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Landlord and Tenant - From: 1849 To: 1899

This page lists 135 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Cannock v Jones [1849] EngR 164; (1849) 3 Exch 233; (1849) 154 ER 829
20 Jan 1849


Landlord and Tenant

[ Commonlii ]
 
Robinson v Waddington [1849] EngR 717; (1849) 13 QB 753; (1849) 116 ER 1451
9 Jun 1849


Landlord and Tenant

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Cannan v Hartley; 1850 - (1850) 9 CB 634; [1850] EngR 9; (1850) 137 ER 1040
 
Jones v Cannock [1850] EngR 673; (1850) 5 Exch 713; (1850) 155 ER 312
19 Jun 1850


Landlord and Tenant

[ Commonlii ]
 
Smith v Howell (1851) 6 Exch 730
1851

Pollock CB
Landlord and Tenant
A lease had been granted to G, who assigned the term to the Plaintiff, who later assigned on to the Defendant. The assignees each covenanted to perform the obligations under the lease, and to indemnify the assignor. Rent not being duly paid, and the premises being out of repair, the freeholder sued G for the rent, and got judgment by default for the rent and for damages for the want of repair. G paid these amounts and then sued the Plaintiff for the amount so paid and his costs. The Plaintiff defended that action unsuccessfully, and became liable to pay the sum claimed and G's costs. Not yet having paid, he sued the Defendant in turn. Held: The Plaintiff was not entitled to recover his costs of resisting G's action, because such resistance was unreasonable and unnecessary, but he was entitled to the rent and damages payable to G, and the costs of the freeholder's action against G.
The rent and damages and the costs of the freeholder's action against G were "properly incurred for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of the Defendant's liability" (including quantifying the liability for the want of repair) but that all costs thereafter were unnecessary and superfluous and could not be recovered. Pollock CB: "There is no doubt that, at one time, very wild notions were entertained with respect to the contract of indemnity; but these notions are now exploded, and it is considered, that, by a contract of indemnity, is meant that the party indemnified may recover all such charges as necessarily and reasonably arise out of the circumstances under which the party charged became responsible." and "As I have stated, it seems that under the contract of indemnity the party is entitled to recover those costs only which have been fairly and reasonably incurred."
1 Citers


 
Doe d. Landsell v Gower (1851) 17 QB 589; 21 LJQB 57; 18 LTOS 135; 15 JP 816; 16 Jur 100; 117 ER 1406
1851


Landlord and Tenant
The tenant was let into parochial property by the parish officers making an entry in the vestry book 'We the churchwardens & overseers of P., do hereby agree to let to JB of . . . The newly erected cottage . . Situate . . . At the rent of 1s 6d per week: & JB doth hereby agree to quit and deliver up the cottage into the hands of the parish officers at any time on one month's notice from the churchwardens & overseers for the time being, or one of them, or by their order . . The rent, as above stated, to commence from the date hereof, Witness' etc. The entry was signed by the overseer and by the defendant. The tenant occupied the property for 21 years, but paid no rent. He was then given a notice to quit, but stayed a further five years paying no rent and then selling the cottage. The circumstances were known to the parish officers thhroughout the period. Held: If the officres as lessors were enitled to maintain an action, a notice to quit was unnecessary because the defendant had disclaimed. The document was for a sufficiently determinate period to constitute a lease. Being for less than three years it could be granted without writing only if all the parish officers concurred.
1 Citers


 
Kendall v Baker [1852] EngR 140; (1852) 11 CB 842; (1852) 138 ER 706
22 Jan 1852
CA

Landlord and Tenant
In a lease of land for twenty-one years from the 25th of March, 1848, it was covenanted that the lessee should pay a stipulated sum for the first year,-with proviso that the rent for each subsequent year of the term should be reduced or increased according to “the average price of wheat in any one year of the said term,” such average “to be taken and ascertained from the then current year’s averages which were taken in the month of January in every year under and by virtue of the tithe-commutation act, 6 & 7 W. 4, c. 71, s. 56,”-which is the result of the sales “during seven years ending on the Thursday next before Christmas Day then next preceding :-Held, that the rent must be computed according to such septennial average so published in each year.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Jones v Cannock [1852] EngR 682 (A); (1852) 3 HLC 700
5 Jun 1852


Landlord and Tenant

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Heaton v Dearden; 1-Jul-1852 - [1852] EngR 799 (B); (1852) 16 Beav 147
 
Trent v Hunt (1853) 9 Exch 14
1853

Alderson B
Land, Landlord and Tenant
A mortgagor in possession continues to have a legal right to receive the rents in his own name. However since he had no legal interest in the reversion, he could not forfeit for breach of covenants in the lease.
1 Citers


 
Barnhart v Greenshields [1853] 99 Moore PC18
1853

Pemberton Leigh
Landlord and Tenant
Pemberton Leigh said: 'With respect to the effect of possession merely, we take the law to be, that if there be a tenant in possession of land, a purchaser is bound by all the equities which the tenant could enforce against the vendor, and that the equity of the tenant extends not only to interests connected with his tenancy, as in Taylor v Stibbert (2 Ves. Jun. 437), but also to interests under collateral agreements, as in Daniels v Davison (16 Ves. 249; 17 id. 433) and Allen v Anthony (21 Mer. 282), the principle being the same in both classes of cases – namely, that the possession of the tenant is notice that he has some interest in the land, and that a purchaser having notice of that fact is bound, according to the ordinary rule, either to inquire what that interest is or to give effect to it, whatever it may be.'
1 Citers


 
Grey v Friar (1854) 4 HL Cas 565
1854

Coleridge J
Landlord and Tenant
Coleridge J: "...the covenants must have been strictly kept, or, if broken, must have been satisfied for. So understood, the words import a condition precedent neither impossible nor unreasonable; and where that is clearly the case, the mere difficulty of performance, from the number or nature of the covenants to be performed, - a fact which must have been perfectly within the knowledge of the party contracting, - seems to me a very unsatisfactory reason for holding it to be otherwise."
1 Citers


 
Powys v Blagrave 43 ER 582; (1854) 4 De G M & G 448
1854

Lord Cranworth, L.C
Equity, Landlord and Tenant
The appellants were tenants in tail in remainder and were not able to proceed at law against their co-defendant since he was only an equitable tenant for life. They argued that he ought by analogy to have the obligation not to commit permissive waste imposed on him in the court of equity, and to be impeachable of waste in equity. Held: The application was refused. Even legal liability was very doubtful.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Yellowly v Gower (1855) 11 Ex. 274
1855
CEC
Parke, B
Landlord and Tenant
A tenant for years was liable for permissive waste: A doubt has been stated indeed in a note to 2 Saund. 252b, whether a tenant for years is liable for permissive waste . . .These doubts arise from three cases in the Common Pleas: Gibson v. Wells 1 N.R. 290, Herne v. Benbow 4 Taunt 764, Jones v. Hill 7 Taunt 392. Upon examining these cases, none of which appears to be well reported, the Court seems to have contemplated the case only of a tenant at will in the two first cases, and in the last no such proposition is stated, that a tenant for years is not liable for permissive waste. We conceive that there is no doubt of the liability of tenants for terms of years, for they are clearly put on the same footing as tenants for life, both as to voluntary and permissive waste by Lord Coke, 1 Inst. 53, Harnet v. Maitland.
1 Citers


 
Kingsmill v Millard (1855) 11 Exch 313; (1855) 19 JP 661; (1855) 3 CLR 1022; 156 ER 849
1855

Parke B
Land, Limitation, Landlord and Tenant
Parke B set out the doctrine that a tenant acquiring adjoining land by adverse possession acquires it on behalf of his landlord: "It is laid down in all the cases – whether the inclosed land is part of the waste, or belongs to the landlord or a third person – that the presumption is, that the tenant has inclosed it for the benefit of his landlord unless he has done some act disclaiming the landlord's title. …The encroachment must be considered as annexed to the holding, unless it clearly appears that the tenant made it for his own benefit."
1 Citers


 
Simpson v Eggington (1855) 10 Exch 845; [1855] EngR 220; (1855) 10 Exch 845; (1855) 156 ER 683
9 Feb 1855

