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Intellectual Property - From: 1930 To: 1959

This page lists 50 cases, and was prepared on 08 August 2015.

 
Nichols -v- Universal Pictures Co 45 F 2nd 119 (2nd Cir 1930)
1930

Learned Hand J
International, Intellectual Property
(US Second Circuit) The judge discussed the difficulty in copyright cases in drawing the line between the taking of general concepts and copying in an infringing manner: "Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at times may consist of only its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his 'ideas', to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended."
1 Citers


 
Pytram -v- Models (Leicester) Ltd [1930] 1 Ch 639
1930
ChD
Clauson J
Intellectual Property
A model of a wolf-cub's head was produced from a papier-mache mould in order to be used as a totem by the Boy Scouts Association. They had failed to register it as a design under the 1907 Act and sued for infringement of their copyright under the 1911 Act. Held: The item was not protected by copyright, but was an artistic work under the 1911 Act and also fell within the definition of a "design" under the 1907 Act as amended by the 1919 Act, since it was intended to be reproduced more than fifty times: "The whole point in the preparation of this model was to enable the plaintiffs to supply totem poles in large quantities." As a consequence of the amended definition of "design", it was excluded from protection under the 1911 Act and no protection existed for it under the 1907 Act without registration.
Patents and Designs Act 1907 - Patents and Designs Act 1919 - Copyright Act 1911
1 Citers


 
in re Bass Nicholson [1931] 48 RPC 227
1931
CA
Lawrence LJ
Intellectual Property
Lawrence LJ said: "The cases to which I have referred (and there are others to the like effect) show that it was firmly established at the time when the Act of l875 was passed that a trader acquired a right of property in a distinctive mark merely by using it upon or in connection with his goods irrespective of the length of such user and of the extent of his trade and that such right of property would be protected by an injunction restraining any other person from using the mark."
Trade Marks Act 1875
1 Citers



 
 Columbia Graphophone's TMs; 1932 - (1932) 49 RPC 621

 
 Reid & Sigrist Ltd -v- Moss and Mechanism Ltd; 1932 - (1932) 49 RPC 461
 
See -v- Scott-Paine (1933) 50 RPC 56
1933


Intellectual Property
The court granted an order allowing amendments applied for, but then to give the applicant a period of time in which to consider, in light of the amendments, whether it wished to maintain that the patent or design in suit was valid and continue with the infringement action or whether it wished to consent to the revocation of the patent or design, with protection from an adverse costs order.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Pirie's Application (1933) 50 RPC 147
1933

Lord Tomlin
Intellectual Property
Lord Tomlin considered how the Registrar of Tade Marks should exercise his discretion as to potentially confusing trade marks: "In my opinion, when once the two factors, viz., the previous registration of the Appellants' mark and the Respondents' knowledge of the Appellants' mark have fallen into their right perspective, the case becomes easy of decision and should in my opinion be determined in favour of registration for the following reasons:- (1) While recognising the possibility in certain, perhaps somewhat remote, contingencies of confusion from phonetic similarity between the two words and giving due weight to the possibility of mistake arising from inaccurate or ill-remembered impression on the mind of one or other of the marks, I am of opinion that the possibility of confusion is slender. (2) The choice of the word "Abermill" was honestly made. (3) Five years' honest concurrent user has been proved. (4) It is the user and not the registration which is liable to cause confusion, and the commercial user has not produced any proof of confusion. This fact cannot be regarded as unimportant even though allowance be made for difficulty of proof; and (5) the Appellants' trade is small, and for some years has remained more or less stationary. The Respondents, on the other hand, have built up with their trade mark a large and increasing business.
Bearing these matters in mind, the hardship to the Respondents of refusing registration appears to be out of all proportion to any hardship to the Appellants or inconvenience to the public which can possibility result from granting it."
Trade Marks Act 1875
1 Citers


