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Intellectual Property - From: 1996 To: 1996

This page lists 42 cases, and was prepared on 08 August 2015.

 
Swiss Army Knife [1996] RPC 507
1996
ChD
Jacob J
Intellectual Property, Litigation Practice
Jacob J said: "six months is a very generous period for the filing of evidence".
1 Citers



 
 Neutrogena Coroporation -v- Golden Ltd; ChD 1996 - [1996] RPC 473
 
Bravado Merchandising Services Ltd -v- Mainstream Publishing (Edinburgh) Ltd [1996] FSR 205
1996
SCS
Lord McCluskey
Intellectual Property, Scotland
The petitioner was the proprietor of the trade mark Wet Wet Wet (the name of a popular music group). It was registered for (among other classes of goods) books. The defendant intended to publish a book about the group using "Wet Wet Wet" as part of the title. Held: Distinguishing Mothercare, that that would be a trade mark use, but that it would nevertheless be within section 11(2)(b) (as amounting to an indication of the characteristics of the goods to which the mark was applied) and so would not amount to an infringement.
Trade Marks Act 1994 11(2)(b)
1 Cites


 
Brugger -v- Medic-Aid Ltd (No 2) [1996] RPC 635
1996
ChD
Laddie J
Intellectual Property
B alleged infringement by M of its patented nebulizer. M replied saying that the claims failed for obviousness. Features of the nebulizer were admittedly old and well known, but the claimant asserted a new mechanism which reduced the size of the droplets, increasing its efficiency. Held. The patent was invalid for obviousness. Laddie J set out the basis for making such assessments. The aims and specification were to be read together; though the insert at issue had little practical effect, it could not be ignored; the court should be wary of disregarding older prior art in a form of ageism, obviousness did not reduce with time; in this case an uninvetive skilled man would have considered variations in the older art; the claim made for the baffle used was wide enough to encompass any baffle; and a development which might be commercially unviable might still be obvious.
Laddie J said: "It is not legitimate to define the inventive step as something narrower than the scope of the relevant claims. In particular it is not legitimate to identify a narrow sub-group of embodiments falling within the claim and which have certain technical advantages and then to define the inventive step in terms which apply to that sub-group but not the rest of the claim."
and "if a patentee has chosen to define the characterising part of his claim in narrow terms the Court should not rewrite it in broader language simply because it thought a wider form of wording would have been easy to formulate." and "First a route may still be an obvious one to try even if it is not possible to be sure that taking it will produce success, or sufficient to make it commercially worthwhile. The latter point is inherent in Johns-Manville Corporation's Patent [1967] RPC 479, a decision of the Court of Appeal under the Patents Act, 1949 which is just as relevant to obviousness under the 1977 Act. Secondly, if a particular route is an obvious one to take or try, it is not rendered any less obvious from a technical point of view merely because there are a number, and perhaps a large number, of other obvious routes as well. If a number of obvious routes exist it is more or less inevitable that a skilled worker will try some before others. The order in which he chooses to try them may depend on factors such as the ease and speed with which they can be tried, the availability of testing equipment, the costs involved and the commercial interests of his employer. There is no rule of law or logic which says that only the option which is likely to be tried first or second is to be treated as obvious for the purpose of patent legislation."
"Obviousness is tested against the mental and developmental norm of a notional uninventive person skilled in the art. In doing that the law is protecting not only established businesses which may wish to adopt new products, processes or designs or modify existing ones but also the new entrant who has employed persons skilled in the art to help him get into the market. Each of those categories of trader must be free to adopt what is obvious" and
" On the basis of this they say there is no reason why it should have been obvious to modify the prior art in any particular direction. That it appears to me, is a non sequitur. The fact, if it be one, that existing commercial products are highly successful and satisfactory does not indicate that there are no obvious modifications to make to them. It merely demonstrates that there may be little incentive to those already making those products to change the design – a quite different matter."
and "if a particular route is an obvious one to take or try, it is not rendered any less obvious from a technical point of view merely because there are a number, and perhaps a large number, of other obvious routes as well. If a number of obvious routes exist it is more or less inevitable that a skilled worker will try some before others. The order in which he chooses to try them may depend on facts such as the ease and speed with which they can be tried, the availability of testing equipment, the costs involved and the commercial interests of his employer. There is no rule of law or logic which says that only the option which is likely to be tried first or second is to be treated as obvious for the purpose of patent legislation.