Parke B
Contract, Landlord and Tenant, Company, Contract
It is a good answer to a plea of set-off, that the amount has heen paid by a person professing to act as agent for and on account of the plaintiff, though without his authority, and that the latter ratified the act at the time of the trial. The treasurer of a corporation paid their clerk (the defendant) the amount of his year's salary, both parties believing at the time that the treasurer had the authority of the corporation to make such payment, but the treasurer had no such authority, and the corporation afterwards repudiated the payment and dismissed the defendant from their service. In an action against the deferidatit for the recovery of certain monies paid to him on account of the corporation -- Held, that the corporation was entitled, at the trial, to ratify the act of their treasurer, and, consequently, that the defendant could not set off the amount of his salary as due to him from the corporation.
The court found no evidence that as between himself and the landlord, or between himself and the plaintiff, the defendant had acted or purported to act or regarded himself as acting as agent for the plaintiff when making payments of what the tenant claimed had been his rent. Held: Parke B said: "The general rule as to payment or satisfaction by a third person, not himself liable as a co-contractor . . appears to be, that it is not sufficient to discharge a debtor unless it is made by the third person, as agent, for and on account of the debtor and with his prior authority or subsequent ratification."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Palmer v Goren (1856) 25 LJ Ch 841
1856


Landlord and Tenant, Contract
The court considered events where a vendor of leasehold land had failed to maintain the insurance pending completion, and in breach of the lease: "It is, in fact, the duty of the vendor so to act that nothing done by him prior to the completion of the contract shall constitute a forfeiture of the lease. The policy of insurance not having in this case been kept up till the completion of the contract, so rendering the property liable to a forfeiture, that was not done by the vendors that which they should have done, and therefore, I think, the purchaser ought to be discharged from his contract."
1 Citers


 
Greyv Ellison (1856) 1 Giff 438; 65 ER 990
1856

Stuart V-C
Landlord and Tenant, Contract
A policy of insurance was created in which one department of an insurance company purported to effect a contract with another department of the same company. Although different individuals were parties to the contract, they all contracted as agents for the company with the intention that it alone should be able to sue and be sued on the policy. Held: The policy was a nullity. It infringed the two party rule. A company, even though it might operate different kinds of business from separate premises, cannot contract with itself. It is merely whimsical to grant a lease of one’s own property to oneself. Two agents of the same principal cannot contract with each other.
1 Citers


 
John Maples v William Pepper [1856] EngR 420; (1856) 18 CB 177; (1856) 139 ER 1334
22 Apr 1856


Landlord and Tenant, Insolvency
Ten years ago, A let to B, as tenant from year to year, premises adjoining other premises occupied by B. About seven years ago, A. permitted B. to make a communication through the party-wall, and to make other alterations, upon condition that B. should, at the termination of his tenancy, restore the premises to their original state. In April, 1855, B. became bankrupt; and, on the 17th of May, B. gave notice to A. that he would deliver up possession of the premises, under the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, section 145, the assignees having declined to take them: Held, that the "damages resulting from the non-compliance with the condition upon which the permission to alter was given," did not constitute "a liability to pay money upon a contingency within the 178th section of the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106 ; and that the condition or agreement above specified, to restore the premises to their previous state, was not a condition or agreement within s. 145.
[ Commonlii ]
 
French v Phillips [1856] EngR 971; (1856) 1 H & N 564; (1856) 156 ER 1327
28 Nov 1856


Landlord and Tenant
A count alleged that the plaintiff held a workshop as tenant to the defendant at a certain rent, and that the defendant wrongfully seized divers goods and chattels of the plaintiff; of great value, to wit, of the value of 30l, as a distress for arrears of rent, to wit, 13l. 10s, then claimed by the defendant to be in arrear, and the defendant afterwards wrongfully sold the said goods and chattels for the alleged arrears of rent, and costs ; whereas in fact a small part only, to wit, 9l. of the pretended arrears of rent so distrained for was in arrear. The defendant pleaded not guilty, and at the trial a verdict was found for the plaiittiff, with 10l 10s damages Held, in the Exchequer Chamber, that the count disclosed no cause of action.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Cox v Bishop [1857] 44 ER 604; (1857) 8 De G & J 276
1857


Landlord and Tenant
The lease was assigned to a man of straw. Held: The covenants in the lease could not be enforced against an equitable assignee of the lease who had entered into possession. The covenants were not enforceable because there was no privity of contract or estate between the lessee and the assignee.
1 Citers


 
Croft v Lumley (1858) 6 HL Cas 672
1858

Bramwell B
Landlord and Tenant
"When a lessee commits a breach of covenant on which the lessor has a right of re-entry, he may elect to avoid or not to avoid the lease, and he may do so by deed or by word. If in that notice he says, under circumstances which bind him that he will not avoid the lease, or he does an act inconsistent with his avoiding as distraining the rent or demanding subsequent rent, he elects to not avoid the lease."
1 Citers


 
Dendy v Nicholls [1858] 4 CB (NS) 376
1858

Crowder J, Willes J, Byles J
Landlord and Tenant
For a landlord to demand and sue for rent, when he knew of facts entitling him to forfeit the lease, amounted to waiver of forfeiture and prevented him from bringing a later action for ejectment. Referring to Jones v Carter: (Crowder J) "Here, there has been not merely a demand for rent, but an action brought to enforce it. That seems to me to be an unqualified and conclusive act on the part of the landlord, shewing an intention on his part to treat the lessees as still continuing his tenant ... I think the authorities abundantly show that, by such a demand as has been made here, the plaintiff has elected conclusively to treat the defendant as his tenant, and cannot afterwards turn round and make him a trespasser."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Cross v Ayres and Horncastle; 24-Apr-1858 - [1858] EngR 596; (1858) 1 F & F 187; (1858) 175 ER 684
 
Faithful Croft v Benjamin Lumley [1858] EngR 626; (1857-58) 6 HLC 672; (1858) 10 ER 1459
29 Apr 1858


Landlord and Tenant

[ Commonlii ]
 
Slack v Crewe [1860] EngR 244; (1860) 2 F & F 59; (1860) 175 ER 958
1860


Agency, Landlord and Tenant
It is doubtful whether an agent to let a house has an implied general authority to let persons into possession, but slight evidence will be sufficient to show an express authority.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Furnival v Grove (1860) 8 CB (NS) 496
1860


Landlord and Tenant
A lease may have been surrendered according to the circumstances where the tenant returns his key to the landlord who accepted it.

 
Cuthbertson v Irving [1860] EngR 980; (1860) 6 H & N 135; (1860) 158 ER 56
7 Jul 1860


Landlord and Tenant
Held: Decision affirmed. Neither the lessee nor the lessor can dispute one another's title and if the lessor without a legal estate later acquires one, the estoppel is "fed"
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Rollason v Leon (1861) 7 H & N 73
1861


Landlord and Tenant
The tenancy document, properly construed, purported to take effect as a tenancy and not as a mere agreement to grant a tenancy.
1 Citers


 
Phene v Popplewell (1862) 12 CB NS 334
1862


Landlord and Tenant
The tenant gave his keys to the landlord and claimed to have surrendered the property. Held: The landlord's equivocal act of using the keys for the purpose of obtaining an entrance to the premises was afterwards rendered unequivocal.

 
Lancaster v de Trafford [1862] 31 LJ Ch 554
1862


Landlord and Tenant
The plaintiff had offered to work mines under the defendant's land, paying a fixed rent with a royalty. No formal agreement was concluded, but the plaintiff sought specific agreement. Held: There was no sufficient agreement and the claim for specific performance was dismissed , but in the light of the defendant's behaviour, no costs were ordered.
1 Citers


 
Gray v Bompas (1862) 11 CB(NS) 520
1862


Landlord and Tenant

1 Citers


 
Hill v Tupper (1863) 2 H & C 121; [1863] EWHC Exch J26; [1863] EngR 493; (1863) 2 H & C 121; (1863) 159 ER 51
1863

Bramwell B
Landlord and Tenant
The canal company had by deed granted the sole right to use the canal for pleasure boats to the plaintiff. The defendant disturbed that right by using the canal for the same purpose. Held: The claim failed. The right under the contract was not an easement but only a personal licence. It existed not for the accommodation and better enjoyment of the land but more the land was required to exploit the right. Bramwell B said that "it is not competent to create rights unconnected with the use and enjoyment of land, and annex them to it so as to constitute a property in the grantee. This grant merely operates as a licence or covenant on the part of the grantors, and is binding on them as between themselves and the grantee, but gives him no right of action in his own name for any infringement of the supposed exclusive right."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Commonlii ]
 