 
Clock Ltd -v- Clock House Hotel Ltd (1936) 53 RPC 269
1936


Intellectual Property

1 Citers



 
 Van Dusen -v- Kritz; 1936 - [1936] 2 KB 176

 
 Massine -v- de Basil; CA 1936 - [1936-45] MCC 233; (1938) 82 Sol Jo 173
 
Burke and Margot Burke Ltd -v- Spicers Dress Designs [1936] Ch 400
1936


Intellectual Property

1 Citers


 
Sutherland Publishing Co Ltd -v- Caxton Publishing Co Ltd [1936] Ch 323
1936
CA
Lord Wright MR
Intellectual Property, Damages

1 Citers



 
 Donoghue -v- Allied Newspapers Limited; 1938 - [1938] Ch 106
 
Electric and Musical Industries Ltd -v- Lissen Ltd (1938) 56 RPC 23
1938
HL
Lord Russell of Killowen, Lord Porter
Intellectual Property
The House described the status of patent claims: "The function of the claims is to define clearly and with precision the monopoly claimed, so that others may know the exact boundary of the area within which they will be trespassers. Their primary object is to limit and not to extend the monopoly. What is not claimed is disclaimed. The claims must undoubtedly be read as part of the entire document and not as a separate document; but the forbidden field must be found in the language of the claims and not elsewhere." The words and grammar of a sentence in a claim are to be given their "natural and ordinary meaning", that is the meanings assigned to the words by a dictionary and to the syntax by a grammar. This meaning was to be adopted regardless of the context or background against which the words were used, unless they were "ambiguous", that is to say, capable of having more than one meaning: "If the Claims have a plain meaning in themselves, then advantage cannot be taken of the language used in the body of the Specification to make them mean something different."
1 Citers


 
Johnstone -v- Bernard Jones Publications Ltd [1938] 2 Ch 599
1938

Morton J
Intellectual Property
The question of whether a fair dealing defence to a claim of copyright infringement succeeded, the amount of the work used is relevant: "I may add, however, that the substantiality of the part reproduced is, in my view, an element which the Court will take into consideration in arriving at a conclusion whether what has been done is a fair dealing or not. To take an example, if a defendant published long and important extracts from a plaintiff's work and added to those extracts some brief criticisms upon them, I think that the Court would be very ready to arrive at the conclusion that that was not fair dealing within the section."
1 Citers


 
Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd -v- Scorah [1938] RPC 21
1938


Intellectual Property
A company may be able to rely upon an obligation of confidentiality even though the formal agreement for confidence entered into is for some reason ineffective.
1 Citers



 
 Millington -v- Fox; 23-Jan-1938 - (1838) 40 ER 956; [1838] EngR 377; (1838) 3 My & Cr 338

 
 The Canadian Shredded Wheat Company Limited -v- The Kellogg Company of Canada Limited and Another; PC 4-Feb-1938 - [1938] UKPC 11
 
Draper -v- Trist (1939) 56 RPC 429; [1939] 3 All ER 513
1939
CA
Lord Greene MR, Goddard LJ
Intellectual Property
An action for passing off can be maintained without having to prove actual damage to trade. Goddard LJ: " The action is one of that class which is known as an action on the case, akin to an action of deceit. In an action on the case, the cause of action is the wrongful act or default of the defendant. The right to bring the action depends on the happening of damage to the plaintiff. A man, for instance, may be negligent: and the consequences of his negligence may not cause damage for twelve months. The cause of action is the breach of duty: the right to bring the action depends upon the happening of the damage. But this class of case forms an exception, or an apparent exception, to the ordinary action of deceit; because, in an ordinary action of deceit, the plaintiff's cause of action is false representation, but he cannot bring the action until the damage has accrued to him by reason of that false representation.
But, in passing-off cases, the true basis of the action is that the passing-off by the defendant of his goods as the goods of the plaintiff injures the right of property in the plaintiff, that right of property being his right to the goodwill of his business. The law assumes, or presumes, that if the goodwill of a man's business has been interfered with by the passing-off of goods, damage results therefrom. He need not wait to show that damage has resulted, he can bring his action as soon as he can prove the passing-off; because it is one of the class of cases in which the law presumes that the Plaintiff has suffered damage."
1 Citers


