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Landlord and Tenant - From: 1900 To: 1929

This page lists 95 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
In Re Jolly [1900] 2 Ch 616
1900
CA
Lord Alverstone MR, Rigby LJ
Landlord and Tenant, Limitation
Mrs Jolly let a farm to her son who paid rent until 1881, but not thereafter, and her title to the farm was extinguished in 1893. She died in 1898. The question which arose was whether at her death any rent arrears remained due. Held: The extinction of the title also determined her entitlement to arrears of rent.
Lord Alverstone MR said: "In the year 1893 R. T. Jolly obtained, by virtue of the Real Property Limitation Act 1874, s. 1, an absolute title to the property. It is, I think, inconsistent with his right so acquired that the rent which he ought to have paid should be deemed to be still owing. The effect of the Limitation Acts of 1833 and 1874 is, in my opinion, that, after the expiration of the statutory period of 20 and 12 years respectively, all rights which the reversioner would have had in respect of the land have come to an end; and I do not think that it would be consistent with that position that rent, the non-payment of which has given the occupier a title to the land, should still be deemed to be owing."
Rigby LJ said: "It seems to me to be plain that on the expiration of the twelve years all the rights of the owner of the land are determined."
1 Citers


 
Ellis v Rowbotham [1900] 1 QB 740
1900
CA
AL Smith LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The plaintiff had let and the defendant had taken a tenancy of premises at a rent payable quarterly in advance. The tenancy agreement had provided that if rent should be in arrears for 14 days the plaintiff could regain possession by re-entry. A quarter's rent became in arrears. The plaintiff gave notice and re-entered. The plaintiff sued for the unpaid rent which was due for the whole quarter during which the plaintiff had re-entered. Held: The rent became due long before the need to have recourse to the Apportionment Act could arise. Rent payable in advance is not apportionable.
1 Citers


 
Gentle v Faulkner [1900] 2 QB 267
1900
CA
AL Smith and Romer LJJ
Landlord and Tenant
A declaration of trust of a lease had been executed by the tenant. The landlord complained that this was a breach of the covenant against assignment. Held. In the absence of any context showing that the covenant is to have an extended meaning, a covenant in a lease against assigning the demised premises covers only a legal assignment.
Romer LJ said: "It seems to me to be clear that a covenant in a lease against assigning the demised premises, in the absence of any context showing that the covenant is to have an extended meaning, covers only a legal assignment. The covenant against assignment is, therefore, not broken by anything short of a legal assignment. In my opinion such a covenant is not broken by the lessee executing a declaration of trust of the demised premises."
1 Citers


 
In re Joll Gathercole v Norfolk (1900) 16 the Times LR 521; [1900] 2 Ch 616
1900

Collins LJ
Landlord and Tenant
Collins LJ said: "At the end of the 12 years the possession of a tenant who has paid no rent becomes adverse during the whole time the adverse possession is validated by the statute, and it is not competent for the landlord to say that he still retains the right to recover rent which was not payable to him. I think that is emphasized by the position of a tenant under a lease for years as compared with that of a tenent under a lease from year to year. In the former case the non-payment of rent does not render the possession of th etenant adverse unless he pays rent to some person other than the lessor. But in the latter case the Legislature has treated the mere non-payment of rent by a tenant from year to year as a payment to some person other than the landlord."
1 Citers


 
Fenner v Blake [1900] 1 QB 426
1900


Landlord and Tenant, Estoppel
The tenant told the landlord that he wanted to vacate the premises midway during the tenancy. Relying on the oral representation, the landlord sold the premises to a third party. The tenant subsequently refused to vacate the premises and claimed that there had been no consideration for his promise to quit the premises. Held: The tenant was estopped from resiling from his promise to vacate the premises because the landlord had incurred a liability in relying on the tenant's promise by entering into the sale and purchase agreement for the premises. In so doing, the landlord had rendered himself liable to an action at the suit of the purchaser if he was unable to provide vacant possession.
1 Citers


 
Handel v The City of London Brewery [1901] Ch D 496
1901


Contract, Landlord and Tenant

1 Citers


 
Ewart v Fryer [1901] 1 Ch 499
1901


Landlord and Tenant
When creating a new tenancy after granting relief from forfeiture, the court may adjust the rent.

 
Stacey v Hill [1901] 1 KB 660
1901
CA

Landlord and Tenant
The surety for performance of the tenant's covenants under the lease which was "to remain in force concurrently with the lease for a period of five years" was discharged by the disclaimer of the lease by the insolvent tenant's liquidator. The lease was determined from the date of the disclaimer. The surety liability was also determined and that the action on the guarantee was not maintainable.
1 Citers


 
The Toronto Railway Company v The Corporation of The City of Toronto [1901] UKPC 48
2 Aug 1901
PC

Commonwealth, Landlord and Tenant
(Ontario)
[ Bailii ]
 
Sir Malcolm Donald McEacharn v The Honourable Sir John Colton KCMG and Others [1901] UKPC 51; [1902] AC 104
19 Nov 1901
PC

Commonwealth, Landlord and Tenant
(South Australia)
[ Bailii ]
 
Stein v Pope [1902] 1 KB 595 CA
1902
CA
Romer LJ, Sir Richard Henn Collins MR
Insolvency, Landlord and Tenant
A lessee assigned the lease by an assignment which constituted an act of bankruptcy. He was subsequently adjudicated bankrupt and his trustee disclaimed the lease. During the interval between the assignment of the lease and the date of the adjudication two quarters' rent had fallen due, the lessors had sued the assignee and had recovered judgment for the first quarter's rent, and had commenced proceedings for the second quarter's rent. The action did not come on for trial until after the adjudication. Was the assignee of the lease liable for the rents notwithstanding the relation back of the trustee's title? Held: He was. The bankruptcy provisions, including the relation back of the trustee's title, were not provisions for the benefit of the bankrupt. As a general rule bankruptcy did not affect the rights and liabilities of persons not parties to the bankruptcy, except so far as might be necessary in the interests of the trustee and creditors and the administration of the bankrupt's estate in bankruptcy. It was not necessary in those interests to hold that the bankruptcy had freed the assignee from his liability to the lessor. The court reserved its opinion on what would have been the outcome if bankruptcy had supervened before any action had been take by the lessor against the assignee.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Budd-Scott v Daniell [1902] 2 KB 351
1902