Lord Ranelagh v Melton (1864) 2 Drew & Sm 278
1864

Sir Richard Kindersley V-C
Landlord and Tenant
The tenants were given an option in the lease to purchase the freehold: "if . . the lessees . . should give three months notice . . and should at the expiration of such notice pay . .", Held: Time was of the essence: "I apprehend the rule of law applicable to cases like the present is perfectly clear. No doubt, if an owner of land and an intending purchaser enter into a contract constituting between them the relation of vendor and purchaser, and there is a stipulation in the contract that the purchase-money shall be paid and the contract completed on a certain day, this Court in ordinary cases has established the principle that time is not of the essence of the contract, and that the circumstance of the day fixed for the payment of the money and completion of the purchase being past does not entitle either party to refuse to complete. On the other hand it is well settled that where there is a contract between the owner of land and another person, that if such person shall do a specified act, then he (the owner) will convey the land to him in fee; the relation of vendor and purchaser does not exist between the parties unless and until the act has been done as specified. The Court regards it as the case of a condition on the performance of which the party performing it is entitled to a certain benefit; but in order to obtain such benefit he must perform the condition strictly. Therefore, if there be a day fixed for its performance, the lapse of that day without its being performed prevents him from claiming the benefit."
1 Citers


 
Stewart v Watson (1864) 2 M 1414
1864


Scotland, Landlord and Tenant
An irritancy clause taking effect on the sequestration of a tenant was lawful and, in contradistinction to a legal irritancy, could not be purged.
1 Citers


 
Candy v Jubber (1865) 9 B & S 15
1865

Erle CJ
Landlord and Tenant
The plaintiff had been injured by a defective iron grating which was out of repair so as to amount to a nuisance. The property was occupied by a yearly tenant but the claim was brought against the reversioner, who was held liable by the Court of Queen's Bench. The defendant appealed to the Court of Exchequer Chamber on the ground that it was not alleged that the defendant knew of the nuisance, nor that it had existed prior to the commencement of the yearly tenancy. Held. A tenancy from year to year, however long it continues, is a single term, not a series of separate lettings. The case was settled, but in the undelivered judgment Erle CJ said: "There frequently is an actual demise from year to year so long as both parties please. The nature of this tenancy is discussed in 4 Bac. Arb. tit. Leases and Terms for Years . . and this article has always been deemed to be the highest authority being said to be the work of Chief Baron Gilbert. It seems clear that the learned author considered that the true nature of such a tenancy is that it is a lease for two years certain, and that every year after it is a springing interest arising upon the first contract and parcel of it, so that if the lessee occupies for a number of years, these years, by computation from time past, makes an entire lease for so many years, and after the commencement of each new year it becomes an entire lease certain for the years past and also for the years entered on, and that it is not a reletting at the commencement of the third and subsequent years. We think this is the true nature of a tenancy from year to year created by express words, and that there is not in contemplation of law a recommencing or reletting at the beginning of each year".
1 Citers


 
The Right Hon Henry John Chetwynd, Earl Of Shrewsbury And Earl Talbot, And The Right Hon George Rice, Baron Dynevor v Harbord And Others [1865] EngR 549; (1865) 19 CB NS 643; (1865) 141 ER 939
6 Jun 1865


Landlord and Tenant

[ Commonlii ]
 
The Right Hon Henry John Chetwynd, Earl Of Shrewsbury And Earl Talbot, And The Right Hon George Rice, Baron Dynevor v Beazley And Others [1865] EngR 561; (1865) 19 CB NS 651; (1865) 141 ER 942
8 Jun 1865


Trusts, Landlord and Tenant

[ Commonlii ]
 
The Queen v Frederick William Dallimore, John Henry Clough And William Bogg [1865] EngR 767; (1865) 3 Moo PC NS 347; (1865) 16 ER 132
7 Dec 1865
PC

Landlord and Tenant

[ Commonlii ]
 
Baillie v M'Kewan [1865] EngR 769; (1865) 35 Beav 177; (1865) 55 ER 862
8 Dec 1865


Landlord and Tenant

[ Commonlii ]
 
Clements v Welles [1865] EngR 774; (1865) 35 Beav 513; (1865) 55 ER 995
13 Dec 1865


Landlord and Tenant

[ Commonlii ]
 
Carr v Levingston [1865] EngR 778; (1865) 35 Beav 41; (1865) 55 ER 809
14 Dec 1865


Landlord and Tenant

[ Commonlii ]
 
The Queen v Walter Watson Hughes And Edward Stirling [1865] EngR 794; (1865) 3 Moo PC NS 439; (1865) 16 ER 166
22 Dec 1865
PC

Constitutional, Commonwealth, Landlord and Tenant
Leases granted by the Governor of South Australia under powers conferred on him by the Colonial Act, 21st Vict. No. 5, sec. 13, for regulating the sale and other disposal of waste lands belonging to the Crown, sealed with the public seal of the Province, but not enrolled or recorded in any court, are not in themselves Records; and, though bad on the face of them, being for a larger quantity of land than allowed by that Act, cannot be annulled or quashed by a writ of Scire facias
[ Commonlii ]

 
 Ramsden v Dyson; HL 1866 - [1866] LR 1 HL 129; [1866] 12 Jur NS 506
 
Lyle v Richards (1866) LR 1 HL 222
1866
HL
Lord Westbury, Lord Cranworth LC
Contract, Landlord and Tenant
A lease described the southern boundary of the premises as "a straight line of about 355 fathoms from John Vincent's house . . to a bound-stone", which was then described, the demised premises being "particularly delineated by the map", that map being on the back of the lease. The problem was this that the lease did not say from what part of the house that line was to be drawn. Further, on the map John Vincent's house had been placed incorrectly. Held: Extrinsic evidence was admissible to determine the true boundary. The judge was required to ask the jury to include consideration of the map. There remained a latent ambiguity which would have to be resolved by evidence other than construction of the deed.
Lord Cranworth LC: "The map is referred to not for the purpose of shewing the site either of the house or the bound-stone. The facts as to the true position of the house and the bound-stone are ascertained by other means. The use of the map is to clear up what, without it, was uncertain, namely, from what part of the house the line was to be drawn; and for that purpose its exact site is immaterial." It was for the jury, strictly, to say where the boundary line was drawn on the map, but because it was so plainly drawn from the north-east corner of John Vincent's house the jury would have had so to find.
1 Citers


 
Campbell v Lord Wenlock [1866] EngR 3; (1866) 4 F & F 716; (1866) 176 ER 760
1866


Landlord and Tenant

[ Commonlii ]
 
Sucksmith v Wilson [1866] EngR 43 (A); (1866) 4 F & F 1084
1866


Landlord and Tenant

[ Commonlii ]
 
Moss v Barton [1866] EngR 54; (1866) 35 Beav 197; (1866) 55 ER 870
12 Jan 1866


Landlord and Tenant

[ Commonlii ]
 
Buckland v Papillon [1866] EngR 81; (1866) 35 Beav 281; (1866) 55 ER 904
8 Feb 1866


Landlord and Tenant

[ Commonlii ]
 
Johnson v The Edgware, &C, Railway Company And Others [1866] EngR 101; (1866) 35 Beav 480; (1866) 55 ER 982
15 Feb 1866


Landlord and Tenant

[ Commonlii ]
 
Walmesley v Pilkington [1866] EngR 118; (1866) 35 Beav 362; (1866) 55 ER 936
6 Mar 1866


Landlord and Tenant
Premises mere demised for three lives and for twenty-one years after the death of the last survivor. The lessor covenanted with the lessee that if he should "lose a life and think proper to have a new life put in, then, within six months after the death of the first life, and so on continuing the term and estate thereby demised ” the lessor ‘ would put in a new life.” Held, that the Lessee had power to introduce one new life only, and that one in the place of the first life dropping, but with a new term of twenty-one years, commencing with the death of the survivor of the two survivors and the new life.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Llewellyn v Rous [1866] EngR 138; (1866) 35 Beav 591; (1866) 55 ER 1026
19 Apr 1866


Landlord and Tenant

[ Commonlii ]
 
Belaney v Belaney (1867) 2 Ch.App138
1867

Lord Chelmsford
Landlord and Tenant
The testator bought the residue of a 99 year lease and took an assignment of the term. In the following year he bought the freehold reversion and, by a deed which recited that he was desirous that the term should not merge in the freehold, the reversion was conveyed to a trustee for him. He afterwards made a will bequeathing his personal estate. Held: The reversion did not pass, but the term did: “It is most important to observe, that in the conveyance of the reversion, taken by the testator within a year after the assignment of the term to him, it is stated that the conveyance is taken to a trustee for the express purpose of preventing merger. The term, therefore, remained in the testator as personal estate”
1 Citers