 
Francis Day & Hunter Limited -v- 20th Century Fox Corporation Limited [1940] AC 112; [1939] UKPC 68
12 Oct 1939
PC
Thankerton, Russell of Killowen, Wright, Romer LL, Sir Lyman Poore Duff (CJ Canada)
Intellectual Property, Commonwealth
(Ontario) As a rule, a film title ("The Man Who Broke the Bank at Monte Carlo") does not involve literary composition, and will not be sufficiently substantial to justify claims of copyright infringement.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
King Features Syndicate Inc -v- O & M Kleeman Ltd [1940] Ch 523
1940
ChD

Intellectual Property
The plaintiff had relied on fifty five drawings of the Popeye character out of the many thousands of such drawings in the cartoon series. The defendant might have copied from any one of those thousands. Held: The Court accepted that the fifty five drawings included the earliest from which all the many thousands of others were subsequently derived. The copying of a subsequent drawing was an indirect copying of one or more of the first fifty five.
1 Citers


 
King Features Syndicate Inc -v- O&M Kleeman Ltd [1940] Ch 806
2 Jan 1940
CA

Intellectual Property

1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Saville Perfumery Ltd -v- June Perfect Ltd (1941) 58 RPC 147
1941
CA
Lord Greene MR
Intellectual Property, Torts - Other
Lord Greene MR said: "It does not necessarily follow that a trader who uses an infringing mark upon goods is also guilty of passing-off. The reason is that in the matter of infringement, as I have already pointed out, once a mark is used as indicating origin, no amount of added matter intended to show the true origin of the goods can affect the question. In the case of passing-off, on the other hand, the defendant may escape liability if he can show that the added matter is sufficient to distinguish his goods from those of the plaintiff. Such proof may be very difficult, but theoretically at any rate the result may be as I have stated."
1 Citers


 
King Features Syndicate Inc -v- O and M Kleeman Ltd [1941] AC 417; [1941] 2 All ER 403
1941
HL
Lord Wright, Viscount Maugham
Intellectual Property
The owners of copyright in drawings of "Popeye, the Sailor" sued importers of "Popeye" dolls and other toys. The defendants contended that the copyright in the original work had been lost by the operation of section 22 of the 1911 Act because the designs were capable of registration under the 1907 Act (although not registered) and the plaintiffs had previously licensed other companies to manufacture dolls and other items based on those designs. Held: The argument was rejected. The condition of use or intention to use for multiplication by an industrial process had to be satisfied or not at the date when the design first came into existence. If it was not satisfied at that time then full copyright protection under the 1911 Act could not be lost by the grant of subsequent licences for the multiple reproduction of the design.
Notwithstanding similarity, products may still have been independently designed and not copied.
Copyright Act 1911 - Patents and Designs Act 1919 - Patents and Designs Act 1907
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Meikle -v- Maufe [1941] 3 All ER 144
1941

Uthwatt J
Intellectual Property
An implied licence is limited to what is in the joint contemplation of the parties at the date of the contract, and does not extend to enable the Client to take advantage of a new unexpected profitable opportunity.
Uthwatt J said: "It was contended on behalf of the defendants that there could not be a separate copyright in a building as distinct from a copyright in the plans on which the building was based, and that, if there were a separate copyright in the building, the copyright was in the builder. In the present case, neither of these contentions is material, except in so far as the correctness of either of them may affect the quantum of damages. Upon the first contention, it is argued that the originality lies in the plan, and that, therefore, there can be none in the building which reproduces the plans. Upon the second contention, it is said that , wherever originality may lie, the author, for copyright purposes, is the builder who has built the building, and not the architect responsible for the plans. In my opinion, neither contention is well-founded. As regards these contentions, an architectural plan finds its meaning and purpose in the use to which it is put. The point of the architect's activities is not the making of plans as such, but the embodiment in the building of artistic and other ideas which he has in mind and which are contained in his plan. The plan is a means to an end, and not an end in itself. To deny originality to the artistic design embodied in a building by attributing originality only to the plans which led to the building would be to give reality to the shadow and refuse it to the substance."
1 Citers