For these reasons a Simpkins list of prior art proposals, as furnished in this case, will frequently be of little assistance in resolving the issue of obviousness. Such a list may demonstrate that the particular route followed by the patentee was studiously avoided by others in the art in which case it may be of some assistance in countering arguments of obviousness. But it may only show that a number of other designs are possible and have been proposed. This does not strengthen the patentee's case. That is particularly so where, as here, there is no evidence that any of the earlier patentees had used as their starting point the prior art pleaded."
and "On the basis of this they say there is no reason why it should have been obvious to modify the prior art in any particular direction. That, it appears to me, is a non sequitur. The fact, if it be one, that existing commercial products are highly successful and satisfactory does not indicate there are no obvious modifications to make to them. It merely demonstrates that there may be little incentive to those already making those products to change the design - a quite different matter."
Patents Act 1977
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Neutrogena Coroporation -v- Golden Ltd [1996] RPC 473
1996
CA
Morritt LJ
Intellectual Property
The court discussd the "substantial proportion of the public" test applied in passing off. The purpose of this evidence was to provide real evidence from ordinary members of the public wholly untainted by any artificiality.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Lancashire Fires Ltd -v- S A Lyons and Co Ltd [1996] FSR 629
1996
CA
Sir Thomas Bingham MR
Intellectual Property, Employment
It was claimed that a loan to the employee from a customer of the employer coupled with an exclusive supply agreement by the employee as and when the competing business becomes operative was in breach of an non-compete clause. Held: The injunction was granted. It was not incumbent on an employer to point out to an employee the precise limits of what he might later seek to protect as confidential information. Distinctions can be hard to draw in this field. Sir Thomas Bingham MR said that it was "just that Susan Magnall should be precluded from disclosing the information to others" and therefore granted an injunction against her, though "if the plaintiff seeks financial relief against Susan Magnall, we shall need to hear further argument before deciding the point."
Sir Thomas Bingham MR said: "In Faccenda Chicken (at page 137) the Court of Appeal drew attention to some of the matters which must be considered in determining whether any particular item of information falls within the implied term of a contract of employment so as to prevent its use or disclosure by an employee after his employment has ceased. Those matters included: the nature of the employment: the nature of the information itself: the steps (if any) taken by the employer to impress on the employee the confidentiality of the information: and the case or difficulty of isolating the information in question from other information which the employee is free to use or disclose. We have no doubt that these are all very relevant matters to consider. In the ordinary way, the nearer an employee is to the inner counsels of an employer, the more likely he is to gain access to truly confidential information. The nature of the information itself is also important: to be capable of protection, information must be defined with some degree of precision: and an employer will have great difficulty in obtaining protection for his business methods and practices. If an employer impresses the confidentiality of certain information on his employee, that is an indication of the employer's belief that the information is confidential, a fact which is not irrelevant: Thomas Marshall Ltd v Guinle [1979] Ch 227 at 248. But much will depend on the circumstances. These may be such as to show that information is or is being treated as, confidential; and it would be unrealistic to expect a small and informal organisation to adopt the same business disciplines as a larger and more bureaucratic concern. It is plain that if an employer is to succeed in protecting information as confidential, he must succeed in showing that it does not form part of an employee's own stock of knowledge, skill and experience. The distinction between information in Goulding J's class 2 and information in his class 3 may often on the facts be very hard to draw, but ultimately the court must judge whether an ex-employee has illegitimately used the confidential information which forms part of the stock-in-trade of his former employer either for his own benefit or to the detriment of the former employer, or whether he has simply used his own professional expertise, gained in whole or in part during his former employment."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Work Model Enterprises Limited -v- ECO System Limited [1996] FSR 356
1996


Intellectual Property
There had been an admitted infringement of copyright by a competitor who copied the claimant's brochure. Held: The infringement did not cause the lost sales which were the result of legitimate competition.
1 Citers


 
Cavity Trays Ltd -v- RMC Panels Products Ltd [1996] RPC 361
1996
CA

Intellectual Property
The threats provisions may have the effect of making litigation more rather than less likely. The exclusion in the subsection is limited in its scope. It does not give rise to a general entitlement to threaten manufacturers or importers or users. In particular, if a trader both manufactures and sells products and a patentee threatens him with infringement proceedings in respect of both activities, section 70(3) provides a statutory defence in relation to the threats directed at the acts of manufacture, but not in relation to threats directed at acts of selling.
Patents Act 1977 70(4)
1 Citers