 
Gayford v Moffatt [1868] 4 Ch App 133
1868


Landlord and Tenant, Land
The enjoyment of a light or any other easement by a tenant is in law the enjoyment of the landlords.
1 Citers


 
In re London and Colonial Co.; Horsey's claim (1868) LR 5 Eq 561
1868


Landlord and Tenant

1 Citers



 
 Freeman v Jefferies; CE 1868 - (1868-69) LR 4 Ex 189
 
Jones v Phipps [1868] LR 2 QB 567
1868
QBD

Landlord and Tenant, Agency
For many years, an agent had, with the authority of his principals, dealt with an estate as his own and negotiated with the tenant as to the terms and continuance of the holding. Held: It was incidental to that authority that he should determine the tenancy by notice to quit. The tenant was not aware of the existence of the agent's principals and considered the agent to be the landlord.
1 Citers



 
 Henderson v Squire; 1869 - (1869) LR 4 QB 170
 
Moreton v Woods (1869) LR 4 QB 293
1869


Landlord and Tenant


 
De Nicholls v Saunders (1870) 5 LRCP 589
1870


Landlord and Tenant
The existence of an agreement (and the payment in appropriate circumstances may evidence an agreement) between the landlord and tenant that on the day that the rent becomes due an earlier payment shall be treated as a fulfilment of the obligation to pay the rent can displace the presumption that an early payment of rent does not satisfy the rent when it later becomes due.
1 Citers


 
In re Progress Assurance Co Ex parte Liverpool Exchange Co (1870) LR 9 Eq 370
1870

Lord Romilly MR
Company, Insolvency, Landlord and Tenant
The lessors of a company in liquidation levied a distress for unpaid rent upon its office furniture three months after the winding up order. A distress after the winding up order would be allowed to proceed only where the company "has retained not merely formal but actual possession of the property for the purpose of carrying on the business of the liquidation . ."
1 Citers


 
Makin v Watkinson (1870-71) LR 6 Ex 25
1870


Landlord and Tenant
The court considered the extent of a Landlord's duty of repair where he had entered into an express covenant for the purpose.
1 Citers


 
Jane Day v Jane Day, And Others [1871] EngR 38; (1871) 8 Moo PC NS 152; (1871) 17 ER 270
17 Jul 1871
PC

Landlord and Tenant, Limitation
Tenant at will without interruption for more than twenty years, during which period he let and transferred portion of the land, with the knowledge, and without the interference of the Owner in fee: held to have acquired an indefeasible title against the Owner, whose right of entry after that period was barred by the Statute of Limitations.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Alexander John Forbes v Baboo Luchmeeput Singh, Dhunput Singh, Sheikh Jowhur Ali, And Mussumat Ameeroonissa Begum [1871] EngR 52; (1871) 14 Moo Ind App 330; (1871) 20 ER 810
7 Dec 1871


Landlord and Tenant

[ Commonlii ]
 
Tanham v Nicholson (1872) LR 5 HL 561
1872

Hatherley LC
Landlord and Tenant
The tenant was an mentally disbled. He lived in the house with his children. The landlord served a notice to quit at the premises by giving it to a daughter. She burned it and did not inform her father. Held: The service was effective. It was the son's duty to pass it to the father. A servant of the tenant on the premises is an implied agent of the tenant, unless there was evidence to the contrary.

 
Dennett v Atherton [1872] LR 7 QB 316
1872


Landlord and Tenant
The covenant for quiet enjoyment cannot be elevated into a warranty that the land is fit to be used for some special purpose.
1 Citers



 
 Moule v Garrett; CA 1872 - (1872) LR 7 Exch 101
 
The General Manager Of The Raj Durbhunga, Under The Court Of Wards v Maharajah Coomar Ramaput Sing [1872] EngR 21; (1872) 14 Moo Ind App 605; (1872) 20 ER 912
21 Mar 1872
PC

Landlord and Tenant
In a suit by A. against B. for arrears of rent, a Decree was obtained by A. against B.’s Widow; B. having died pending the suit. Under this Decree execution was obtained, and the interest of the Widow was sold under Act, No. XI. of 1859. The amended Certificate stated, that the estate was sold by virtue of the Decree. Held, reversing the Decree of the High Court, and following Joham Chnder Mitter v. Buksh Ali Soudagur (Marshall’s Ben. App. Cases, 614), that the sale was not of the Widow’s personal interest, but as the representative of her husband‘s estate.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Erskine v Adeane [1873] LR 8 CH 756
1873

Mellish LJ
Landlord and Tenant
Mellish LJ said: "The law of this country is that a tenant when he takes a farm must look and judge for himself what the state of the farm is. Just as in the case of a purchaser of a business the rule is caveat emptor, so in the case of the lease of property the rule is caveat lessee; he must take the property as he finds it."
1 Citers



 
 Allan v Liverpool Overseers; 1874 - (1874) LR 9 QB 180

 
 Mellor v Watkins; 1874 - (1874) LR 9 QB 400
 
Spoor v Green (1874) LR 9 Ex 99
1874
CExC
Kelly CB, Cleasby, Bramwell BB
Landlord and Tenant
There had been an assignment of a lease of coal mines but at the time of the conveyance to the plaintiff, the coals had already been substantially worked out. The grantor did not have title in the coals and was in breach of the covenant of title. The plaintiff bought the land and built houses upon it. The houses were damaged by subsidence caused by the underground mining. Held: There had been no breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment which had been given by the vendor.
Cleasby B said: "It seems to me impossible to say that there is a breach of covenant for quiet enjoyment by reason of the subsidence of the house in consequence of the previous removal of the coal. This subsidence of the house was a necessary consequence of the condition of the property bought by the plaintiff."
Bramwell B took the view that a breach of covenant for title was a once for all breach and completed at the time when the assignment was executed and hence would have been statute-barred. Kelly CB differed, held that it was a continuous breach. He drew a distinction between a covenant for title and a covenant for quiet enjoyment.
1 Citers


 
Leech v Schweder (1874) 9 Ch App 463
1874
CA

Landlord and Tenant
Mellish LJ said: "It is perfectly true that the lessee is 'to hold and enjoy without any suit, let or hindrance.' But what is he to hold and enjoy? 'The premises'. What are the premises? The things previously demised and granted. The covenant does not enlarge what is previously granted, but an additional remedy is given, namely, an action for damages if the lessee cannot get, or is deprived of that which has been previously professed to be granted. Nothing, I apprehend, can be plainer than that at law it would not, in the least degree, enlarge what was granted."
1 Citers



 
 Smith v Seghill Overseers; 1875 - (1875) LR 10 QB 422; 44 LJMC 114; 32 LT 859; 40 JP 228; 23 WR 745
 
Jones v Chappell (1875) LR 20 Eq 539; 44 LJ Ch 658
1875
CA
Jessel MR
Landlord and Tenant
A lessee who erects a building without the landlord's consent does not commit waste, unless it can be shown that the building is an injury to the inheritance. 'The erection of a building upon land is not waste'


 
 Harris v James; 1876 - [1876] 35 LT 240

 
 Finch v Underwood; CA 1876 - (1876) 2 Ch D 310
 
Howard v Boddington (1877) 2PD 203
1877


Landlord and Tenant

1 Citers



 
 Oastler v Henderson; 1877 - [1877] 2 QBD 575
 
Birmingham Joint Stock Co v Lea (1877) 36 LT 843
1877


Landlord and Tenant
The court considered whether a covenant in a lease survived its extinction: "though the old under-lease was gone it was clearly part of the arrangement that the defendant should remain subject to the covenant and that accordingly he remained bound by it in equity."
1 Citers


 
Hand v Hall (1877) 2 ExD 355
1877
CA

Landlord and Tenant
An agreement was made on January 26 1876 for a tenancy until Midsummer 12 months from February 14 1876. Held: The agreement operated as a devise within the exception in section 2 of the Statute of Frauds.
1 Citers



 
 Wilson v Lord Finch Hatton; CExC 1877 - (1877) 2 Ex D 336

 
 Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co; HL 1877 - [1877] 2 App Cas 439; [1877] 46 LJQB 583; [1877] UKHL 1
 
Winn v Bull (1877) 7 Ch D 29; 47 LJ Ch 139; 42 JP 230; 26 WR 230
1877

Sir George Jessel
Contract, Landlord and Tenant
By an agreement in writing, the defendant agreed with the plaintiff to take a lease of a house. The other details were included, but the agreement was 'subject to the preparation and approval of a formal contract". Held: The words "subject to the preparation and approval of a formal contract" in a document prevented the document from being held to be a final agreement of which specific performance could be enforced.
1 Citers