 
Kempe's Application [1942] 54 RPC 72
1942

Morton J
Intellectual Property
The court considered the meaning of the word 'application' in the context of the 1907 Act. Morton J said: "Mr Shelley . . argued that . . the words "the application" mean a piece of paper . . and do not mean what he calls "the legal proceeding" and what Mr Beacall calls "the prayer of the inventor to the Crown" . . No doubt instances could be multiplied where the words "the application" appear to refer to the form and not to the proceeding; but, in my view, in Section 8A, subsection 2 of the Act, what is referred to is not a piece of paper, but a legal proceeding."
Patents Act 1907
1 Citers



 
 Aristoc Ltd -v- Rysta Ltd; HL 1945 - [1945] AC 68; [1945] 1 All ER 34; (1944) 1B IPR 467

 
 Vigneux and Others -v- Canadian Performing Right Society Limited; PC 18-Jan-1945 - [1945] UKPC 1; [1945] AC 108
 
Re Jellinek's Application [1946] RPC 59
1946

Romer J
Intellectual Property
Romer J discussed the test to be applied under section 11: "[Counsel] submitted to me the following propositions with regard to this section: (1) In all applications for registration of a trade mark the onus is on the applicant to satisfy the Registrar (or the Court) that there is no reasonable probability of confusion. (2) It is not necessary, in order to find that a mark offends against the section, to prove that there is an actual probability of deception leading to a passing-off. It is sufficient if the result of the user of the mark will be that a number of persons will be caused to wonder whether it might not be the case that the two products come from the same source. It is enough if the ordinary person entertains a reasonable doubt. (3) In considering the probability of deception, all the surrounding circumstances have to be taken into consideration. (4) In applications for registration, the rights of the parties are to be determined as at the date of the application. (5) The onus must be discharged by the applicant in respect of all goods coming within the specification applied for, and not only in respect of those goods on which he is proposing to use it immediately, nor is the onus discharged by proof only that any particular method of user will not give rise to confusion; the test is: What can the applicant do?
I think that these propositions are, in substance well founded, and I would merely add, with regard to the second of them, the following extract from the judgment of the late Farwell J. in [Wm. Bailey (Birmingham) Ltd.'s Application] 52 R.P.C. 136 at page 153: "I think that the Court has to be satisfied not merely that there is a possibility of confusion; I think the court must be satisfied that there is a real tangible danger of confusion if the mark which it is sought to register is put on the Register."
Trade Marks Act 1938 11
1 Citers


 
Office Cleaning Services -v- Westminster Window and General Cleaning (1946) 63 RPC 30
1946
HL
Lord Simmonds
Intellectual Property
Where a trader adopts words in common use for his trade name some risk of confusion is inevitable, and that risk must be run by him unless the first user is allowed unfairly to monopolise the words. The consequence of this is that where a mark is largely descriptive small differences may suffice to avoid confusion.
Lord Simonds said: "So long as descriptive words are used by two traders as part of their respective trade names, it is possible that some members of the public will be confused whatever the differentiating words may be. I am ready to believe that in this case genuine mistakes were made. I think they ought not to have been made. In the Vacuum Cleaner case it appeared that ninety per cent of its customers had addressed the Plaintiffs, in the British Vacuum Cleaner Coy., Ltd as the "Vacuum Cleaner Coy". In spite of this fact and of instances of actual confusion Parker J refused to grant an injunction to restrain the New Vacuum Cleaner Coy., Ltd from using the word "vacuum cleaner" in conjunction as part of its registered or other name. So in Turton v Turton (42 Ch. D. 128) the possibility of blunders by the public was held not to disentitle the defendant form trading in his own name though the plaintiff had long traded in the same name. It comes in the end, I think, to no more than this, that where a trader adopts words in common use for his trade name, some risk of confusion is inevitable. But that risk must be run unless the first user is allowed unfairly to monopolise the words. The Court will accept comparatively small differences as sufficient to avert confusion. A greater degree of discrimination may fairly be expected from the public where a trade name consists wholly or in part of words descriptive of the articles to be sold or the services to be renered.
I have not troubled your Lordships with many of the numerous cases on this topic. The principles of law are, as I have said, very clear and their application will depend on the facts of each case."
1 Citers