Lord Alverstone CJ
Landlord and Tenant
The plaintiff had let a furnished house to the defendant for a year. Fom the outset the plaintiff was under a statutory obligation to paint the outside of the house during that year. In default, the statutory authority was empowered to do the work. The plaintiff had forgotten that the year of the lease was the year of the painting. She did the painting and the defendant and her family had to leave the house for about a fortnight. The defendant trenant obtained judgment for damages on her counterclaim for breach of an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. Held: A landlord may be in breach of covenant notwithstanding that he has acted in performance of a statutory obligation. The landlord might have protected herself by a covenant for the purpose in the lease. A covenant for quiet enjoyment is implied in favour of the lessee but a covenant for good title (or good right to confer possession) is not. Lord Alverstone, the Chief Justice, explained the nature of a landlord's implied covenant for quiet enjoyment: "Apart from authority it would certainly seem, on principle and in common sense, that when one person agrees to give possession of his house for a time to another, that ought to carry with it an agreement that he, the landlord, and those claiming through him, will not dispossess the tenant during that time. Therefore, unless there is some special meaning attached to the word 'demise', the good sense of the thing would seem to be that, upon an agreement to let, a covenant or contract was to be implied that the landlord and those claiming under him would not disturb the possession of the tenant. Unless driven to do so by authority, I should hesitate a long time before drawing any distinction in that respect between the words 'agree to let' and 'demise'".
1 Citers


 
Walter v Yalden [1902] 2 KB 304
1902
QBD

Landlord and Tenant
The surrender of a lease by a lessee whose right and title to possession had been extinguished by effluxion of time gave the leaseholder no right of re-entry during the remainder of the term.
1 Citers



 
 Davis v Town Properties Investment Corpn Ltd; CA 1903 - [1903] 1 Ch 797

 
 Wordsley Brewery v Halford; 1903 - (1903) 90 LT 89
 
Serjeant v Nash Field and Co [1903] 2 KB 304
1903


Landlord and Tenant

1 Citers


 
Glenwood Lumber Co Ltd v Phillips [1904] AC 405; [1904-7] All ER Rep 203; (1904) LJPC 62; (1904) 90 LT 741; (1904) TLR 531
1904
PC
Lord Davey MR
Landlord and Tenant, Torts - Other
The Crown had granted licenses to cut timber from an area over a period of years. Held: It was well established that possession is good as against a wrong doe, who may not set up as a defence a jus terii unless his claim is derived from that right. "The appellants contended that this instrument conferred only a license to cut timber and carry it away, and did not give the respondent any right of occupation or interest in the land itself. Having regard to the provisions of the Act under the powers of which it was executed and to the language of the document itself, their Lordships cannot adopt this view of the construction or effect of it. In the so-called licence itself it is calld indifferently a licence and a demise, but in the Act it is spoken of as a lease, and the holder of it is called a lessee.It is not, however, a question of words but of substance." and "it is not open to the Defendant, being a wrong-doer to enquire into the nature or limitation of the possessor's right, and unless it is competent for him to do so the question of his relation to, or liability towards, the true owner cannot come into the discussion at all, and therefore, as between those two parties, full damages have to be paid without any further enquiry.' "
Lord Davey said: "In the so-called licence itself it is called indifferently a licence and a demise but in the Act it is spoken of as a lease, and the holder of it is described as the lessee. It is not, however, a question of words but of substance. If the effect of the instrument is to give the holder an exclusive right of occupation of the land, though subject to certain reservations or to a restriction of the purposes for which it may be used, it is in law a demise of the land itself."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Harris v Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd [1904] 2 Ch 376
1904

Warrington J
Landlord and Tenant
The case concerned the question whether an original lessee could enforce by injunction against a successor in title to the term, a provision in a lease precluding alteration without consent. The ground on which he sought to do so was a covenant by the successor in title in the usual form to observe and perform the covenants etc. contained in the lease. "There is nothing in the structure or language of the usual covenant which suggests that whilst the term is vested in the assignee the obligation to the assignor is one of indemnity, but on a subsequent assignment by him it changes into an obligation of guarantee. The single promise that the assignee and those deriving title under him would perform the covenants in the lease does not suggest that two separate obligations, different in nature, are being undertaken. The actual language used is that of indemnity: and the common understanding of conveyancers is that there exists a chain of indemnities. This established understanding of the nature of the assignee’s obligation mirrors the established understanding of the original tenant’s obligation. The original tenant’s obligation to pay rent does not become a contract of guarantee when he assigns the term."
1 Citers


 
Bree v Scott (1904) 29 VLR 692
1904

Beckett J, Madden C.J
Commonwealth, Landlord and Tenant, Limitation
(Supreme Court of Victoria) The defendant squatted from 1878 upon land allotted to her mother as Crown licensee. A Crown licensee was entitled to acquire the fee upon performance of obligations in the licence. In 1885 a Crown grant was duly issued to the mother in consideration of a payment then made. A mortgagee sought to eject the defendant. The question which arose was whether the 15-year limitation period had run its course by 1899. If the period ran from 1878 the claim was barred. If the period ran only from 1885, being the date of the grant of the legal estate through which the mortgagee claimed title, the claim was not barred. Held: Time ran from the earlier date. The licence under the Land Act 1869 was the seed of which the subsequent grant was the fruition of title. "Stated generally, the policy of the [limitation legislation] was to require a person having a right to land to exercise it as against a person illegally occupying at the peril of losing the land if the illegal occupation continued undisturbed for fifteen years. Here we have an occupation such as the Statute contemplated continuing undisturbed, and when it commenced, and up to the time of the issue of the grant, a person having legal title from the Crown who could have recovered the land against the occupant ... This inactive licensee and lessee afterwards acquired a legal estate in the fee, not by virtue of any new right unconnected with her prior interest, but by the maturing of a right which had its inception in the licence. No doubt, up to the issue of the grant, there was no certainty that the fee would be acquired: the right to the land was inchoate, and might have been lost, but it was in fact perfected, and we have to say whether the nature of this new title is such as to wipe out all the consequences of past inaction, and to give a new term of fifteen years within which inaction must continue before the illegal occupant could acquire title ... I should say that since the Judicature Act, if not before, the mere difference between legal and equitable estates would be insufficient. Take the case of omission to proceed against an illegal occupant by a purchaser under a contract of sale ... there is no reason for saying that a conveyance by the vendor ... would give this new start in the owner's favour ... The changes in the legal interest of the person who might have brought the action against the defendant in the present case made no changes in her rights as against the defendant; the right to turn her out was as good in the licensee as in the grantee."
1 Citers