 
Mills v Haywood (1877) 6 Ch 196
1877

Cotton LJ
Contract, Landlord and Tenant
Mr Mills became the under tenant of the Radnor Tavern, 72, Chancery Lane, for a ten year term from 1861. The agreement between him and Mr. Austin, the holder of a long lease, contained an option to purchase the headlease. On 26th July 1867 Mr. Mills' solicitors wrote as follows: "Mr. Mills is desirous of exercising his right to purchase the lease of the Radnor, and has instructed us to call upon you, as far as you are concerned, to complete the sale, which he is ready and willing to do. We have informed Mr. Gibbon and the National Bank of this, and if there be any other parties now representing you, be kind enough to hand them this letter." A draft assignment was prepared but the details were never finalised. Mr. Mills continued to pay sums by way of rent up to and after the ten year period of the option had expired. In November 1872 Mr. Austin was adjudicated bankrupt and Mr. Haywood was appointed trustee. He decided to sell the Radnor Tavern and offered it first to Mr Mills. Mr Mills took advice and pursuant to that advice claimed specific performance of the option that he claimed to have been exercised. Vice-Chancellor Hall made a decree for specific performance. Held: The appeal succeeded. "If it were necessary to determine the point, there is considerable ground in the present case for holding that there had been a mutual abandonment of the contract, both sides treating the whole matter as at an end, and dealing with one another accordingly. But it is not necessary to give a decision on that point.
It is a well-established principle, as laid down by Lord Alvanley in Milward v Earl Thanet, that a party cannot call upon a Court of Equity for a specific performance unless he has shown himself ready, desirous, prompt and eager.
This rule is specially applicable where the subject-matter of the contract is of a somewhat speculative and fluctuating value, as the tavern, the subject of the present suit, must necessarily be; and the delay which has occurred in the present case from March, 1868, till May, 1873, unless satisfactorily explained, must be fatal to the plaintiff's title to a decree for specific performance. It was contended that the delay was solely attributable to the disputes between Gibbon and Austin; but even if this were so, it was the duty of the Plaintiff, if he desired to obtain specific performance, to insist upon, and if necessary file a bill to enforce, specific performance of his contract. Then it is said that the Plaintiff has been in possession, and that a purchaser in possession does not lose by delay his right to specific performance. But possession, in order to obviate the consequence to a purchaser of delay, must be possession under the contract sought to be enforced, that is (to use the words of Lord St. Leonards in Clarke v Moore) 'an enjoyment of the benefits given to him by the contract', and the vendor must have known, or have been bound to know, that the purchaser claimed to be in possession under the contract. In such a case, as, eg where the purchaser in possession has no right or title to such possession except as purchaser, his possession is an assertion on his part of his right under the contract of purchase, and acquiescence in his possession is a recognition by the vendor of this right. But where a tenant in possession contracts for the purchase of his landlord's interest the case is different. His right under the contract is to be no longer tenant of the vendor, and his possession as tenant is not an assertion of right under the contract of purchase. He may be in possession of the property, the house or land which is the subject of the contract of purchase, but, if he is, he is not in possession of, or asserting right to, the benefit or interest secured to him by the contract. ...
In my opinion, the result is that the plaintiff did not, from March, 1868, till May, 1873, claim to be in possession as purchaser, and there is nothing to show that the vendors recognised or were bound to recognise his possession as being that of purchaser under the contract for sale. In my opinion, therefore, his possession was not such as to prevent the delay which has occurred being fatal to his claim for specific performance."
1 Citers


 
Saner v Bilton (1878) 7 Ch D 815
1878
ChD
Fry J
Landlord and Tenant
A lessor’s covenant to do structural repairs carried an implied licence to enter for that purpose. Fry J said: "It is further said that the construction of the covenant, as carrying with it an implied licence to enter, is inconsistent with the lessor’s covenant for quiet enjoyment. I do not think it is, and for this reason, that the covenant for quiet enjoyment, if read as absolutely unqualified, is as inconsistent with an entry on the warehouse for a single moment as it is with an occupation for a month or a year . . I think the covenant for quiet enjoyment must be read as subject to the licence which I have held to be implied in the covenant to repair."
1 Citers


 
Kusel v Watson (1879) 11 Ch D 129
1879
CA
Sir George Jessel MR
Landlord and Tenant
A tenant in the house let it to K at a fixed rent, with a lease at the same rent 'at any period he may feel disposed' and more not to molest or disturb him or raise his rent after Kusel had spent money to improve the house. K spent the money and now sought specific performance of the agreement as against the landlord's personal representative. The court at first instance had held that he was entitled to an underlease of his landlord's term less one day. Held: The landlord's appeal failed. The agreement meant that he should be granted a lease for the residue of his landlord's term less on day, if he should so long live.
1 Citers


 
Ahearn v Bellman; Sedgewick v Ahearn (1879) 4 Ex D 201
1879

Bramwell LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The defendant held a tenancy of a shop from year to year. The landlord gave him a notice giving a valid date for termination, but continued with a term providing a different rent if the tenant stayed in possession. Held: The later words did not invalidate the earlier effective notice. A notice to quit which is optional is not a notice to quit.

 
Hannan v Henderson (1879) 7 R 380
1879

Lord Shand
Scotland, Landlord and Tenant
The court recommended the possibility of attaching conditions to the purgation of an irritancy where enforcement involved the loss of large vested rights of property.


 
 Willmott v Barber; 1880 - (1880) 15 Ch D 96
 
Anderson v Oppenheimer [1880] 5 QBD 602; [1880] 49 LJQB 708
1880
CA

Nuisance, Landlord and Tenant
The defendant owned a house in the City of London with different floors let to tenants. In the lease of the ground floor, he covenanted to allow the tenant "peaceably hold and enjoy the demised premises during the term without any interruption by the defendant". Water was supplied through pipes from a cistern. A pipe leaked, letting water into the plaintiff's basement premises, damaging his goods. No negligence was found. Held: There was no breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. The water had been stored for the benefit of the plaintiff as much as for anyone else, and so a Rylands -v- Fletcher claim was not available. Although the escape of water was a consequence of the maintenance of the cistern and water supply by the landlord, it was not a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. It did not constitute an act or omission by the landlord or anyone lawfully claiming through him after the lease had been granted. The water system was there when the tenant took his lease and he had to take the building as he found it.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Cheshire Lines Committee v Lewis and Co (1880) 50 LJQB 121
1880

Lush J
Landlord and Tenant
A weekly tenancy agreement contained an undertaking by the landlord not to give notice to quit until he needed to pull down the demised buildings. Held: Lush J applied Warner v Browne saying: "This reasoning applies with at least equal force to the present case. This is not a mere constructive tenancy as that was. It is as explicit as words can make it that the defendants are to hold 'upon a weekly tenancy at a weekly rental, and that the tenancy is to be determined by either of the parties on giving a week's notice to the other.' There is this difference between the two cases, that in Doe d. Browne v. Warner the lessor engaged not to turn out the tenant so long as he observed the conditions, and in this case Radcliffe engages that the tenant shall hold until the company require to pull down the buildings. But, as that is an event which may never happen, the distinction is merely between the contingency of the tenant breaking the conditions and the contingency of the company wanting the premises in order to pull them down. The restriction is as repugnant to the nature of the tenancy in the one case as is in the other. It is therefore no legal answer to the ejectment to say that the contingency provided for has not happened."
1 Citers


 
Marshall v Berridge (1881) 19 ChD 233
1881
CA

Landlord and Tenant
The court was asked as to the validity of an agreement for lease. Held: Lush LJ said: "there must be a certain beginning and a certain ending otherwise it is not a perfect lease and a contract must in order to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, contain this reference."
1 Citers



 
 Bradley v Baylis; CA 1881 - (1881) 8 QBD 195

 
 Barnes v Dowling; QBD 1881 - (1881) 44 LT 809
 
In re Silkstone and Dodworth Coal and Iron Co (1881) 17 ChD 158
1881
ChD
Fry J
Landlord and Tenant, Insolvency
A mining lease provided that the rent was payable half-yearly in arrears. Rent became payable after presentation of the winding-up petition and a winding-up order was made after the rent became payable. The lease was subject to a proviso for re-entry. The landlords sought leave to destrain submitting that: "the entire rent which became due after the winding-up ought to be paid by the liquidator." The liquidator submitted that: "for the rent due before winding-up, the lessor can only prove . . and that under the Apportionment Act 1870 the rent must be apportioned up to that time [and therefore the landlord could only] destrain for the proportion of the rent which became due after presentation of the petition for winding up." Held: Fry J did not engage with the apportionment issue but instead held: "the lessors have this power: if rent remained unpaid for 30 days after the usual date for payment, they had a right to enter and stop the working as well as to destrain and accordingly, on 6 December, they gave notice to the liquidator demanding either payment of the arrears of rent or the stoppage of the works when the liquidator, considering it desirable to carry on the enterprise of which this colliery forms part, neither stopped nor paid the rent but continued working. That is, in my view, an election by the liquidator to continue in possession of the property and, if he continued in possession of the property, could only do so upon the terms of the lease, and it was only equitable if he keeps the lease as an asset of the company and for the purposes of the liquidation that he should satisfy those conditions upon which the asset remains his. In other words, he should pay the rent in full."
1 Citers