 
Greater Glasgow Health Board's Application [1996] RPC 207
1996

Jacob J
Employment, Intellectual Property
An Opthalmic Registrar employed by the Board invented an optical spacing device for use with an indirect ophthalmoscope. The Hearing Officer decided that the invention belonged to the employer. Held: The employee's appeal succeeded. The court was only concerned to ascertain the normal duties of the Registrar. In doing so he relied on the contractual job description and the evidence of the Head of Department.
1 Citers



 
 Banks -v- EMI Songs Ltd (No.2); ChD 1996 - [1996] EMLR 452
 
In re GEC Alsthom Limited's Patent [1996] FSR 451
1996
ChD
Laddie J
Intellectual Property
Laddie J pointed out a number of injustices that could be produced by the making of an Earth Closet order, including: "i) Such an order was a disincentive to a defendant to plead his best case, particularly since prior art from all over the world may be used to attack the validity of a patent (whereas only art published in the UK could be relied on when the Earth Closet order was invented);
ii) This disincentive might mean that the court was required to pronounce on the validity of a monopoly on the basis of a second best case. Put bluntly this would be against the public interest;
iii) Earth Closet orders are seen as a gift from heaven by patentees with a weak case which enables them to take the benefit of a costs order when the amendment was not really the cause of the discontinuance. In addition they will have had the commercial benefit of reliance on a monopoly which, with hindsight, can be seen to have been invalid;
iv) There is also a danger that the making of such orders will front load the costs onto defendants who will have to undertake exhaustive searches of prior art at a very early stage in the litigation."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Brugger -v- Medic-Aid Ltd [1996] FSR 362
1996
PatC
Jacob J
Intellectual Property, Costs
The defendant had admitted copying B's drawings and designs for the creation of a nebulizer. To assist its election on damages, B sought preparation of details of the sales including costs and sale prices. When B also sought statutory damages, M said that having omitted it from the statement of claim, it was too late to make such a claim, and that the consideration of the costs were to be deferred pending the outcome of the inquiry, having made a Calderbank offer and given undrtakings as to future conduct. B argued that the letter alone was insufficent and that a payment in should have been made. Held. The costs were allowed. It was wrong to require so much work of M. The court set out what was required to allow the claimants to make an informed election based on estimates.
Statutory damages were not exemplary damages, and B should be allowed to amend and pursue that element.
Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 97 - Rules of the Supreme Court Ord 18.8 Ord 62.9
1 Cites


 
British Sugar plc -v- James Robertson & Sons Ltd [1996] RPC 281
1996

Jacobs J
Intellectual Property
Use "in the course of trade" means use by way of business and does not just mean use as a trade mark.
1 Citers


 
Brain -v- Ingledew Brown Benson & Garrett and Another [1996] FSR 341
1996
CA
Aldous LJ
Intellectual Property
The defendant firm of solicitors had acted for a Danish Research Institute. They wrote to several parties regarding a patent. B initiated a threat action. IBB appealed against an order striking out their defence, saying that the issue of whether what they said amounted to a threat was a question of fact to be decided at trial, and not on a summary application. Held. The appeal succeeded. Until the patent was granted before trial, the defendant could justify his action. Whilst the judge could ascertain the meaning of the letter complained of, whether it amounted to a threat remained a question for the trial.
Aldous LJ said: "the conclusion as to whether a document amounts to a threat of patent proceedings is essentially one of fact. It is a jury-type decision to be decided against the appropriate matrix of fact. Thus a letter or a statement may on its face seem innocuous, but when placed in context it could be a threat of proceedings. The contrary is less likely but could happen." and "even if it be assumed that the letter contained a threat in general terms it does not follow that the recipient would read it as making a threat of proceedings in respect of all potentially infringing acts. A letter, such as the letter of June 13, when written to a person who only operated a process, could be understood as being a threat of infringement by carrying out the process; whereas a letter written in general terms to a person who not only carried out the process but sold the products of that process, could be understood in a different way."
Patents Act 1977 70 - Rules of the Supreme Court 14A
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Glaxo Plc -v- Glaxowellcome Limited [1996] FSR 388
1996
ChD
Lightman J
Intellectual Property, Company
The defendant company registration agent had registered the name Glaxowellcome Limited shortly after the announcement of Glaxo Plc’s intention to make a take-over bid for Wellcome and if it succeeded to re-name itself Glaxo-Wellcome Plc. He then offered to sell the company to Glaxo Plc at a high price. The company had not traded, but it was considered likely that it would, it being implicit in the demand for a high price for the company and that the Defendant was threatening that if it was not paid he would use or transfer the company to someone else who would use it to injure Glaxo’s goodwill. An application was made for an interlocutory injunction. Held: The Judge granted a mandatory interlocutory injunction requiring the name of the company to be changed. This amounted to final relief, because the object was to enable Glaxo themselves to change their name to Glaxo-Wellcome, thereby making a restoration of the original position virtually impossible. Lightman J: "the court will not countenance any such pre-emptive strike of registering companies with names where others have the goodwill in those names and the registering party demands a price for changing the names".
1 Citers