 
Marengo -v- Daily Sketch [1948] 65 RPC 242
1948
HL
Lord Simonds
Intellectual Property
The appellant enjoyed a reputation as a cartoonist under the pseudonym "Kem". The defendant published the work of another cartoonist with the pseudonym "Kim" but without the dot over the "i". The claimant claimed in passing off. Held: "Is it ‘Kim’ or ‘Kem’? That is the question. With great respect to those who have thought otherwise, I do not see how it is possible to form a confident opinion one way or the other. For inevitably I approach the question, knowing that there is a question, whereas the real test is what impression would be made upon the citizen, who, finding his ‘Daily Sketch’ on his breakfast table or buying it at a bookstall, opens it and sees a cartoon bearing this signature." and "In these circumstances I could not avoid the conclusion, even if the Appellant had called no evidence of confusion, that the Respondents were taking a course which was in the highest degree likely to lead to confusion. But in fact the Appellant called witnesses of candour and good reputation who had seen the offending cartoons and had been misled, partly no doubt by the character of the cartoons, but also by the signature, into the belief that they were the works of the Appellant. Here then was a clear case of confusion arising from the fact that Mr Price had so signed his pseudonym of ‘Kim’ and the Respondents had published his signature, that his work had been wrongly attributed to ‘Kem’. What more is required to entitle the Appellant to the relief that he claims? Upon the evidence I would only make two further observations. First, where it appears to the eye of the court that there is likely to be deception, and there is evidence of rational men that they have been deceived there is little value in the evidence of witnesses who say they have not been deceived. Secondly, there is a suggestion in the judgment of at least Somervell LJ (it may be per incuriam), that the evidence of witnesses, who, knowing ‘Kem’ but not ‘Kim’. were deceived, does not advance matters much. But in a passing-off action the persons whose evidence is most cogent are those who, because they know only the plaintiff’s goods are the more easily deceived by the similarity of the defendant’s goods and it is from just that deception that the plaintiff is entitled to be protected."
1 Citers


 
John Summers & Sons Limited -v- Cold Metal Process Co [1948] 65 RPC 75
1948
ChD
Romer J
Intellectual Property
It is unnecessary for a claimant in a threat case: "to prove that the defendant has in so many words said: 'I intend to issue a writ against you for infringement . .' The terms of the Act are satisfied if the defendant in the action is proved to have asserted that he has legal rights in respect of the [intellectual property] and that he intends as against the plaintiff to enforce those rights." It is sufficient if words or acts convey an intention to enforce those rights by legal action.
1 Citers



 
 Saltman Engineering Co -v- Campbell Engineering Co Ltd; CA 1948 - [1948] 65 RPC 203
 
May and Baker Ltd and others -v- Boots Pure Drug Company Ltd [1950] UKHL 1
9 Feb 1950
HL
Lord Simonds, Lord Normand, Lord Morton of Henryton, Lord MacDermott, Lord Reid
Intellectual Property
The House considered whether in defending the validity of a patent, the patentee might be allowed an application to amend the patent specification. The patentee had not been so allowed in this case. Held: The proposed amendment will make the invention claimed substantially different from that claimed before amendment, and was not permissible.
Patents and Designs Act 1946 22
[ Bailii ]
 
Stephenson Jordan and Harrison Limited -v- Macdonald and Evans [1952] 1 TLR 101; [1952] RCOC 10
3 Dec 1951
CA
Sir Raymoind Evershed MR, Denning and Morris LJJ
Intellectual Property, Employment
An accountant engineer employed by the plaintiffs assigned to the defendants the copyright in a work derived from public lectures he had given. The plaintiffs obtained an injunction saying that the work contained confidential material and that having been prepared in the course of his employment, the copyright belonged to them. The publishers appealed. Held: The defendant's appeal succeeded in part. The claim of breach of confidence was not supported by the evidence and failed. The bulk of the work was derived from public lectures given outside the scope of the author's employment as an accountant, and he owned and could assign the copyrights. In particular it seemed that some was written after the termination of the employment. Certain parts of it however were created as part of his employment and were not his to assign. There was a mixed contract with certain parts created under a contract of employment, and certain under a contract for services.
Copyright Act 1911 5(1)(b)

