is adverse, even if the owner is, by legislation, prevented from bringing ejectment proceedings."
Limitation Act 1939 9(2) 10
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Bradley-Hole v Cusen; CA 1953 - [1953] 1 QB 300; [1953] 1 All ER 87

 
 Sarum Trust Ltd v Duke of Westminster; 1953 - [1953] CPL 86

 
 Dobbs v Linford; CA 1953 - [1953] 1 QB 48

 
 Cooden Engineering Co Ltd v Stanford; CA 1953 - [1953] 1 QB 86; [1952] 2 All ER 915

 
 Martinali v Ramuz; CA 1953 - [1953] 1 WLR 1196

 
 Boyer v Warbey; CA 1953 - [1953] 1 QB 234

 
 Brewer Street Investment v Barclays Woollen Co; CA 1953 - [1954] 1 QB 428; [1953] 2 All ER 1330

 
 Adler v Blackman; CA 1953 - [1953] 1 QB 146
 
Beck v Scholz [1953] 1 QB 570
1953
CA
Evershed MR
Landlord and Tenant
The court faced "a jury question to be determined by applying ordinary common sense". And "The question posed and to be answered by ordinary commonsense standards, is whether the particular premises are in the personal occupation of the tenant as the tenant's 'home'"
1 Citers


 
Lever Finance Ltd v Needleman's Trustee [1956] Ch 375
1954
ChD
Harman J
Landlord and Tenant
In a mortgage, the transferee of a registered charge appointed a receiver during the "registration gap". Held: Until registration the transferee could not exercise the statutory power to appoint a receiver.
1 Citers


 
Smith v Express Dairy Limited [1954] JPL 45
1954
ChD
Harman J
Landlord and Tenant, Registered Land
Express Dairy (as registered owner) let a shop to Smith, but then transferred its interest to a subsidiary company. The subsidiary did not become registered as owner but nonetheless served notice to quit on Smith. Held: Unless the subsidiary could be treated as having given notice to quit as agent of Express Dairy the notice to quit was bad, because the reversion remained vested in Express Dairy.
1 Citers


 
In Re Town Investments Ltd Underlease [1954] 1 Ch 301
1954
ChD
Dankwerts J
Landlord and Tenant
The court considered a proposed underletting at a rent well below the current market rent, and in consideration of a substantial premium. It had been refused by the Landlord. Held: The lessor had reasonably withheld consent. It was enough that the lessor has genuine, and not "unfounded" concerns, on matters relevant to the value of his interest in the property, even if the prospect of those concerns being realised is small. Its ability to collect rent, and the value of the property, might be adversely affected in the future. Another concern was related to the lessor's rights under the 1908 Act, which, when the head lessee's rent was in arrear, would allow the lessor to require the underlessee to make future payments of rent direct to him. If the rent payable by the underlessee were less than the corresponding rent payable by the head lessee the lessor's remedy under this section might not be wholly effective. Other concerns were the position which might arise on forfeiture of the headlease or on bankruptcy.
Dankwerts J said: "if a reasonable man in the [Respondent’s] position might regard the proposed transaction as damaging to his property interests, so that the [Respondent’s] view cannot said to be unfounded though some persons may take a different view he is not acting unreasonably in withholding his consent." and
"I can apply these decisions to the present case. The dangers to the defendants from the defendants having to forfeit the plaintiff's leases, owing to failure to perform its obligations by the plaintiff or his assigns, may be negligible. The situation in the event of bankruptcy of the plaintiff or an assign may present no real difficulty. But those who manage the defendant company think that notice under section 6 of the Law of Distress Amendment Act, 1908, might not produce sufficient rent to discharge the sums payable in respect of the rent under the plaintiff's lease. They are apprehensive also that, if they wished to realize their investment in the lease of No. 28, Berkeley Square, by sale or to raise money on it by mortgage, the reduced rent payable by Mr Romain might prove an embarrassment in their dealings. I cannot say that such a view is unfounded . ."
Law of Distress Amendment Act 1908
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Church of England Buidling Society v Piskor [1954] Ch 553
1954
CA