 
Cavity Trays Ltd -v- RMC Panel Products Ltd [1996] RPC 361
2 Jan 1996
CA
Aldous LJ
Intellectual Property
The exclusion provided in section 70(4) of the 1977 Act is of limited scope. Whatever the legislative intention, it does not give rise to a general entitlement to threaten manufacturers or importers or users. In particular, if a trader both manufactures and sells products and a patentee threatens him with infringement proceedings in respect of both activities, section 70(3) provides a statutory defence in relation to the threats directed at the acts of manufacture, but not in relation to threats directed at acts of selling. Aldous LJ said: "Section 70 provides relief against abuse of monopoly . . Subsection (4) is an exception added in the 1977 Act to allow warnings to be given in certain circumstances. In my view the subsection defines the acts of alleged infringement that are excluded and not the type of person who may be threatened. The division between the type of acts in respect of which warnings are allowed without risk of suit and those which are not, can be said to be arbitrary but is sufficient to enable a patentee to give the appropriate warning."
Petents Act 1977 70(4)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Haddonstone Ltd and Another -v- Sharp Independent, 26 January 1996
26 Jan 1996
CA

Intellectual Property
The term 'product of the same design' did not cover independently produced designs even though they were substantially similar.
Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988


 
 Barclays Bank Plc -v- RBS Advanta; ChD 8-Feb-1996 - Times, 08 February 1996; [1996] RPC 307
 
British Sugar Plc -v- James Roberston & Sons Times, 17 February 1996; [1996] RPC 281
17 Feb 1996
ChD
Jacob J
Intellectual Property
The question was raised on whether, given its derivation from article 5 of the trade mark directive, non-trade mark use could be caught by sections 10(1) to (3). Held: There was no trade mark infringement by the use of a common laudatory word. The trade mark registration was cancelled. Courts should look to whether they have similar uses, they will be made available to the same users, they will be similar in size and makeup and they will compete with each other.
Trade Marks Act 1994 10(1) 10(2) 10(3)
1 Citers


 
Danowski and Another -v- The Henry Moore Foundation and Another Times, 19 March 1996
19 Mar 1996
CA

Employment, Intellectual Property
The 'artists copy' convention was displaced by an explicit term in the commissioning agreement giving the ownership to company.

 
Pavel -v- Sony Corporation and Others Times, 22 March 1996
22 Mar 1996
CA

Intellectual Property
The excessive elaboration of pleadings in Patents County Court pleadings was criticised.

 
In Re Aktiebolaget Draco Times, 27 March 1996
27 Mar 1996
ChD

Intellectual Property
A five year supplemental patent was calculated from the date of the first patent, and not later.

 
Harrods Ltd -v- Harrodian School Times, 03 April 1996; [1996] RPC 697; [1996] EWCA Civ 1315
3 Apr 1996
CA
Millet LJ
Intellectual Property
No passing off was to be found to have been shown without the public believing that the plaintiff was responsible for the defendant's services or goods. It was not enough to show only that the defendant was somehow 'behind' the defendant. Millet LJ said: "Passing off is a wrongful invasion of property vested in the plaintiff; but the property which is protected by an action for passing off is not the plaintiff's proprietary right in the name or get up which the defendant has misappropriated but the goodwill and reputation of his business which is likely to be harmed by the defendant's misrepresentation."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Electrolux Northern Ltd and Another -v- Black & Decker Times, 06 May 1996
6 May 1996
ChD

Intellectual Property
No penalty for non-disclosure of discarded experiments in patent's challenge.