 
 In re Oak Pits Colliery Co; CA 1882 - (1882) 21 Ch D 322
 
Walsh v Lonsdale [1882] 21 ChD 9
1882
CA
Sir George Jessel MR
Landlord and Tenant, Equity
Lonsdale purported to grant to Walsh a seven year lease with rent payable in advance. The lease was not embodied in a deed, and when Walsh went into possession, an annual tenancy with rent payable in arrear was created. Walsh did not pay in advance, Lonsdale issued an execution against the premises, and Walsh sought damages. Held: Equity, as embodied in the maxim "equity regards as done what ought to be done", required that the lease should take effect on the terms originally intended. "He [Walsh] holds, therefore, under the same terms in equity as if a lease had been granted . . He cannot complain of the exercise by the landlord of the same rights as the landlord would have had if a lease had been granted." This was: "a case in which both parties admit that relief is capable of being given by specific performance."
1 Citers


 
Swinburne v Milburn [1884] 9 AC 844
1884
HL
Lord FitzGerald
Landlord and Tenant
In construing a covenant in a lease with the effect of providing that it will be perpetually renewable, the same approach should be taken as with any other clause or contract. The parties' intentions are to be deduced from the words used in the lease. However, the courts will lean against holding that a lease is perpetually renewable. Lord Fitzgerald approved confining interpretations of perpetual renewability to leases where words such as "for ever" or "from time to time for ever hereafter" or some equivalent were used in the relevant document.
1 Citers


 
Sanderson v Berwick-upon-Tweed Corporation [1884] 13 QBD 547
1884

Fry LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The Corporation let a farm to Sanderson. It reserved in favour of Cairns, another tenant farmer, the rights to use a drain across one of Sanderson's fields and to enter and repair it. Water discharged by Cairns leaked through the drain and flooded Sanderson's land. He sued the landlord on the covenant for quiet enjoyment. Held: The flooding was a breach of the covenant. It is a question of fact and degree in each case as to whether the tenant's ordinary use of the premises has been substantially interfered with.
Fry LJ said: "[T]he damage here has resulted to the plaintiff from the proper user by Cairns of the drains passing through the plaintiff's land which were improperly constructed. In respect of this proper user Cairns appears to us to claim lawfully under the defendants by virtue of his lease, and to have acted under the authority conferred on him by the defendants. The injury caused to the field appears to us to have been, within the meaning of the covenant in that behalf contained in the lease to the plaintiff, a substantial interruption by Cairns, who is a person lawfully claiming through the defendants, of the plaintiff's enjoyment of the land, and so to constitute a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment for which the defendants are liable in damages."
1 Citers


 
Knill v Prowse [1884] 33 WR 163
1884


Equity, Landlord and Tenant
An assignee of land may sue the tenant for the rent.
1 Citers


 
Farrer v Nelson (1885) 15 QB 258
1885

Pollock B
Landlord and Tenant
The plaintiff was tenant of a farm over which the defendants' predecessor had reserved shooting rights. The defendants had brought pheasants in coops on to land very close to the plaintiffs' farm. The came onto the farm damaging his crops. The defendant said that having a right of shooting over the land, it was necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of this right that they should be at liberty to stock the land with pheasants. Held: Pollock B said that so long as the lessee of the right of shooting was exercising the ordinary rights which the landlord who had reserved the right might have exercised, he was acting within his rights, but the moment he brings on game to an unreasonable amount or causes it to increase to an unreasonable extent, he is doing that which is unlawful, and an action may be maintained by his neighbour for the damage which he has sustained.
1 Citers


 
Gooch v London Banking Association (1886) 32 Ch D 41
1886

Pearson J
Landlord and Tenant
On the application of a landlord, the court had jurisdiction to restrain the liquidators of a solvent company in voluntary liquidation from distributing assets of the company amongst its shareholders, without setting aside sufficient assets to provide for the payment of all future rent and liabilities under the lease. Held: "I am satisfied here that the intention of the legislature as shown by all the terms of the Act, was to provide once and for all for the winding up of the company, for the discharge of its liabilities, the distribution of its assets, if there were any to distribute, and then for the dissolution of the company; being of that opinion I have come to the conclusion that the liquidators would be guilty of a dereliction of duty if they were to distribute the assets without providing for this liability, and that the landlord therefore in the present case, who has a claim, as it is admitted, against the company for the future rent which may become due, is interested in seeing the liquidators discharge their duty properly, and is entitled to come to this court and ask to restrain them, when... it appears... that they claim as a matter of right..... to distribute these assets without providing for this liability ".
1 Citers



 
 Coatsworth v Johnson; 1886 - (1886) 55 LSQB 22
 
Mitchell v Cantrill (1887) 37 Ch D 36
1887
CA
Cotton, Lindley, Lopes LJJ
Landlord and Tenant, Land
In 1864 Sir Humphrey de Trafford granted a 999 year lease of a dwelling house "with all rights and appurtenances, legal, used, or reputed, to the said plot of land, except rights, if any, restricting the free use of any adjoining land or the conversion or appropriation at any time thereafter of such land for building or other purposes, obstructive or otherwise." A house was built on the adjoining land and this was leased to a Mr Cantrill. Mr Cantrill's executrix sought to build an extension on the Cantrill land which interfered with light to the plaintiff's windows. The plaintiff applied for an injunction to restrain the building works. The question was whether the exception of easements was an agreement or consent for the purposes of section 3. Held: The court eversed the decision of the District Registrar in the Palatine Court, held that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction. The clause quoted above did not trigger the proviso to s.3.
Cotton LJ said: "Now does this clause which I have read bring it within that? In my opinion it does not. It is not an agreement given for the purpose of the enjoyment of the light, but it is simply an exception out of the grant made of appurtenances and rights, so as to prevent the lessee from urging as against the landlord or anybody claiming through him, before a right had been obtained under the statute, that the landlord could not derogate from his own grant either by his building or granting to anybody else a right to build so as to interfere with the Plaintiff's lights. That is the reasonable, and I think, the only meaning of this clause. It was in effect saying, "If I grant this house to you without protecting myself, you will say, if I build up any adjoining house, that is derogating from my own grant; and this clause is to prevent any such contention being made." But if independently of the grant the lessee has enjoyed the use of these windows for twenty years he will have the same right as against the adjoining lessee as against a stranger. There was certainly no case referred to in the argument to shew that such claim as is contended for by the Plaintiff exists. But he has the right simply by the effect and operation, not of the grant, but of the statute, and in my opinion he is entitled to enforce that."
Then there was another point which was suggested, that this must be considered an agreement between the landlord and the lessee, that the landlord should be at liberty if he thought fit to do anything, even although it would operate so as to interfere with his right to light; but I do not think that is the true meaning of it. If you had an express proviso in the contract between the parties that, notwithstanding the grant to the Plaintiff, the landlord should be at liberty to build so as to interfere with his right, that would be another point, but that is not the express form of it, and in my opinion the fair and clear meaning of this clause, construing it without reference to the consequences to one party or the other, is not anything of that sort."
. .and: "The enactment is this, that the right to light is granted where there has been an enjoyment of the access and use of light for twenty years, "unless it shall appear that the same was enjoyed by some consent or agreement expressly made or given for that purpose by deed or writing." Now does this clause which I have read bring it within that? In my opinion it does not. It is an agreement given for the purpose of the enjoyment of the light, but it is simply an exception out of the grant made of appurtenances and rights, so as to prevent the lessee from urging as against the landlord or anybody claiming through him, before a right had been obtained under the statute, that the landlord could not derogate from his own grant either by his building or granting to anybody else a right to build so as to interfere with the Plaintiff's lights. . . .If you had an express proviso in the contract between the parties that, notwithstanding the grant to the Plaintiff, the landlord should be at liberty to build so as to interfere with his right, that would be another point, but that is not the express form of it, and in my opinion the fair and clear meaning of this clause, construing it without reference to the consequences to one party or the other, is not anything of that sort."
Lindley LJ said: "The last words in the section mean that when you find an agreement under which the light is enjoyed you must look at that agreement and see what, if any, right to light is expressly given by it. Here the Plaintiff falls under the words of the statute, and it appears to me the contention of the Defendant is not warranted by the words at the end of the section. There is nothing except the grant coupled with the words which Cotton LJ has alluded to, and which obviously are for the purpose of preserving to the lessee a right, until an adverse right is acquired, of doing what he likes with the adjoining property. Under the grant he could deal with that property as he liked within the twenty years, and within that period he might have blocked up all these lights; but after the Plaintiff has enjoyed them without interruption for twenty years the statute confers upon him the right to their future enjoyment. I think therefore this appeal should be allowed."
Lopes LJ saw the exception as directed only to acquisition by the original grant, rather than by subsequent enjoyment. As to the argument that the exception was a consent or an agreement within section 3 he said "for the reasons which have already been given I am clearly of opinion that cannot be brought within those words".
Prescription Act 1832 3
1 Citers