 
Hargroves, Aronson and Co v Hartopp [1905] 1 KB 472
1905
CA
Lord Alverstone
Nuisance, Landlord and Tenant
The tenants of a building of which the defendants were landlords sought damages after a rainwater gutter became stopped up and the defendants failed to clear it out for a few days after receiving notice of the stoppage. Held: The landlords were in breach of a duty of care to the plaintiffs and were liable for the damage done. If a building owner retains common parts which have to be maintained to protect the safe use of the demised properties, he has an obligation to take reasonable care that the parts he retains are not in such a condition as to cause damage to the tenant or to the premises demised.
Lord Alverstone said: "A person who maintains an artificial thing like a gutter used for the very purpose of carrying off the rainwater from the roof in an improper condition after notice may be said, in my opinion to be guilty of an act of commission, and he is, in my opinion, under a duty to take care that as a result of that act no damage happens to the occupants of the house."
1 Citers


 
Fear v Morgan [1906] 2 Ch 406
1906
CA

Landlord and Tenant

1 Citers


 
Lyttelton Times Company Ltd v Warners Ltd [1907] AC 476
1906
PC
Lord Loreburn LC
Landlord and Tenant, Nuisance
(New Zealand) The plaintiffs owned a hotel in Christchurch, next to the premises in which the defendants operated a printing press running 24 hours. They made an agreement under which the defendants would rebuild their premises and grant a lease of the upper floors to the plaintiffs for use an additional hotel bedrooms. Unfortunately the noise and vibrations of the press beneath caused substantial inconvenience to the occupants of the bedrooms. The plaintiffs claimed an injunction to restrain the defendants from working their press. They said that the defendants knew that they intended to use the premises as bedrooms and were under an implied obligation not to interfere with their convenient use. Held: The plaintiffs also knew that the defendants intended to use their premises for printing.
Loreburn LC said: "When it is a question of what shall be implied from the contract, it is proper to ascertain what in fact was the purpose, or what were the purposes, to which both intended the land to be put, and having found that, both should be held to all that was implied in this common intention . . [If] it be true that neither has done or asks to do anything which was not contemplated by both, neither can have any right against the other." and "Ought the fact that one of the parties was the grantor and the other the grantee of a lease to dominate the decision of the case? If A lets a plot to B, he may not act so as to frustrate the purpose for which in the contemplation of both parties the land was hired . . The fact that one lets and one hires does not create any presumption in favour of either in construing an expressed contract. It was argued that the common intention was that the plaintiffs should have reasonably quiet bedrooms. If it was so, that was only one half of the common intention. The other half was that the defendants should keep on printing. One cannot bisect the intention and enforce one half of it when the effect of doing so would be to frustrate the other half." and
"In this case their Lordships think that both parties agreed upon a building scheme with the intention that the building should be used for bedrooms and also for a printing house according to a design agreed upon. Both parties believed these two uses could co-exist without clashing, and that was why both of them accepted the scheme. Neither would have embarked upon it if he had not thought his intended enjoyment of the building would be permitted, and both intended that the other should enjoy the building in the way contemplated. They were mistaken in their anticipation. But if it be true that neither has done or asks to do anything which was not contemplated by both, neither can have any right against the other."
1 Citers



 
 Cavalier v Pope; HL 22-Jun-1906 - [1906] AC 428; [1906] UKHL 1
 
Morgan v William Harrison Limited (1907) 2 Ch 137
1907


Landlord and Tenant
In some cases the relation of tenant at will may be expressly created by contract.
1 Citers



 
 Morgan v Fear; HL 1907 - [1907] AC 425; 76 LJ Ch 660; 51 Sol Jo 702
 
Cable v Bryant [1908] 1 Ch 259
1908

Neville J
Land, Landlord and Tenant
A tenant sought a right to ventilation enjoyed by land let to a tenant. It was argued that there could be no implied easement over adjoining property of a lessor where the adjoining property was already let out. It would be an easement in reversion. Held: The court avoided a decision on the point by resort to the doctrine of non-derogation from grant, which prevented the lessor and his successors from interfering with the lessee's use of the dominant land after the lease of the servient land had fallen in.
1 Citers


 
Markham v Paget [1908] 98 LT 605; [1908] 24 LTR 426; [1908] 1 Ch 697; [1908] 77 LJ Ch 451
1908


Landlord and Tenant, Contract
Parties had entered an agreement, with a draft lease attached to lease a coal seam. If the company anticipated damage, the lease allowed the company to leave sections unmined as support. The final lease allowed the miners to let down the surface, but now asked the miners to request obtain consent before leaving any coal un-mined. The surface was then also let to the plaintiff on a yearly tenancy. The miners sought consent as agreed, but the consent was withheld, and they proceeded. The surface property was damaged, and the tenant sought damages. Held: There was an implied covenant for quiet enjoyment in the lease of the house, but the owner of the land who was liable under that covenant could not seek an indemnity from the miner without joining in the trustees who had actually executed the lease.

 
More v Ullcoats Mining Co Ltd [1908] 1 Ch 575
1908


Landlord and Tenant
A landlord who seeks an injunction against a tenant for breach of covenant has not thereby made an act unequivocal to found a right of forfeiture.

 
Chalmer's Trustee v Dick's Trustee 1909 SC 761
1909


Scotland, Landlord and Tenant
The enforcement of an irritancy clause in an agricultural lease had deprived the tenants of all property in the crops growing at the time when the leases were terminated.
1 Citers


 
Gray v Owen [1910] 1 KB 622
1910


Landlord and Tenant
Even if one of the parties to a tenancy is acting under a mistake, there can be a surrender of a tenancy by law, provided that the mistake is not induced by the fraud of the other.
1 Citers



 
 Phipos v G and B Callegari; 1910 - (1910) 54 SJ 635
 
Matthews v Smallwood [1910] 1 Ch 777
1910

Parker J
Landlord and Tenant
A landlord cannot prevent accepting a payment of rent from operating as a waiver of breach merely by stating at the time of payment that he accepts it without prejudice to his right to forfeit.
Parker J said: "It is also, I think, reasonably clear upon the cases that whether the act, coupled with the knowledge, constitutes a waiver is a question which the law decides, and therefore, it is not open to a lessor who has knowledge of the breach to say 'I will treat the tenancy as existing, and I will receive the rent, or I will take advantage of my power as landlord to distrain; but I tell you that all I will do will be without prejudice to my right to re-enter, which I intend to reserve'. That is a position which he is not entitled to take up. If, knowing of the breach, he does distrain, or does receive the rent, then by law he waives the breach, and nothing which he can say by way of protest against the law will avail him anything."