Land, Landlord and Tenant
Weekly tenancies had been granted by the purchaser of the property, title to which was unregistered, before completion. The society now sought possession of the property. The tenants argued that although their tenancies were equitable, they were binding on the building society whose money the purchaser had used to complete and in whose favour a charge (containing provisions against leasing by the chargor) was executed at the same time as completion of the purchase. Default having been made in payments due under the society's charge, the society were not entitled to possession against the tenants in possession. Held: The tenants succeeded. The various conveyancing steps must be treated as separate steps in the eye of the law. The court accepted the argument of the tenants that they had acquired their tenancies by estoppel which was "fed" by the acquisition of the legal estate, thereby converting their tenancies into legal tenancies binding on the society. The court rejected the argument of the society that the conveyance and the charge were in reality one single transaction with the result that the purchaser's legal estate was, from the outset, subject to the society's charge and so could not be available to feed the estoppel free from it.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Montague v Browning; CA 1954 - [1954] 1 WLR 1039; [1954] 2 All ER 601; (1954) 98 Sol Jo 492

 
 Warren v Keen; CA 1954 - [1953] 2 All ER 1118; [1954] 1 QB 15; [1953] 3 WLR 702; 97 Sol Jo 742
 
Meghiji Lakhamshi and Brothers v Furniture Workshop [1954] UKPC 1
13 Jan 1954
PC

Landlord and Tenant
(Eastern Africa)
[ Bailii ]
 
Morelle Ltd v Waterworth [1955] 1 QB 1
1955
CA

Landlord and Tenant, Charity
The court was asked (1) Was the assurance to the Plaintiff Company of the unexpired residue of a term of years in house property in London an assurance of land in mortmain within the terms of section 1 of the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1888? (2) If so, was the term so assured automatically forfeited to the Crown by virtue of the same subsection? Held: Both questions were answered affirmatively.
Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act 1888
1 Citers


 
Aglionby v Cohen [1955] 1 QB 558; [1955] 1 All ER 785
1955


Landlord and Tenant
A freeholder with an order for possession is entitled to enforce that order in its favour without issuing and enforcing a writ of possession.
1 Citers



 
 Re Lower Onibury Farm, Onibury, Shropshire, Lloyds Bank Ltd v Jones; 1955 - [1955] 2 All ER 409
 
Miller v Emcer Products Ltd [1956] EWCA Civ 6; [1956] 1 All ER 237; [1956] Ch 304
20 Dec 1955
CA
Sir Raymond Evershed MR, Birkett LJ, Romer LJ
Landlord and Tenant, Contract
An express term in a contract excludes the possibility of implying any term dealing with the same subject-matter as the express term.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Goodrich v Paisner; HL 1956 - [1957] AC 65; [1956] 2 All ER 176; [1956] 2 WLR 1053; 100 Sol Jo 341
 
Reohorn v Barry Corporation [1956] 1 WLR 845
1956
CA
Denning LJ
Landlord and Tenant
As to the landlord's intention to reconstruct the premises on opposing a renewal: "[a] man cannot properly be said to 'intend' to do . . work when he has not got the means to carry it out. He may hope to do so; he will not have the intention to do so."
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 30(1)(g)
1 Citers


 
Owen v Gadd [1956] 2 QB 99
1956
CA
Lord Evershed MR, Romer LJ, Birkett LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The lessors had let a ground floor shop to the lessee. To repair to the first floor, they erected scaffolding. They did what they could to minimise inconvenience to the lessee. They completed the repairs within a fortnight. The scaffolding hindered, but did not prevent, access to the lessee's premises. It obscured his display of wares to some extent. A contractual provision denied the plaintiff an action for nuisance. Held: The award of only nominal damages to the tenant was upheld. There could be a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment without an actual physical interruption into or upon demised premises on the part of the landlord. For there to be a case of interference with quiet enjoyment, there must be substantial physical interference with the enjoyment of the premises. "The question whether the quiet enjoyment of the premises demised has been interrupted or not is in every case one of fact; and the covenant is broken although neither the title to the land nor the possession of the land may be otherwise affected, where the ordinary and lawful enjoyment is substantially interfered with by the acts of the lessor or of those lawfully claiming under him."
Lord Evershed MR said: "It was said by Mr. Chapman that we must further qualify the language of Fry L.J. and that there could be no breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment unless there was what he called an actual physical irruption into or upon the premises demised on the part of the landlords or some persons authorized by them by their actually entering upon or invading the premises, or by, e.g., the irruption thereon of water emitted from the landlords’ premises elsewhere. In my judgment, that submission is not justified by the authorities. I do not think that there is any sufficient warrant for such a limitation [upon the statements of Fry LJ in Sanderson v Mayor of Berwick-on-Tweed (1884) 13 QBD 547]. Concluding, therefore, as I do, that in this case the judge was entitled to find as a fact that the interference was substantial and that there was no principle of law which disqualified him from concluding as he did, I think that this appeal must fail . ."
Whilst agreeing, Romer LJ said: "Then comes the question whether the degree of interruption be such as to constitute a ground for legal complaint or whether it should be merely dismissed on the ground of its being of a temporary character or on the ground of de minimis. That appears to me to be essentially a question of fact to be determined by the judge who tries the action . . I cannot see that the judge's finding should be displaced by the considerations on which Mr Chapman relied, which may be summarized in this way: that the work of external repair which the lessors put in hand was reasonably necessary, that it was efficiently done and was done with all reasonable speed. I do not think that those considerations are really relevant to the question of whether there has been a breach of the tenant's contractual rights under the covenant for quiet enjoyment . ."
1 Citers