 
Allmanna Svenska Electriska A/B -v- The Burntisland Shipbuilding Co Ltd (1952) 69 RPC 63
1952

Jenkins LJ
Intellectual Property
The question whether an the invention was obvious was 'a kind of jury question'. As such, an appellate court should be reluctant to disturb it. If it was so obvious, the patent was invalid.
1 Citers


 
Usher v Barlow [1952] Ch 255; (1952) 69 RPC 27
1952
CA

Intellectual Property
A wall plaque was published before 1950. Its design was an original artistic work but was produced for the purpose of reproduction by an industrial process. It was not registered as an industrial design under the applicable designs legislation because the Comptroller of the Patents Office would not register wall plaques as designs under the Patents and Designs Acts 1907 to 1919. Held. The reference in section 22 of the 1911 Act to the 1907 Act was ambulatory, with the result that there included in section 22 of the 1911 Act a reference to the designs statute as amended from time to time after the commencement of the 1911 Act.
Copyright Act 1911 - Patents and Designs Act 1907 22
1 Citers


 
Usher -v- Barlow [1952] Ch 255; (1952) 69 RPC 27
1952
CA
Lord Eversed MR, Jenkins, Morris LJJ
Intellectual Property, Litigation Practice, Constitutional
A wall plaque was published before 1950. Its design was an original artistic work but was produced for the purpose of reproduction by an industrial process. It was not registered as an industrial design under the applicable designs legislation because the Comptroller of the Patents Office would not register wall plaques as designs under the Patents and Designs Acts 1907 to 1919. The 1949 Act came into effect on Jan 1 1950. The Board of Trade made rules under that Act which came into operation on 2 January 1950. By rule 26 wall plaques were excluded from registration as designs under the Act. The rules were made pursuant to section 1(4) of the Act which empowered the Board of Trade to make rules excluding from registration, designs for articles which were literary or artistic in character. Held: The judgment at first instance was upheld.
the reference in s. 22 of the 1911 Copyright Act to the Patents and Designs Acts 1907 to 1919 was, after the coming into operation of the 1949 Act, to be read as a reference to the 1949 Act. It followed that copyright in the wall plaque subsisted because the 1949 Act and the rules made thereunder prevented the registration of the plaque as a design. It was not then capable of registration.
Lord Evershed MR said that section 37 of the 1889 Act extended to something more than that which was requisite to enable the Act to come into operation at all: it covered such steps as would be required to enable the Act to operate effectively.
Jenkins LJ, with whose judgment Morris LJ agreed, observed that "operation" was used in section 37 in two different senses, namely the sense in which it appeared in the definition of "commencement" and the sense of "effective operation". The section should be construed as extending to whatever was necessary or expedient for the purpose of bringing the Act into effective operation, in the second sense, at the time when it came into operation, in the first sense.
Interpretation Act 1889 - Registered Designs Act 1949
1 Citers



 
 Re Charles Selz's Application; 1953 - (1953) 71 RPC 158

 
 Regina -v- Commissioner of Patents, ex parte Martin; 1953 - (1953) 89 CLR 381
 
Electrolux Ltd -v- Electrix Ltd (1954) 71 RPC
1954


Intellectual Property

1 Citers


 
Patchett -v- Stirling Engineering Co Ltd (1955) 72 RPC 50
1955

Viscount Simonds
Employment, Intellectual Property
The court considered the position at common law of an employee claiming to patent his invention: "It is elementary that, where the employee in the course of his employment (ie in his employer's time and with his materials) makes an invention which falls within his duty to make (as was the case here) he holds his interest in the invention, and in any resulting patent, as trustee for the employer unless he can show that he has a beneficial interest which the law recognises." The source of an employee's duty is primarily contractual, though some of the terms are implied by law.
1 Citers