 
 Green v Rheinberg; CA 1911 - (1911) 104 LT 149

 
 Browne v Flower; 1911 - [1911] 1 Ch 219
 
Ind, Coope and Co [1911] 2 Ch 223
1911


Landlord and Tenant

1 Citers



 
 Lurcott v Wakely and Wheeler; CA 1911 - [1911] 1 KB 905; [1911-13] All ER Rep 41; [1911] 104 LT 290; [1911] 55 Sol Jo 290

 
 West v Gwynne; CA 1911 - [1911] 2 Ch 1
 
Stait v Fenner [1912] 2 Ch 504
1912

Neville J
Trusts, Agency, Landlord and Tenant
The lease to Fenner contained a break clause. The lease was legally assigned to X and then to Y. Y then agreed to assign back to Fenner (but no formal assignment was entered). Fenner then "assigned" to Z (the contract saying that he was not obliged to get in the bare legal estate outstanding in Y). Z then exercised the break clause. Held: The beneficiary under a bare trust is not thereby constituted the agent of the trustee. A break clause was operable by the tenant if he gave notice and if he should pay all the rent and perform all the covenants up to the determination of the lease. The question for the court was whether that condition for payment and performance was a condition precedent to be performed before the expiration of the term: "it must have been intended, in construing a covenant of this kind, that the question whether the lease does or does not exist after the expiration of the seven or fourteen years should be capable of being decided there and then and not left to future contingency leaving both the lessor and the lessee in uncertainty as to whether they are bound by the lease or whether they are not." In this case the condition was a condition precedent.
Neville J held: "In my opinion, the legal estate in the term being outstanding, it was not competent for the lessee or any assignee of the lessee who had not the legal estate vested in him to give a notice."
1 Citers


 
Ayers v Hanson, Stanley and Prince [1912] 56 SJ 735
1912


Landlord and Tenant, Nuisance

1 Citers


 
Corea v Appuhamy [1912] AC 230
1912


Landlord and Tenant

1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Shanly v Ward; CA 1913 - [1913] 29 TLR 714

 
 Rickards v Lothian; PC 11-Feb-1913 - [1913] AC 263; [1913] UKPC 1

 
 Jolly v Brown; CA 1914 - [1914] 2 KB 109

 
 Dooner v Odlum; 1914 - [1914] 2 Ir R 411
 
Wheeler -v Keeble [1920] 1 Ch 57
1914


Landlord and Tenant

1 Citers



 
 Reeves v Pope; CA 1914 - [1914] 2 KB 284
 
Dooner v Odlum Unreported, 1914
2 Jan 1914

Cherry LCJ, Kenny J
Landlord and Tenant
(Court of Appeal - Ireland) The court affirmed the decision in the King's Bench.
Cherry LCJ said: "The law is, I think, well settled that where a lessee of demised premises assigns portion of these premises to a stranger, the assignee is liable to the lessor upon the covenants contained in the lease only in so far as those covenants affect the lands in his possession; and, as regards rent, only for an apportioned part of the rent properly chargeable in respect of the land actually vested in him." he explained this conclusion, saying: "the liability of an assignee to pay the rent, which the original lessee has covenanted to pay, arises, not from privity of contract, but from privity of estate. It is not because the lessee has entered into the covenant with the lessor, but because he has vested in him the lands which are charged with the rent, that the assignee becomes liable. The covenant to pay the rent, in addition to the personal liability which it imposes upon the lessee who enters into it, also affixes upon the land itself a liability to pay."
Kenny J said: "it will be found that throughout [previous cases] the principle was recognized that, in order to free the assignee of part of the lands from payment of the entire rent, he must hold the part in physical severalty. When he does so there is no privity of estate, as between him and the reversioner, in the entire of the lands . . The determination of the assignee's liability depends on privity of estate, and I am unable to draw a distinction between a case where the act of severance is that of the covenantor and a case where the severance had taken place before the covenant was entered into. In neither case is there full privity of estate, and therefore, there is no liability on the part of the assignee for the whole rent."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
John Haig and Co v Boswell-Preston 1915 SC 339
1915


Scotland, Landlord and Tenant
A tenant may be able to retain rent where the landlord was in material breach of his duty under the lease to maintain fixed equipment.
1 Citers


 
Goldstein v Sanders [1915] 1 ChD 549
1915


Landlord and Tenant

1 Citers


 
London and Northern Estates Company v Schlesinger [1916] 1 KB 20; [1914-15] All ER 593
1915

Lush J
Contract, Landlord and Tenant
By a war-time order in council, an Austrian subject, who was an "alien enemy", was prohibited from residing within certain specified areas, including the area where the leased premises were situated. He claimed that the tenancy contract was frustrated. Held: Although he could not personally exercise a right of personal occupation, he could sub-let the premises and therefore there was no frustration. His personal occupation of the premises was not at the root of the contract.
Lush J said: " As the contract could be performed without his personal residence, the fact that his personal residence was prohibited by the Order did not make the performance of the contract impossible. But there is, I think, a further answer to the contention. It is not correct to speak of this tenancy agreement as a contract and nothing more. A term of years was created by it and vested in the appellant, and I can see no reason for saying that because this Order disqualified him from personally residing in the flat it affected the chattel interest which was vested in him by virtue of the agreement."
1 Citers


 
Lord Ashburton v Nocton [1915] 1 Ch 274
1915
CA
Swinfen Eady LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The parties to a lease can agree that an early payment of rent will satsify the duty to pay rent due later, displacing the rule that an early payment does not satisfy a later duty to make payment.
1 Citers


 
Re Boyer's Settled Estates [1916] 2 Ch 404
1916

Sargant J
Trusts, Landlord and Tenant
A right to reside shared by two persons was recognized as a valid and effective right. Sargant J said: "I think that the effect of s58 is, broadly speaking, to give to the large class of persons comprised in the nine headings of subs(1) of s58 the powers of a tenant for life, although they are not strictly tenants for life by reason of their estates not being strictly estates for life. But, apart from that, I think that the persons who are dealt with under s58 are persons who fall within the general defining provisions of s2(5), under which in determining tenancy you have to regard beneficial title to possession".
Settled Land Act 1882 2(5) 58
1 Citers