 
Beloit Technologies Inc; Beloit Walmsley Limited -v- Valmet Paper Machinery Inc and Valmet Paper Machinery (Uk) Ltd [1996] EWCA Crim 430
14 May 1996
CA

Intellectual Property

[ Bailii ]
 
Fujitsu Ltd, Re Patent Application No. 920495 2 [2006] EWHC 3186 (Pat)
24 May 1996
PatC

Intellectual Property

[ Bailii ]

 
 In Re A Patent Application No 9204959 2 by Fujitsu Ltd; Merrill Lynch, Gale, and Fujitsu Limited's Application; ChD 18-Jun-1996 - Times, 18 June 1996; [1996] RPC 511

 
 Bristol-Myers Squibb and others -v- Paranova; ECJ 11-Jul-1996 - C-427/93; C-429/93; C-436/93; [1996] EUECJ C-427/93; [1996] ECR I-3457; [2000] Ch 75; [1997] FSR 102; [2002] 3 WLR 1746; [1996] ETMR 1; [1997] 1 CMLR 1151; (1997) 34 BMLR 59; [1996] CEC 716

 
 Eurim-Pharm Arzneimittel -v- Beiersdorf and others; ECJ 11-Jul-1996 - [1997] 1 CMLR 1222; [1996] ECR I-3603; C-71/94; [1996] EUECJ C-71/94

 
 MPA Pharma -v- Rhone-Poulenc Pharma GmbH; ECJ 11-Jul-1996 - [1996] EC I-3671; C-232/94; [1996] EUECJ C-232/94

 
 A Ltd -v- B Bank; CA 15-Aug-1996 - Times, 15 August 1996
 
Beecham Group Plc and Another -v- Norton Healthcare Ltd and Others Times, 11 October 1996; Gazette, 06 November 1996
11 Oct 1996
ChD

Intellectual Property, Litigation Practice
A patent claim could be amended to add a claim for an action for breach of confidence by the defendant. The claim was rightly amended after service abroad to add more heads; UK was the forum conveniens in this action.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Biogen Plc -v- Medeva Plc Times, 01 November 1996; [1997] RPC 1; [1996] UKHL 18; (1997) 38 BMLR 149
31 Oct 1996
HL
Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Mustill, Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Hoffmann
Intellectual Property, Litigation Practice, Intellectual Property
A recombinant method of making the antigens of a hepatitis virus was patented with a priority date of 22 December 1978 but was conceded to have been obvious by 21 December 1979. Held: The claim for a DNA patent was too broad; no new principle was shown, and other means were available of achieving the technical effect claimed. The question of whether an invention was obvious should be treated with appropriate respect by an appellate court, and specific findings of fact, even by the most meticulous judge, are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression which was made upon him by the primary evidence. Where the application of a legal standard such as negligence or obviousness involves no question of principle but is simply a matter of degree, an appellate court should be very cautious in differing from the judge's evaluation. Disclosure must enable the invention to be performed to the full extent of the monopoly claimed.
Lord Hoffmann discussed a court of appeal reversing a decision of the first court: "The need for appellate caution in reversing the trial judge’s evaluation of the facts is based upon much more solid grounds than professional courtesy. It is because specific findings of fact, even by the most meticulous judge, are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression which was made upon him by the primary evidence. His express findings are always surrounded by a penumbra of imprecision as to emphasis, relative weight, minor qualifications and nuance (as Renan said, la vérité est dans une nuance), of which time and language do not permit exact expression, but which may play an important part in the judge’s overall evaluation." and "Where the application of a legal standard such as negligence or obviousness involves no question of principle but is simply a matter of degree, an appellate court should be very cautious in differing from the judge's evaluation."
Patents Act 1977 1(1) 72(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Biogen Plc -v- Medeva Plc Times, 01 November 1996; [1997] RPC 1; [1996] UKHL 18; (1997) 38 BMLR 149
31 Oct 1996
HL
Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Mustill, Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Hoffmann
Intellectual Property, Litigation Practice, Intellectual Property
A recombinant method of making the antigens of a hepatitis virus was patented with a priority date of 22 December 1978 but was conceded to have been obvious by 21 December 1979. Held: The claim for a DNA patent was too broad; no new principle was shown, and other means were available of achieving the technical effect claimed. The question of whether an invention was obvious should be treated with appropriate respect by an appellate court, and specific findings of fact, even by the most meticulous judge, are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression which was made upon him by the primary evidence. Where the application of a legal standard such as negligence or obviousness involves no question of principle but is simply a matter of degree, an appellate court should be very cautious in differing from the judge's evaluation. Disclosure must enable the invention to be performed to the full extent of the monopoly claimed.
Lord Hoffmann discussed a court of appeal reversing a decision of the first court: "The need for appellate caution in reversing the trial judge’s evaluation of the facts is based upon much more solid grounds than professional courtesy. It is because specific findings of fact, even by the most meticulous judge, are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression which was made upon him by the primary evidence. His express findings are always surrounded by a penumbra of imprecision as to emphasis, relative weight, minor qualifications and nuance (as Renan said, la vérité est dans une nuance), of which time and language do not permit exact expression, but which may play an important part in the judge’s overall evaluation." and "Where the application of a legal standard such as negligence or obviousness involves no question of principle but is simply a matter of degree, an appellate court should be very cautious in differing from the judge's evaluation."
Patents Act 1977 1(1) 72(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Ocular Sciences Ltd -v- Aspect Vision Care Ltd [1997] RPC 289; (1997) 20(3) IPD 20022; [1996] EWHC Patents 1
11 Nov 1996
ChD
Laddie J
Intellectual Property
The freedom for a claimant in registered design right to frame his claim, as to whether he asserts an infringement of the entire design, or limits it to the section infringed, is important.
Laddie J said: "This means that the proprietor can trim his design right claim to most closely match what he believes the defendant to have taken. The defendant will not know in what the alleged monopoly resides until the letter before action, or, more usually, the service of the statement of claim. This means that a plaintiff's pleading has particular importance. It not only puts forward the claim but is likely to be the only statement of what is asserted to be the design right."
Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 213(6)
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Norling and Another -v- Eez-Away (Uk) Ltd and Others Gazette, 05 February 1997; Times, 27 November 1996
27 Nov 1996
ChD