 
Church Commissioners for England v Ve-Ri-Best Manfacturing Co Ltd [1957] 1 QB 238; [1956] 3 WLR 990; 100 Sol Jo 875
1956

Goddard LCJ
Landlord and Tenant
The lease provided for re-entry for breach of covenant. The landlord served a notice requiring repairs and payment of compensation on both the tenant and the mortgagee. The mortgagees served a counter-notice, and the landlord proceeded against the tenant alone. The tenant argued that the counter-notice operated to trigger the requirement for proceedings to begin only with consent. Held: The tenant could not rely upon the mortgagee's counter-notice, and leave was not required to proceed against the tenant alone. The landlords had no obligation to serve the original notice on the mortgagees.
Leasehold Property (Repairs) Act 1938 1(2) - Law of Property Act 1925 146
1 Citers



 
 Piper v Muggleton; CA 1956 - [1956] 2 QB 569
 
Levermore v Jobey [1956] 1 WLR 697
1956
CA
Danckwerts LJ
Landlord and Tenant
Danckwerts LJ said: “A lease is not intended to be either a mental exercise or an essay in literature: it is a practical document dealing with a practical situation.”
1 Citers



 
 Sidney Bolsom Investment Trust Ltd v E Karmios and Co (London) Ltd; CA 1956 - [1956] 1 QB 529; [1956] 1 All ER 536; [1956] 2 WLR 625
 
Labone v Litherland UDC [1956] 1 WLR 522
1956

McNair J
Landlord and Tenant
The court distinguished between the carrying on of a trade or business and the sale of particular items within that trade or business even though those items might themselves be properly sold by another trade or business.
1 Citers


 
Wheeler v Mercer [1957] AC 416; [1956] UKHL 5; [1956] 3 All ER 631
31 Oct 1956
HL
Viscount Simonds, Lord Morton of Henryton, Lord Cohen, Lord Keith of Avonholm, Lord Somervell of Harrow
Landlord and Tenant
The freeholder sought possession of his premises occupied by the defendant over many years. The tenant said that he had the protection of the 1954 Act as a tenant at will. The landlord said that the occupation was not protected. The formal tenancy had been terminated before the 1954 Act came in, but the tenant had stayed in occupation after losing the right to have a new tenancy as the new Act came in. Held. A tenancy at will, whether created in writing or orally did not achieve protection under the 1954 Act. Section 69 defined a tenancy in such a way as to exclude a tenancy at will.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Joel v Swaddle [1957] 1 WLR 1094
1957


Landlord and Tenant

Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 30(1)(f)
1 Citers


 
Betty's Cafe Ltd v Phillips Furnishing Stores Ltd [1957] Ch 67
1957
CA
Denning LJ, Evershed MR
Landlord and Tenant
The tenant had applied for a new tenancy. The landlord offered to provide suitable accomodation. Held: Where the landlord's offer met the statutory criteria, the court had no jurisdiction to grant a new tenancy. What mattered was the landlord's intention at the date of the hearing.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954
1 Citers



 
 HL Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v TJ Graham and Sons Ltd; CA 1957 - [1957] 1 QB 159; [1956] 3 All ER 624
 
Percy E Cadle and Co Ltd v Jackmarch Properties Ltd [1957] 1 QB 323
1957


Landlord and Tenant
In the context of section 30(1)(f) of the 1954 Act "premises" applies only to parts of a built structure which perform some structural function.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 30(1)(f)
1 Citers



 
 Lennox v Bell; 1957 - (1957) EG 753

 
 Addiscombe Garden Estates Ltd v Crabbe; CA 1957 - [1958] 1 QB 513; [1957] 3 All ER 536
 