 
Malzy v Eicholz [1916] 2 KB 308; (1916) LJKB 1132; (1916) LT 9; (1916) 32 TLR 506; (1916) 60 Sol Jo 511
1916
CA
Lord Cozens-Hardy MR
Landlord and Tenant, Nuisance
A tenant claimed against his landlord seeking to make him responsible for the nuisance of a co-tenant. Held: The claim failed.
Lord Cozens-Hardy MR said: "A lessor is not liable in damages to his lessee under a covenant for quiet enjoyment for a nuisance caused by another of his lessees because he knows that the latter is causing the nuisance and he does not himself take any steps to prevent what is being done. There must be active participation on his part to make him responsible for the nuisance. A common lessor cannot be called upon by one of his tenants to use for the benefit of that tenant all the powers he may have under agreements with other persons."
A landlord will be liable for breach of a covenant for quiet enjoyment only if the disturbance was by the landlord, his servants or agents.
Lord Cozens-Hardy MR said: "It is quite a novel doctrine to me that permission by a lessee to use demised premises for a purpose which may or may not involve or create a nuisance is a wrong act on the part of the landlord, and that the landlord can be rendered liable merely because a person does carry on that business in such a manner as to create a nuisance. It would be different, of course, if it were let for a purpose which necessarily involved a nuisance, but this letting did not necessarily involve a nuisance. That is quite plain from the plaintiff's own evidence. He says there was no ground for complaint until the Dents came into possession."
1 Citers



 
 In re Yenidje Tobacco Co Ltd; CA 1916 - [1916] 2 Ch 426; [1916-17] All ER 1050
 
Malzy v Eichholz [1916] 2 KB 308
1916
CA
Lord Cozens-Hardy MR
Nuisance, Landlord and Tenant
A landlord is not liable in damages to his lessee under a covenant for quiet enjoyment in respect of a nuisance caused by another of his lessees, even if he knows the lessee is causing the nuisance and takes no steps to prevent it. To be liable for nuisances committed by his tenant, it is not enough for them to be aware of the nuisance and take no steps to prevent it, he must either participate directly in the commission of the nuisance, or must be taken to have authorised it by letting the property.
Lord Cozens-Hardy MR said: "It is quite a novel doctrine to me that permission by a lessee to use demised premises for a purpose which may or may not involve or create a nuisance is a wrong act on the part of the landlord, and that the landlord can be rendered liable merely because a person does carry on that business in such a manner as to create a nuisance. It would be different, of course, if it were let for a purpose which necessarily involved a nuisance, but this letting did not necessarily involve a nuisance. That is quite plain from the plaintiff's own evidence. He says there was no ground for complaint until the Dents came into possession."
1 Citers


 
Phelps v City of London Corporation [1916] 2 Ch 255
1916

Peterson J
Landlord and Tenant
Peterson J said it was "at least doubtful" whether a nuisance by noise was a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment.
1 Citers


 
Fox v Jolly [1916] AC 1
1916
HL
Lord Buckmaster LC, Lord Parmoor
Landlord and Tenant
The House referred to a schedule of repair served on the tenant: "Now the schedule is attacked on several grounds. It is said that it does not tell the tenant what it is he ought to do in order to remedy the breach of which complaint is made. I am not prepared to accede to that view of the schedule. But even if it did not, I can find nowhere in the section any words which cast upon the landlord the obligation of telling the tenant what it is that he must do. All that the landlord is bound to do is to state particulars of the breaches of covenants of which he complains and call upon the lessee to remedy them. The means by which the breach is to be remedied is a matter for the lessee and not for the lessor. In many cases specification of the breach will of itself suggest the only possible remedy. " and "In the present case I think the notice sufficiently specified the landlord's complaint. It gave the tenant adequate notice of what he was required to do, and it provided full and sufficient information upon which he could determine what course of action he should adopt." In applying Fletcher v Nokes, "it should be borne in mind that the notice is addressed to a person who knows, or ought to know, the nature and condition of the premises of which he is the tenant, so that a statement might be sufficient to draw his attention to the things of which the landlord complains, which might be insufficient so to do in the case of a stranger who had never seen or who knew nothing of the premises. "
Lord Parmoor said: "I think that the notice should be construed as a whole in a common-sense way, and that no lessee could have any reasonable doubt as to the particular breaches which are specified."
Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1881 14
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Lovesy v Palmer; 1916 - [1916] 2 Ch 233; [1916-1917] All ER 1034
 
Hart v Rogers [1916] 1 KB 646
1916

Scruton J
Landlord and Tenant
The landlord claimed for unpaid rent and the tenant counterclaimed for damages for breach by the landlord of the implied covenant to repair the roof of the premises demised. Held: The cross-claim was no defence to an action for rent.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
King v David Allen and Sons Billposting Ltd [1916] UKHL 1; [1916] 2 AC 54; (1915) 2 IR 213
14 Feb 1916
HL

Contract, Landlord and Tenant
Termination of a periodical tenancy by either the landlord or the tenant will bring to an end the possession of a licensee from the tenant, since the licensee's rights are only contractual rights against the tenant. Termination by the tenant will expose the tenant to a claim for damages from the licensee. A licence creates personal rights which are binding solely upon the parties to the contract and do not run with the land
[ Bailii ]
 
Cheater v Cater [1917] 21 KB 247
1917
CA
Pickford LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The defendant landlord let a farm to a tenant retaining the adjoining premises on which was a shrubbery containing yew trees. The branches of the yew trees overhung the farm and were within the reach of the tenant's cattle and horses. The tenant’s horse died after eating yew from the overhanging branches of trees growing on the landlord’s adjoining land. Held: The tenant’s claim against the landlord in negligence and nuisance failed.
Pickford LJ said: 'The law of this country is that a tenant, when he takes a farm, must look and judge for himself what the state of the farm is. Just as in the case of a purchaser of a business the rule is caveat emptor, so in the case of taking the lease of property the rule is caveat lessee; he must take the property as he finds it. I never heard that a landlord warranted that the sheep should not eat his yew trees." That is a distinct statement of the law and not a dictum. It is the second ground given by the Lord Justice for his judgment. If a judge states two grounds for his judgment and bases his decision upon both, neither of those grounds is a dictum. The law so stated by Mellish L.J. is in agreement with a series of cases of which Sutton v Temple is an early instance. In a case of this kind the tenant takes the land demised as it is, and therefore if the tenant here took the land with the yew trees growing over it so that his cattle could eat of the branches and they did eat, he cannot complain. Therefore the broad proposition argued on behalf of the plaintiff cannot be maintained.'
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Barnes v City of London Real Property Co Ltd; 1918 - [1918] 2 Ch 18
 