 
 Davies v Davies; 1888 - (1888) 38 Ch D 499

 
 Jenkins v Jackson; ChD 1888 - [1888] 40 ChD 71

 
 Hardy v Fothergill; 1888 - (1888) 13 App Cas 351

 
 Tod-Heatley v Benham; 1888 - (1888) 40 CH D 80
 
Gardner v Ingram (1889) 61 LT 729
1889

Lord Coleridge C.J
Landlord and Tenant
"Although no particular form need be followed, there must be plain, unambiguous words claiming to determine the existing tenancy at a certain time."
1 Citers


 
Re Cartwright; Avis v Newman (1889) 41 Ch D 532
1889

Kay J
Landlord and Tenant, Equity
A tenant for life is not liable in damages for permissive waste. "Since the Statutes of Marlbridge and of Gloucester there must have been hundreds of thousands of tenants for life who have died leaving their estates in a condition of great dilapidation. Not once, so far as legal records go, have damages been recovered against the estate of a tenant for life on that ground. To ask me in that state of the authorities to hold that a tenant for life is liable for permissive waste to a remainderman is to my mind a proposition altogether startling. I should not think of coming to such a decision without direct authority upon the point. Such authority as there is seems to me to be against the contention, and in opposition to the positive decisions in Gibson v. Wells, Herne v. Bembow, and Jones v. Hill 7 Taunt. 392, there are only to be found certain dicta of Baron Parke and the late Lord Justice Lush which seem to amount to this, that the words of the Statutes of Marlbridge and Gloucester are sufficient to include the case of permissive waste, at any rate where there is an obligation on the person who has the particular estate not to permit waste, whether that obligation does or does not exist at the common law in the case of a tenant for life. But at the present day it would certainly require either an Act of Parliament or a very deliberate decision of a Court of great authority to establish the law that a tenant for life is liable to a remainderman in case he should have permitted the buildings on the land to fall into a state of dilapidation. I therefore think that this claim must be disallowed."
1 Cites

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Walker v Hobbs and Co (1889) 23 QBD 458
1889

Lord Coleridge CJ
Landlord and Tenant
The tenant brought an action under section 12 on the term, saying the property was not fit for human habitation. Held: Lord Coleridge CJ said: "It is admitted that the ceilings were in a dangerous condition, and therefore that the rooms were not, speaking in a broad sense, fit for human habitation."
Housing of the Working Classes Act 1885 12
1 Citers


 
In re Wanser Ltd [1891] 1 Ch 305
1891

North J
Insolvency, Scotland, Landlord and Tenant
A landlord of Scottish property began proceedings after a winding up order for sequestration of the company's goods on the premises in order to answer for future rent. Held: North J allowed the sequestration to continue, being satisfied that under Scottish law the landlord was a secured creditor at the date of commencement of the winding up, and therefore in the same position as a mortgagee Proceedings in insolvency begun without the stipulated leave should not be regarded as irretrievably null but rather as existing and capable of redemption by the late giving of leave.
1 Citers


 
Joyner v Weeks [1891] 2 QB 31
1891


Landlord and Tenant, Damages
The general rule at common law is that the measure of damages for breach of the covenant to repair by a tenant is the cost of putting the premises into the state of repair required by the covenant.
1 Citers


 
Foster v Reeves [1892] 2 QB 255
1892
CA
Lord Esher MR, Fry LJ, Lopes LJ
Landlord and Tenant
An agreement was made on May 12 1890 for a tenancy for three years to commence on June 24 1890 and thereafter from year to year until determined. The landlord sued to recover rent after the tenant had given up possession. The tenant argued that no lease existed because it was a reversionary lease not under seal. The landlord sought to enforce the agreement under Walsh v Lonsdale.
Lord Esher MR said: "When the agreement is looked at, it is found that it assumes to create a tenancy for three years to begin at a subsequent date. Such a tenancy can at common law only be created by deed … If, therefore, we look to the common law alone, this claim cannot be supported."
Fry LJ said: "it was a sum which could be recovered in equity, provided the agreement under which it was claimed was one that would be enforced by a court of equity. Independently of this, there was no right to sue for it."
Lopes LJ said: "By the joint operation of the Statute of Frauds and . . [the Real Property Act 1845], a lease for more than three years must be by deed. Here the agreement purports to create a term of more than three years, and it is clear that rent could not, at common law, have been recovered under that agreement."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Wallis v Hands [1893] 2 Ch 75; [1893] All ER Rep 719
1893


Landlord and Tenant
Where the tenant abandons the property and the landlord creates a new tenancy, the law will imply acceptance of the tenant’s surrender of the lease by the landlord.


 
 Fitz v Iles; CA 1893 - [1893] Ch 77

 
 Parker v Briggs; CA 1893 - (1893) 37 Sol Jo 452
 
Warren v Murray [1894] 2 QB 648; (1894) 10 The Times LR 573
1894

A L Smith LJ
Landlord and Tenant
A person went into possession of land under a contract to grant him a lease for 99 years, but no lease was ever granted. Held: In the absence of a lease he was no more that a tenant at will, which tenancy could be determined at any time, but the agreement might lead a court of equity to grant an injunction to restrain the landlord exercising his rights. The effect was that the landlord would have no right at all of any kind to go to the court and demand possession, and no right had accrued to begin the period of limitation: "It seems to me evident that a person must have an effective right to make an entry and to recover possession of the land in order that the statute may begin to run. If th eargument for the plaintiff is correct, the trustees are to lose their property because thay did not enter at a time when they really could not enter with any effect, insamuch as a Court of equity would at once have decreed specific performance and put an end to any entry they might have made. It seems to me impossible to hold that this constitutes an entry within the meaning of the Act. It is, however, said that the plaintiff's predecessaors became tenants at will, and, by virtue of section 7 the statute begand ti run after they were let into possession. I do not so read the section. As in the case of section 2, it seems to me that section 7 requires that there should shave been aneffective right of entry or action before the section can apply at at all. It provides at what time the right of entry or action shall be deemed to have accrued, but that ssumes that there is a 'right' of entry or action. In this case there was no such right, and therefore the statute did not run."
1 Citers


 
In re New Oriental Bank Corporation (No.2) [1895] 1 Ch 753
1895

Vaughan Williams J
Landlord and Tenant
Where a tenancy continues after the insolvency of the tenant, the landlord is entitled (i) to prove for all the arrears of rent; (ii) to enter a claim for all future rent; and (iii) as rent accrues due, to submit proofs in the liquidation from time to time. "The proof should be admitted only for future rent, less the benefit which the landlord obtains by getting his property back again; that is to say, he is in the position of a secured creditor."
1 Citers


 
In re Smith and Hartogs (1895) 72 LT 221
1895


Landlord and Tenant
A landlord agreed to a reduction of the rent payable for the time being, with the balance in effect being added to the rent payable later in the term. The tenant failed to pay the reduced rent. Held: The landlord was entitled to distrain for the full amount of the rent.
Vaughan Williams J said: "To put the case in the manner most favourable to the trustee [i.e. the tenants' trustee in bankruptcy]; Here was an agreement that if the tenant paid the rent agreed upon by instalments, the landlord would not enforce his original remedy. Treating the agreement as being one for good consideration, it cannot be enforced by the tenant if he was in default . . "
1 Citers