Griffith v Pelton [1957] EWCA Civ 4; [1958] 1 Ch 205; [1957] 3 All ER 75; [1957] 3 WLR 522
23 Jul 1957
CA

Landlord and Tenant

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Teasdale v Walker [1958] 1 WLR 1076
1958
CA

Landlord and Tenant
The tenant sought protection under the 1954 Act for his lease of premises which he only occupied during the seasonal periods: they were closed and empty in the winter and only used in the summer. Held: That was sufficient to create a protected tenancy, though a mere intention to resume occupation if a tenant get a new tenancy will not preserve the continuity of the business user if the thread has once been definitely broken.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954
1 Citers



 
 Hanak v Green; CA 1958 - [1958] 2 QB 9; [1958] 2 WLR 755; [1958] 2 All ER 141
 
Kanda v Church Commisioners for England [1958] 1 QB 332
1958


Landlord and Tenant
The landlord served a section 146 notice for breach of a repairing covenant. The lease had been assigned. Held: The notice should be served on the assignee.
Law of Property Act 1925 146
1 Citers


 
District Bank v Webb [1958] 1 All ER 126; [1958] 1 WLR 148
1958

Danckwerts J
Landlord and Tenant, Land
The court was asked whether a lease constituted an incumbrance on a title: "In the first place, I am not satisfied that a lease was an incumbrance to these parties. It is true that in certain circumstancess a lease may be regarded as an incumbrance, but it seems to me that an incumbrance, normally, is something in the nature of a mortgge and not something in the nature of a lease or tenancy."
1 Citers


 
Brown v Davies [1958] 1 QB 117
1958
CA
Lord Evershed MR
Housing, Landlord and Tenant
Lord Evershed MR considered an appeal against an order finding it reasonable to award possession where the landlord had provided alternative accommodation: 'the judge made it quite clear . . that he appreciated his duty was to decide whether it was reasonable to make the order and not merely whether it was reasonable for the plaintiff to ask him to make the order.'
1 Citers


 
Cusack-Smith v Gold [1958] 1 WLR 611
1958

Pilcher J
Landlord and Tenant
The landlord wanted to serve a section 146 notice for breach of repairing covennat. The lease had been assigned. Held: The person who had assigned was not entitled to receive a section 146 notice. Therefore the person on whom the notice should be served was the assignee.
Law of Property Act 1925 146
1 Citers


 
Betty's Cafe Ltd v Phillips Furnishing Stores Ltd [1959] AC 20; [1958] 1 All ER 607
1958
HL
Viscount Simonds, Lord Denning, Lord Keith, Lord Morton
Landlord and Tenant
On a renewal of a tenancy a landlord's counter-notice under section 26(6) relied on section 30(1)(f) and (g). Held: (Lord Keith dissenting) The court was bound to have regard to the position as it was on the date of the order. The landlord must have a "firm and settled intention" as regards the proposed works. The court will in an appropriate case, and having regard to the nature of the proceedings, consider a landlord's notice to be invalid on the grounds of dishonesty or fraud without recourse to the 1954 Act procedure. The landlord's notice must state the grounds 'honestly and truthfully'. The issues as the landlord's intention are to be tested as at the date of the hearing.
Viscount Simmonds held that the relevant date for proof of the required intention was the date of "the hearing": "At the hearing [the landlord] will oppose and prove his avowed intention. This seems to me, with all deference to those who take a different view, to be the plain English of section 26(6) and section 30(1)(f). I have already pointed out that it appears to accord also with the general purpose of the Act. It harmonizes also with the language of section 31(1) which contemplates the landlord satisfying the court upon any of the grounds upon which he is entitled to oppose the application."
Lord Morton said: "Section 26(6) provides that the landlord's notice of opposition "shall state on which of the grounds mentioned in section 30 of this Act the landlord will oppose the application." The words "will oppose" must surely refer to some date after the delivery of the notice in which the landlord states the ground on which he "will oppose" the tenant's application. And, in my view, that date can only be the date when the opposition of the landlord is heard by the High Court or the county court, as the case may be."
Lord Denning said: "Provided, however, that the notice is a good and honest notice when it is given, then it is clear to my mind that the ground stated therein must be established to exist at the time of the hearing . . To succeed [the landlord] must satisfy the trial judge that, at the time when the court comes to make its order, he is then willing to provide alternative accommodation, or then intends to reconstruct, or as the case may be . . In short, it comes to this: the landlord must honestly and truthfully state his ground in his notice and he must establish it as existing at the time of the hearing."
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Nursey v P Currie (Dartford) Limited; 1959 - [1959] 1 WLR 273
 