Epsom Grand Stand Association Ltd v Clarke [1919] WN 170
1919
CA
Bankes.Scrutton and Atkin LJJ
Landlord and Tenant
Premises on a racecourse were let to the defendants in part as a public house, and to occupy the other part themselves. The court was asked whether this was a letting of "a house or a part of a house let as a separate dwelling . . and every such house or part of a house shall be deemed to be a dwelling-house to which this Act applies" so that the 1915 Act applied. Held: The premises were "let as a separate dwelling". Bankes LJ: "The house was dwelt in by the defendants and let to them for that purpose. It is in the fullest sense a dwelling-house and none the less so because it is also a public-house. [Counsel for the landlord] contended that the Acts do not apply to houses if let for business purposes. I cannot accept that view. No doubt if the word "dwelling-house" is given its ordinary meaning the Act may seem to include cases not contemplated by the Legislature; but a restricted meaning would exclude many cases which were intended to be included. The object of the Legislature was to include all houses which are occupied as dwelling-houses provided they are of the class ascertained by their value as prescribed by the Act, notwithstanding that they are also used by the tenant for other purposes as well as those of a dwelling-house."
Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (War Restrictions) Act 1915
1 Citers


 
Epsom Grandstand Association Ltd v Clarke (1919) 35 TLR 525
1919
CA
Bankes LJ (with whom Scrutton and Atkin LJJ
Landlord and Tenant
The court considered whether a property, let and used as a public house on the ground floor with a flat above, fell within the ambit of the 1915 Act. Held: Bankes LJ said that the property "was a dwelling house, and nonetheless so because it was also a public house". His reasoning was that: "The object of the legislature was to include all houses which were occupied as dwelling houses… irrespective of whether the premises were also used for some other purpose. They came within the statute, although part of the premises might be used for other purposes."
Rent and Mortgage Interest (War Restrictions) Act 1915
1 Citers


 
Ellis v Torrington [1920] 1 KB 399
1920
CA
Scrutton LJ
Torts - Other, Landlord and Tenant
An assignment of the benefit of a covenant in a lease held to be sufficiently connected with enjoyment of the property as not to be a bare right of action. The assignment was not void.
Scrutton LJ stated that the assignee of a cause of action was not guilty of maintenance or champerty by reason of the assignment he took because he was buying not in order to obtain a cause of action but in order to protect the property which he had bought.
1 Citers


 
Cole v Kelly [1920] 2 KB 10
1920
CA
Asprey J, Bankes LJ, Atkin LJ
Landlord and Tenant
In the absence of a contrary intention a concurrent lease passes to the concurrent lessee the concurrent lessor's accrued rights under the existing lease. The landlord has granted to the second lessee a pro tanto disposition of the reversionary estate.
Asprey J explained a holding over: "A holding over occurs where, after the expiration of the term originally granted, the tenant continues in possession with the consent of the landlord but without prior agreement as to the terms upon which the possession of the subject property is to be retained, which situation gives rise to a tenancy at will which tenancy by a subsequent payment of rent or by subsequent agreement may be converted into a tenancy of more fixed duration, e.g. weekly, monthly, etc."
Atkin LJ said that where, after the termination of any tenancy, the tenant holds over, and "the facts do not exclude an implied agreement to hold upon the terms of the old lease," then impliedly the old terms remain.
1 Citers


 
Hemmings v The Stoke Poges Golf Club Limited [1920] 1 KB 720
1920
CA

Landlord and Tenant, Land
The defendant landlord had entered the demised property, in which the plaintiff and his wife were living, and removed them and their furniture, using no more force than was reasonably necessary to do so. The landlord had an immediate right to possession because the tenant's right to live in the property depended upon his continuing to work for the landlord, which he no longer did. Held: The plaintiff had no right of action against the defendant even if the actions of the landlord were a crime under 5 Ric 2, stat 1 c 7. No civil wrong is done by turning out a trespasser using no more force than is reasonably necessary.
1 Citers


 
Matthey v Curling [1920] 3 KB 608
1920
CA

Contract, Landlord and Tenant

1 Citers


 
Re Lyne-Stephens and Scott-Miller's Contract [1920] 1 Ch 472
1920
CA

Contract, Land, Landlord and Tenant
A vendor of a house was entitled to retain the benefits of payments from a tenant made between contract and completion, because the vendor had sold the house but not yet also the benefit of the lease.
1 Citers


 
Rossdale v Denny [1921] 90 LJ Ch 204; [1921] 1 Ch 57; [1921] 124 LTR 294; [1921] 37 TLR 45; [1921] 65 Sol Jo 59
1921
CA
LJ Sterndale, Sargant LJ
Contract, Landlord and Tenant
The plaintiff offered in writing to purchase a leasehold house, but the letter was to take effect 'on signing of a formal contract' and 'This offer is subject to a formal contract to embody such reasonable provisions as my solicitors may approve'. The offer was accepted, but the defendant backed out. Held: No formal contract was created.
L Sterndale said: "I am far from saying that there may not be an unconditional offer and acceptance of a binding contract although the letters may contain the words 'subject to a formal contract', but certainly those words do point in the direction of the offer or acceptance being conditional. I do not think it can be put higher than that; I think he is well founded in saying that the general trend of the decisions has been, where those words occurred, to hold that the offer or acceptance was conditional."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Matthey v Curling [1922] 2 AC 180; [1922] All ER Rep 1; (1922) 91 LJKB 593; (1922) 127 LT 247; (1922) 38 TLR 475; (1922) 66 Sol Jo 386
1922
HL
Atkin L
Landlord and Tenant, Contract
During the term of the lease, the property had been taken over by the military authorities under wartime powers. Shortly before the term expired the house was destroyed in a fire. The lessor claimed the last quarter's rent and fopr breach of the tenant's covenants to insure and deliver up in good condition. Held: The tenant remained liable. He had not been evicted by title paramount, and the occupation had been temporary, and did not excuse him from performance of his obligations.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
United Dairies Ltd v Public Trustee [1922] 1 KB 469
1922

Greer J
Landlord and Tenant
Greer J discussed the effect in law of the division and assignment of a tenanted property: "Where the leased property has been physically divided amongst two or more assignees it is clear that the obligations of the lease, so far as they affect the assignees, become separate, and each of the assignees is liable, while he is assignee, to perform the covenants so far as they affect his divided part of the leased property."
After referring to the Holloway case, Greer J said: "Where leased land is physically divided it is possible to say that the covenant imposed by law through privity of estate on the assignee is confined to the part of the land in respect of which there is privity of estate between the assignee and the landlord, but where the land is not physically divided, it is not possible to split the covenant into two covenants capable of enforcement."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Jackson v Simons [1923] 1 Ch 373
1923

Romer J
Landlord and Tenant
The lease contained a covenant by the lessee not to "part with or share the possession or occupation [of the demised premises] or of any part thereof". Held: The lessee had "retained the legal possession of the whole of the premises" and therefore had not committed any "breach of covenant against parting with possession". However, what the lessee had done "amounted to a sharing of the possession of part of the demised premises".
1 Citers