 
Smallwood v Sheppards [1895] 2 QB 627; [1895-9] All ER Rep 863
1895


Landlord and Tenant
The defendant contracted by parol to take space for his roundabout at a fair on three bank holidays. He attended and paid for only the first, and the landlord sued for the sums due for the subsequent days. Held: Occupation of a property can occur notwithstanding that the property is to be occupied for discontinuous periods. Though the occupation was to be on discontinuous occasions, it was one letting at a single rent. The plaintiff's right to recover his rent was not affected by the separate dates. A tenancy had been created, and the rent was due.
1 Citers


 
Howard v Fanshawe [1895] 2 Ch 581
1895

McMullen J
Landlord and Tenant, Equity, Costs
In equity a proviso for re-entry in a lease is to be treated as a security for the payment of the rent.
A tenant applying for relief from forfeiture will normally be required to pay the lessor's costs of the forfeiture proceedings, save in so far as those costs have been increased by the lessor's opposition to the grant of relief, upon appropriate terms.
1 Citers


 
Sidebotham v Holland [1895] 1 QB 378
1895
CA
AL Smith LJ, Lord Halsbury
Landlord and Tenant
A house was let to the defendant as a yearly tenant "commencing on May 19 instant", and on 17th November the landlord served a notice to quit "on 19th May next". Held: It related to a point of time which was held to be common to both dates and was effective since the days were contiguous. Linley LJ said that a special rule applied for determining periodic tenancies at comon law.
A L Smith LJ, doubting this, said: "the plaintiff has only himself to blame for the difficulties he is in in this case. Had he added the words which are very ordinarily inserted in a notice to quit, 'or at the expiration of the year of your tenancy, which shall expire next after the end of one half-year from the service of this notice,' and which are inserted to avoid such a point as that now taken, all would have been in order; but the words are not there. If the notice to quit in this case had been for May 20 or 21 or any later day I should have had no doubt but that it was a bad notice; and I own that the inclination of my opinion is that the present notice is bad because it does not expire upon the last day of some year of the tenancy; but, as Lord Halsbury and Lindley L.J. are of opinion that, inasmuch as this was a full six months' notice given to quit upon the anniversary of the day upon which the tenancy commenced, it is good, though the tenancy expired at midnight the day before, I yield to what they say, and will not differ from them, and hold that this unmeritorious technicality must prevail; and I content myself with expressing what I have said."
1 Citers


 
Shackell v Chorlton [1895] 1 Ch 378
1895


Landlord and Tenant

1 Citers


 
In re Howell [1895] 1 QB 844
1895
KBD

Insolvency, Landlord and Tenant
The court considered whether, a tenant having become bankrupt during the currency of a quarter, that part of the quarter's rent apportionable to the part of the quarter before the order of adjudication should be held to be rent "accrued due", within section 42(1) of the 1883 1883. Such apportionable part of the quarter's rent was of course not recoverable from the tenant until the expiry of the quarter; but it was held, nevertheless, that is to say, notwithstanding the fact that it was not payable until the end of the quarter, to have "accrued due" within the meaning of section 42, from day to day. In other words, the effect of the Apportionment Act was held to be that, rent accruing de die in diem, the part attributable to the time elapsed must be considered as "accrued due" for the purpose of applying a statute passed before the Apportionment Act itself.
Bankruptcy Act 1883 42(1)
1 Citers


 
Tabor v Godfrey (1895) 64 LJQB 245
1895

Charles J
Landlord and Tenant
Where a tenant occupies land adjacent to land demised to him by the landlord, he occupies it as additional to the tenancy, and subject to its terms.
1 Citers



 
 Re Panther Lead Company; 1896 - [1896] 1 Ch 978
 
Bates v Donaldson [1896] 2 QB 241
1896
CA
Kay LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The landlord had refused consent to an assignment of the lease to a respectable and responsible prospective tenant, for the reason that the landlord wished to place commercial pressure on the existing tenant to surrender the lease to the landlord. Held: The refusal of consent to assign a lease was unreasonable in the particular facts of this case. The landlord was motivated by a desire to obtain a commercial benefit which was collateral to the lease, in the sense that the lease did not confer any right upon the landlord to terminate the lease. The court also considered that the use of the power to refuse consent for such a purpose was a derogation from the right of assignment conferred upon the tenant.
Kay LJ observed that a landlord might reasonably refuse consent to an assignment because of the use to which the tenant proposed to put the premises, even though that use was not forbidden by the lease.
1 Citers



 
 Southport Tramways Co v Gandy; 1897 - [1897] 2 QB 66
 
Re Roundwood Colliery Co [1897] 1 Ch 371
1897


Landlord and Tenant, Insolvency
The court discussed the interplay of a distress by the landlord and the later insolvency of the tenant.
1 Citers


 
Seaward v Paterson [1897] 1 Ch 545
1897
CA
Lindley LJ
Landlord and Tenant, Litigation Practice, Contempt of Court
The plaintiff had obtained a permanent injunction restraining the defendant, his tenant, from interfering with the quiet enjoyment of the plaintiff and other tenants living in the vicinity of the demised premises. The plaintiff successfully moved to commit for contempt one Murray who had assisted in the holding of a boxing match on the premises, and who now appealed. Held: The order was upheld. Murray's liability was the aiding and abetting of the breach of the injunction. Lindley LJ suggested that there might be a wider principle in play: "A motion to commit a man for breach of an injunction, which is technically wrong unless he is bound by the injunction, is one thing; and a motion to commit a man for contempt of Court, not because he is bound by the injunction by being a party to the cause, but because he is conducting himself so as to obstruct the course of justice, is another and a totally different thing. The difference is very marked. In the one case the party who is bound by the injunction is proceeded against for the purpose of enforcing the order of the Court for the benefit of the person who got it. In the other case the Court will not allow its process to be set at naught and treated with contempt."
1 Citers


 
Fletcher v Nokes [1897] 1 Ch 271
1897

North J
Landlord and Tenant
A notice to a tenant requiring him to carry out repairs "ought to be so distinct as to direct the attention of the tenant to the particular things of which the landlord complains, so that the tenant may have an opportunity of remedying them before an action to enforce a forfeiture is brought against him"
1 Citers


 
Stuart v Diplock [1899] 43 Ch 343
1899
CA
Cotton LJ, Bowen LJ
Landlord and Tenant
The landlords of a property had covenanted not to permit or suffer to be permitted on thir neighbouring property the business of ladies' outfitting. That property was later let to the defendants, who were hosiers, selling four classes of clothes that a ladies' outfitter would sell. The tenant holding under the first lease brought proceedings against the tenants of the adjoining property for an injunction to restrain them carrying on the business of ladies' outfitting. Held: The defendants were not carrying on that business.
Cotton LJ said: "If it could be made out that the sale of these articles made up the business of a ladies' outfitter it would be quite another question, but it does not follow, because it is necessary for a ladies' outfitter to sell certain articles, that everyone who sells these articles is carrying on the business of a ladies' outfitter. Suppose, for instance, that the sale of corsets is an important part of the business of a ladies' outfitter, it could not be contended that a person who sold corsets, and nothing else, was to be considered a ladies' outfitter. That trade is not carried on by anyone who does not sell substantially all articles of ladies' underclothing. The Defendants sell many things which are not sold by ladies' outfitters, and do not sell many things which are sold by ladies' outfitters. They sell some things which are sold by ladies' outfitters, but they sell them in the ordinary course of their business as drapers and hosiers. The covenant is not against selling any of the articles which are sold by ladies' outfitters, such a covenant would raise quite a different case. "
Bowen LJ said: "The business of a ladies' outfitter is one business - the business of a hosier is a distinct business. The two businesses overlap each other by having four classes of articles the sale of which is common to them both. But a covenant not to carryon the business of a ladies' outfitter is not broken by carrying on the business of a hosier, and the hosier commits no breach by selling some articles which are usually sold by a ladies' outfitter, ifhe does it in the ordinary course of the business of a hosier. Mr Dauney put the argument of the Respondent very happily in the form of a syllogism: "All ladies' outfitters sell combinations, the Defendants sell combinations, therefore the Defendants are ladies' outfitters." I do not think that a covenant not to carryon the business of a ladies' outfitter is broken by carrying on a part of that business, which is also a part of another distinct business, even though it be a substantial part of the business of a ladies' outfitter and only a subordinate part of the other business."
1 Citers


 
In Re Carne's Settled Estates (1899) 1 Ch 324
1899

North J
Landlord and Tenant, Equity
A right to occupy for life, arising by settlement gives to the occupier an equitable interest in the land.
1 Citers


 
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