Sleafer v Lambeth Borough Council [1959] 3 All ER 378; [1960] 1 QB 43
1959
CA
Wilmer LJ
Landlord and Tenant, Personal Injury
The plaintiff held a weekly residential tenancy of the defendant local authority. The front door was defective and jammed. The tenancy agreement contained a covenant by the tenant to keep the flat in good and tenantable repair. When the tenant pulled at the door it came off causing him injury as he fell. He claimed damages for personal injuries. Held: The claim failed. There is no implied duty to repair a property on landlord, and no such implication could be based on the obligations on the part of the Lessee under a clause permitting the Lessor to view the property and to effect work necessary for upholding the building. Wilmer LJ observed: “I think there is much to be said for the view that Clause II of the Agreement, which requires a tenant to reside in the dwelling house, does by implication require the landlords to do such repairs as may make it possible for the tenant to carry out that obligation. At least it seems to me that that is a possible view.”
1 Citers


 
Rhyl Urban District Council v Rhyl Amusements Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 465; [1959] 1 All ER 257
1959


Local Government, Landlord and Tenant
The tenant said that the landlord local authority had accepted his surrender of his lease by granting a new one, but the new lease was void as ultra vires. Held: Not even the surrender of their old lease on the promise to grant the new one assisted them. The old lease would not be deemed surrendered unless the new lease was granted by deed. The defendants made a new lease, which was void: "It would be absurd if the same result were to be achieved as had been intended by the Agreement and which led to that Agreement being ultra vires, merely because the court has declared the Agreement void and put a notional contract of employment in its place. It would be achieving by a different means the same improper purpose, and that is something which the law cannot contemplate."
1 Citers


 
Silvester v Ostrowska [1959] 1 WLR 1060; [1959] 3 All ER 642
1959


Landlord and Tenant
A notice was served under section 146, and specified breaches of the covenant to repair and breach of a covenant against sub-letting. In fact there was no covenant against sub-letting in the lease. Held. Having regard to earlier cases, the notice was held to be sufficient for the purposes of Section 146. The breach relied upon was accurately set out even though there was an unjustified reference to another alleged breach.
Law of Property Act 1925 146(1)
1 Citers


 
Regis Property Co v Dudley [1959] AC 370
1959
HL
Viscount Simmons, Lord Denning
Landlord and Tenant
T covenanted to keep the interior of the flat in good and substantial repair 'fair wear and tear and damage by accidental fire excepted.' The House was asked to set the proportion in which L and T bore the overall repair burden. Held: T's responsibilities should not be discounted only because they reflected any common law burden not to commit waste. The assessment should be on the basis of a hypothetical tenant of he sort who might be expected to enjoy such an occupation. The fair wear and tear exception did not excuse the tenant from liability for further damage consequent on fair wear and tear. Lord Denning said: "If a slate falls from a roof through wear and tear and in consequence the roof is likely to let through the water, the tenant is not responsible for the slate coming off but he ought to put in another one to prevent further damage."

 
Cornish v Brook Green Laundry Ltd [1959] 1 QB 394
1959
CA

Landlord and Tenant

Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 27
1 Citers


 
Radaich v Smith (1959) 101 CLR 209,
7 Sep 1959

Justice Windeyer
Landlord and Tenant
(High Court of Australia) Justice Windeyer said: "What then is the fundamental right which a tenant has that distinguishes his position from that of a licensee? It is an interest in land as distinct from a personal permission to enter the land and use it for some stipulated purpose or purposes. And how is it to be ascertained whether such an interest in land has been given? By seeing whether the grantee was given a legal right of exclusive possession of the land for a term or from year to year or for a life or lives . . A right of exclusive possession is secured by the right of a lessee to maintain ejectment and, after his entry, trespass . . All this is long established law: see Cole on Ejectment (1857.
The lessee, having a right to exclusive possession, could, before entry into possession, maintain an action for ejectment. A licensee, if he did not have a right to exclusive possession, could not bring ejectment. A tenant or a licensee who was in actual possession - that is to say, in occupation in circumstances in which he had exclusive possession in fact - could maintain an action for trespass against intruders; but that is because he relied on the fact of his possession and not on his title. "
1 Citers

[ Austlii ]
 
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