 
 Multiform Displays -v- Whitmarley Displays; CA 1956 - [1956] RPC 14
 
Multiform Displays -v- Whitmarley Displays [1957] RPC 260
1957
HL
Viscount Simonds
Intellectual Property
The claimant appealed against refusal of a committal order to enforce a court order in patent infringement proceedings. Held: Viscount Simonds said: "Thus it is, my Lords, that upon what was a motion for sequestration and committal your Lordships are asked to try an action for infringement of a patent, and, inconvenient though such a procedure may be, it cannot be denied that there is ample precedent for it, nor that in certain cases it may be an expeditious way in which patentees can enforce their established rights. It may, nevertheless, well be doubted whether in the present case it would not have been a better course if advantage had been taken of the facilities offered by Sec. 66 of the Patents Act, 1949, to have the issue of infringement tried in proceedings unattended by threats of committal and sequestration."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
In the Matter of J R Dalrymple's Application for a Patent [1957] RPC 449
1957


Intellectual Property
Dalrymple distributed many copies of his technical bulletin. Each was marked 'CONFIDENTIAL' Held: An objective test was used to determine whether on the facts, the information retained the quality of confidentiality. In this case it did not. The mere fact that a document has been labelled "confidential" will not automatically confer confidentiality on it if it has been made generally available.


 
 Nicrotherm Electrical Company -v- Percy; CA 1957 - [1957] RPC 207
 
Cluett Peabody & Co Inc v McIntyre Hogg Marsh & Co Ltd [1958] RPC 355
1958

Upjohn J
Intellectual Property
Each party had, to the knowledge of the other, been infringing the other's trademarks over a considerable period. There had been discussions over the years between the parties and the effect of a letter written on behalf of the plaintiff was that anyone "might reasonably think that the Defendants were being told inferentially that no complaint was being made of the Defendants' then present user of their trademark (device and words) on shirts, nor was any complaint made for twenty-nine years thereafter". Held: Upjohn J said: "Nevertheless, while falling short of estoppel, in my judgment the behaviour of the Plaintiffs, coupled with the very long delay, really amounted to an acknowledgement by them of the Defendants' right to continue the use of their (the Defendants') marks, and to a waiver of the Plaintiff's right to sue for infringement by such continued user. I accept the Defendants' submission that really the course of conduct between the parties showed a mutual policy of restraint to one another, or, putting it more colloquially, a mutual agreement to live and let live."
1 Citers


 
Joseph -v- National Magazine [1959] Ch 14
1959


Intellectual Property
False attribution of article to plaintiff - injunctive relief
1 Citers


 
Football League Limited -v- Littlewoods Pools [1959] 1 Ch 637; [1959] 2 All ER 546
1959
ChD
Upjohn J
Intellectual Property
The plaintiff alleged copyright infringement by the defendant in the reproduction of its fixture lists. The defendant argued that the work which went into deciding when and where the fixtures were to take place was not relevant: the only relevant skill and labour being that involved in reducing that information to material form. Held: To assess the extent of skill labour and judgment going into a compilation for the 1956 Act, the court must allow for the whole history, including any work done to bring the data into existence in the first place. Copyright therefore subsisted in football fixture lists as a literary work and compilation. Importance was attached to the reproduction of not only the information, but also its arrangement, and to the fact that essentially the whole of the work in suit had been reproduced.
Upjohn J said: "Copyright for such a compilation can be claimed successfully if it be shown that some labour, skill, judgement or ingenuity has been brought to bear upon the compilation. The amount of labour, skill, judgement or ingenuity required to support successfully a claim for copyright is a question of fact and degree in every case." and "Mr Shelley . . submits, and I agree with him, that it is clearly settled law that there can be no copyright in information or in an opinion per se. Copyright can only be claimed in the composition or language which is chosen to express the information or the opinion." He rejected the argument that the skill and labour expended was directed to the creation of the programme, and not its recording in permanent form, saying: "In my judgement, on the facts of this case, it is not open to the defendants to try and dissect and break down the efforts of Sutcliffe in the way suggested. Accordingly in my judgment the plaintiffs are entitled to copyright in the chronological list."
Copyright Act 1956
1 Citers



 
 Chappell & Co Ltd -v- Nestle Co Ltd; HL 18-Jun-1959 - [1959] UKHL 1; [1960] AC 87
 
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