 
Brewer v Jacobs [1923] 1 KB 528
1923


Landlord and Tenant
A proviso for re-entry in a tenancy is inapplicable to a statutory tenancy. It is concerned with the forfeiture of an existing term and can have no application after the contractual term has expired. Once the statutory tenancy has come into being, the tenant and landlord can look only to the statute creating the tenancy for protection, and not to common law principles.
1 Citers


 
Fairman v Perpetual Investment Building Society [1923] AC 74; 92 LJKB 50
1923
HL
Lord Wrenbury, Lord Sumner, Lord Atkinson
Litigation Practice, Negligence, Landlord and Tenant
The defendants owned a block of flats that were tenanted. The plaintiff lived as a lodger with her sister in one of the flats. She was injured when walking down the steps from her flat; the steps were part of the common property under the control of the landlord. The plaintiff argued that she was an invitee of the landlord and thus was owed a higher standard of care than would have been owed to a licensee. Held: An invitee of a tenant was only a licensee of the landlord when using the stairway. In fact, the plaintiff would have lost on the facts, whether she was an invitee or a licensee, because the defect in the step on which she had slipped was perfectly obvious.
Lord Wrenbury stated: "There are some things which a reasonable person is entitled to assume, and as to which he is not blameworthy if he does not see them when if he had been on the alert and had looked he could have seen them." His Lordship then instanced the case of a staircase with a missing stair, or a ladder in which a rung has been removed, and went on to say that no reasonable person would expect that a step or a rung had been removed and added pungently: "he has nevertheless suffered from what has generally been called "a trap" although if had stopped and looked he would have seen that the step or rung had been removed. He was not guilty of negligence, he was not bound to look out for such an unexpected danger as that, although if he had proceeded cautiously and looked out it would have been obvious to him."
1 Citers


 
Re Knight and Hubbard's Underlease [1923] 1 Ch 130
1923

Sargant J
Landlord and Tenant
The court considered the validity of a notice to determine an underlease. The beneficial owner of the reversion was a friendly society, all of whose property was vested in trustees of the society holding as nominees, and for the exclusive benefit, of the society. The whole management of the property was in the hands of a management committee of the society under whose direction the trustees were bound to act. When the underlessor's interest was acquired, the underlessee was given notice that the sale had been made to the society and rent was collected from the underlessee by agents of the society. Held: In view of the position of the trustees and the course of conduct, the trustees allowed the society to have the full management of the property and the notice by the society in its own name was valid.
1 Citers



 
 Keeves v Dunn; CA 1924 - [1924] 1 KB 685

 
 Anstruther-Gough-Calthorpe v McOscar; CA 1924 - [1924] 1 KB 716

 
 Cockburn v Smith; 1924 - [1924] 2 KB 119

 
 P Phipps and Co (Northampton and Towcester Breweries) Ltd v Rogers; 1925 - [1925] 1 KB 14

 
 Houlder Brothers and Co Ltd v Gibbs; CA 1925 - [1925] Ch 575

 
 Boswell v Crucible Steel Co; CA 1925 - [1925] 1 KB 119
 
Booth v Thomas [1926] Ch 397
1926
CA
Sir Ernest Pollock MR, Sargant LJ
Landlord and Tenant
A landlord, whose predecessor in title had enclosed a natural stream in an artificial culvert which was incapable of retaining it, was held liable to the tenant for injury suffered by the demised premises as a result of the outflow of water consequent upon the culvert falling into disrepair. Held: Without finding it necessary to decide whether liability arose on other grounds also, considered that it arose under an express covenant for quiet enjoyment contained in the lease. A mere act of omission on the part of a landlord is capable of constituting a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment, if, but only if, there is a duty to do something.
1 Citers


 
Fisher v Walters [1926] 2 KB 315
1926
KBD
Finlay J, Mackinnon J
Landlord and Tenant
T complained of being injured when the ceiling fell in the house. The defect was latent. Held: L was not liable without notice of the defect.
Housing, Town Planning etc Act 1909 15
1 Citers


 
Griffin v Fillet [1926] 1 KB 17
1926

Wright J
Landlord and Tenant
The tenant gave notice to his landlord that steps to the dwelling-house needed attention but the lessee did not know that the steps were in fact actually dangerous. Held: The landlord's liability rested upon the lessor when subsequently he, though not his lessee, did acquire knowledge that the steps were actually dangerous.
Wright J said: "the lessor in my judgment was not liable for breach of covenant until he had been able to ascertain the nature of the repairs required. This he knew by 8th April, and I think he acted at his peril if he did not at once remedy the non-repair, either by temporary measures, if the permanent repairs could not be immediately effected, or by doing the permanent repairs, if this was practicable. If he did not do this he committed a breach of covenant."
1 Citers


 
Newman v Slade [1926] 2 KB 328; [1926] 42 TLR 607; [1926] 70 Sol Jo 738
1926
KBD

Landlord and Tenant
A notice to quit given by reference to a calendar week (excluding the day on which it was sent, but including the day on which it is received) was effective, unless a contrary intention was shown.

 
Lesley and Company v Cumming [1926] 2 KB 417
1926
KBD
Roche J and MacKinnon J
Landlord and Tenant
The County Court had held that the landlords were not entitled to recover possession of a flat of which the defendant was tenant because the premises had not been taken out of the protection of the Rent Restrictions Act by the tenant twice sub-letting furnished the whole of the premises with the landlord's permission for periods of a year, which periods had expired before the commencement by the landlord of proceedings to recover possession. Held:
Roche J said: "I do not think that the effect of the letting of the whole premises furnished to Mr Moore and Mrs Wilcox (with it is to be noted, the consent of the plaintiffs) was that the premises both became and continued for all time premises to which the Acts of 1920 and 1923 did not apply. In my opinion, at any rate, from the termination of those sub-tenancies Robert Cumming was in possession; his tenancy was a statutory one and the premises were not let furnished."
Mackinnon J: "I do not suppose that Mr Stone (counsel for the landlord) would have sought to argue that Prout -v- Hunter went as far as to apply in a case where the dwelling house had been let furnished during the currency of the original lease, say in 1919 or 1920, but he does seek to say the letting furnished for, I suppose, however short a period after the tenant became a statutory tenant took the house out of the category of a protected house and put it into the category of unprotected house. It is only necessary to consider what startling results that contention would lead to in order to see that that argument must be wrong. For instance, if there be, as well there may be, a person in occupation of a house at Henley on Thames as what is called a statutory tenant, and supposing the owner of that house discovered that the statutory tenant let the premises furnished for Regatta Week in 1922, could he now, by virtue of that use of the house for a week 4 years ago, come to the court and say: give me possession of the premises, because by virtue of that temporary sub-letting so long ago the premises cease to be protected? I am far from saying because you find that some contention under these Acts leads to an extraordinary result that therefore that cannot be the effect of the Act, because the Acts are so worded that extraordinary results of one kind and another do follow; but I think these considerations assist in leading one to the conclusion, with which I agree, that the fact that a house has been let furnished for a period which had expired before proceedings are commenced cannot be relied upon as taking the house out of the protection of the Act in the way in which is suggested."
1 Citers