Intellectual Property
A power to amend a patent continues though a challenge to its validity is withdrawn.
Patents Act 1977 75(1)

 
Patents Court: Practice Direction Times, 28 November 1996
28 Nov 1996
ChD

Intellectual Property
Directions on authority and assorted other matters in Patents courts.

 
Pioneer Electronics Capital Inc; Pioneer Electronics (Usa) Inc (Together Trading As Discovision Associates) -v- Warner Music Manufacturing Europe Gmbh and Warner Music UK Limited Times, 10 December 1996; [1996] EWCA Civ 1059
28 Nov 1996
CA

Intellectual Property
The product of a process remained such despite application of a further process; There had been no loss of identity.
Patents Act 1977 60(1)(c)
[ Bailii ]
 
Film Investors Overseas Services Sa and Another -v- Home Video Channel Ltd T/A Adult Gazette, 04 December 1996; Times, 02 December 1996
2 Dec 1996
ChD

Intellectual Property
Acquiescence by a TV company in the breach of a copyright licence by the sale of unlawful decoders was capable of defeating an infringement claim in respect of the same complaint.


 
 Regina -v- Patent Office ex parte Chocoladefabriken Lindt and Sprungli Aktiengesellschaft; Admn 5-Dec-1996 - [1996] EWHC Admin 323
 
Gerber Garment Technology Inc -v- Lectra Systems Limited Lectra Systemes SA Times, 17 January 1997; [1996] EWCA Civ 1245; [1997] RPC 443
18 Dec 1996
CA
Staughton LJ
Intellectual Property, Damages
The plaintiffs claimed damages for patent infringement. Some of the lost profits for which the plaintiff company claimed damages were suffered by subsidiary companies in which it held all the shares. Held: When a shareholder has a cause of action but his company has none, he can recover damages measured by the reduction in value of his shareholding; but that the plaintiff must prove the amount of his own loss and that it cannot be assumed that this is the same as the loss suffered by the company. There is no rule of law limiting damages which can be awarded for patent infringement to monopoly profits only. Infringement of a patent is a statutory tort; and the damages recoverable should be governed by the same rules as with many or most other torts. The victim should be restored to the position he would have been in if no wrong had been done, and the victim can recover a loss which was (i) foreseeable, (ii) caused by the wrong, and (iii) not excluded from recovery by public or social policy. The requirement of causation is sometimes confused with foreseeability, which is remoteness. The two are different.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina -v- Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks ex parte Lenzing Ag Chancery Division, In the Matter of European Patent (Uk) No 0,356,419 In the Name of Lenzing Ag Chancery Division, Lenzing Ag -v- C Gazette, 05 March 1997; Times, 17 January 1997; [1996] EWHC Admin 390
20 Dec 1996
Admn

Intellectual Property
The UK patents Registry must make note of the revocation of a European patent by the EPO.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
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