 
Chaplin v Smith [1926] 1 KB 198
1926


Landlord and Tenant
It is possible for a lessee to permit a company, in which he has an interest, to occupy the demised premises for the purpose of its business, without parting with possession of those premises to that company.
1 Citers


 
Morgan v Liverpool Corporation [1927] 2 KB 131
1927
CA
Lord Hanworth MR, Atkin LJ, Lawrence LJ
Personal Injury, Landlord and Tenant
The tenant claimed that he had been injured when as the upper portion of a window was being opened one of the cords of the window sash broke and the top part of the window slipped down and caught and injured his hand. The plaintiff admitted that the defect was latent one (of which the plaintiff did not know and about which accordingly he could not give any notice) but it was contended that (there was a statutory obligation on the landlord which was different from that contained in an ordinary covenant and that in the Act, there were no words requiring that any notice should be given to the landlord. He said that L failed to perform the statutory obligationn that the house would be "kept in all respects reasonably fit "for human habitation." L had a right to enter the property to inspect its condition. Held: L was not liable. Liability would be conditional upon his having been given notice of any defects even though they were latent ones. The right to enter to inspect did not change this.
Lord Hanworth MR said that it was long established that where there is a covenant on the part of a landlord to keep premises in repair the tenant must give notice to the landlord of what is out of repair. Notice was required whether or not the landlord had means of access. The fact that the origin of a covenant was statutory did not give the covenant any higher authority than one inserted in a contract by the parties.
Atkin LJ said: "Here is a case of something which arose quite suddenly. It is possible that a very careful inspection of the window cords might have revealed the state in which they were, but there are many other defects which arise quite suddenly, leaks quite suddenly spring up in joints of water pipes and gas pipes, and so on, and to say that the landlord is responsible for the consequences of those not being in repair in circumstances in which no time could have elapsed between the time when the defect first arose and the time when the injury from it occurred, would certainly be to impose a very harsh obligation upon a landlord which the Courts do not impose except subject to a condition that he must receive notice of the defect. To my mind in those circumstances it is clear that, if the landlord gives the exclusive occupation to the tenant, the landlord does not in fact know, and in this case could not know of the defect."
In ordinary circumstances L's obligation to repair does not come into existence until he has notice of the defect which his contract to repair requires him to make good: "I think the power of access that is given, extensive though it may be, does not take the case away from the principle from which the Courts have inferred the condition that the liability is not to arise except on notice. The position is quite a satisfactory one, because as soon as the tenant is aware of the defect he must then give notice, and if the landlord does not repair it, the landlord will be liable. If in fact the tenant is not able to ascertain the defect, there seems to be no reason why the landlord should be exposed to what remains still the same injustice of being required to repair a defect of which he does not know, which seems to me to be the real reason for the rule. This was a case in which notice was not given to the landlord. As I have said, it appears to me that, as soon as the defect became so known by the fall of the sash, the tenant was able to give notice to the landlord and did give notice. In my view the landlord then became under a liability to repair in the circumstances of this case, because if he did not, the house would be in a state not in all respects fit for human habitation ; but as no notice was given, I think the landlord was not liable."
Lawrence LJ said: "On the question of notice I am in complete agreement with the judgments delivered by the Master of the Rolls and Atkin LJ and have very little to add. In my opinion the established rule is that the obligation of the landlord to keep the premises in repair is not broken unless notice has been given to him of the want of repair, and that mere knowledge is not sufficient to saddle the landlord with liability. The foundation of such rule is that the tenant in occupation is generally in a far better position to know of any want of repair. I am further of opinion that for the reasons stated by Atkin LJ the rule applies to latent as well as to patent defects, and certainly applies to the defect which existed in the present case."
Housing Act 1925
1 Citers


 
Hicks v Snook (1928) 27 LGR 175
1928
CA
Scrutton, Greer and Sankey LJJ
Housing, Landlord and Tenant
The property had been let for twenty five years with a shop on the ground floor with living accomodation above. There had been no formal tenancy agreement, and no explicit user stipulation. The tenant claimed the protection of the 1920 Act. Held: The effect of section 12(2)(ii) appeared "to affirm in statutory form what the Court of Appeal had decided [in the Epsom Grandstand case]." The commercial use of part of the premises did not "stop the premises in which he lives from being a dwelling house".
Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920 1(1) 12(2)
1 Citers



 
 Howson v Buxton; CA 1928 - (1928) 97 LJKB 749; [1928] LT 504

 
 Farr v Gillings; 1928 - [1928] TLR 249

 
 In re Drew (A Bankrupt); 1929 - [1929] IR 504
 
Viscount Tredegar v Harwood [1929] AC 72
1929
HL
Viscount Dunedin, Lord Phillimore
Contract, Landlord and Tenant
A covenant in the lease required the lessee to insure the premises with a nominated insurer or another insurer approved by the lessor. The lessor refused to approve a responsible and reputable insurer because of his wish that all tenants insure with the same insurer (for convenience in the event of a claim by more than one tenant). The House was asked as to the ambit of the rights of the lessor under the covenant. Held: the refusal was reasonable. The lessor had an absolute right to refuse his approval to an alternative office without giving reasons, and thus could take into account the administrative convenience to him as the lessor of a large number of properties of dealing with a single insurance office. One "should read reasonableness in the general sense".
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Tay Salmon Fisheries Co Ltd v Speedie [1929] ScotCS CSIH_4
31 May 1929
SCS
Lord President Clyde
Scotland, Landlord and Tenant
The pursuers sought to assert a right to abandon a lease of a salmon fishery at Tents Moor. A danger zone had been created by the Air Council which included the area comprised, and it had become impossible for anyone to use the land. Held: Two grounds of judgment were put forward, eviction and rei interitus. Entire estates can be overblown with sand for centuries and so fall subject to the rei interitus doctrine of the civil law. There was not actual destruction, but there was constructive total destruction. The the law applicable to physical or actual rei interitus was extended to constructive total destruction.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
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